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ABSTRACT
This study w as designed to explore organizational change in 
primary health  care, specifically the introduction of Local Health 
Groups which were m ean t to create radical change a t local level 
across Wales. The aim  w as to gain a  better understand ing  of the 
factors th a t influence the formation and  developm ent of 
organizations receptive to change. The specific questions included: 
firstly, w hat s tru c tu ra l and  organizational changes were m ade for 
the promotion and  developm ent of Local Health G roups?
Secondly, w hat leadership behaviours did the selected health  
professionals apply to their roles as Chairm en, in term s of 
building organizations capable of change and  developm ent? And 
thirdly, w hat lessons can be learned for leadership and  
organisational reform, and  policy im plem entation a t local level for 
the future?
The policy decision to devolve decision-m aking in health  care to 
primary care professionals a t local level provided the opportunity 
to conduct a  prospective study. A case study approach was 
selected to explore the experiences of all 22 Local Health Groups, 
through the reported experiences of the Chairm en as  the lead 
figures responsible for forming and  developing the new 
organizations. D ata were collected using  three waves of face-to- 
face interviews, supplem ented with M inutes of Board Meetings 
tracing the study period: April 1999 to October 2001. Some 
limited observation of key events w as also carried out.
The study was conducted a t a  time of considerable turbulence in 
the health system  in Wales. Firstly, it appears from th is study th a t 
the structu ral changes made to im plem ent the new policy were 
inadequate to th a t task. But some Chairm en appeared to exercise 
specific skills th a t enabled them  to m anage the consequent 
uncertainty in the system  more comfortably th an  others. In 
addition, key leadership behaviours appeared to influence the 
development of change promoting organizations. These included 
strategic vision: the ability of the lead figures to articu late  an 
attractive vision of the future, and persuade o thers to pu rsue it. 
Secondly, the ability to forge constructive working relationships 
with a wide variety of stakeholder organizations proved to be 
pivotal. Thirdly, the ability to identify key features of the 
organization and  build on them  to create unique organizational 
identities and  services emerged as a  key leadership behaviour in 
this context.
*1 am not a cynic but I  do know  that history is the propaganda o f  
the victors....I know  that the Duce has made it clear that the Greek 
campaign w as a resounding victory fo r  Italy. But he w as not there, 
He does not know  w hat happened. He does not know that the  
ultimate truth is that history ought to consist only o f the anecdotes 
o f the little people who are caught up in it”
Carlo Piero Guercio, p 33, de B em ieres, Louis, 1995 Captain 
CorellVs Mandolin, London: Minerva (Martin Seeker & Warburg)
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Chapter 1 In troduction
1.1 C ontext
Primary Care is the  cornerstone, indeed the flagship, of the UK 
health care system  (Starfield et al 2005). For m ost people, in 
Britain, prim ary care em bodies the health  care system, com prising 
the totality of the ir personal experience of health care throughout 
their lives (Williams e t al 1997). Despite th is centrality, prim ary 
care has traditionally  been viewed as the ‘country cousin ' to 
sophisticated high technology acu te specialist hospital care. But, 
since the 1980s, w hen inflation began to rise rapidly in the health  
sector, com pared to o ther sectors of the economy, policy m akers 
have become increasingly focussed on the potential roles th a t 
primary care could m ake to improving the quality and the 
efficiency, as  well a s  the effectiveness, of the overall health care 
delivery system .
These inflationary p ressu res , sparked  partly by the rapid rise in 
expensive new health  technologies, added to the existing 
imbalance between dem and and  supply  th a t had bedevilled the 
NHS since 1947, despite the best in ten tions of Aneurin Bevan. 
Changing dem ographic p a tte rn s  tow ards a  higher proportion of 
older people living longer, producing, arguably, higher dependency 
ratios have also contributed  to increased dem ands for health 
services. In addition, health  care policies across the UK, since the 
1990s, have been designed to strengthen  public involvement in
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service delivery and  quality  monitoring by promoting consum erist 
behaviour. One effect of th is approach had been to raise public 
expectations of h ea lth  service treatm ents higher than  available 
resources could deliver. In Wales, th is imbalance between supply 
and dem and was exaggerated further by historical p a tte rn s  of 
relatively high dem and for acu te  services (Drakeford 2006).
In response, in the early 1990s, and  in common with governm ents 
throughout the developed world, UK government health  policies 
began to shift tow ards em phasising  prevention of ill health , as  a  
m eans of reducing dem and in the longer term by ‘intervening 
further u p stream ’ (Welsh Assembly Government 2003, p .6). This 
attem pt to intervene earlier m et w ith mixed reactions from health  
service providers. N onetheless it is still a  predom inant strand  of 
health policy across the UK today (Smith and Goodwin 2006; Ham 
2007).
In addition, health  policy in W ales had  another, and perhaps 
stronger, driver in the form of high levels of deficits incurred by 
the acute sector (Welsh Assem bly Governm ent 2003; Drakeford 
2006). In some ways, the UK’s experim ent with delegating 
budgets to GPs (GP Fundholding) could be seen to have been an  
attem pt to curb dem and for secondary sector services by 
empowering GPs, as referrers, to provide more services from 
within the prim ary and  com m unity sectors. Starfield et a l’s (2005,
2
p.457) stud ies correlated  health  systems with strong prim ary care 
elements with lower costs and better performance. A key 
weakness which em erged from the GPFH model, however, was the 
inability to im pact significantly on acute sector spending, or, for 
that m atter, accountab ility  (Le Grand et al 1998). In th is sense, 
then, setting u p  p rim ary  care organisations with responsibility for 
reconfiguring local services to m eet local needs (rather than  
replicating historical spending patterns) could be seen as an  
appropriate policy response to curb  acute sector spending. Since 
primary care w as trad itionally  perceived as the weaker player in 
the system, a ttem p ts  to streng then  it m ight have been expected to 
do the trick.
In line with such  thinking, a  series of major policy initiatives have 
been introduced, aim ed a t cap tu ring  and  exploiting the 
<‘entrepreneurialism ,, of G eneral Medical Practitioners (GPs) as 
independent con tracto rs (eg th rough  GP Fundholding) while, a t 
the same time, increasing  the public health  and com munity 
orientation of prim ary care services, and  the em phasis on 
prevention of d isease and  the prom otion of wellbeing (Williams et 
al 1997; D epartm ent of H ealth 1997; NAW 2001; NAW 2002;
Welsh Assembly G overnm ent 2003).
Despite th is trend, the policy decision, taken by the then  new 
Labour Governm ent in 1998, to establish  local prim ary care
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organisations, represen ted  a  major change in the organisational 
landscape of health  provider organisations across the UK. In 
parallel with the re s t of the UK, in 1999, primary care 
organizations were created, in Wales, to take on responsibility for 
commissioning health  services to better address local needs 
(Welsh Office 1998a an d  b; D epartm ent of Health 1997).
But, within th is overall UK policy drive, the devolved Assembly 
government in Wales h as  increasingly been carving out its own 
distinctive agenda (Drakeford 2006) in relation to health services 
organization and  delivery. The Welsh model of primary care 
organization (Local H ealth Group) p u t GPs in the driving seat, as 
Chairmen of the new organizations, and, more radically, 
formalised links with local au tho rities  through coterminosity of 
boundaries and  represen tation  on the LHG Boards. Public 
involvement and  responsiveness were formally encouraged 
through lay represen tation  on these  Boards too.
Against th is backdrop, th is  s tudy  arose from the researcher’s 
fascination with general p ractices a s  organizations. As a  prim ary 
care development facilitator, an d  academ ic, issues about policy 
implementation a t local level had  been p art of her portfolio for a  
decade, working with p ractices in the deprived post industrial 
areas of south  Wales, supporting  practitioner and practice 
development and innovation “on the ground” through, largely,
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educational initiatives. Such initiatives were, in the m ain, aimed 
at improving the quality  of individual practitioners’ services. The 
implementation of th e  “new” Contract for GPs in 1990 had  
heralded a  shift, in  policy interest, towards practices as 
organizations. T hus th e  decision to set up LHGs in 1999 was 
welcomed as an  excellent opportunity to study the ways in which 
these new, larger, organizations developed and grew, as  change 
promoting agencies locally.
But the setting u p  of LHGs raised  a  plethora of issues, abou t ways 
in which local organizations im plem ent policy directives, the 
variations th a t occur an d  why. These questions had always 
hovered in the background of my work, as various monitoring 
agencies com plained ab o u t the  extent to which their initiatives 
“failed” due to lack of application, determ ination, or other 
weakness of those a t the grassroots. This study provided the 
opportunity to explore policy im plem entation a t local level through 
the eyes of those responsible for leading the new organizations.
The researcher w anted  to know w hat they experienced, w hat 
problems they m et in trying to change services locally, and why. 
How did they tackle any  im plem entation challenges? And more, 
importantly, why did they  m ake the choices they did? W hat 
approaches worked an d  w hat w as less effective, in term s of 
strategies and tactics?
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1.2 S electio n  o f  R esearch Problem
J u s t  as the researcher 's  employment as  a  prim ary care 
development facilitator in the south Wales valleys from 1990- 
1996, provided the  opportunity  to learn about factors driving the 
policy in tentions to develop prim ary care in Wales, it also provided 
familiarity w ith the organisational development challenges faced 
by GPs as em ployers and  service providers, in trying to act on new 
policy directives. The researcher w anted to understand more 
about these challenges, from the perspective of those responsible 
for meeting them . It w as hoped th a t learning to understand  the 
ways key partic ipan ts tried to deal with the changing expectations 
on them  would lead to improved understand ing  of the problems 
inherent in policy im plem entation a t  local level, more generally.
This practical stim ulus w as streng thened  by the relative paucity of 
academic literature on prim ary care organizations, as 
organizations, a t the time (Jan u ary  1999). Margot Jeffreys and 
Hessie Sach’s (1983) work w as an  im portan t step towards 
reconsidering the organization of prim ary care, predating the 
Conservative governm ent's 1990 reforms. The introduction of GP 
Fundholding had  stim ulated  a  fair degree of interest across the 
UK (e.g. Bain 1994; Dixon and  G lennerster 1995; Gillam and 
Pencheon 1998; LeGrand et al 1998; Light 1998) bu t substantive 
studies of the effects of GPFH or of the other models (Total 
Purchasing Pilots; Locality Commissioning Groups, M ultifunds,
6
etc) beginning to em erge alongside GPFH, emerged later. In 
Wales, little evaluative research  on GP fundholding had  been 
commissioned; a t  the  sam e time policy in Wales favoured 
fundholding above o th er possible models of primary care service 
delivery and organization. And although the decision to establish  
primary care organizations across the UK sparked a  great deal of 
new academic research  in terest, m atched by funding from the 
Departm ent of H ealth an d  the  Scottish Executive, th is was not the 
case in Wales. The Assem bly subsequently commissioned a  review 
of the literature on prim ary  care organizations from Professor 
Clare Wilkinson, to inform  the consultation process on structu ra l 
change in 2001 (Wilkinson 2001). Nonetheless it was hoped th a t 
this study could go som e way tow ards addressing th a t gap in the 
literature.
In order to get a  clearer u n d erstan d in g  of the factors th a t might 
potentially im pact on the  estab lishm en t of LHGs, the researcher 
conducted a short study, betw een Ja n u a ry  and May, 1999, to 
elicit Welsh GPs’ a ttitu d es  tow ards the new LHGs. The guidance 
establishing LHGs (Welsh Office 1998b) stipulated th a t GPs would 
hold 6 of the 18 places on LHG Boards. This weighting indicated 
tha t their views could therefore exert a  strong influence on the 
ways in which LHGs developed locally. The findings bore ou t the 
initial hypothesis: GPs across Wales expressed strong misgivings 
about the natu re  and  function of the new LHGs (Williams 2002).
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Thus they indicated the scale of the challenge facing the new 
organizations, in te rm s of engagement of local practitioners, as 
reported.
1.3 R esearch Aim  and O bjectives
This backdrop of scepticism  (only 1 of the 80 GPs polled reported 
a positive a ttitude  tow ards the new LHGs: “...potentially the best 
idea since sliced bread , b u t I em phasize potentially...” (SH30I) 
confirmed the overall research  aim: to identify the influences 
affecting the form ation and  development of the new LHGs as they 
went live on 1st April 1999. Specific research questions were 
whittled down to:
(1) w hat s tru c tu ra l and  organizational changes were made for 
the prom otion and  developm ent of LHGs?
(2) w hat leadership  behaviours did the selected health 
professionals apply to the ir roles as  Chairm en, in term s of 
building organizations capable of change and development?
(3) w hat lessons can  be learned for leadership development, 
organizational reform  and  policy im plem entation for the 
future?
1.4 R esearch M ethod
The study was designed to be exploratory and inductive, aimed a t 
eliciting the perceptions and  experiences of the key actors 
responsible for leading the new organizations. The study aimed to
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capture their perceptions of the factors th a t helped, or hindered, 
their efforts to develop the ir organizations, in order to address 
research question 1, an d  subsequently research question 3.
The role of C hairm an, the  individual responsible for leading the 
formation and  developm ent of the new organizations, w as 
identified a s  the m ost appropriate  focal point for the study, 
enabling exploration of research  questions 2 and 3. Individual 
interviews were selected a s  the  d a ta  collection method m ost likely 
to enable a  deep u n d ers tan d in g  of relevant issues to emerge. All 
22 Chairmen agreed to partic ipate; there was 100% compliance 
throughout the study. A longitudinal design was used for d a ta  
collection: Chairm en were interviewed, face-to-face, a t the 
beginning of the study  (April-December 1999) and a t the end of 
the study (April-October 2001). The interim  tranche of interviews 
(Summer 2000) were conducted  by telephone. An interview guide 
was devised based on issu es identified in the literature review and 
from the au th o r’s own experience in the field. Subsequent 
interviews were based on issu es arising from previous interviews, 
alongside questions ab o u t C hairm en’s views of their own progress 
towards achieving the ir aim s.
The researcher’s position a s  an  academ ic employed within a  
medical school, conferred a  degree of both access and credibility 
which was instrum ental in getting th is study underway. And, as  a
9
senior employee of Wales* national leadership development 
agency, the research er w as able to participate in a  num ber of 
primary care developm ent initiatives throughout the duration  of 
the study. Of course  th is  quasi-insider role had, potentially, both 
positive and negative im plications for this study. Positive features 
included ease of access to key actors. Negative features included 
the danger of being too close to events to enable clarity of analysis, 
together with the possibility of a  too-ready acceptance of prevailing 
shared assum ptions ac ross the m anagem ent and policy-making 
communities.
1.5 T hesis S tructure
Chapter 2 exam ines and  critiques literature relevant to the 
specified research  questions. The research design is explained in 
detail in C hapter 3. C hap ters 4 and  5 use the d ata  analysed to 
explore the policy context in which the study is situated, and 
analyses the influences th a t specific organizational and  structural 
features had on the estab lishm en t of LHGs. These two chapters 
serve to locate decision-m aking w ithin the health  sector a t the 
time of the study, an d  th u s  address the first research question. 
Chapter 6 addresses the second research  question, examining the 
personal characteristics and  career histories of the LHG Chairm en 
themselves, and  the challenges and  opportunities they saw 
themselves facing. Particularly  im portant in this chapter is the 
nature of the “ideological vision” some Chairmen expressed and
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developed to build the ir organizations and embed them  locally. 
Chapters 7, 8 an d  9 address the second and third research 
questions, exam ining the ways in which Chairmen were able to 
build organizational relationships, both vertically and horizontally, 
to support the ir new organizations. These three chapters show 
the ways in which different Chairm en played the ‘institutional 
politics’ within the hea lth  system  and thus serve to explain the 
location of decision-m aking locally. Chapter 10 analyses the 
specific features th a t C hairm en identified within their nascen t 
organizations, and  how they exploited, or leveraged them, to 
create unique identities for the ir new LHGs, enabling them  to grow 
and develop into change prom oting organizations. The final 
chapter, chap ter 11, d iscusses the im plications of the findings in 
terms of the specific research  questions articulated. It includes 
recom m endations arising from the study  and also provides 
pointers for fu rther research.
This study, though devised and  conducted ju s t  as new primary 
care organizations were created, h as  relevance for today’s debates 
about the organization and  delivery of health  care. The Welsh 
Assembly Governm ent (WAG 2008) is currently (April-June 2008) 
consulting the public on its proposals to restructure the health 
service in Wales, so the issues raised in this study are pertinent to 
the decisions being taken  now. And, in England, although the 
importance of the gatekeeper function is recognised as
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contributing to efficiency of care and reduced costs (Starfield et al 
2005), attention is also tu rn ing  to promoting diversity of provision 
(DOH 2008). The findings of th is study have im plications for the 
roles of clinicians a s  leaders, the development strategies needed, 
and the issues im pacting  on local implementation of policy.
Chapter 2: D evelopm ent & O rganizational Change in  Primary 
Care: L iterature R eview
2.1 Introduction  This chapter examines the literature relevant 
to public policy m aking, power and politics, organizational 
behaviour and  change m anagem ent in the field of health  service 
organization and  delivery. It also encom passes research relevant 
to facilitating innovation in organizations, including leadership 
behaviour and  leadersh ip  development, in order to explore the 
theoretical background to the p resen t study, and to identify any 
gaps in the existing literature.
This study exam ines a  particu lar example of attem pts to create 
changes in service delivery p a tte rn s  within the public sector, in a 
specific geographical location, over a  finite period of time. 
Literature relevant to th is  study  crosses a  num ber of disciplinary 
boundaries, however. Therefore, prevailing theories about policy 
making and im plem entation are analysed for their relevance and 
ability to illum inate the p resen t study. Clearly th is implies an  
understanding of the socio-economic factors which have combined 
to produce the context in which the study  takes place. Theories 
relevant to the ways in w hich organizations behave in times of 
turbulence, and  im plem enting organizational change relate to key 
aspects of the study  and  so are included in this review. Changes 
in organizational forms and  s tru c tu re s  in response to this 
turbulence are exam ined. Since innovation was a policy aim in the
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context of th is study, literature relevant to conditions needed to 
create innovation w ithin organizations and, more specifically, 
across a  health  provider system , is also included. Leadership 
styles appropriate for fostering innovation and creativity in 
organizations, and  the  strategies appropriate to developing those 
sorts of leadership behaviours are examined. The aim of the 
researcher has been to syn thesise  the findings, using w hat Mays 
et al (2005, p .S l:6) have term ed an  “aggregative approach, focused 
on the cum ulation and  generalizability of evidence” to build a 
strong foundation of knowledge to support the proposed study 
and its design. This ch ap te r critiques the literature identified as 
relevant to the study  aim  in order to identify current thinking and 
thus provide a strong foundation , and  springboard for the presen t 
study’s focus, design an d  conduct. An im portant caveat should be 
noted here. In developing the  initial search strategy, the decision 
was taken to limit the lite ra tu re  search  to material relevant to the 
period directly u nder s tudy  (1999-2001). Clearly, during the 
seven years th a t have elapsed  since the data  was collected, events 
have moved swiftly, especially in the fields of public sector reform, 
associated organizational s tud ies and  leadership. The final 
chapter of the thesis, therefore, links the findings from this study 
to the more recent work in these  areas, and examines their 
implications for policy and  practice.
2.2  Search S trategy
In setting ou t to explore the issues noted above, it was necessary 
to access a  wide range of literature from different, and  sometimes 
overlapping, disciplines. In order to manage this diversity 
effectively, an  a ttem p t w as m ade to search systematically, using 
MeSH term s to steer electronic searches of appropriate databases. 
Search term s used  included: ‘health  sector reform AND 
innovation’; ‘organizational change AND public sector reform,; 
‘decentralization of h ea lth  services’; ‘organizational structu re 
AND innovation’ ; ‘organizational structu re AND UK health  sector 
reform’; ‘organizational s tru c tu re s  AND UK health service reform 
AND Primary C are’; ‘h u m an  services organizations AND 
entrepreneurship’; ‘Leadership AND innovation AND NHS’;
‘health policy’ AND ‘NHS’ AND ‘UK’ AND ‘primary care’. In 
addition, key au th o rs , already known to the researcher as credible 
and im portant com m entators, were searched using a combination 
of Google Scholar and  University web pages, to identify any works 
that might have been m issed  by the database searches. Relevant 
journals were routinely h an d  searched, throughout the last nine 
years. Finally, recen t work, particularly  topic-based Literature 
Reviews com m issioned by the  National Coordinating Centre for 
Service Delivery an d  O rganization related research, were 
downloaded and  critiqued for their relevance to aspects of this 
study. The references included in these sources also provided an
15
additional check on sources th a t might have been m issed by the 
researcher’s electronic and  m anual searches.
2.3  The Public P olicy  C ontext
The decision, taken  a t the end of 1998, to create new 
organizations to oversee the delivery of primary health care 
services to local populations across Wales was not taken  in 
isolation. It was, ra ther, the  outcom e of a  long series of policy 
developments rooted in the changing economic and social p a ttern s 
emerging in Britain since the  1970s. This section of the review 
sets out to explain the m ultiple drivers th a t worked together to 
create the context in which th a t policy decision was taken, and 
the reasons underp inning  them .
By the end of the tw entieth  cen tury , it had become evident th a t 
changes in both the social an d  economic conditions across the 
UK, perhaps exacerbated, b u t certainly  affected, by changing 
demographic patterns, had  w orked together to unravel w hat has 
come to be term ed the ^welfare co n sen su s’ th a t prevailed across 
Britain in the years following the end of the Second World War 
(Hutton, 1996; Clarke and  Newman, 1997; Exworthy and Halford, 
1999; Lister, 2005). In public policy term s, a t least, the years 
immediately following the end of World War II had been 
characterised by general agreem ent th a t welfare was a  public good 
and th a t the State had  a  legitim ate role in ensuring the delivery of
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welfare services in a  fair and  equitable m anner (Timmins 2001). 
The provision of welfare benefits and services was overseen by 
welfare in stitu tions created , a s  instrum ents of the State, to reflect 
these values, a s  they  were articulated a t the time. Welfare was 
seen to be an  effective m eans of supporting the prevailing social 
order and value system  of B ritain (Clarke and Newman, 1997). 
Thus, bureaucratic  welfare organizations were intended to be 
large, so th a t they could take  both a  wide and a long view of social 
need, and in terp ret su ch  need uniformly across the UK. This 
uniformity would en su re  equal distribution of resources across 
groups pre-defined -  an d  generally agreed -  as needy. Their rules 
and procedures would en su re  th a t services were allocated and 
delivered w ithout consideration  of the personal characteristics of 
the intended recipients, or the  potential biases of service providers 
(Clarke and Newman 1997). Until the 1970s, political discourse 
largely revolved aro u n d  questions of how m uch resource should 
go to specific areas of welfare provision, ra ther than  around 
whether or not any allocation w as appropriate (Exworthy and 
Halford 1999; Minogue, 1998; Clarke and Newman 1997). In 
retrospect, during these  post-w ar years, the government could be 
seen to have relied on an  allocative planning, and, largely, 
incremental model of funding  public service delivery organizations 
(Saltman and von O tter, 1992, p9).
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The global economic crisis of the 1970s is considered by m any to 
have been the proxim ate cause of the dissolution of this 
consensus, and  the period of growing political discord th a t ensued  
(Giddens 1998; S altm an  and  von Otter, 1992). The onset of the 
economic crisis coincided with the emergence of a  host of other 
social tensions. New social groupings were forming, whose 
interests had  previously been excluded from those defined as 
“needy" in term s of welfare provision. Women’s interests, as a 
distinct group, in p articu lar helped to stim ulate criticism against 
what came to be seen as ‘paternalis tic ’ aspects of bureaucratic 
organisations and  policies (Fiona Williams cited in Clarke and 
Newman, 1997, p. 10). Rising num bers of immigrants, with their 
specific needs, often fell outside the existing rules on entitlem ents, 
based as they were on the concerns of a  more homogeneous 
population. The com position of households changed, and the 
need for more single occupancy hom es began to grow. For the 
first time, too, population projections began to point towards 
growth in the proportion of older people living longer lives. Against 
this background of increasing diversity, w hat had previously been 
seen as a  strength , the im personality of the bureaucratic model, 
soon began to be perceived as  a  w eakness (Clarke and Newman, 
1997). At about the sam e tim e, the u n it of social concern began 
to move away from the family a s  the predom inant social grouping 
and, thus, focus of atten tion , in welfare policy terms, and  more 
towards the individual (Ham, 2004, p. 236). The com bination of
18
economic p ressu re  an d  perceived scarcity, in the face of a  plethora 
of “new” dem ands, com bined to destroy the last sh reds of 
consensus abou t w hat constitu ted  social need, welfare, and  the 
role of the state in m eeting it.
Not surprisingly, in th e  face of these tensions, political discourse 
changed significantly, too. Interestingly, this change in discourse 
was not unique to B ritain  b u t w as paralleled -  or perhaps fuelled -  
by similar changes in the  US. In both countries, neo-liberal 
philosophies began to gain prom inence, a t first in response to the 
critical economic conditions presenting globally. But the 
prescriptions of the New Right soon spread more widely across 
social and political a ren as. Their focus on the individual may 
have struck  a chord w ith prevailing social and demographic 
trends. But placing the individual a t the centre of thinking, a t the 
expense of the social group, h ad  wide ranging repercussions, in 
both philosophical an d  public policy term s (Ellison and Pierson
2003).
The tenets of the New Right em phasized the rights of individuals, 
not the responsibilities of groups (or the State). Thus “rights” 
soon became equated w ith “freedom s”, and therefore any 
structures or rules th a t encroached on these rights and  freedoms 
was seen as an  infringem ent of individual liberty. Thus, the role 
of the state was increasingly curtailed, so tha t individual effort
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could be liberated. In economic terms, this inferred th a t jobs 
could be created no t by S tate intervention b u t by individual 
entrepreneurship an d  h ard  work. The realm of welfare was 
consequently re-cast, no t as  a  public good, b u t as a  drain  on 
public resources an d  a sse ts  (Clarke and Newman, 1997). This, in 
turn, affected the definition of w hat constituted a social need. At 
times in the ensu ing  decades, it seemed as though there had been 
a return  to Victorian definitions of welfare ‘worth’, as, increasingly, 
responsibility for m eeting need was placed a t the foot of the 
individual (as carer or supplicant) and  increasingly away from the 
responsibility of the  S tate (Lister 2005, p .34). In discussions 
about resource allocation, individual responsibility for health and 
welfare som etim es becam e entw ined with notions of worth, and 
blame, deserving and  undeserving of State help or intervention. 
This changing discourse had  a  profound effect on health policy 
and delivery, a s  the following sections will show.
2.4  The Health Policy C ontext
In common with governm ents across the developed world, the UK 
government faced significant challenges in the health sector. By 
the 1980s, inflation in th is  sector was increasing faster than  in 
other areas of public expenditure. This was partly due to the rapid 
pace of technological developm ent in healthcare interventions 
(Smith and Goodwin 2006; Ham 2004; Welsh Assembly
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Government 2003). Demographic changes added to these cost 
pressures, and, a s  dem and continued to outstrip supply, 
disillusionm ent with the Bevanite dream  of conquering ill health  
among the population gradually  began to set in am ongst policy 
m akers and the public alike. By 1990, cost control had  become 
the dom inant aim  of policy m akers in the health sector (Lister, 
2005, p.35; Ham, 2004, p .236; Saltm an and von Otter 1992, 
p. 12). In common with governm ents across northern Europe, and  
the USA, the British governm ent began exploring alternative 
models for funding increases in the delivery of public services.
The concept of “p lanned  m ark e ts” as  a m eans of increasing the 
productivity, or value for m oney, of public services gained 
prominence. Such an  approach  aim ed to harness the 
competitiveness inheren t in m arkets, through decentralisation of 
decision-making and  the in troduction  of incentives to stim ulate 
provider behaviour change (Saltm an and von Otter, 1992), bu t 
within the overall confines of public ownership and direction. This 
focus on influencing the supply  side of the economic equation 
m eant tha t, although a  variety of policy instrum ents were 
adopted, throughout the 1980s th rough  to the present day, the 
underlying paradigm  inform ing them  was consistent with New 
Right ideology generally, an d  m anagerialism  in particular.
Managerialism, as a  way of th ink ing  about organisations, is rooted 
in New Right philosophies ab o u t the role of governments in
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promoting economic growth (Lister 2005). The New Right's 
thinking abou t econom ic development springs from liberal 
philosophies abou t th e  benefits of the m arket as the preferred 
mechanism for allocating resources. Thus de-regulation of trade, 
and reduction of co n s tra in ts  on m arket forces, coupled with 
decreases in public spending  are viewed as necessary pre­
conditions for effective m ark e t operation which will, in tu rn , lead 
to higher economic growth an d  th u s  increased social gain. The 
individual, as pu rchaser, is viewed as the matin agent, influencing 
the provision of goods for sale by the choices they m ake as 
consumers.
The prevalence of New Right th inkers in the debate about 
stimulating economic growth in response to the economic crisis of 
the 1970s, a t the m acro level of analysis, led to the adoption of a 
parallel philosophy a t the micro level of public sector 
organisations in Britain. By 2007, in Britain, m anagerialism  
could be seen to have becom e the dom inant approach to creating 
effective health care organizations. This represents a  significant 
change in philosophy since the  agreem ent to create the NHS in 
1948 pu t medical professionals firmly in the driving seat. So, why 
did such a  significant change come about?
Part of the answ er m ay lie in the increasingly frenzied attem pts by 
the Conservative governm ent, from 1979, to control public
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expenditure generally, and  health  spending in particular. Using 
the rhetoric of quality  improvem ent through increased diversity of 
provision and  greater consum er choice (Welsh Office 1988) opened 
the door to let a  new class rise to ascendancy: m anagers (Wilsford 
1994, p.269). M anagers would be the channels through which 
public policy would be m ost effectively implemented. They would, 
through their em phasis on, initially, efficiency and cost control 
techniques, bring reca lc itran t professionals to heel. Sir Roy 
Griffiths’ 1983 (DHSS 1983) report m arked a seminal change in 
the philosophy underp inn ing  health  policy in the UK. With the 
benefit of hindsight, G riffiths’ com m ent about the difficulty 
Florence Nightingale m ight have, should she return  from the 
grave, in finding anyone “in charge” m arked the end of the ‘m essy’, 
compromise system  of co n sen su s m anagem ent tha t had prevailed 
across the NHS since 1974. In troducing a  tight system of 
performance m anagem ent and  accountability  would enhance the 
system further by in troducing  clarity and  speed of decision­
making.
Pollitt (1997, cited by Clarke an d  Newman, p 34) quotes Michael 
Heseltine, Secretary of S tate for Industry  in 1980, indicating the 
centrality of m anagem ent in accom plishing the new national
project of transform ation:
Efficient management is the key to the [national] revival...and the
management ethos must run right through our national life...
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To this end, G eneral M anagers were created to replace Hospital 
Management Teams. Private sector-style “Boards” were created to 
support, and hold to account, the new General M anagers who 
held personal responsibility  for decision-making. These Boards 
performed ano ther function, too: they would help to em bed the 
newly-termed D istrict G eneral Hospitals in the com m unity -  and 
thus distance them  from cen tra l government responsibility.
These structu ra l an d  titu la r  changes signified huge cultural 
changes across the NHS. Until th is time doctors -  and, to a  lesser 
extent, professionals generally -  by virtue of their position and 
public esteem, held sole responsibility for resource allocation. 
Every clinical decision m ade, a t  each patient encounter across the 
health system, day in an d  day out, had  a resource implication.
And the only lim itation on th is  power to commit resources was the 
individual clinician’s conscience and  professional judgem ent 
(Harrison et al 1992, p, 18). U nder the term s of the agreem ent 
founding the NHS, th is  clinical freedom was enshrined as 
sacrosanct: a  basic principle. So, the introduction of 
managerialism also m arked  a  significant shift in the perception of 
professionals and  the ir roles in the health  care system. For the 
first time since 1948, professionals were cast as part of the 
problem to be resolved (Harrison et al 1992). And it w as the 
managerial class, formerly m ere adm inistrators and im plem enters 
of clinician-led resource allocation decisions, who would rescue
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the nation from the consequences of such ‘irresponsible’ decision­
making by the ir focus on the corporate good, ra ther than  on the 
single individual p a tien t in isolation.
Clearly, accom plishing su ch  a  m ajor cultural change in thinking 
and in practice would require a  powerful legitimising philosophy. 
The discourse of the New Right provided ju s t that. The language 
of the m arket: efficiency, quality, competition through diversity of 
products and  services, levered by the power of the individual’s 
choices, prom ised to ca te r for the diversity of interests 
proliferating in a  now more heterogeneous Britain. The newly- 
empowered individual would th u s  be freed from the stultifying, 
blunter in stru m en t of S tate controlled welfare services, to secure 
more tailored-m ade options (DoH 1997, paragraph 1.4). It would 
appear therefore th a t the fostering of consum erism  a t the 
individual level across Britain w as a  necessary adjunct to the 
language of the m arket a t organizational levels. C harters 
embodying p a tien ts’ rights heightened citizens’ expectations of the 
fruits of th is new approach  to public service provision (DoH 1997).
Thus the very language proved to be strangely seductive, a t both 
organizational and  individual levels, partly because it provided a 
unifying narrative th read  for a  wide variety of potentially 
competing in terests. The concept of the m arket place gave voice 
and legitimacy to previously disenfranchised and overlooked social
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groups, offering them  a  way to get their needs heard w ithin the 
system. M anagerial control would offset the spending excesses of 
unfettered clinical freedom. Individuals were to be fu rther 
empowered through represen ta tion  on health service decision­
making bodies. This would serve to localise decision-making and 
improve responsiveness to com m unity interests. This focus on 
responsiveness to individuals w as later further enhanced by the 
development of pa tien t’s ch a rte rs , under the Major government, 
codifying and  legitim ating p a tien ts ’ rising expectations of public 
services. Such steps to s tren g th en  dem and were intended to 
counter-balance w hat had  com e to be seen as the excessive 
powers of professional providers over the supply of medical 
services (Elston, 1991, p .68).
This potential to transform , offered by the language of the New 
Right, a t both individual an d  organizational level, may have held 
the key to its a ttractiveness an d  th u s  to its trem endous cultural 
power (McDonald 2004, p. 927). Clarke and Newman (1997) chart 
the shift in language w ithin the  discourse on public services, from 
an initial em phasis on efficiency in the early 1980s, fairly quickly 
moving on to effectiveness, w hich, a s  a  concept, could capture the 
values of both professionals an d  m anagers. Professional buy-in to 
the concept of effectiveness a s  a  dom inant quality dim ension 
significantly strengthened th e ir  power base a t a  time w hen it was 
increasingly under th rea t. It w as a  b itter pill to swallow, b u t
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agreement to allocating public resources on the basis of w hat 
worked was alm ost im possible to argue against. And it did give 
professionals the  u p p er h an d  in the determ ination of w hat 
treatm ents could be deem ed effective. Whilst m anagers might 
insist on “aud it” regim es an d  trails, the clinical na tu re  of audits 
was protected th ro u g h o u t the  1990s. Arguably it is only more 
recently, with the in troduction  of the National Institu te for Clinical 
Effectiveness (NICE), th a t  cost h as  become a  more overtly 
dom inant elem ent of the  effectiveness m easurem ent process. And, 
the strong role w hich cost factors now have in NICE’S decisions 
has only emerged th rough  m ore recent reviews (Williams et al 
2007). Thus, the concept of effectiveness proved to be a 
successful tool in the d iscourse, helping sim ultaneously to 
legitimate actions taken  to cu rb  the power of professionals, and to 
give m anagers more credibility in the eyes of the public.
At the sam e time, responsiveness w as also mooted as an  
im portant dim ension of quality  (Le G rand et al 1998). This idea 
tha t health services would be tailored to local needs and 
circum stances w as an  im portan t p lank  in the proffering of 
increased individual choice to the British public. Again it also 
offered em powerm ent to previously disadvantaged groups. But, 
significantly, it also streng thened  the im portance of the 
effectiveness criteria, an d  helped to dem onstrate the efficiency of
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resource allocation decisions, based on w hat was needed (DoH 
1997, paragraph 1.5) and  w hat worked.
The linking of the two concepts of effectiveness and need gave an  
additional degree of clarity to the narrative thread of the New 
Right ideology. This in tu rn  w as further bolstered by the 
simplicity of the language u sed  to sell the ideology to the public a t 
large. More potently, perhaps, the linking of effectiveness and 
need helped to build a  bridge between managers and 
professionals, one th a t could ac t a s  a  unifier between these 
previously com peting groups (Harrison et al 1992). It enabled 
both cam ps to claim to be acting  altruistically, in the public 
interest, when m aking potentially unpopular resource allocation 
decisions, based, as  they were able to claim, on higher criteria 
than  mere penny-pinching. In th is  way, such concepts helped to 
define the territory of the larger debate. Clarke and Newman 
(1997) argue th a t th is effectively limited the scope of the debate 
too, ensuring th a t wider questions abou t the role of the State and 
the natu re  of welfare a s  a  public good stayed off the agenda.
But perhaps the real skill of the New Right apologists lay in their 
ability to alter the language of the  prevailing political discourse to 
em phasise the power of individuals in the decision-making 
process, w hether as citizens or w ithin organizations (McDonald
2004). The rhetoric lent an  alm ost m issionary zeal, endowing
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individuals with a  sense of social purpose while a t the same time 
encouraging them  to ac t in their own self interest. The language 
of organizational transform ation aligned self interest with social 
welfare and as such was alm ost universally seductive. As Clarke 
and Newmart (1997, p. 52) attest:
“the visionary language of both the new managerialism and the New 
Right has tapped into much more potent vocabularies of motive”
and thus helped to create “an  illusion of unity of purpose and
reform”. The promise of such  transformative power may help to
explain the widespread appeal of both philosophies, the New Right
a t the macro level of policy making, and managerialism as the tool
for effecting these transform ations, a t the organizational level
(Clarke and Newman 1997, p .34).
2.5  Organizational Change at the Micro Level
Clarke and Newman (1997) point out the “normalising narratives” 
which not only served to m ake organizational change the norm 
rather than  the exception, b u t also helped to place those who 
resisted such change as obstructive and old-fashioned: labels 
such as ‘d inosaurs’, for example, were commonly applied by 
m anagers to recalcitrant professionals who objected to the scale 
and pace of change. These normalising narratives provided a 
crucial link between social change a t the macro level and 
organizational change a t the micro level. McDonald (2004), for 
example, illustrated the extent to which the vocabulary of staff
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empowerment was used  as an  instrum ent of organizational 
control, delineating the boundaries between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour within the organization (eg self directed, 
positive) in her study of a  new staff development programme 
within a  Primary Care T rust (PCT). This language emphasized the 
shift away from the responsiveness and reactive approach 
characteristic of health  service adm inistrators in the 1970s, 
promoting the adoption of the more ‘managerial’ qualities of 
leadership, individual initiative, and  employee empowerment in 
effecting change (DoH 2001 cited in McDonald 2004, p 925-6). 
Inevitably such  changes in language would have to be paralleled 
by changes in the ways in which organizations were structured.
2.5.1 Structural Implications at the Organizational Level 
Organizational theorists have struggled to make sense of the ways 
in which corporations, public and private, have reacted to the 
changing social and economic trends illustrated above.
Responding to the global economic crisis of the 1970s, and in line 
with the rhetorical solutions of the New Right, organizations 
decentralised, downsized, diversified, and in so doing, fragmented. 
The old hierarchical structures of “Fordist” organizations, geared 
to m ass production for stable m arkets, gave way to “permanently 
innovating” (Exworthy and Halford, 1999) organizational models. 
In an effort to secure m arket share, organizations focussed more 
on their “core” business, enabling them  to slim down their
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workforces as they “outsourced” work to cheaper suppliers and 
producers across an  increasingly global territory. The previously 
predom inant model of the paternalistic organization, prepared to 
provide employees with benefits throughout their changing life 
stages (eg in the USA, health  insurance, college fee paym ent 
plans), was replaced by calls for employee flexibility and part-tim e 
contracts. Perhaps m ost crucially, a t least as far as the public 
sector was concerned, hierarchical forms of control were gradually 
replaced by contractual relations (Exworthy and Halford 1999; 
Flynn et al, 1996). Vertically integrated organizations tended to 
become flatter, too, with a  consequent growth in the num ber of 
horizontal links. And, perhaps mirroring changes in social values, 
em phasis within organizations tended to be more and more on 
individual performance (Minogue et al, 1998) and on the difference 
th a t individual effort could m ake to overall organizational 
performance. This em phasis on individuals and empowerment, in 
tu rn , however, sparked a  search for different mechanisms to 
ensure employee and organizational accountability (Ferlie et al 
1996, p 235-7 cited in Blackler et al 1999, p224). The em phasis, 
in government white papers u nder the Labour government of 1997 
onwards, was on individual empowerment and decentralized 
decision-making, within an  over-arching framework of centrally 
determined standards (DoH 1997). Ferlie et al (1996) point to the 
emergence, in response to these pressures, of hybrid 
organizational forms within the NHS which, paradoxically, tended
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to make service integration, a  key policy aim, more difficult to 
achieve (Blackler et al 1999, p 226).
During th is increasingly tu rbu len t social and economic period, the 
drive to innovate became an  over-riding organisational imperative. 
This focus on continuous innovation sparked an era of further 
structural experim entation and change (Pettigrew and Fenton 
2000) as organisations struggled to find more effective ways to 
communicate internally in an  increasingly more globalised, yet 
fragmented, marketplace. Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) point to 
the increasing pace of organizational change throughout the 
1990s due to the influence of new technologies and the faster 
diffusion of innovations, increasing the competitive aspects of the 
environment, th a t were, in tu rn , further exacerbated by 
increasingly volatile consum er buying patterns. Organisations 
struggled to respond to less regulated environments by 
fragmenting and decentralising, shedding “excess capacity”. At 
the same time there was a  noticeable increase in merger and 
acquisition activity (Pettigrew and Fenton 2000, p. 22). This 
increased sensitivity to the external environment was paralleled by 
increased focus on the relationship between organizational 
strategy, structure and performance.
2.5.2 Structural Implications at the Level o f the Individual Employee 
One of the m ain implications of these structural changes a t the 
organizational level was a new em phasis on employee flexibility.
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At an  individual employee level, employment security was replaced 
by an increase in the num ber of temporary contracts and part 
time working (Whittaker 1992), intended to reduce production 
costs in the drive to compete in the global m arket place with 
countries whose labour costs were considerably lower than  in 
Britain. And these short term  contracts, particularly a t the senior 
m anagem ent echelons of health  organizations, were increasingly 
tied to specific performance goals. These goals tended to be 
couched in transformative term s (Clarke and Newman 1997, 
p .42), contributing to the idea th a t individual effort, initiative and 
ability could accomplish organizational regeneration -  and tha t 
such whole scale change could be effected within a short time 
span. It proved to be only a  m atter of time before this em phasis 
on positive potential became im bued with the logical negative 
consequences. As public accountability arrangements tightened, 
clinical governance arrangem ents included personal 
accountability elements, and  individual chief executives were 
increasingly dismissed in the wake of organisational failures 
identified by public scrutiny arrangem ents (Sausman 2001, p 
ii 17). Thus the language of empowerment, organizationally and 
individually seductive as it was, also carried a sharp edge of 
personal cost a t the individual level. This was particularly true for 
th e  newly empowered m anagerial class, but health professionals 
were not exempt from similar scrutiny. Clinical governance 
arrangem ents became increasingly formalised, through clinical
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managem ent structu res throughout the 1990s (Ayres et al 1998). 
By 2000, these arrangem ents had come together to pu t 
responsibility for both clinical and managerial failings a t the door 
of hospital Chief Executives (Mamoch et ad 2000).
2.6  Innovation as a Key Organizational Goal
The increased focus on individuad effort and performamce had 
another im portant, if unexpected, outcome, relevant to the focus 
of this research study. In th is increasingly competitive 
environment, organizations began to emphasise organizationad 
learning as a  core competence (Senge 1990, quoting Walter 
Wriston then CEO of Citibank) and to look for structural 
arrangem ents to facilitate learning a t all levels of the firm. 
Pettigrew's & Fenton's (2000) review discerned three types of 
orgainizational form emerging in response to this quest. The first, 
the “globalising firm'' is chairacterised by its changing geographical 
boundaries and use of IT as the chief integrative mechanism. 
Structurally this type may be closely related, a t least externally, to 
the multidivisional organizational type emerging from the 1960s. 
But it differs significantly from this more classic model in the 
em phasis pu t on business processes, not functions. A second type 
refers to w hat they call “the knowledge firm'' which em phasises 
the value of knowledge creation and transfer as its core activity. In 
this type of organization lateral communication channels become 
important, and organizational capability depends on the ways in
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which the firm is able to capture individuals' specialist knowledge. 
The role of top m anagem ent in this type of firm is to design and 
build the structures to enable and facilitate this knowledge 
creation and transfer activity. In this type of firm, the 
organization's role, and  th u s  its structures and processes, is to 
facilitate individuals' creativity and learning. Pettigrew and 
Fenton's third organizational type is the socially embedded 
network. Strategic relationships held together by extensive sub­
contracting arrangem ents w ithin geographical areas characterised 
this model, to create intellectual and  social capital, enabling the 
partners to ‘punch above their weight' in increasingly globalised 
and highly competitive m arkets. These three organizational 
typologies have emerged in response to the perception that 
changing m arkets required increasingly tailored products and 
services, and thus th a t organizational structures that enable 
increased flexibility and responsiveness are required. Again, in all 
of these three typologies it is worth noting the emphasis -  and 
value -  placed on individual effort and  creativity in building added 
value a t the organizational level.
The emergence of these three organizational types is not the end of 
the story of organizational restructuring. Pettigrew & Fenton 
(2000) point to the on-going challenges to strike the right balance 
between the dualities tha t have surfaced in the wake of efforts to 
find optimal organizational structures. Tensions between
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centralism and localism, standardisation and customisation, 
managing networks and maintaining horizontal accountability, 
and optimising individual and  corporate performance are 
challenges which require continual re-balancing efforts. Blackler 
et al (1999, p.240) point to the anxieties created am ongst 
workers, managers and professionals trying to make sense of, and 
implement, directives which they often perceive as conflicting. 
They concluded th a t organizations and individuals working within 
them  could not be sheltered from such tensions, bu t tha t they 
could indeed be better supported through them using collective 
learning approaches.
2 .7  Changing Leadership Styles
This, of course, has critical implications for the role of leadership 
in these emerging organizational forms, also of relevance to the 
NHS and to the focus of th is research study. Moving away from 
command and control approaches requires leadership th a t is 
strategic and conceptual (Fenton and Pettigrew 2000). Leaders 
need to be able to make sense out of the environmental 
complexities surrounding the organization, and the often 
competing dem ands arising from them. Pettigrew's and Fenton's 
case studies point to the ability to deliver “clear, simple and 
evocative messages which balance future goals with present 
needs...to communicate purpose and priority” (p 299) as a  critical 
leader competence in organizational performance, particularly in
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term s of steering organizations through times of crisis. This 
implies a strong analytical ability together with sophisticated skills 
in communicating complex messages in simple terms. In 
addition, all three emerging organizational forms placed a  high 
premium on organizational learning, a t all levels of the firm, 
confirming Blackler et aTs (1999) views, based on their case 
studies in NHS organizations.
The same environmental forces th a t impacted so strongly on 
organizations in the global m arket place had similarly significant 
effects on health and social policy, and thus on the shape of 
public sector organizations across Britain, as the following 
sections illustrate.
2.8  Structural Im plications for Public Service Delivery 
Organizations
The strength of the rapidly changing social, economic and 
demographic trends roiling across the UK throughout the last 
thirty years of the twentieth century prompted similar demands 
for organizational redesign in the public service delivery sector.
The Blairite m antra  of ‘m odernization' was seen by many to be 
echoing the New Right's prescriptions for slimmed-down, 
streamlined and th u s more efficient organizational forms (Giddens 
1998, p. 166). In an  effort to create more 'responsive' service 
delivery channels, the public sector was urged to adopt the same
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structural principles th a t governed those of the free m arket. At 
the same time the welfare system was re-shaped in the mode of 
the ‘flexible’ labour force. Giddens argues that, in order to meet 
the welfare challenges facing Britain a t the close of the twentieth 
century, especially in term s of tackling inequality and social 
exclusion, the instrum ents of the state needed reshaping on the 
basis of a new mixed economy (p.69). Such a model would require 
more devolution and decentralised decision-making, accompanied 
by more accountability and transparency. The role of government 
would be to manage risks (Giddens p.77). Giddens emphasizes 
the difficulties to be overcome in trying to strike the right balance 
between the contradictory tensions inherent in this approach to 
public policy. It may be that, in the face of this complexity, the 
rhetoric of the New Public M anagement appeared to offer a 
relatively simplistic solution, a t organizational level, to the 
challenges posed a t the macro level of society.
Minogue (1998) asserts th a t the New Public Management 
apologists favoured structu ral reform as the preferred m eans to 
achieving more cost effective and  appropriate public service 
delivery a t the micro, or organizational, level. To this end, 
devolved responsibility could be m atched with increased financial 
responsibility, giving increased “freedom to manage”. This would 
be tempered by tighter individual and corporate accountability 
through cost centre allocation, Rayner-type scrutinies, and
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customer satisfaction indices (Minogue 1998, p .33). Separation of 
purchaser and provider, a  mechanism borrowed from the market, 
would be tempered by more strategic controls a t regional levels, 
tha t would “hold the ring”, by “steering not rowing” (Barber, M. for 
McKinsey, undated). This separation of operational activity from 
more strategic direction was a  common feature of both public and 
private sector organizational change throughout the 1990s.
Barber cautioned against the idea th a t this might mean “letting 
go” by government, em phasizing the need for strength and clarity 
a t strategic level, as well as for a long-enough timeframe to ensure 
sustainability (p.9). These structural changes, devolving 
responsibility downwards and increasing performance 
managem ent upw ards, were intended to be implemented against a 
backdrop of increased capacity and capability underpinned by 
cultural change across the health  system (p.7). But the extent to 
which the narratives of the New Public Management are 
consistent with, or conflict with, those of the Governance 
literature has been raised by Ferlie (2002). He notes tha t the 
governance models being proposed were predicated on concepts of 
partnership, interagency working and networks, requiring a 
different set of leadership skills capable of influencing and 
steering ra ther than  the directing, commanding and controlling 
.modes pertinent to hierarchical organisational forms. Ferlie 
(2002, p.4) viewed the New Public Management approach as being 
essentially centralist, emphasizing target setting, and measuring
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local adherence through audit and performance management 
systems.
The engagement of health professionals, especially the medical 
profession, soon began to be seen as a critical element for effecting 
systemic cultural change. By the second half of the 1990s, 
systematic efforts were being made to capture professional 
interests in the pursu it of health  sector reform. Systemic 
approaches to issues of service quality promulgated by Berwick 
and the Institute for Health Improvement in the US were 
increasingly promoted, am idst efforts to steer debate around 
issues of service “quality” and, latterly, “patient safety”. 
M echanisms to effect changes in physician behaviour became the 
object of academic study and policy discussions (see, for example, 
the Recommendations emerging from the Kennedy Report into 
Heart Surgery a t the Bristol Royal Infirmary, 2001; King's Fund 
Conference, June , 2007) and ranged from individual incentives, 
professional recognition and reward mechanisms, to 
encouragem ent to take on full scale management roles. Clinical 
Directorates were created in m ost acute Trusts, headed by the 
Medical Director. In addition, experiments in using networks 
(‘m anaged clinical networks') as m echanism s for engaging 
clinicians were started. The Modernization Agency was set up, in 
England, to promote clinical engagement with the change agenda 
promulgated by the NHS Plan in 2000, using demonstration
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projects, and “clinicians to persuade clinicians...[in an  effort to 
win] hearts and m inds by acknowledging professional sensitivities 
and potential resistance” (Davies et al, 2005, p. 119). These 
approaches, then, were aimed at reducing expected resistance to 
change and to harnessing  clinical motivation and commitment to 
further organizational change initiatives (Mamoch et al 2000). 
However the use of such  networks quickly exposed the underlying 
tensions between the centralised managerial control systems in 
place in vertically m anaged NHS organizations, and the more 
horizontally linked network structures (Ferlie, 2002), which 
potentially threatened to rem ain as separate, bu t highly 
influential, and, perhaps potentially destructive, forces in the 
system.
As the twenty-first century opened, health policy reform efforts 
accelerated, according to Ferlie (2002, p.2) with two effects. The 
first was to change the natu re  of the role of local organizations to 
one of “influencing” rather than  directing, change; this changed 
em phasis required further reforms in terms of organizational 
structures, roles and responsibilities. At the same time, attention 
increasingly turned  towards the concept of innovation as an 
indicator of the success of structural and systemic changes for 
health service delivery organizations (Welsh Assembly Government 
2005a; Welsh Assembly Government 2005b; Welsh Assembly 
Government 2003; National Assembly for Wales 2001a).
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2.9  Health Policy Im plem entation Strategies
In pursu it of these changed policy goals, the Innovations in Care 
team in Wales, set up  as a Task Force under the Improving Health 
in Wales (NAW 2001a) banner, acted as a catalyst for largely 
clinical innovations across Wales. And, in England, the National 
Coordinating Centre was set up  to commission service-delivery 
and organization-related research relevant to stimulating, 
embedding and sustaining innovation in health service delivery 
across the health care system.
In term s of policy implementation strategies and their effects, 
Harrison et al (1990) concluded th a t successful policy 
implementation required a  high degree of shared ownership of the 
aims and agenda across constituent agencies. It also required top 
level commitment and engagement to the policy aims. Thirdly, 
including relevant indicators in the performance management 
framework would facilitate implementation. Harrison et al also 
caution th a t competing policy aim s inhibit implementation. 
Exworthy et al (2001) support these findings, pointing to policy 
implementation barriers raised by w hat Ferlie (2002) terms 
“initiative overload”.
42
2 .10  ‘Managing Change’: Approaches to Effecting Change at 
Organizational (Micro) Level
The literature on change management, though largely drawn from 
private sector organizations, has more recently been trawled by 
several writers (e.g. lies and  Sutherland 2001; Bate et al 2004; 
Greenhalgh et al 2004) for lessons which might be applicable to 
the NHS in its efforts to implement whole scale change a t both 
system and organizational levels. Greenhalgh et al’s (2004) recent 
work on organizational factors stimulating innovation notes the 
importance of structure, capacity and context. The concept of 
receptive contexts for change was first proposed by Pettigrew, 
Ferlie and McKee (1992) based on their empirical study of policy 
implementation in NHS organizations. They identified a  series of 
factors th a t were associated with forward movement. These 
included the quality and coherence of the policy to be 
implemented, together with goals and priorities tha t were clear 
and simple. The existence of key people capable of leading the 
proposed change; environm ental pressures, including the nature 
of the change agenda and its location, favouring the particular 
change proposed; a supportive organizational culture; good 
managerial-clinician relationships; and co-operative inter- 
organizational networks were also noted as playing a determining 
role in the uptake of change. Whilst not terming these factors 
‘necessary preconditions' for effecting change, in term s of 
implementing policy a t local level, together these factors were
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identified as playing an important role in creating contexts in 
which change could be effected. Crucially, Pettigrew, Ferlie and 
McKee (1992) point to the transient nature of these factors, 
emphasising the dynamic nature of the concept of receptivity, and 
noting th a t whilst receptivity can be built through cumulative 
development processes, equally it can be destroyed by changes in 
any one of the eight factors. Butler's (2003) empirical study of 
implementing policy within two local authorities subsum es these 
eight factors down to four: ‘ideological vision' denoting the 
existence of coherent policy, clearly communicated; leading 
change’ denoting the locus of decision-making within a system; 
Institutional politics' as indicative of the inter-play of 
relationships within a system; and Implementation capacity' to 
indicate the extent to which organizations can be seen to have 
created unique identities and capacities by leveraging their 
asym m etries’: in other words, by identifying and then exploiting 
their unique (and often tacit) assets (Miller et al 2002). Butler's 
study seeks to integrate the environmental, public service and 
organizational levels of change into a coherent theory, but he 
stresses the contextual specificity of the receptivity factors 
identified and calls for further testing to develop the theory beyond 
the cases he studied.
Greenhalgh et al (2004) also point out th a t characteristics of a  
proposed change itself can also affect uptake, depending on the
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level of complexity involved, the “fit” with prevailing values and 
norms, and its perceived advantage relative to cost as being 
determ inants of success. Their review emphasizes, above all, the 
complexity of the work involved in creating organizations receptive 
to change and in developing more creative ways of working in 
pursu it of innovations.
At the macro level, Bate et al (2004) reviewed literature relevant to 
social movements with a  view to identifying any implications for 
service improvement within the NHS. They noted the importance 
of a  rather different kind of leadership: tha t of the ‘institutional 
entrepreneur’ who facilitates radical change from within their 
institutions by enabling a  new and different dialogue to take place:
“...leaders offer frames, tactics and organizational vehicles that allow 
participants to construct a [new] collective identity and participate in 
collective action at various levels...” (Bate, 2004)
which such leaders then weave into collective and unifying 
narratives to make meaning for others (Morgan and Smircick 
1980, cited by Bate et al 2004, p .37). This form of leadership 
appears to work independently of position, status or charismatic 
traits, and thus perhaps provides a  better fit for emerging network 
forms of organization. Bate et al highlight the importance of this 
type of leader’s role in ‘framing’ dialogue so tha t common 
understanding is engendered across the organization or collective. 
This collective shaping of the sense-making process builds on 
earlier work by Weick (1995), and to some extent, Morgan (1997).
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The leader’s work in orchestrating this collective sense-making is 
referred to as an  integral part of creating contexts receptive to 
change (Bate et al 2004, p 37).
2.11 Incentives and Change at the Individual Level
Grol’s and Grimshaw’s (2003) systematic review of effective ways 
of encouraging clinicians to change their behaviour echo these 
organizational findings a t the individual level. They, too, cite the 
nature of the proposed innovation, in terms of its simplicity and 
clarity, as being im portant, alongside the perceived strength of the 
evidence base underpinning it. They also point to the importance 
of the m atch between the values underpinning the proposed 
change and those of the clinicians involved. This tallies with the 
importance of being value-driven, noted by the social movement 
theorists. In Grol’s and Grimshaw’s work, ownership was also 
deemed to be im portant, with more credence and commitment 
given to the adoption of changes th a t clinicians saw themselves as 
having stimulated, as opposed to those perceived as having been 
externally driven, regardless of the objective strength of the 
evidence base attached to proposed changes.
So, perceived ownership of proposed changes may be a 
determining factor in professionals’ motivation to change. Several 
studies have sought to ascertain the extent to which this 
motivation was intrinsic, or could be affected by the presence of
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incentives. Bosanquet's and Leese's (1989) study of the effects of 
incentives in the form of target paym ents for specific fees-for- 
items-of-service noted the mediating effect of local environmental 
factors on take up. For example, in more financially deprived 
areas, doctors trying to initiate changes to encourage uptake of 
. preventive health m easures had to take larger financial risks in 
order to innovate than  did their colleagues in better-off areas. It 
was this study's findings th a t initially sparked the researcher's 
interest in exploring this area in more depth. Flynn, Williams and 
Pickard (1996, p. 146) quote Hudson's caution that systems which 
promote individual reward (such as incentive payments) may well 
militate against the sorts of collaborative models of working 
appropriate to primary care. Since then, Davies et al (2005) have 
reported th a t there is a  “risk of damaging intrinsic motivation [of 
health professionals] through the use of financial incentives”, and 
th a t m uch more study is needed into the complexities 
surrounding models of organizations, and links between 
governance, incentives and individual performance.
2.12  Changing Models o f  Primary Care Organization
Against this background of continuing social fragmentation and 
political and organizational decentralization, over the last thirty 
years, the policy intention to devolve responsibility for overseeing 
delivery of primary care services to local levels across the UK, 
taken in 1999, was perhaps the logical next step in this trend
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towards the development of market mechanisms to achieve public 
aims. The implementation of this policy decision across the UK 
sparked an explosion in academic interest (e.g. Le Grand et al 
1998; Regan et al 1999; Regan 2002; Mays et al 2001; Smith and 
Goodwin 2002; Williams 2002; Sheaf et al 2003; Roland and 
. Smith 2003), which h as  intensified as the distinctiveness of the 
new models has continued to develop across the four countries of 
the UK (Exworthy et al 2001; Ham 2004; Smith et al 2004; 
Exworthy and Peckham 2005; Smith and Goodwin 2006). The 
National Tracker Studies carried out by the King’s Fund and the 
National Primary Care Research and Development Centre 
collaboration charted the progress of these emerging forms, 
focusing largely on England’s model of primary care organization 
and its development into tru s ts  (PCTs). The English policy drive 
has tended to focus on encouraging competition, and diversity of 
providers (Ham 2004; DOH 2008) as a  spur to quality 
improvement and patient choice. The Welsh model, on the other 
hand, has promoted partnership  and collaboration, particularly 
with local authorities (NAW 2001a; WAG 2005a). Smith and 
Goodwin (2006) note th a t the development of primary care 
organizations across the UK (and in common with approaches 
taken in the US and New Zealand) has been aimed a t promoting 
more “managed care” within the primary health care sector, and 
point to the tensions th is has created in terms of engaging health 
professionals. In contrast to the rest of the UK, Wales has not
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seen a  similar surge of interest in their own primary care models, 
until very recently. Indeed, within Wales, any attem pts at 
evaluation of LHGs were strongly resisted by health authority 
chief executives1. The Audit Commission did however conduct 
and report on an  initial study of LHGs in 2000 (Audit Commission 
, 2000). And a  study carried out by the researcher (Williams 2002) 
to investigate GPs* attitudes towards the proposed LHGs indicated 
widespread scepticism, ignorance about the roles and functions of 
the LHGs, and a  m arked lack of enthusiasm  for the proposed 
changes.
These studies indicate th a t the story is not yet finished. Indeed, 
real questions rem ain about the policy aims themselves, the 
instrum ents chosen to implement them, and the way in which the 
policies were, or failed to be, implemented. In Wales, Health 
Authorities were abolished in 2003, and LHGs were made into 
statu to iy  bodies (LHBs). Now the Welsh Assembly Government 
(WAG 2008) has invited consultation on proposals to further 
transform  the organization of the NHS, by abolishing the internal 
m arket in Wales, establishing an  independent Board to oversee 
planning and allocation of resources within the NHS, and 
reducing the num ber of LHBs from 22 to 8. Acute Trusts were 
rationalised from 1st April 2008, reducing the num ber from 16 to 
8 .
1 Personal Communication, Bro Taf HA Chief Executive, summer 2002.
49
2 .13  Analytical Approaches to Health Policy: Implications for 
the Present Study
Academic analysts of post war health care policy-making have 
tended to fall into three broad groupings: structuralist, Marxist, 
and pluralist, in trying to understand and explain the underlying 
forces driving politicians’ and  policy makers’ decisions in the 
health care arena. Most com m entators recognize th a t a plethora of 
competing interests are come together in different combinations to 
effect health policy decisions. Marxist theorists tend to identify the 
different groupings of in terests along fairly entrenched economic, 
and therefore, class lines. Pluralists approach the topic somewhat 
less deterministically, perhaps, highlighting the rise and fall of 
different groups depending on the nature of the issue under 
discussion, and attributing fairly equal am ounts of influence to 
the different constituent groups. Alford, in his seminal (1975) 
study, is often credited with first identifying and best describing 
the structuralist perspective, claiming that the ways in which 
health care was organised significantly affected the distribution of 
power and influence throughout the health system (cited in Ham 
2004, p. 215). Alford pointed to three types of interest groups: 
dominant, challenging and repressed, and asserted th a t it was the 
interactions between these three groups that most accurately 
explained the way health care policy decisions were made.
Alford’s typology placed the medical profession and its powerful 
position in health care policy making in the ‘dom inant’ group,
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whose interests tended to control decision-making at both macro 
and micro levels. Alford noted that the interests of this dominant 
group were, however, under threat by the groups of interests tha t 
he termed 'corporate rationalisers': those responsible for health 
care adm inistration and planning (Ham 2004, p .215). This review 
has argued th a t the rise of a  new managerial class has been aimed 
a t curbing the powers of the predominant medical profession, in 
term s of resource allocation. Harrison, Hunter and Pollitt (1990, 
p .l  13) point, however, to the limited impact tha t the Griffiths- 
initiated reforms actually had, in practice, on medical dominance 
in policy and decision-making.
Arguably, the present th ru s t to increase the role of doctors in 
decision-making, begun formally with the introduction of Medical 
and Clinical Directors as an  essential prerequisite for gaining 
Trust sta tus, is tacit recognition of the continuing centrality of the 
profession's role in term s of health care policy and decision­
making. The Kennedy Report into the mistakes identified in the 
m anagem ent of children's heart surgery a t the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (2001) highlighted the need for more involvement of, and 
more training of, doctors in managem ent. Since 2003, UK health 
leaders have looked to the US for insights into managed care 
models and their operation. Ham et al (2003) compared the 
performance of Kaiser Perm anente's approach to chronic disease 
m anagem ent with th a t of the NHS, noting the much larger role for
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doctors in decision-making in the US model as a  significant 
feature in its success.
Paradoxically, however, such  moves to recognize an implicit reality 
in term s of power and influence, may also have served to further 
complicate the process of health  care policy analysis. Since 1987, 
the Labour government has prioritised effectiveness as a  policy 
and decision-making criterion. Setting up national bodies to agree 
(National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness) and set uniform 
standards of care and service delivery (National Service 
Frameworks) has been a  key policy plank underpinning the 
modernization agenda in health  care. Clinical and corporate 
governance arrangem ents a t organizational level have been 
created to support the delivery and monitoring of more uniform 
standards of care across geographical boundaries. The 
determination to promote evidence-based medicine has 
subsequently been m atched with calls for evidence based 
m anagem ent (see, for example, Davies and Nutley, 2000;
Crompton et al 2003; Shortell et al 2007) and in tu rn  evidence 
based policy. But this focus on ‘wha.t works’ may not be so 
appropriate in the policy m aking arena because it may give rise to 
an  impression of linearity and causality tha t is a t odds with the 
complex interactions of interests th a t combine to create policy 
decisions. Ham (2004, p. 113) quotes Easton’s 1953 definition of 
policy as a  “web of decisions and actions” driven by the allocation
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of values. As such, it is the result of a  complex mixture of social 
influences, with specific decisions often determined by a  wide 
variety of factors, of which evidence may be only one, and not 
necessarily always the strongest. Russell et al (2008) point to the 
dangers inherent in the notion that policy can be, or should be, 
“driven by facts ra ther th an  values...or tha t 'evidence’ is context- 
free” (p.40). Learmonth and Harding (2006) point to the disabling 
effects of the concept of evidence-based management “as it is 
currently constituted...[because] it describe[s] a world which does 
not exist in lived space” (p261). In their view, such 
conceptualization precludes consideration of forms of evidence 
other than  those relevant to managerialism, which might help us 
to understand  organizations and decision-making more fully.
This view has implications both for the analysis and 
understanding of health care policy making as well as for the 
development of leaders and organizations. It may have particular 
importance for the appropriate development of clinical leaders 
(Ham 2003; Grint 2001).
This study looks a t the way in which a  selected group of medical 
practitioners have worked to create and develop new organizations 
intended to transform  health care delivery in specific geographical 
areas.
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Ham (2004) and Harrison et al (1990) both point to the need for 
care in delineating the scope of policy analysis efforts, since w hat 
may be appropriate a t the macro level may not be helpful in 
illuminating the micro level of activity. Ham (2004, p. 228) notes 
the need for more empirical studies in this arena, particularly 
“related to the action and inaction of structural interests and the 
changing role and functions of the state” in relation to specific 
policy issues. These findings point to the emerging need for this 
study, tha t attem pts to look a t the interaction of key actors and 
structures in an  effort to shed light on the policy implementation 
process a t a  particular point in time: the creation and 
development of primary care organizations in Wales from 1999- 
2001 .
2 .1 4  Research Focus: The Present Study
Questions remain as to how appropriate the structural and 
organizational changes which took place actually were, in term s of 
the ways in which they helped or hindered the delivery of stated 
health care delivery objectives. How did the structural 
imperatives of decentralisation and devolution of responsibility to 
professionals a t local level play out in practice? What 
organizational features were incorporated to foster changes in 
service delivery on the ground? This study examines these 
questions by looking a t a  specific policy initiative and its 
implementation through the eyes of the key actors responsible for
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implementing it locally. The policy decision, taken in 1998, aimed 
to secure a  better m atch between local service delivery patterns 
and local needs, in the NHS in Wales, between 1999 and 2002. 
The policy instrum ents devised were structural: the new primary 
care organizations set up  on 1 April 1999, to oversee the 
operational delivery aspects of service provision, within a strategic 
framework to be set by five new health authorities across Wales. 
This study, therefore, set ou t to identify, empirically, factors that 
influenced the development of primary care organizations (LHGs) 
in Wales between 1999 and  2001, in order to try to understand 
what happened in term s of policy implementation, and why.
Specific research questions to be addressed were:
(1) W hat structural and organizational changes were made 
for the promotion and development of Local Health Groups?
(2) Given th a t the new organizations were m eant to create 
radical change a t local level, what leadership behaviours 
did the selected health  professionals apply to their roles as 
Chairmen, in term s of building organizations capable of 
change and development?
(3) W hat lessons can be learned for leadership and 
organisational reform, and policy implementation a t local 
level for the future?
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the research strategy and methods chosen 
to address the central aim of this study: an  exploration of the 
factors tha t influenced the development of primary care 
organizations (LHGs) in Wales between 1999 and 2001. The 
chapter outlines the research design, and the specific ways in 
which it addresses each research question. The chapter consists 
of four main sections: section 3.2 explains the choice of the case 
study approach as the research method. Section 3.3 justifies the 
selection of the role of Chairm an as the key actor and therefore 
focal point of the study. Section 3.4 argues the case for the choice 
of individual interviews as the method for collecting data. Validity 
issues are addressed in section 3.5. The conduct of the study is 
explained in section 3.6, while data analysis strategies are detailed 
in section 3.7. Section 3.8 sum m arises the chapter, and explains 
the ways in which ensuing chapters address each research 
question. These questions are repeated here for ease of reference:
(1) w hat structural and  organizational changes were made 
for the promotion and development of LHGs?
(2) w hat leadership behaviours did the selected health 
professionals apply to their roles as Chairmen, in term s of 
building organizations capable of change and development?
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(3) what lessons can be learned for leadership development, 
organizational reform and policy implementation a t local 
level?
3.2 Research Design: The Case Study Approach
Twenty two Local Health Groups, covering the whole of the 
principality, became operational on 1st April 1999 (see Map). Each 
consisted of a  Board of eighteen members, some elected and some 
selected. The range of skills and familiarity with health service 
language, culture and procedure could be expected to vary 
enormously among the eighteen members, including as they did 
two lay representatives, a  community nurse, a local authority 
officer, a  dentist, pharm acist, optician and six GPs. The guidance 
(Welsh Office 1998b) stipulated tha t the Chairman should be a 
practising GP. So the challenge for the researcher was how best 
to capture their experiences and perceptions, as they unfolded.
The process of the formation and development of the new LHGs 
could be viewed as a naturally occurring phenomenon, capable of 
direct observation (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). An exploratory 
approach would enable the researcher to study participants within 
their natural settings as they came together to form the new 
groups (Bowling, 2004). The research aims implied a  commitment 
to an  ethnographic approach, focused on exploring the nature of 
the social phenomenon presenting, rather than  on testing 
hypotheses about it (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998a). Moreover, the
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researcher wished to focus on “participants’ methods, definitions 
of order, explanations and assessm ents” (Pollner and Emmerson 
in Atkinson et al 2007 p. 119) in order to develop a framework for 
understanding the phenom enon of Local Health Group formation 
and development. Thus ethnographic features would need to be 
incorporated into the study design (Atkinson and Hammersley in 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1998a).
These considerations pointed towards taking a case study 
approach (Bowling, 2004, p.404). The phenomenon to be studied: 
the emergence and development of these new organisations, 
formed a discrete whole (22 LHGs) within a  bounded geographical 
and adm inistrative area (Wales). This area also had a degree of 
policy autonomy (Drakeford, 2006) from the rest of the UK, as a 
new Assembly government had been elected in 1998. These 
features conferred a  significant degree of distinctiveness to the 
LHGs. The “case” therefore would be the 22 LHGs themselves.
Because of the dynamic natu re  of the phenomenon to be studied, 
however, a  method tha t would enable the researcher to capture 
both the longitudinal and “processual” aspects (Pettigrew 1973) of 
the change experience would be needed. Selecting all twenty two 
LHGs would enable a comparative approach to analysis to be 
taken, as it could be assum ed th a t each LHG might respond
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differently, in light of their own specific context and perceptions of 
need, to the policy challenge presented to them.
However, the issue of access still remained: how best to capture 
the experiences of th is group given the practical limitations of time 
and resources available to conduct the study. In th is respect, 
Rosemary Stewart’s (1996) study of 20 newly appointed District 
General Managers (DGMs) across England and Wales, as part of a 
restructuring of the NHS in 1985, provided an im portant element 
of inspiration for the presen t study. Stewart selected 20 DGMs 
and interviewed them  a t regular intervals over the course of the 
next two years to elicit their views of their jobs and w hat they felt 
had gone well or badly. Stew art’s aim was to develop a definition 
of leadership and subsequently to base management development 
activities around this definition. Stewart had a team of four 
researchers, and funding from the NHSTA for the study, which 
consisted of semi structured  interviews, with lengthy initial and 
final interviews, averaging about 25 interviews per subject. The 
study resulted in a comprehensive analysis of the experience of 
the emergence of a new form of leadership within the NHS in the 
UK. It was one of the first studies of its kind, in the NHS, 
focussing as it did on the people responsible for policy 
implementation, and, in particular, on their experiences as they 
took on new roles. This work th u s  had a number of similarities 
with this researcher’s aims, in th a t it studied the impact of the
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creation of new roles as part of a major structural change; 
secondly, it explored individuals' experiences as they took up 
these new roles; thirdly, it focused on the individuals’ experience 
as a way of learning about the social whole; and, finally, it 
identifed implications for leadership development in the future. It 
was decided to construct a  similar study, though on a much 
smaller scale, sufficient to address the research questions 
specified, and a t the sam e time, commensurate with researcher 
time and available resources. The commitment to an  exploratory 
inductive approach would be central to the research activity.
3.2.1 Time Frame and Perspective
Focussing on the experiences of the twenty two LHGs, from 
formation to development, would enable “em phasis on the 
organization as an  ongoing system with a past, present, and a 
future” (Pettigrew, 1973, p. 268) to be built into the study design.
The study would be prospective, following the initial establishment 
and subsequent development of the LHGs over a  period of time. 
This would enable the social process of change and development 
to be explored. The researcher aimed to get as close as possible to 
the LHGs in order to learn how they interpreted their remit and 
developed plans to operationalise it. Ideally, some form of direct 
observation would have been appropriate. However the logistical 
difficulties of systematically observing 22 groups across Wales 
over a period of time whilst working full time m eant tha t a more
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focused -  and thus more limited - approach would have to be 
used. Furtherm ore the researcher, as a  senior manager within 
the agency responsible for leadership development in the NHS in 
Wales, wanted to avoid any hints that the study was an evaluation 
of progress of the new organisations. The aim was to focus on 
participants’ own understanding, to learn as m uch as possible 
about their experiences of the development process and pathway 
itself.
Therefore the researcher’s key aim remained the identification of 
the challenges and opportunities perceived by key players 
themselves. Previous primary care development studies had 
tended to focus on evaluation of either the implementation of 
policy directives, or, less frequently, of their outcomes. Such 
studies tended to be conducted from a “top-down” perspective. In 
this situation, however, the researcher sought to identify 
development opportunities and implementation barriers from the 
perspective of those directly responsible for implementing the new 
policy, 'on the ground’. By studying the implementation of the new 
policy as a  process, by focussing on a  major organisational change 
within a  specific health system, the aim was to create a picture of 
the drivers promoting, or inhibiting change, over time. It was 
hoped th a t identifying issues faced by social actors, a t field level, 
and in such a context, would contribute to improved 
understanding of the difficulties facing those responsible for
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implementing policy a t local level, and, ultimately help to inform 
the policy making process.
3.3  Selection o f the Chairman as Key Actor and Focal Point 
o f the Study
The role of LHG Chairm an was selected as the eventual focal point 
for the study. This individual, elected by GP peers bu t directly 
accountable to the Secretary of State for Health & Social Care, 
held primary responsibility for the creation and development of 
the new organisations and, ultimately, for the delivery of the 
LHG’s remit (Welsh Office 1998b). The Chairman, as the first 
appointm ent and lead figure, would also have a role in selecting 
many of the new Board members, and in selecting his General 
Manager (the accountable officer of the LHG). The Chairman 
would, therefore, have a major role in shaping the new 
organisation.
The role of Chairman was u n u su a l in another respect, namely its 
relative independence within the health care provider system. The 
Guidance Advice (Welsh Office 1998b) indicated tha t Chairmen -  
and independent contractor clinician Board members -  should be 
professionals actively practising in the locality. Whilst Board 
members were to be paid honorarium s as token recognition for the 
time they were devoting to the work, Chairmen were allocated 
designated sessions (2) for their duties. At the same time,
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however, as practising GPs, they each held additional sources of 
income, independent from their roles as Chairmen. Their income 
as practising professionals far exceeded the honorarium paid to 
them as Chairmen. Moreover, as local GPs, they lived in the 
communities they were elected to represent, and thus knew their 
‘patches’ well, with (on the whole) longstanding family ties to the 
area. They would be likely to be respected and recognisable local 
figures within their communities. And they would be unlikely to 
have been closely associated with the management community 
responsible for health  policy and decision-making. This added to 
their independence of viewpoint.
LHG General Managers were also possible focal points for the 
study. The General Managers however had complex 
accountabilities. They were appointed by Health Authority Chief 
Executives, and remained accountable to those Chief Executives, 
for the work of the LHGs as sub committees of the Health 
Authorities. They were required to work closely with Chairmen to 
create and develop the new organisations, but their salary slips 
came directly from the health authorities, as they remained health 
authority employees. The General Managers were also career NHS 
m anagers, and as such, would be likely to see themselves as 
responsible for implementing, rather than  changing, any central 
policy directives. In addition, any future career ambitions would 
be highly sensitive to perceived performance and loyalties in this
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role. In the researcher’s opinion, this ambiguous position 
incorporating potentially conflicting loyalties, might introduce an 
element of selective recall, and thus potential partiality into the 
study.
Mapping the development of the new organisations through the 
Chairm an’s eyes and ears would avoid any bias inherent in a more 
ambiguous role. However the Chairmen would also come into the 
role with a  particular perspective and set of experiences. Because, 
however, so few of them  had any prior management experience, 
they might bring a  freshness of perspective to the work. Most 
would be expected to bring a  high degree of local experience and 
sensitivity as well, which career managers, who by necessity need 
to move relatively rapidly across organisations in order to gain 
promotion, Were unlikely to be able to match.
Other members of the LHG Boards represented a  wide diversity of 
groups, with very few common features. Each of the other 
independent contractor professions was represented by only a 
single member in each locality. Nurses were represented by two 
representatives, drawn from an  unspecified variety of different 
specialties within the profession (e.g. Health Visitors, District 
Nurses, Midwives) and, though each would have made a 
fascinating group to study, drawing any generalizable conclusions 
from their collective insights might have proven problematic.
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Nurses did not have a  leading role to play in the development of 
the LHG per se: rather, they were one among many, with the same 
sta tus as other professionals on the Board. Given th a t a  key 
research question was the identification of leadership behaviours, 
the decision was made to focus on the Chairmen as the key actors 
in this study.
3.4  Data Collection: The Semi-Structured Interview
Having selected Chairm an as the focal point for the study, the 
issue of access largely determined the method of data gathering 
employed to carry out the research. The logistical problems 
involved in arranging access to 22 different groups across Wales, 
for the purpose of observation, have already been mentioned. 
Ideally, direct observation of LHG Board meetings might well have 
been the m ost desirable way to capture the experience of setting 
up and developing these new organisations. However, in the 
researcher’s experience as a senior NHS manager, Board meetings 
tend to be rather formalised affairs, with much of the decision 
making agreed informally outside of the meeting. For this reason, 
direct observation of Board meetings did not appear to offer the 
best opportunity to collect the “richest possible data” (Lofland and 
Lofland 1995). The researcher would only have been able to attend 
those Board meetings open to the public anyway. It was decided 
instead to collect Minutes of Board meetings and use these as a 
m eans of triangulating data gathered from other sources.
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3.4.1 Interviews as Data Collection Instrument 
Meeting with, and talking about the challenges and opportunities 
presenting themselves to the Chairmen, would offer insights into 
their own understanding of their roles and the issues they were 
identifying as im portant in carrying out those roles (Taylor, 2005 
p. 41). This in tu rn  would shed light on the extent to which they 
saw themselves as agents for change, what their motivations were 
and where their loyalties lay. Thus the proposed schedule of 
“intensive interviewing” was m eant to “discover the informant's 
experience of a  particular... situation” or experience (Lofland & 
Lofland, 1995). It would enable a relationship to be built up, over 
time, with each of the Chairmen that would draw out their own 
construction of their new worlds and the issues which struck 
them  as important. The decision was therefore made to carry out 
one-to-one interviews with each of the Chairmen over the next two 
years.
Interviews were guided, ra ther than  structured, allowing the social 
actors themselves to identify issues of importance to them  
(Mamoch et al 2000), thus enabling insights into both the process 
of development of the new organisations and the experience of 
developing them (Flynn et al, 1996). An interview guide was 
constructed, based on issues identified in the literature as likely to 
be pertinent, together with those issues identified by the 
researcher's previous study (Williams 2002). An Interview Guide
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was devised for each tranche of interviews. Table 3.1 is the first 
one. Subsequently, efforts were made to incorporate issues raised 
by Chairmen themselves, to test the relevance of these more 
broadly. In addition, each Chairman was sent a  sum m ary of his 
previous interview, together with a broad list of topics to be 
covered in the ensuing interview. An exemplar is listed in 
Appendix A.
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Table 3.1 Interview Guide Initial Interviews Summer 1999
Step 1: Establish Rapport Explain my interest in study; 
Professional background & 
current roles
Repeat study aims
Anticipated outcomes of 
study
Benefit to individual 
participant: ? 
reflection/PPDP points if 
wished
Benefit to me: PhD
Agree process Initial & Final Interviews: 
face-to-face;
Quarterly interviews: 
telephone
Get permission to 
record
Turn on Tape
Make sure tape is working
PROMPT: 
check red light!
Step 2: Start Interview 
“proper”:
1. Role of Chairman 
(Run up)
How did the interviewee 
approach the role of 
Chairman?
Why ran for election? 
What hoped to achieve?
PROMPT:
How do you see the 
Chairman’s role?
2. How found role once 
elected?
How do you see the role of 
Chair in situ?
Major surprises?
Aims changed?
PROMPTS:
Opportunities?
Constraints?
3. Training & 
Development Needs:
Did you ID any?
How did you go about 
meeting these?
PROMPTS:
What did you find 
helpful/not 
helpful?
4. Setting up the LHG How did you go about the 
mechanics of setting up the 
LHG?
PROMPTS:
Finding a base 
Developing 
relationships with 
the Board 
Introducing selves 
to public/the local 
community? 
Politicians /  press? 
Trusts?
5. LHG Aims Hopes for the next 3-6 
months?
Anticipated obstacles? 
Hoped for supports?
PROMPT:
Clinical governance 
issues?
Stage 3: Summary & 
Closure
Thanks for time 
Promise to send summary 
for review
Remind will contact in 3 
months for update
68
3.4.2 Problems o f Access
The first interview would be conducted face-to-face, and would 
establish a  form of baseline; subsequent interviews would explore 
Chairmen's views of their own, and their organisations' 
experiences over time. Interim  interviews were intended to be 
conducted by telephone, with the final interview, again to be 
conducted face-to-face. The initial and final interviews were 
expected to take about one hour; interim interviews were designed 
to be shorter. Initially, the researcher planned to carry out a 
series of three interviews per year, with each Chairman, over the 
course of the two year study. In practice, however, the experience 
of carrying out the initial interviews, in terms of access and 
duration, to say nothing of travel time, made it necessary to 
curtail this ambitious programme considerably. In the event, the 
initial interviews took an  average of one and a half hours -  one 
took three hours -  in addition to travel time. Because of the 
nature of the geography and transport links of Wales, travel time 
was often considerably out of proportion to distance, even though 
efforts were made to schedule interviews geographically: for 
example, undertaking all those based in North Wales over two 
days, bu t this still entailed an  additional two days' travelling time, 
all to fit with the dem ands of w hat were rapidly becoming the 
researcher’s two full-time jobs. In addition, the Chairmen's 
additional commitments and the requirements of their ‘day jobs' 
severely limited the opportunity to schedule interviews in
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geographical groupings, or to suit the researcher's convenience. 
Despite their willingness to participate in the study, the 
constraints on their time were many and the researcher was 
grateful to get into their diaries a t all.
. 3.4.3 Enrolling study participants 
The researcher had contributed to the design of the development 
programme created (under the auspices of the NHS Staff College 
Wales) to prepare the newly elected Chairmen for their new roles. 
As part of this process, the researcher attended the final two day 
study block for the Chairmen, on 1-2 July 1999. This study block 
provided an  opportunity to speak with individual Chairmen and to 
invite them  to participate in the study. It became clear at this 
meeting, however, tha t the Chairmen were interested in forming 
their own peer group by this time. Indeed one of the aims of the 
development programme had been to bring them together to begin 
sharing their learning as they took up  their new responsibilities.
From the perspective of prim aiy care development this was a very 
good thing, bu t from the perspective of the researcher it had a 
definite down side in that, as a  group, they were becoming 
protective of their collective privacy. They decided, for example, to 
meet quarterly as an  all Wales group. They did not agree to the 
presence of “outsiders” a t these group meetings. Eventually, I was 
able to participate in, and observe, selected development activities;
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nonetheless, the one-to-one interview process remained the 
principal data collection tool.
Following the Study Days held on 1st and 2nd July 1999, the 
researcher wrote individually to each Chairman, formally inviting 
him  to participate in the study. The letters explained the purpose 
of the study, the research method and tools, and the efforts th a t 
would be made to safeguard each individual's confidentiality 
throughout the study (Appendix A). The letters included a tear off 
slip, to be signed in agreem ent to participate in the study, together 
with relevant contact details.
This study took place before current Medical Research Ethical 
Committee requirements had been designed or implemented. It 
should be noted that, remarkably, all twenty two Chairmen agreed 
to participate in the study. All 22 Chairmen remained enrolled in 
the study throughout its duration.
3.5  Validity Issues
The research method adopted was designed to elicit individual 
actors' subjective impressions, experiences and views in order to 
discover the meanings they attributed to their interactions with 
other key actors and agencies within the health and social care 
system in Wales. In order to aid critical reflection and analysis of 
these accounts, however, some mechanisms for validating the
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data would be necessary. Three approaches to this problem were 
adopted: participant validation; triangulation; and inclusion of all 
possible cases in the study design.
The first mechanism  for ensuring accuracy of interpretation was 
participant validation, gathered in two ways. Firstly, after each 
interview was transcribed, the researcher produced a  sum m aiy of 
the issues raised by the individual. This summary (see Appendix 
B for an exemplar) was sen t to each Chairman as an aide memoir, 
together with a  list of topics to be raised in the subsequent 
interview, two weeks before it was scheduled to take place. At the 
beginning of each successive interview, the participant was asked 
to comment on the sum m aiy and the researcher’s understanding 
of the points noted. Secondly, as the study progressed, and to aid 
interpretation of the emerging analyses, the researcher devised 
two additional frameworks. The first framework was a 
diagrammatic representation of the organizational landscape 
through which LHGs were making their ways. Chairmen were 
invited to comment on the accuracy of this diagram as a  map of 
their key stakeholders. This m ap was initially used to check the 
researcher’s understanding of the organizational context. As the 
analysis progressed, and the importance of relationship-building 
became clearer as central to the LHGs’ development as 
organizations, the researcher adapted the map as a tool for 
eliciting Chairm en’s perceptions of the relationships they were
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forming. The researcher subsequently added a  rating scale to the 
diagram to enable discussion of the quality of the relationships 
tha t Chairmen felt were developing with each of the relevant 
organizations, over time.
Secondly, during the second tranche of interviews it became clear 
tha t a num ber of different forces were affecting LHG development. 
The researcher constructed a  chart along the lines of Lewin’s 
(1951) Force Field Analysis to try to capture the range of these 
forces and their impact. Lewin’s diagrammatic tool was devised as 
a m eans of analysing organizational contexts in term s of the 
likelihood of a  proposed change being adopted. Essentially, it 
enables mapping of factors promoting the adoption of a  change on 
the left hand side, juxtaposed by factors likely to hinder adoption 
on the right hand side, with arrows of different sizes to denote 
differences in strength. Again, in th is study, participants were 
asked to comment on the extent to which the researcher’s analysis 
reflected their own understanding and interpretation of their 
world.
As interview prom pts these two tools were valuable; they were 
useful m eans of checking the validity of the researcher’s emerging 
interpretations (Miles and Huberm an 1994). However the 
relationship indicator was not m eant to be, and proved not to be, 
wholly successful as a  m easurem ent tool. Respondents varied in
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their receptivity to, and use of, the tool, with some Chairmen 
expressing discomfort with using it. The researcher was also 
anxious to avoid leading the respondents too much in one 
direction, a t the expense of providing space for them to raise their 
own issues, within the limited periods of time available for 
interviews. Nonetheless, both the organizational map and the 
Force Field diagram provided useful frameworks for the 
researcher, against which to test her own emerging understanding 
and interpretation of the d ata  with participants.
3.5.1 Potential Threats to Validity Participant validation is 
recognised to be imperfect (Bloor, 1983 cited in Maxwell, 1996). 
Maxwell (1996, p. 94) cites G uba’s and Lincoln’s (1989) view that 
“systematically soliciting feedback from the people you are 
studying...is the single m ost im portant way of ruling out 
m isinterpretation”. But Bloor is reported by Maxwell (1996) to 
counsel caution, noting th a t participants’ responses to the 
researcher’s analysis can only be taken as evidence regarding the 
validity of th a t account. In other words, the participants’ 
accounts are not, in themselves, necessarily valid; hence the need 
for corroboration from other sources.
Two points are im portant to note here. The first is the reminder 
tha t it is participants’ own experiences tha t are of prime interest 
in this study. The aim throughout has been to capture the
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participants’ own perceptions, values and meanings th a t they 
attribute to their actions and those of others: in other words, 
relative not absolute “tru th ”. The aim is to build a  picture of their 
world, in order to understand  more fully the actions they took to 
develop their organizations and why (Miller and Glassner 2006, pp 
126-7). It is only by getting closer to their understanding of the 
world in which they found themselves, as change agents, tha t we 
can hope to understand the reality of the policy implementation 
process on the ground.
Secondly, therefore, triangulating the interview data with 
documentary evidence from Minutes of LHG Boards, and policy 
documents, was an appropriate strategy for testing the validity of 
interview data. Denzin referred to this as validation by data 
source (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 267). In line with this 
strategy, each LHG was written to, requesting a full set of the 
Minutes of all public Board meetings held between 1st April 1999 
and 31st March 2003, i.e. covering the full time span of their 
existence. This combination of data  collection methods: 
structured questionnaire and guided personal interviews, limited 
participant observation, and docum entary analysis was intended 
to build a  detailed understanding of the context as well as of the 
process of development, thus contributing to the growing body of 
policy ethnography in the NHS (Flynn et al, 1996).
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Thirdly, the inclusion of all twenty two LHGs in the study was 
useful in reducing potential bias because it enabled constant, on­
going com parisons to be made. This enabled continuous testing 
and re-testing of emerging findings (Maxwell, 1996). Participants’ 
own feedback served to provide an additional check on the validity 
of the researcher’s emerging analyses.
3.5.2 Researcher Bias Commentators have, however, also noted 
the extent to which researchers can influence the research setting 
and its participants (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 265). To 
minimise potential effects like this, and to prepare to introduce 
herself to the study participants, the researcher prepared a 
personal profile. This was also helpful in carrying out the 
interviews, because it enabled the researcher to think about how 
to develop an atm osphere of trust, to gain insight into her 
interactions with the study subjects, and, also, into her own 
interviewing techniques.
In addition, Miles and Huberman suggest a  number of steps tha t 
can help to reduce researcher bias (1994, p. 266). In line with 
participants’ time and space constraints, interviews were held in a 
wide variety of settings, including Chairm en’s own surgeries, 
practice libraries and, in some cases, own homes. For example, a t 
the beginning of the study, few LHGs had premises of their own, 
leaving Chairmen to identify and procure them as one of their first
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duties once appointed. Taking field notes from each setting 
helped to identify and ‘ground' some of the challenges facing 
Chairmen in the early m onths of the study. Towards the end of 
the study, when m ost LHGs had acquired their own premises, 
meeting Chairmen there emphasized the development th a t had 
" actually taken place in the intervening period of time. In addition, 
the researcher made specific, systematic and continuous efforts to 
clarify her own purpose in conducting the study, through initial 
letters of invitation, followed up  by invitations to specific 
interviews, the interview schedule, and the summaries prepared 
for each Chairm an following each interview (Appendix B: 
Exemplar).
Inevitably, too, the researcher can be a source of potential bias, in 
this type of research. Again, led by Miles' and Huberman's (1994) 
suggestions for reducing this, visits to the participants' work sites 
were spread out over six m onth periods over the course of the 
three years of the study, th u s  minimising her impact on the 
research sites. In addition, the researcher's work brought her into 
contact with a  num ber of policy m akers and advisors throughout 
the period of the study. Naturally, these people made com ments 
about the policy implementation process from their perspectives. 
Some of these yielded m aterial directly relevant to the study. In 
such cases, the researcher was careful to make detailed notes. 
These provided a useful com parator for the researcher. In the
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same way, observing a key meeting of the Assembly government’s 
Health and Social Services Committee provided further 
opportunity to gain insight into the policy intentions being 
promulgated, and the forces driving them. Every effort was also 
made, throughout the study, to think conceptually (Miles and 
Huberman 1994, p .266). The analytical frameworks constructed 
to elicit participant feedback on emerging interpretations 
exemplify such efforts. Nonetheless, the researcher became 
increasingly aware of the potential biases inherent in her own 
position within the health  system, and the potential impact that 
assum ptions implicit in her own work role might have on the 
subsequent interpretation and analysis of data. To address this 
aspect of potential bias, the researcher has tried to make these as 
explicit as possible throughout the study, from design to analysis. 
In this way the researcher’s own understanding of the context is 
made as transparen t as possible.
The two development programmes tha t the researcher participated 
in and observed took place in 2000 and in 2001. The first 
focussed on developing the key relationship between Chairman 
and General Manager; the second looked at leadership styles and 
skills. The latter programme was designed to prepare Chairmen 
for what they perceived to be a  stronger leadership role 
appropriate for the new organisations which it seemed likely 
would be created once health authorities were wound up. Both of
78
these two-day programmes provided insights into issues the 
Chairmen had identified as important to their own development 
and tha t of their organisations. As such they served again to help 
validate data collected from the interview process rather than  to 
generate new data. In addition the researcher's professional role 
required attendance a t various LHG Conferences. Meetings with 
senior NHS Wales and Assembly officers were also part and parcel 
of the researcher's working life. This created opportunities for 
observation th a t were valuable in terms of supporting or refuting 
emerging hypotheses. Relevant observations and comments are 
noted in the text in footnotes where referred to in ensuing 
chapters reporting on the results of the analysis.
3 .6  Conduct o f the study
All interviews were carried out on a one-to-one basis. Each 
Chairman was written to personally, inviting him to participate in 
the study, and enclosing written consent forms. Guarantees of 
confidentiality were also given. Care needed to be taken to ensure 
that no h in t of information divulged by one Chairman was ever 
shared with another. The interviews took place a t roughly 6-9 
month intervals between August 1999 and December 2001, as the 
Table below shows (Table 3.2):
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Table 3.2 Interview Schedule
Initial
Tranche
Interim
Tranche
Final Tranche
August -
December
1999
March-July
2000
June -  October 
2001
As noted above, all 22 Chairmen agreed to participate in the 
study; all 22 continued to participate throughout the course of the 
study, apart from three, who had resigned from the role during 
the course of the study. In all three of those cases, their 
replacements agreed to, and continued to, participate. This high 
level of participation over the course of a two year study was very 
rewarding. It may have been -  and indeed several Chairmen 
commented tha t this was the case -  that they found the interview 
process a useful opportunity for reflection. The researcher tried to 
develop a relationship of tru s t with each of the participants, and 
to maintain it by scrupulously respecting their confidentiality. 
Some of the emerging analyses were reported to two all Wales 
Primary Care Research seminars, and to two international 
conferences on strategic issues in healthcare management, but 
stringent efforts were made to ensure that no comments were 
attributable to individuals. This required special care as such a 
small group of high profile people could be easily identifiable 
within a community as small and relatively closed as NHS Wales. 
Nor was any data, or analysis, made available to the Welsh
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Assembly Government a t any stage, though some interest was 
expressed.
3.6.1. Timescale Finally the length of time needed to conduct, 
transcribe, sum m arise and feedback the interviews to the 
participants, and then  to carry out the analyses, m eant tha t the 
original intention to carry out interviews at quarterly intervals was 
wildly ambitious and impractical. The original interval schedule 
was thus pared down to three interviews per Chairman over the 
course of the three year study; this produced 67 interview 
transcripts in all (in one case both the retiring Chairmen and the 
new Chairmen gave interviews). Nonetheless, the study design and 
method adopted enabled the researcher to capture the processual 
nature of the organizational change in question, as recommended 
by Pettigrew (1996).
In the event, and this would have been impossible to have 
predicted a t the outset of the study, the time period of the study 
matched the lifespan of the LHGs as organizations. The decision 
to abolish health authorities was announced in January  2001, 
with the publication of the NHS Plan for Wales, Improving Health 
in Wales (NAW 2001). From 1st April 2003, LHGs were 
transformed into statutory agencies, Local Health Boards, with 
responsibility for commissioning and providing primary care
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services to their local populations. The organizational boundaries, 
coterminous with local authorities, remained intact.
3 .7  Data Analysis
Each interview was recorded by the researcher, whether it was 
undertaken face-to-face or by telephone, using electronic devices. 
In addition, the researcher took her own notes during each 
interview. Field notes were also made, after each interview, to 
record the researcher’s initial impressions of the interview setting 
and the interview process. These served as useful checks on 
understanding throughout the study. For example, notes on the 
researcher’s impressions of the site at which each interview took 
place, and the potential impact the conditions noted had on the 
individual Chairm an’s challenges in carrying out his new role (eg 
lack of personal space, or office support, or premises for the LHG 
and the impact on developing organizational identity) were 
captured. Subsequently these helped to inform analysis.
Each tape was checked hy  the researcher, immediately following 
the end of each interview. In one or two cases, perhaps inevitably, 
the tape had malfunctioned. In both of those cases, the 
researcher immediately checked her own notes and, by 
transcribing them  virtually immediately, was able to reconstruct 
the main elements of the interview. The subject’s verification of 
the substance of the interview was invaluable in such cases too.
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In all cases, interview transcripts were listened to, by the 
researcher, and transcribed within two days following the 
interview. As the interviews progressed and the transcriptions 
became more time consuming, an external resource was employed 
to assist the researcher with the mechanics of transcription. This 
ensured that all tapes were transcribed within a  reasonably short 
timeframe following the interviews. In these cases the researcher 
again checked each transcription by following it line by line while 
listening to the tape. This ensured tha t nuances of speech were 
captured and aided understanding and interpretation. This 
approach helped to ensure th a t attention was paid to the details 
th a t contribute to understanding of the individual actor’s meaning 
within the whole context (Potter and Weatherell, 2000).
3.7 .1 Analytical Techniques Each individual transcript was coded, 
line by line, by hand, by the researcher. Because the interviews 
were often conducted in batches for geographical reasons, it was 
easier to find oneself immersed in the data, during analysis. This 
helped in “searching out patterns” and the identification of 
phenomena, “and being sensitive to inconsistencies” (Bryman and 
Burgess 2000, p. 6-7). Clearly, the interview guides themselves 
provided an initial and rudim entary indicative coding frame.
After the first ten interviews were addressed this way, the 
researcher began using colour codes to identify emerging 
groupings of concepts across transcripts, using highlighters and
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matching self-sticking plastic tabs. These groupings were tested, 
against each transcript, as possible themes. This process of 
referring back and forth between categories emerging and the data 
itself, enabled the researcher to make connections between the 
categories, in a form of ‘axial coding" (Biyman and Burgess 2000,
" p. 5). This process was further aided by writing analytical memos 
throughout the process of analysis. This helped to capture 
insights generated and to access them again, a t later stages in the 
study. Such memos proved to be invaluable throughout the 
(lengthy and frequently interrupted) period of analysis, theory 
generation, and writing up  (Bryman and Burgess, 2000, p. 5). 
Where relevant them es emerged from preliminary analysis, they 
were incorporated into the interview guide for inclusion in 
subsequent interviews, so th a t data analysis continually informed 
data collection (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001, p. 161).
In late 1999, the researcher entered the first twenty transcripts 
into NU*DIST for electronic analysis. The researcher had attended 
a course on using NU*DIST and had hoped that using the package 
would be an aid to data analysis throughout the study. The 
researcher’s experience of using the package, however, was not 
wholly positive. The researcher felt that a  degree of distance from 
the data was created by using this approach. This distance had 
the effect of reducing researcher control and thus confidence in
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understanding and interpretation. As Jennifer Mason (2000, p. 
108) has noted:
“computers cannot perform the creative and intellectual task of devising 
categories, or of deciding which categories ...sire relevant.... Or what is a 
meaningful comparison, or of generating appropriate research questions 
and propositions with which to interrogate the data...”
For this reason, the researcher discarded the electronic approach 
and returned to using a  m anual approach to coding and analysis 
throughout the study. Although the manual approach did not 
make it easy or quick to retrieve data, the researcher was able to 
m aintain close contact with the data.
Each wave of interviews -  initial, interim, and final -  were 
analysed individually and then collectively within “waves”. In 
addition, vertical slices were taken to try to get a fuller 
understanding of the processes and context. During this process 
a  parallel “time line” (Appendix C) was created by the researcher, 
noting significant policy events and announcements from the 
WAG, which would be expected to have an impact on the concerns 
of Chairmen during this period. The time-line was used to help 
further triangulate the interview data.
3.7.2 Analytical frameworks applied Throughout the analysis, 
special attention was paid to participants' own words in an effort 
to understand the specific meanings they attached to their own 
actions, and those of other agencies. Weick’s (1995) work on the 
way individuals and groups make sense of their environments was
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an im portant analytical aid to understanding meanings and 
concepts generated, prompting the researcher to look more deeply 
into the subtleties of Chairmen’s discourses.
In addition, the relationships the Chairmen formed and the value 
they placed on those relationships was particularly noteworthy 
and significant in the context of this study. During the course of 
writing up  the data, a  typology created by Schulter and Lee (1993) 
for the Tavistock Foundation and later adapted by Meads (2001) 
for use with primary care organizations in England (see Chapters 
7-9) was especially helpful in organising the reporting of the 
relationships th a t were developing throughout the study. This 
typology was not used as a  measuring tool in this study, but as a 
reporting device.
An additional theoretical framework was identified by the 
researcher towards the end of the period of data analysis and 
interpretation. The concept of organizational receptivity to 
change, was first written about in relation to public sector 
organizations, by Pettigrew, and later amplified by Pettigrew, Ferlie 
and McKee (1992). But Butler applied the framework to public 
sector organizations in 2003. Butler’s application was particularly 
helpful to the researcher in helping to build theory from the data 
gathered in this study. Butler defined receptivity as a series of 
features, or patterns of associations, which appear to contribute to
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enabling an organisation to adapt and change. Receptivity factors 
are dynamic, and, therefore, indeterminate in outcome, so are best 
identified over time. They are also likely to be context-driven and 
specific. Butler’s work was based on the study of existing and well 
established local authority organizations. The factors he identified 
emerged from a case study of the ways in which the two 
organizations responded to government-initiated policy directives 
on contracting out. This study on the other hand examines new 
emergent organizations. Nonetheless the concept proved useful to 
generating further understanding in this study.
3 .8  Summary
As stated a t the outset of this chapter, the research aim was to 
explore factors tha t influenced the development of LHGs in Wales 
between 1999 and 2001. The setting chosen was Wales, because it 
offered a  discrete geographical and policy arena. The specific case 
to be studied consisted of the twenty-two Local Health Groups 
created on 1st April 1999. An exploratory inductive approach was 
the research method selected as m ost appropriate for addressing 
the research aim. The LHG Chairmen were selected as principal 
actors whose experiences would be captured, throughout the 
study period, using one-to-one semi structured interviews. 
Analysis was conducted according to principles of grounded 
theory.
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The next chapters, 4 through 10, give the results of the study. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine in detail the context in which the study 
took place, focussing on the different structural arrangem ents 
created, their intentions and their effects in practice, and thus 
address research question 1. Chapter 6 examines the 
characteristics th a t Chairmen, the key actors in this study, 
brought to their roles and their implications, thus addressing 
research question 2. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 examine the horizontal 
and vertical relationships formed by chairmen, and their 
importance in term s of the development of LHGs. These chapters 
address research question 2, identifying specific leadership 
behaviours relevant to Butler's 'institutional politics’. Chapter 10 
examines the assets identified and applied by Chairmen to the 
task  of building and developing their new organizations, thus 
addressing research question 2. Chapter 11 discusses the 
implications of the results and concludes the study with 
recommendations applicable to leadership and organizational 
development and policy implementation, along with suggestions 
for further research, addressing research question 3.
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C hapter 4: S tru ctu ra l In flu en ces on  LHGs: L ocatin g D ecisio n ­
m aking in  NHS W ales 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2
4.1 Introduction
This chapter, and the next one, address the first research 
question: the nature of the structural influences on LHG 
development. This chapter examines the vertical, or hierarchical, 
linkages with LHGs, illustrated in Figure 4.1; chapter 5 analyses 
the horizontal connections with LHGs. Figure 4.1 shows the 
organizational landscape of NHS Wales during the period under 
study. The solid bold lines indicate existing connections between 
organizations; the larger bold arrows point to the hierarchical 
relationships; dotted lines indicate new connections needing to be 
created, to implement the policy directive to build partnerships to 
improve service integration. The wide variety of stakeholders 
arises from the policy directive to increase responsiveness to the 
local community. Section 4.2 explains the roles, term s of 
reference, and structure of LHGs arising out of the 1998 policy 
decision to create primary care organizations across the UK. 
Section 4.3 examines the structural links between the LHGs and 
the National Assembly for Wales (NAW). Section 4.4 examines the 
structural links between LHGs and the five health authorities 
across Wales. Section 4.5 sum m arises the chapter, and its 
relationship to the research questions posed a t the beginning of 
the study.
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Figure 4.1: Key LHG Stakeholders in Wales 
National Assembly for Walesx
Health Authority
Politicians^
(AMs, MPs) ' ' '
Local Authority.:
Local Health Allianc^S^
NHS Trusts
Press/M edia
✓*
/t►
Volun­
tary
Sector
Professional 
Communities 
(Independent 
(Contractors, 
Nurses, PAMs, 
etc) LMCs
General Public: 
CHCs
Local community 
Local politicians
Key:
R elationships already in existence: eg Trust<->HA: solid  lin es 
R elationships to be forged by LHG: dotted lines
Bold type/larger font: more established players w ith  
statutory power and authority in  the system
Plain type /sm aller font sizes: advisory relationships and potential 
to influence rather than direct LHGs
Source: Developed by researcher in February 2000, following first tranche of 
interviews, in order to elicit participants’ views of emerging analysis and 
interpretation in 2nd tranche of interviews during Summer 2000.
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The study draws on interview data1, supplemented with grey 
literature and M inutes of LHG Board meetings, to analyse the 
distribution of power and influence within NHS Wales in 1999, as 
a  backdrop to locating the decision-making points within the 
health system, and illustrating the ways in which the new 
structures facilitated or impeded the development of LHGs, 
between April 1999 and October 2001.
The key stakeholder groups included in this discussion, and 
shown in Figure 4.1, comprise all those with whom LHG 
Chairmen were trying to build positive relationships: firstly, 
looking vertically, the newly-formed Welsh Assembly (NAW, later 
WAG), and within th a t the NHS Directorate; and the Health 
Authorities (HAs); then, looking horizontally, Local Government, 
including Social Services departm ents and Local Health Alliances 
(LHAs); NHS Trusts; Local Medical Committees (LMCs) - and to 
some extent other Local Professional Committees (LPCs) 
representing the remaining independent contractor groups; 
educationalists; Community Health Councils (CHCs) and 
voluntary organisations; and, of course, the media. Apart from 
the LHAs, these agencies pre-dated the establishment of LHGs. 
All of them, however, could be said to have had a strong interest 
in primary care development within their local communities. This
1 Data excerpts used throughout the dissertation are taken from transcripts of interviews with 
Chairmen. Each Chairman was assigned a three digit code at the beginning of the study. The 
single digit suffix refers to the relevant interview tranche, followed by the date on which the 
interview took place. In addition selected sections of the excerpts are put in bold type to aid 
reader understanding.
chapter, therefore, focuses on the impact that the new structural 
arrangem ents had on the vertical distribution of power and 
influence within NHS Wales.
Together chapters 4 and 5 explore the political and cultural 
context in which the specific case under study is situated, thereby 
addressing the first research question. In so doing, they set the 
stage to examine the notion of ‘organizational receptivity’ 
(Pettigrew et al 1992; Butler 2003) to change, as indicative of an 
organization’s capacity to react positively and constructively to 
new government policy initiatives. The analysis suggests that, 
despite all the good intentions to strengthen primary care 
enshrined in policy and rhetoric, the structural changes made 
were inadequate to the task. The organizational restructuring 
effected, though extensive, appears to have had little impact on 
the dynamics operating within the health system in Wales, or on 
the distribution of power and influence within it, during the years 
under study.
LHGs V ent live’ on 1st April 1999, officially charged with 
improving the health of their local populations (Welsh Office 
1998b). How did other stakeholders react to this new 
organisation? These reactions can be analysed in terms of the 
structural changes introduced and the impact these changes had 
on the behaviours of the key actors involved. Specifically, it is
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argued here tha t the structural changes themselves had a 
determining effect on the location of decision-making throughout 
the system. Analysis of the extent to which the newly appointed 
Chairmen, as key actors within the system, were then able to 
influence the  subsequent development of the new LHGs forms the 
subject of this thesis.
“....the Health Service conducts its business in this kind of fragmented 
and sort of factional way, really. In a way it seem s to  be a system  
where it arms the various groups, and then enables them to have a 
sort of open house -  not to say guerrilla warfare because that’s too 
negative -  but.. .there seem s to  be a kind of th icket o f different 
groups w ith their in terests, but making clear progress quite 
difficult really....” (006.3: 16.07.01)
This LHG Chairman's view of the LHGs' development process,
after nearly three years in post, is salutary. His frustration with
the lack of “progress” was common across virtually all Chairmen,
and the frustration they experienced continued to grow over time,
from a feeling of impatience to get on with the job -  and to be freed
up to do so -  in early sum m er 1999, to a general perception of
being actively hindered from delivering the vision they felt
themselves to have been appointed to achieve, by sum m er 2001.
This analysis focuses on organizational re-structuring, and the 
resulting interplay between agencies, context and actors (McNulty 
and Ferlie 2004; McAuliffe and McKenzie 2007). It examines the 
forces marshalled by different agencies, both individually and 
collectively, to influence the actions of others. This microanalysis 
thus traces the roles of interest groups and government in relation 
to the specific policy of establishing a  primary care focussed NHS
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in Wales (Pollitt, Burchill and Putnam 1998), based on an 
examination of organisational structures and their impact on 
individual behaviours (Lipsky 1980). The assum ption is that, in 
any organisation or system, a  number of interests operate 
simultaneously, and  often these interests conflict with each other. 
Organisational structu res can enhance or decrease the potential 
for mutually advantageous adjustm ent of these conflicting 
interests. Examining the extent to which the new structures 
created helped to encourage -  or worked to impede - 
implementation of th is espoused policy will contribute to 
increased understanding of “the mechanisms by which essentially 
antagonistic or divergent interests are adjusted (Dahrendorf, cited 
in Lipsky 1980 p. 17). The analysis proceeds to examine the extent 
to which any collective actions identified could be seen as 
significant “system realignm ents” (Hartley 2002).
As Figure 4.1 illustrates, LHGs could be said to have been created 
in the m idst of a  fairly crowded organizational landscape. The 
existing organizations could be categorized as key stakeholders, 
holding a strong interest in primary care activity. How did their 
roles and responsibilities complement or conflict with those of the 
new organizations?
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4 .2  Establishing LHGs: Structure, Membership, and Terms o f  
Reference
Putting Patients First (Welsh Office 1998a, paragraph 4.19) 
specifically states th a t the rationale behind setting up the new 
Local Health Groups was “to ensure that primary care is 
empowered and supported to improve the health of their local 
population”. LHGs were constituted, therefore, so as:
“to give GPs and other local stakeholders the opportunity to take 
increasing responsibility for shaping health services to meet local need 
and by taking responsibility for commissioning local health care” (Welsh 
Office 1998a).
The Guidance Advice (Welsh Office 1998b, p.l) emphasized the 
pivotal role tha t LHGs were expected to play, stressing th a t they 
“m ust be vehicles for decision-making not ju st maintaining the 
sta tus quo”, and laid out the three core areas of responsibility, 
shown in Table 4.1.
It is also im portant to note, in light of subsequent events, two 
additional directives included in the document. Firstly, the 
Guidance Advice em phasised that, although LHGs were initially 
being established as sub committees of health authorities, they 
would “be encouraged to take on greater autonomy and 
responsibility”, tha t criteria for assessing this would be agreed 
early in 1999, and that LHGs would take on “direct responsibility 
for commissioning” from April 2000 (p3). Secondly, in addition to 
the roles, outlined in Table 4.1, the Guidance Advice specifically 
noted the need for LHG Board members “to act corporately” in
Table 4.1: The Role o f LHGs
AIMS OBJECTIVES
Development of local Health 
Improvement Plans:
“Implementing the HIP 
should be a t the heart of the 
LHG agenda”
1. Proposing priorities and 
opportunities for the development 
of primary health care
2. identifying local health needs
3. focusing on the quality of services 
provided for local communities
4. building effective links with local 
partners in health
Developing the principles of 
clinical governance to 
improve the quality of 
primary health care
1. HAs and LHGs will agree quality 
markers and offer, where 
appropriate, expert support
2. LHGs must demonstrate a 
systematic approach to developing 
and monitoring clinical standards
3. Each LHG will elect a senior 
clinical professional to take the 
lead on clinical standards and 
professional development as part of 
the group’s overall responsibility to 
demonstrate that quality of care is 
a key value.
4. LHGs will need to develop the 
support of other members of the 
LHG, perhaps through the 
formation of a multidisciplinary 
Quality sub group...link[ed]to other 
local national and international 
experts and appropriate 
networks...This group would be 
accountable to the Chair of the 
LHG.
5. Individual health professional 
[members]...will be expected to 
develop the qualify of services and 
to demonstrate that they are doing 
so through clear reporting 
arrangements.
6. LHG performance will be 
monitored by the health authority.
Informing and developing 
the commissioning of 
hospital and community 
services
1. LHGs will be encouraged to take on 
greater authority and responsibility
2. LHGs will...take direct 
responsibility for commissioning a 
range of agreed local services from 
April 2000
Source: Adapted from Working For Patients: Establishing Local Health Groups 
Welsh Office 1998b
96
terms of securing local engagement and implementation of LHG 
decisions. It also noted the need for LHGs to “engage closely with 
local professional advisory machinery” (p.4).
In pursuit of these policy aims, LHGs were constituted as 
management boards of 18 people, as Table 4.2 shows. GP 
representatives were to be elected by ballot from amongst the local 
medical community, with elections run  by the Local Medical 
Committee (LMC). Other professional representatives were 
selected by interview panels conducted by their relevant Local 
Professional Committees (LPCs). Local authorities were asked to 
nominate two senior officers; health authorities were also expected 
to do the same, and to specify an additional individual as 
Responsible Officer.
These designated representatives were intended to embed 
partnership working in the structure of the Boards themselves. 
Public involvement was fostered by the representation on the 
Board of two people nominated by the relevant umbrella 
organizations for the voluntary sector and the local community. 
Thus the composition of the new organizations matched the policy 
aims articulated in Putting Patients First (Welsh Office 1998a).
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Table 4 .2  C onstitution o f the LHG: Board Membership
C onstituent Group R epresentation Selection
Process
GPs 6: 1 of whom would be 
elected as Chairperson
Election via LMC
Dentists 1 nominated by local 
peers via LDC
Selection via 
Appointment 
Panel
Pharmacists 1 nominated by local 
peers via LPC
Selection via 
Appointment 
Panel
Opticians 1 nominated by local 
peers via LPC
Selection via 
Appointment 
Panel
Nurses 2 nominated by local 
peers
Selection via 
Appointment 
Panel
Health Authority 2 1 to be 
designated 
Responsible 
Officer (GM)
Local Authority 2 senior officers
Local Community 2 Proposed by local
umbrella
voluntary
organisation and
local community
council
respectively
Source: Welsh Office 1998b: Putting Patients First: Estab ishing LHGs
Responsiveness was further encouraged by the stipulation tha t 
LHGs would hold meetings in public, and would ensure tha t 
appropriate arrangem ents were in place to enable local people to 
attend LHG Board meetings. But how did the structural supports 
tha t were built in to the system help facilitate the effective 
implementation of the LHG’s new roles? What decisions, in w hat 
spheres of activity, were they free to take?
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Perhaps significantly, on 1st April 1999, the birth of the new 
organisations was a  surprisingly quiet affair, with little in the way 
of ceremony or publicity. This lack of fanfare is an interesting 
juxtaposition with the espoused scale of the LHG’s remit. Despite 
such an inauspicious start, the LHGs had, potentially, strong 
support for their new roles. The policy intention was ostensibly 
clear, and aligned with UK policy to devolve decision-making to 
local level, as well as to empower clinicians to make improvements 
to their services in line with local needs. The newly elected 
Minister for Health & Social Care took a personal interest in 
LHGs, as her willingness to address the Chairmen a t their 
induction training, and subsequent agreement to meet the 
Chairmen a t quarterly intervals, testified. And legislation to 
enable pooled budgets and the UK government’s decision to pump 
more funds into the health care provision system, in line with 
Derek W anless’s (DOH 2002) subsequent recommendations, were 
further concrete examples of direct interventions to support 
increased decision-making a t local level. Table 4.3 illustrates the 
facilitating forces (on the left hand  side) supporting LHG 
development. The right hand side shows the opposing forces, 
militating against the further development of LHGs. The Table, 
adapted from Lewin’s (1951) approach to mapping the interplay 
between opposing and resisting forces, uses bold type to indicate 
relative strength of the force in question. So, for example, in terms 
of the LHGs’ remit, the policy intention is clear, and thus helpful
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to LHG development. This clarity was later offset however by the 
failure to articulate clear development stages or pathway 
throughout the lifespan of LHGs. The Table will be used in the 
following sections of this chapter and the next one to illustrate 
specific points.
Table 4.3: Force Field Analysis: Pressures Facilitating & 
Inhibiting LHG Developm ent (Vertical Links) August 2000
Facilitating forces Inhibiting Forces
Putting Patients First: 
LHG’s remit
No defined developmental 
pathway for LHGs
LHGs’ statutory right to be 
consulted by Trusts
Trusts’ longer standing links 
direct to HA;
Lack of LHG decision-making 
powers as HA sub-committees
NAW agenda: inequality & access National UK government agenda: 
waiting lists and winter 
pressures
Establishment of All Wales Chairs 
Group & quarterly meetings with 
Health Minister
No statutory direct channel to
NAW & HA CEO presence at LHG 
Chair meetings
Changes in Personnel at senior 
levels: eg NHS D Director, HA 
CEOs
Devolved budgets: GMS, PCD Existing spends
Proportion of monies already 
allocated leaving marginal scope 
for manoeuvre
Skills deficit re preparation of 
effective Business Cases & short 
timescales required for 
production
New monies from Centre (June 
2000)
Proportion allocated for primary 
care
Local Health Alliances Local Authority re-structuring
Chairs/GMs Futures Group Organisational capacity
Key: The features in bold type indicate a more significant impact 
than  its opposite force.
Source: derived by researcher using interview data, as a tool for checking 
accuracy of interpretation with participants. August 2000. See Methodology for 
further details
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Despite being a  new organization, and partly because of their wide 
composition, LHGs had many potential allies locally. All 22 
Chairmen had been directly elected to their positions on the Board 
by members of their local professional advisory committees 
(LMCs): th is could have been seen as conferring a  degree of 
credibility and authority within the local professional 
communities1. In some cases, the LHG Chairman was himself a 
member of the Local Medical Committee:
“We have four LMC members on our [LHG] Board, but I think the 
relationship between the LMC and the Health Authority is [pause] has a 
history of being not too good, and I see no reason why the relationship 
shouldn’t be stronger...” (010.2: 06.04.00)
This Chairman clearly saw the LMC as a potential ally and bridge
to the rest of the GP community, and to the health authority.
However the relationship was not straightforward. LMCs had a
“history” as the previous quote indicates. Part of this history
included the LMC’s traditional role and focus on promoting the
professional interests of GPs, as a local trades union, in effect.
This focus may well have accounted for much of their credibility
among local GPs, bu t did little to allay suspicions of GP
dominance am ongst other professional groups represented on the
LHG Boards.
Another pu t the dilemma starkly:
We’ve set up quarterly meetings now between the LHG Chairman and 
the executives of the LMC. I reckon, well, we all recognise I think but I 
specifically recognise that unless we were going to get the LMC on
1 Subsequently, individuals were elected to the posts of Chairmen by the whole of the LHG 
Board membership.
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board, they could really make matters quite difficult because they would 
stop the devolution to your local health groups if they felt they are 
more likely to  get a hearing from the health authority with their 
statutory link, if  you like, than they would do through the LHGs.
(005.1: 26.10.99)
In this case, an  existing structural link between LMCs and their 
Health Authorities reinforced tendencies that might have been 
potentially conflicting with the needs of LHGs. Some LHG 
Chairmen addressed this constraint through diplomatic overtures. 
But the fact tha t such structural constraints were not addressed 
in setting up LHGs is significant: the new organisations were very 
much left to carve their own way through the thicket of existing 
agencies and their often overlapping functions.
However, the extent to which the LMC is representative of local 
medical opinion, or only of a  select group, is of course debatable, 
bu t it has traditionally been considered an important force locally 
(which was further legitimised by giving the LMC authority to hold 
LHG Chairm en’s elections in the first place), so steps taken to 
work alongside it could have been seen as an effective tool for 
securing the interest and engagement of local GPs.
The scale of this task  should not be underestimated, however, as 
the strength of the negative responses to a  survey carried out by 
the researcher in the run  up to LHGs (Williams 2002) discovered. 
The GMP community across Wales reported widespread 
scepticism about the democratic nature of the electoral process, 
as well as of its outcomes:
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“I feel very unhappy and demoralised at the way the elections 
went...since the old Mafia got voted in. It’s the same boys on the LMC 
and the same on the MAAG. None of us newcomers can get a look in at 
all” (SH7)
Still others complained tha t the elections in their areas had been 
dominated by “politicos,” rather than by “ordinary”, GPs: “It's 
almost a  problem of democracy: the GPs whoVe stood are acting 
politically, they're LMC-types...politics is the confounding factor” 
(FHGP 421.) Survey respondents also reported information deficits 
and practice commitments as significant constraints on their 
ability to participate in the electoral process, whilst those th a t did 
make the effort complained th a t they were none the 
wiser for having done so: “I've never seen anything like this. I've 
been to all the meetings but am none the wiser. It's never gotten 
off the ground here” (NFH7I). Out of 80 GPs polled in tha t survey, 
across Wales, only one reported optimism: “Potentially the best 
reforming idea yet.. I emphasize ‘potentially!’” (SH30I). The majority 
were unenthusiastic about the advent of LHGs. A significant 
proportion of those canvassed were angry about the loss of the 
benefits th a t they perceived GP F'undholding to have brought to 
their patients. Many others reported tha t they worried about 
becoming government scapegoats, having to implement a form of 
“backdoor rationing”. Others spoke of concerns about the impact 
of proposed clinical governance arrangem ents on their clinical 
freedom: “Its affecting our liberty of making decisions and 
implementing plans” (SHGP51I).
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While some initial scepticism would be expected to accompany 
any large scale organisational re-structuring such as the 
introduction of LHGs represented, the wide range of the negative 
responses was striking, and indicative of the scale of the challenge 
facing the new organisations in terms of engaging local GPs at the 
grassroots.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the range of relationships to be forged by the 
new primary care organisations. As noted in the key, the 
unbroken lines indicate existing statutory relationships; the 
broken lines illustrate the new relationships to be developed 
among agencies and groups already in existence. The lines are 
im portant because they indicate advisory relationships, and thus 
show clearly the structural limits on the LHGs’ ability to influence 
decision-making across the geographical areas over which they 
were responsible. Chairmen reported varying degrees of success 
in building these new links, which will be explored in more depth 
in chapters 7, 8 and 9. For now the main focus is on the 
structural constraints inherent in the systems.
But both the size and composition of the LHG Board proved to be 
challenging to the Chairmen. Forming a corporate entity out of a 
disparate group of 18 people would be a  challenge to any senior 
manager, and certainly taxed the skills of the newly elected GP 
Chairmen. In addition, the preponderance of GP Board members
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was predicted to be problematic by many commentators, and 
proved to be perceived as such, as the following excerpts from 
three interviews indicate:
I think there is a certain amount of conflict in that there is occasionally
the politics start to come in to it I think that is the general
practitioner members will som etim es slip into their mode of 
defending their professions’ interests which they have been used to  
when they have sat on the LMC and so on. But I think that this isn’t 
appropriate and when I recognise that I try to dampen that down.
(010.1: 16.08.99)
I think if we can get ourselves actively involved in terms of our own 
project managements, and we’re given the opportunity to do things, I 
think that the Board will remain on the boil. I think that the Board - 
my interpretation o f my Board - is that they have felt not involved, 
I think that th ey certainly are disappointed that we're not as 
involved -  I th ink they actually don’t  understand, one or two of 
them ...well, certain Board members on occasion- its as if they haven’t 
taken on board their corporate responsibility...I mean there are people 
there who would say that they are there to represent their individual 
profession...” (019.3: 18.07.01)
The doctors have been in charge of e v e r y th in g  and actually I ju st 
realised that that is true but it is OK. We are getting on with that.
We are. The structure that we developed got us over that because it 
gave everyone a forum to say something....(002.1: 28.09.99)
These comments illustrate the range of difficulties encountered in 
seeking to engage both local professionals and the local 
community. They also show th a t the sheer size of the Board and 
its multi-professional complexion made it difficult to build and to 
m aintain collective corporate engagement and ownership. This 
presented continuing difficulties for the GP Chairmen trying to 
introduce service changes locally:
“Well, in the sense that if you have colleagues that will write letters 
which are materially incorrect, to all of your colleagues out there 
without consulting you, and there are major errors, then you have to, 
within two hours, compose a letter basically calling them liars and 
idiots, politely, and it does create certain tensions....I mean, som etim es 
I despair, you know. I w ill [work] out agreem ents for some policy
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on th is, that or the other, and then six m onths [later] when it’s 
com e to  som e sort o f fruition and being, you know, enacted, and 
they w ill turn around and say “We’ve never discussed th is”. And you
will say “Excuse me, but you actually agreed to this” And they don’t 
understand that, once you’ve made your mind up, you’ve made your 
mind up” (019.3: 18.07.01)
So, the need to build consensus among professional colleagues,
without any clear levers of power, and a  perceived lack of clear
direction and commitment to the LHG’s progression, were sources
of continuing challenge to LHG Chairmen. Some GP Chairmen
commented on the unexpected alienation they experienced in this
new role:
Basically I feel like piggy-in-the-m iddle between the health  
authority and th ose bastards who used to be called my colleagues,
but!...Honestly! You’ve never seen letters written like it sometimes! 
(005.2: 12.06.00)
Such structural constraints affected the ability of LHGs to 
effectively engage their own professional communities.
In response to these challenges, the majority of LHG Chairmen 
narrowed the definition of their constituents to the local medical 
community: a t the outset, only two articulated a more inclusive 
view, which went so far as to embrace the general public. 
However, where Chairmen did adopt a  wider definition, they were 
able to build new alliances, which proved to be effective agents of 
change. But, as is explored in Chapter 6, most missed this 
opportunity. Each LHG Board had one member, meant to 
represent the public, and one member representing the voluntary 
sector. Although the potential existed for these two post-holders 
to build broader-based community alliances, their small number
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was dominated by the other 16 members of the LHG Board, the 
majority of whom were practising health professionals and senior 
managers. The overwhelmingly professionally-dominated 
composition of the Board may have been intended as a sop to the 
professions, to persuade them that they were in control of service 
„ planning and delivery decisions. But the nature and num ber of 
the structural constraints affecting the actual powers residing in 
the LHGs tended to negate this intention, as Table 4.3 illustrates.
Thus structural constraints implicit in the way tha t LHGs were 
established from the outset acted to limit LHGs’ operational and 
decision-making capabilities. These were further constrained by 
their structural relationship to, and thus dependence upon, their 
parent health authorities.
The following two sections of this chapter analyse the impact that 
these constitutional arrangem ents had on the development of 
LHGs in term s of their structural connections with, firstly the 
National Assembly for Wales, and secondly, the health authorities.
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4 .3  National Assembly for Wales (NAW)1.
Clearly the government holds key cards in the policy arena, as 
the legitimate and  accepted maker of policy and legislation.
But, increasingly since 1979, “new policy directions have been 
bound up  with new system designs, new funding and financial 
arrangem ents, new relationships between centre and 
periphery, and new relationships between state and citizen” 
(Clarke, Gewitz and McLaughlin 2000). This section, therefore, 
examines the extent to which the new relationships between 
centre and periphery - the Welsh Assembly Government and 
the new LHGs -  flourished and developed, and why. It focuses 
on the impact of the structures pu t in place to support and 
monitor the new LHGs.
The first point to note is tha t the Welsh Assembly Government, set 
up in 1999, was not itself an autonom ous agent, but was 
significantly constrained by UK policies throughout this period 
(Government o f Wales Act 1998). Possessing powers to make 
secondary legislation, they were nonetheless unable to levy tax 
income, so remained dependent on the largesse of Westminster. 
During this period, as might be expected, the new Assembly was 
struggling to form itself into a  cohesive organisation with a clear 
strategic focus. Since the newly elected Assembly Members were
1 The National Assembly for Wales began to call itself the Welsh Assembly 
Government in 2003.
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local politicians, experienced in focussing on local issues rather 
than  national ones, strategic leadership capacity could be said to 
have been constrained. On the plus side, Ministers came in with 
a  fresh sense of determ ination to improve public services for 
people in Wales -  eventually articulated through a series of policy 
documents from Better Health Better Wales (NAW 1998) through 
to the Health, Social Care & Well Being Strategies -  through 
partnership and collaboration. The key strategic aim was to 
devolve responsibility for local services to local level -  in this case, 
health care providers themselves. An implicit drive to increase 
efficiency under-pinned this strategy: matching local services to 
population needs as a  m eans of rationalising service provision, 
eliminating unnecessary duplication. Key concepts in the 
discourse of the policy docum ents (Atkinson and Coffey 2004) 
included “efficiency”, signalling a  return  to the ^health gain* and 
‘resource-effectiveness’ concepts pu t forward a decade earlier by 
the Welsh Health Planning Forum. Devolving decision-making to 
local level and combining accountability for clinical and financial 
decisions were foundation principles for the new structural 
arrangements. Integration and coordination of services replaced 
the previous rhetoric of choice and diversity, termed “wasteful and 
inefficient” in the new White Paper in 1998 (Welsh Office 1998a).
The NAW’s intention to initiate change towards integrated primaiy 
care services across health and social services was further
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evidenced by both policy statem ents and new legislation to back 
these up: the Health & Social Care bill, placing a  statutory duty 
of partnership on health  and local government organisations, 
together with a facility to pool budgets, gave clear direction of 
intent to local organisations, as Table 4.3 indicates. In addition, 
Local Authorities were given leadership roles in setting up Local 
Health Alliances, to bring together a wide range of interest groups 
across public and private sectors to address local health issues, 
including not only health and social services, but also education, 
employment, the police, and third sector representatives. This 
initiative proved problematic, again for largely structural reasons, 
as we shall see later in the next chapter.
External pressures on the Assembly included the need to be seen 
to be doing something distinctive and different from that of their 
UK counterparts:
“I think certainly the Assembly, I mean it’s partly being driven by the 
pace of things in England, but its maintained par with. I think the 
determination that they’ve got to  be more radical if they’re going 
to have a “Made in Wales” that is  right but distinctive to justify 
this new Assembly” (006.3: 16.07.01)
coupled with the need to justify its existence - and the public
expenditure needed to m aintain it -  to the electorate.
But the Assembly seemed to lack the ability to inculcate 
confidence among LHG Chairmen, who often reported that they 
felt let down by the Assembly:
“The Centre is still not clear about what it wants from LHGs. When 
I came in I thought it was very clear: we would have a year on year
110
stepwise progression towards changing the world. I now see that 
changing in Wales. I sense that in fact there is an increase in central 
direction” (019.2: 22.05.00)
Chairmen perceived the Assembly as reluctant to approve locally
generated initiatives, like local prescribing incentive schemes,
despite noting the importance of these, in policy papers, in helping
to change patterns of service delivery locally (and their frequent
application in England). In the early days of LHGs, this was
viewed by LHG Chairmen as lack of support. Similarly, later on in
the study, the lack of direction about PMS pilots m eant tha t there
were none initiated in Wales, and, this, again, was viewed by
Chairmen as a failure of support for change on the ground:
“Of course they have not and will not come out and say “we’re not in 
favour”, but they weren’t pushing PMS pilots...my colleagues who spend 
hours and hours writing their bids for PMS status, they have been quite 
frustrated and disappointed. Not so much a negative response but a 
lack of response to their efforts shall we say...” (019.3: 18.07.01).
Both of these sorts of schemes, however, had the potential to
change existing service delivery patterns significantly; both had
been prefigured in the White Paper (Welsh Office 1998a). In
contrast to this, English Primary Care Groups were using such
schemes fairly routinely by th is time, to reportedly good effect
(Smith and Goodwin 2006). But, despite being in line with
strategic intentions (Welsh Office 1998a), neither PMS pilots, or
early attem pts to create local incentive schemes, won support
from the centre, leaving their champions a t local level
disappointed and confused about the Assembly’s underlying
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intentions. Such reversals did little to help Chairmen gain the
confidence of their grassroots GPs:
The fact that...I mean these are the sort of things that are going to  
produce a sort o f terminal inertia -  like weVe gone through the 
exercise of planning, we had a whole day on it and everybody had 
their input, and it was a useful document which related to Xshire. 
Now the fact that it s its  on a shelf and come to the same time next 
year, who’s going to bother turning up?” (018.2: 20.06.00).
Another potential instrum ent for changing service delivery
patterns locally was Health Improvement Plans (HIPs), discussed
in more detail later in th is chapter. Briefly, here, the experience of
developing HIPs themselves was viewed variably, though largely
negatively, with comments ranging from: “a bureaucratic exercise
by people divorced from the day to day realities” (019.1) to:
“There are already guidelines from Welsh Office, and they are being 
implemented by the centre in the Health Authority so they in turn give 
the guidelines and within the guidelines the local health group will have 
input into their local needs and then they will all be sort of analysed at 
the centre so that it is uniform throughout the country with special local 
flavours so I think that is how it should be working hopefully (011.1:
01.08.99).
This somewhat optimistic interpretation was countered by others 
a  year on in the life of LHGs:
“Now we’ve got our own version [of the HIP] ... [but] it all comes back to 
the same thing...we see slightly different emphasis to the Health 
Authority, slightly different priorities, obviously, in the local view. So 
the question has to come my way on what’s the use of a LHG if it 
can’t  address some local issues?** (018.2: 20.06.00).
And others who questioned the value of the process at all:
MOne difficulty is that we have to produce this in a fairly short 
space of tim e. Whereas its going to take us two or three years 
possibly to get some of the relevant information...basically we will 
find a home for anything anyone thinks ought to be in there because I 
think producing it in such a short time...just put it away so that exists 
on paper...it has evolved and changed almost month by month as well 
and now it has become much more a health authority document 
with little sections for each of the five LHGs1 rather than purely 
our document. So that’s been drawn into the centre again really. I
1 Within that health authority area there were 5 LHGs
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think the health authority has been a bit nervous really that people 
would go off on their own” (014.1: 16.08.99).
So the perceived constraints of working to the health authority's
agenda, in relation to service planning and priorities, rather than
setting their own, were widespread at LHG level. Process
problems exacerbated this, acting to dilute further the LHGs'
input to setting local priorities. In the view of the majority of
LHGs, the nature of the planning and priority setting process
remained top-down despite the bottom-up rhetoric of the policy
statements.
Clinical governance initiatives were another example of a 
nationally-led policy th a t had the potential to become a  powerful 
lever for change locally. But GPs on the ground had reportedly 
(Williams 2002) viewed this concept with some anxiety, not to say 
cynicism, having expressed concerns about relationships across 
the patch, equity problems, regulation and control. Some saw 
clinical governance as a “real poisoned chalice”, expressing 
concerns about its implementation, and the extent to which it 
would be “admin led rather than  GP led or profession-led”. One 
referred to the LHG itself as “... a  means of ditching the 
responsibility” adding th a t in his mind, “clinical governance is the 
worst thing -  a  real ra ts ' nest of bother”.
GP Chairmen were acutely aware of these feelings among their 
colleagues and tried, on the whole, to take a constructive and
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developmental approach to implementing clinical governance 
within their patches. Nationally, across Wales, however, little real 
leadership was apparent. Although LHG Chairmen all responded 
to the request to undertake baseline assessments of local services, 
the scope and quality of these varied tremendously - again largely 
- due to lack of clear criteria about process. Not long after these 
baseline assessm ents were returned, the NAW Medical Officer 
responsible for Quality Improvement strategies left to work in 
England, after which responsibility devolved to a junior non­
medical colleague, thereby exacerbating existing capacity 
problems within the NHS Directorate. The baseline assessm ents 
had been intended to provide a  basis for performance monitoring, 
bu t their variability made drawing together national indicators 
problematic.
Across the UK, the government’s determination to tackle 
variations in care through standard-setting was being 
implemented in practical term s through National Service 
Frameworks (NSFs) designed to specify key elements in patient 
pathways. GP Chairmen in particular were disenchanted by the 
Welsh Assembly Government’s failure to attach additional funding 
resources to these:
“I support the NSFs, the concept of the NSFs, and I do think that the 
government has to, if they’re pushing these things out, they have that 
responsibility of resourcing them. It seems to me to be a lot easier to 
decide where the money’s coming from, this is where everybody gets 
very quiet, you know.” (019.3: 18.07.01)
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This comment, towards the end of the study period, illustrates a 
general dissatisfaction amongst Chairmen a t this point in their 
organizational existence. Chairmen uniformly expressed 
disappointment th a t national UK initiatives were not perceived as 
being available in Wales to the same extent tha t they were in 
England. They tended to place responsibility for this failure a t the 
door of the Assembly.
But the Assembly’s own initial capacity problems were being 
further exacerbated by other significant personnel changes at key 
levels. When the Director of NHS Wales post, a senior Civil 
Service appointment, became vacant, a replacement was not 
appointed for a further nine months. The Director of Primary 
Care retired when the new appointee came into post (Spring 
2001); a  replacement for th a t post was not appointed until 2003. 
Meanwhile, the professional advisory machinery within the 
Assembly was reported to be thinly spread during this period.1 In 
addition, or perhaps because of these factors, a new Primary Care 
Strategy was awaited. This strategy was finally written by a cross 
section of service chiefs in 2001 -  and never implemented. These 
capacity challenges a t national level combined to leave the 
impression of a vacuum  around primary care development. 
Nonetheless, the newly appointed Minister’s commitment
1 Personal communication to the researcher from an Independent Medical 
Advisor to the NAW, 22.08.2001.
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remained firm. In an  unprecedented move, after addressing LHG 
Chairmen at the fined session of their initial induction programme, 
in July 1999, the Minister for Health & Social Care agreed to meet 
with LHG Chairmen on a  quarterly basis in future. This decision 
proved to be singularly significant -  possibly the most significant 
action of all in ensuring the eventual development and 
transformation of LHGs. On balance, however, during the period 
under study, the NAW lacked the capacity to provide the strength 
of leadership needed to counter-balance other drivers in the 
system, as the ensuing sections will illustrate further. In terms of 
factors tha t might be seen to predispose an organization to 
change, however, while the uncertainty and lack of direction from 
the National Assembly did leave a vacuum which LHGs decried, it 
also created opportunities, as later chapters will show.
In this context then, the NAW held the ring but failed to exercise 
sufficient leadership or direction to ensure the outcome it sought. 
As a result, existing interests and powers in the system were able 
to m aintain their prevailing behaviours and intentions, so that the 
status quo was preserved. In term s of factors that might promote 
organizational receptivity to change further down the system, 
strategic vision, leadership capacity, and a  learning orientation 
could all have been said to be notable for their absence amongst 
the new Assembly and its advisors. For these reasons, therefore,
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the locus of decision-making remained with health authorities and 
Trusts.
4 .4  LHG and the H ealth Authorities This is partly because the 
structural limitations placed on LHGs were, a t the outset, and 
remained through 2001, virtually insurmountable. Despite all the 
good intentions expressed in successive policy documents (DOH 
1997; Welsh Office 1998a; Welsh Office 1998b), LHGs’ powers to 
effect change were severely constrained by the limitations inherent 
in their structures, which, in turn , affected their relationships to 
existing bodies, most notably to health authorities. These new 
primary care organisations were intended to be the key 
mechanism for shifting the balance of power -  or, a t the very least, 
activity, and thus resources - away from acute hospital trusts  to 
the primary care arena (Welsh Office 1998b). But LHGs were 
established in the first place as multi-professional sub committees 
of Health Authorities, the organisations responsible for 
commissioning services for their populations. Alongside this,
LHGs were given a substantial responsibility: to improve the 
health of their local populations, by “commissioning local 
services... and taking decisions about resource use” (Welsh Office 
1998a paragraph 4.21), no less. Arguably this remit overlapped 
with that of the of the health authorities’ themselves: to 
commission services to meet local health needs. This role overlap 
itself was inevitably going to lead to conflict, as health authorities
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operated to preserve their own roles in the system and limit the 
scope for the new organizations to de-stabilise the system. The 
question arises then  as to the extent to which the LHGs were able 
to m arshal adequate resources to cany out this task. Right from 
the start, LHG Chairmen argued that there was a  wide gap 
between what they believed they had been put in post to do and 
what their Health Authorities perceived their aims to be:
i  think there is such a need for education of so many participants 
to the project [the LHG], particularly health authority bureaucrats. 
Excuse my language but you know what I mean. I think that there... 
is a culture change which needs to take place and which will 
gradually learn what we are all about. I mean we are in this game to 
serve our patients; anybody who doesn't realise that should get out. 
This is what it is all about; it isn't about politics, its not about 
fighting for one's empire, its  for actually... trying to determine the 
best possible patient services who fulfil the wants and needs of the 
community. ..”(010.1: 16.08.99)
This quote from one GP Chairm an suggests both the conflicting
views of roles prevailing among health authorities and the LHGs,
and the extent to which the conflict was already, a t this very early
stage in the process (August 1999) being articulated in terms of
power struggles.
“I feel let down, I have the feeling they don’t really want us to change the 
world after all” (019.2: 22.05.00)
complained another GP Chairm an some nine m onths later.
Thus the relationship between these two agencies was proving to
be problematic. Initially, Health Authorities were sometimes
perceived as playing a  protective role, shielding their embryonic
LHGs from the harsh  business of commissioning services -  so
much so tha t many LHGs came to view commissioning as outside
their sphere of responsibilities, despite the fact that it was a
118
specifically stated responsibility in the guidance documentation 
(Welsh Office 1998b):
“I think they actually don’t understand, one or two of them, you know, 
that we are not actively involved in [the] commissioning process...they 
fail to understand -  certainly us at the executive level -  can’t actively 
change things...” (019.3: 18.07.01)
ul think commissioning is the grand irrelevance, I don’t want to 
commission. I’m interested in what a Dermatology service could look 
like! I’m probably alone in this view, I just hope change comes!” (002.2:
02.06.00).
These comments illustrate the extent of the differences in 
understanding of their roles among LHG Chairmen, not ju s t a t the 
beginning, bu t throughout the study period.
Other LHG Chairmen reported resentm ent at being in such a 
hemmed in position so late on in the process:
“Frustration, I think, more than anything. What are we here for, 
what are we doing? You go to any.. .you know, sort of set up a sort of 
sub group in any subject, and it all goes back to the Health Authority, 
and its  still th is centralism of the health authority that just 
produces...there’s th is tremendous inertia in the system ...” (018.2:
20.06.00).
Health Authority Finance Directors retained accountability for 
expenditure, so were unwilling to delegate budget control to 
external hands, as yet unproven. Since all 5 Welsh health 
authorities carried substantial overspends a t this point (1999), 
both Chief Executives and Finance Directors felt exposed and 
personally vulnerable. Emphasising this, more than one chief 
executive was removed during this period, signalling the centre's 
strengthened commitment to performance management and 
personal accountability.
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More significantly perhaps, LHG “responsible officers” were Health 
Authority appointees -  and employees. As such they carried 
significant responsibilities on behalf of the Health Authority, of 
which overseeing the operational activity of the LHG was but one. 
Indeed one LHG General Manager remained Director of Finance 
for the Health Authority throughout most of the years under 
study. This shared responsibility was matched by single 
accountability: General Managers were accountable to the Health 
Authority Chief Executive for their performance as managers. In 
this context the job title itself is significant: “general manager” 
does not imply the same level of responsibility as does the title 
“Chief Executive”. In this vein, one LHG general manager went so 
far as to label her LHG Chairm an as a “non executive director” of 
the health authority (Personal Communication from GM 003 to 
researcher). Yet the LHG GMs were also responsible for 
implementing a new agenda, and setting up a new organisation 
and team for this purpose, in tandem  with their Chairmen.
Most General Managers were also long-serving career managers, 
previously working within Health Authorities, and thus inevitably 
aware of the criteria by which their Health Authority Chief 
Executive would be m easuring their performance.
“I feel I’ve got to keep an eye on the Manager...I think it means that 
its something which I really haven’t expected I should have had to 
do...You see, certainly my view o f it would be that...that the 
members of the Local health Group now -  or the [executive] 
committee - is a decision making body and that those who work for 
the LHG like the Manager and the various officers, that their role is to  
implement decisions of the LHG, you see,...and the problem is that
120
the LHG makes decisions and these things aren’t being 
implemented...and the thing is, yes, I mean s /h e  is accountable to 
me, isn’t he? No, responsible to me and accountable to the [HA] 
Chief Executive” (022.2: 10.08.00)
The difficulty th a t th is Chairman was having in operationalizing
this dual accountability chain was still problematic to him, sixteen
months after setting up  the organisation. Others concurred:
“It makes them  feel that they’ve got two masters, in a way...who do 
you relate to, who do you prioritise, where does your duty lie? He is
the responsible officer, its his job to report it back to the Chief Executive 
of the HA. He’s the gamekeeper in the camp, if you like...” (021.1:
08.11.99)
Moreover, this accountability chain could be seen as biasing 
attention towards the concerns and issues as Health Authorities 
perceived them -  and away from the aspirations of primary care 
providers.
Health authority chief executives reinforced this impression by 
their tendency to treat LHG staff as their own resource. So, 
mindful of the need to support five or six different LHGs within 
their catchments, they had no qualms about re-deploying LHG 
General Managers from one LHG to another one to fill a vacancy, 
leaving the donor organisation un-tended. This might have been 
reasonable for staff lower down the hierarchy, but GMs were 
pivotal to the functioning of the new organizations:
“We’ve got difficulty with our staff in a sense that weVe got one 
person on long term sick leave...and then that’s causing problems with 
the other staff, so that means people are being seconded from here, 
there, and everywhere, you know, so there is no sort of continuity.
Then the second ...latest problem, obviously, is our General 
Manager [seconded to another LHG] so that’s adding to a problem of 
staffing...” (011.2: 24.03.00)
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This behaviour re-enforced the tendency to view the health 
authority as “boss” to the detriment of loyalty to the LHG. It also 
exacerbated existing capacity problems. Inevitably, devolving 
responsibility for service configuration to twenty-two local 
organisations from five larger ones, was going to present capacity 
challenges, bu t placing responsibility for dealing with these 
challenges with the health authority, rather than freeing up  the 
local organisation to deal with its needs, fostered centralisation 
rather than  devolution of powers.
“...We’ve gone about it the right way, done all the right things: focussed 
on primary care, referrals, outpatients, prescribing and emergency 
admissions. And we’re trying to build on our strengths. But the 
budgets, the [HA’s] deficit, and secondary care are taking all our 
energy and tim e” (002.2: 02.06.00)
This central control approach was present from the beginning,
informing the LHG recruitm ent process. Procedural rules for
recruiting and selecting LHG Chief Executives included the
stipulation tha t vacancies were to be advertised internally first,
before going to external advertisement. This issue was one of the
first to bring LHG Chairmen's and health authority chief
executives' different perceptions of their roles and remits into the
open.
“Basically we've just enlisted staff who were there [in the HA] to 
work for the Local Health Group, which is not ideal. We really 
would have welcomed some new blood, some new ideas...we just had 
to take what was there in employment already, so we had to take on a 
group of them [from the HA], which again leads to problems down the 
road, I don't think they've got the skills to deliver...[and] this is the 
other problem; I’m not sure; I think some of them feel, well 
particularly they don't like change, and this is a major change, and 
they feel threatened by it and I think a lot of it will be ‘let’s try to  
keep the status quo, let's do what we did before’ and just muddle 
along until someone gives us a [inaudible]....and we’re bit in that mode
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at the moment. We only got all our staff appointed about 3 weeks 
ago...” (020.1: 07.12.99).
The health authorities’ centralist controlling tendencies were 
further encouraged by the lack of any clarity over the LHG 
development process in Wales. In England, primary care 
organisations were established with a clear developmental 
pathway, marking the route and criteria to be met at each 
transitional stage (DoH 1997). In Wales however, despite a  clear 
statem ent that growing independence was expected (Welsh Office 
1998b), no developmental path was ever articulated -  or even 
agreed. Steps were made in late 2000 to try to secure agreement 
on a way forward, using an external accreditation measure as the 
key indicator of “readiness” to progress to more independence -  
b u t LHGs failed to agree on either a mechanism or a need for one.
“I listen to the jargon LHGs will fly’ that’s what we’re being told, but I 
think we’re still taxiing down the runway, and the danger is that well 
drive right off the end before we get airborne! The National Assembly, 
I’m a big believer in local democracy but I think its producing delay; it 
seems to be fudging issues, so its not working so well” (002.2: 02.06.00).
This lack of direction allowed existing forces in the health system
to flourish and prevail, further inhibiting attem pts at
independence on the parts of the new fledgling organisations.
Maintaining responsibility for development of LHGs within the
health authorities’ control, enabled them to define both the
meaning and thus the content of “development”, and allocation of
resources to the process. Health authorities put on very little -  if
any - training and development activity for their new colleagues,
123
LHG Chairmen. This reinforced the existing cultural divide among 
different players operating a t different levels of the system.
Development funds had already become a bone of contention 
between health authority and primary care people following the 
mergers of FHSAs and  HAs. At this point GMS monies -  central 
funds allocated by the UK government for the provision of general 
medical services -  came under the auspices of the HA, whose 
responsibilities went beyond primary care to encompass health 
providers across the system. Given the deficits the health 
authorities were carrying, and the periodic and recurring political 
em barrassm ent these created, the HAs had little incentive to ring 
fence these beyond any statutory requirements, thus the 
discretionary elements historically reserved for training and 
development of primary care staff, could be absorbed into general 
funds - or to plug other holes.
But significant development needs of LHGs revolved around 
health needs assessm ent of their local populations. Public Health 
specialists were employed by health authorities and had 
traditionally carried out the needs assessm ent process on a  health 
authority-wide scale. A key purpose of the reforms was to 
strengthen the link between population needs and service 
provision a t local level. Thus, post 1999, public health specialists 
were expected to carry out this task at LHG level, whilst retaining
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their health authority responsibilities. Again, capacity problems 
reared up: the existing resource was inevitably going to have to be 
spread more thinly. And again, health authorities remained the 
employer, focussing loyalties a t that level, thus re-enforcing the 
status quo:
“The first thing we did alongside the Health Improvement Plan was to 
plan for 5-10 years...[but] then that local one got overturned because 
they decided at the centre of XYHA....” (003b.3: 19.07.01)
Although some LHG Chairmen had little respect for the process of 
assessing health needs, claiming tha t as GPs they were well aware 
of the needs of their local patients, others were both surprised and 
disappointed by the lack of input the LHGs actually had in the 
assessm ent process, or in the subsequent development of the 
Health Improvement Plans based on these assessments. The 
Health Improvement Plans (HIPs) were intended to be the vehicle 
through which changing service provision would be articulated 
and then delivered -  potentially very powerful documents locally.
In the event however these were more damp squibs than rallying 
cries:
“The interim HIP was just waved past, it was already written by the 
Health Authority.. ( 0 0 6 . 1 :  08.11.99)
“I think the difficulty with the HIP, the HIP development, is that I feel 
that there’s too much...there’s not enough bottom up, it’s 
always...always this downward ...the Health Authority priorities, the 
NAW priorities, the frameworks, there’s so much of this...I’m not
saying they shouldn’t be priorities but the thing about LHGs is that they 
should reflect community need. So I think this is not the same thing as 
the Assembly saying, “Yes, this is what should be the priority”” (010.2:
06.04.00)
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The Guidance Advice (Welsh Office 1998b, p. 2) had specifically 
instructed health authorities to avoid “finalising] even the interim 
framework HIPs scheduled for January 1999 without involving 
shadow LHGs in their area”. HAs* collective nominal nod towards 
this directive may have contributed to Chairmen’s cynicism about 
the process and its importance:
“I find Health Improvement Plans are tedious really. I mean its 
something you give lip service to really...I am sounding very derogatory 
but I think Health Improvement Plans are basically things designed by 
public health physicians and bureaucrats, I mean, yes it sounds very 
good and its all very important but in the real world it really isn’t 
something that’s pre-eminent in your head...”(019.1: 10.08.99).
Further complicating this picture, throughout this period health 
authorities’ own m anagem ent and leadership capacity was 
severely constrained, potentially inhibiting their ability to provide 
a consistent sense of direction and development support to the 
new LHGs. The five health authorities existing in 1999 were 
themselves the product of recent mergers with Family Health 
Services Authorities across Wales, and with smaller health 
authorities (Welsh Office 1997). So, for example, in one north 
Wales area, the Clywd and Wrexham FHSAs had merged in 1998, 
and then with Gwynedd had become a single North Wales Health 
Authority, encompassing the whole area from Flintshire through 
to Anglesey. These am algam ations inevitably focussed senior 
management attention on internal affairs, not only creating new 
internal support structures bu t forcing many to apply for new 
jobs. This pressure diverted attention away from the larger
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strategic picture a t a  crucial time in the development process of 
LHGs. Moreover, there were significant leadership gaps a t the 
very top of these new organisations throughout the period from 
1999-2001. In four of the five new health authorities, there were 
changes a t chief executive level during this period. As a result 
LHGs were sometimes left to “get on with it”; a t other times 
embryonic initiatives were stopped from developing further:
"You know, at the moment, we're sort of, it’s a bit like letting the 
rope out a year at a tim e rather than having...we don’t have a 
primary care strategy for Wales yet, so there isn’t a grand plan that 
takes us anywhere...we haven’t yet got clear devolved budgets...we are 
enlarging our role significantly its just that you always feel it’s like a 
big ball up a steep hill really, rather than an open door...it’s us sort 
of trying to stake out another bit of the claim, as it were” (006.2:
17.07.00)
"No we had the problem of no Chief executive haven’t we -
effectively -  X is still here obviously but decisions -  people are being 
told *no that can’t be done until Mr Y changes it. I don’t believe I 
really accept that because I find it difficult to believe that an 
organisation just suddenly for the last 3 months does nothing because 
someone may go in and change it...” (017.1: 11.08.99)
Furthermore, during this period, more than one health authority 
chief executive was removed or moved on because of failure to 
manage the deficits adequately. This re-enforced the centralist 
tendency in the system, giving the strong message of increased 
direction from the wider UK government. The UK government 
exhortations about sticking to budgets was repeatedly reiterated 
during this period, with an increasing intention to hold health 
authority chief executives personally to account for any failures to 
do so. This centralist control was further strengthened through 
increased em phasis on W estminster's stated priorities: to meet UK 
Waiting List targets, and, again, through strengthening
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performance management approaches to this area of activity 
across England, in particular. Health authorities perceived 
themselves as having to pick up the pieces of NHS Trusts’ 
overspends, as accountabilities of Trusts were weak during this 
period. This made it difficult, if not impossible, for LHGs’ 
priorities to claim a  large share of health authority attention. 
When, after continuous pressure by LHGs and some warning 
signals from the centre indicating determination to strengthen 
primary care organisations -  a t least in the English context -  
health authorities began to devolve some responsibilities to their 
LHGs, this proved to be a double edged sword. In the words of 
one Chairman:
“Do you want me to tell you what our agenda is? This is what we Ve just 
been presented with:
• The management of the consultation of Cardiff & Vale 
NHS Trust Clinical Services Strategy changing for the 
better?
• We have to complete the Eastern Services project and
• Management of the consultation process on the findings
• We have to review the Orthopaedic Services across Bro 
Taf and produce a medium term strategy, and we have to
• Management of the local action team on emergency 
admissions in Cardiff and the Vale.
So those are our...that’s part of our corporate agenda...I mean, its 
extremely challenging!” (010.2: 06.04.00)
This em phasis by HAs on directing LHG activity via annual 
Performance Agreements, although stipulated in the Guidance 
Advice (Welsh Office 1998b) further limited LHG scope for creative 
thinking and innovation. It ensured that LHG growth was 
constrained and that the status quo was strengthened:
“Our staff are being used for things which are health Authority 
duties not LHG, and so on. I want to be able to give them an
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opportunity to really build up a team spirit, where they feel as though 
they really are making a difference, that they belong to an outfit which is 
going to effect change, and its not part of a stagnating bureaucratic 
process, but really is going to be a change on behalf of our community” 
(010.2: 06.04.00)
The HAs’ controlling tendencies became more overt as the LHGs 
tried to flex their collective muscles in an effort to assert their own 
agenda. The main tools the HAs used were political and financial. 
In political terms, the HA Chief Executives used their influence to 
try to curtail discussions between the Minister for Health & Social 
Care and the LHG Chairmen. Jane Hutt’s (the then Minister for 
Health and Social Care) remarkable decision to meet quarterly 
with LHG Chairmen opened up a way of circumventing the 
structural limitations inherent in the existing system: as sub 
committees LHGs had no official channel through which to air 
their concerns or issues. The HAs on the other hand had regular 
and frequent meetings (NACE) with the NHS D Director in the 
Assembly. Since the NHS D Director was ultimately accountable 
to the Minister this should have been a powerful communication 
channel to reiterate Ministerial priorities. But the heavy 
predominance of Trust Chief Executives may have helped to dilute 
their messages in tha t forum. It was not long before HA Chief 
Executives were insisting on attending the LHG Chairmen’s 
quarterly discussions with the Minister:
“I suppose from the LHG perception, the attempt to have a dialogue 
with Jane Hutt has been, I would say, fairly successful, and Jane 
Hutt has, I think, gone out of her way to try and make herself available. 
But, as was noted in our discussion last time, the constant ever 
presence of the chief [executive of the HAs]...you know, they can’t 
be free to let us go, so you’re not allowed out anywhere without,
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you know....And I think very much conscious that we're being 
minded in all o f these discussions, it does come out as a dominant 
message.” (006.3: 18.07.01)
LHG Chairs met monthly as a peer support group, helping Chairs
to come to term s with their new roles and responsibilities and
share problems and approaches. Their efforts to stage an all
Wales Conference to highlight their progress were foiled by HAs
who favoured setting up  an  all Wales Group which would
encompass the whole of LHG membership. Since each LHG Board
consisted of 18 people from a variety of backgrounds and
interests, and since Chairmen themselves were still struggling to
create cohesiveness am ongst their Boards, the Chairmen viewed
this as an attem pt to limit their effectiveness and curtail their
voices.
HA Chief Executives reacted negatively to Welsh Assembly 
attem pts to support any evaluative research into LHGs. Having 
agreed funding for a  study, through WORD1 (itself part of the 
Assembly’s own infrastructure by then) by Welsh academics, the 
study’s terms of reference were significantly curtailed after 
remonstrations from a  Health Authority Chief Executive who 
expressed outraged tha t research into the authority’s work would 
be approved without prior reference to her2. The argument that 
LHGs were already being “over-researched” won the day with the 
new Assembly, unused to commissioning research at this stage,
1 WORD: Wales Office of Research & Development
2 Personal communication to researcher
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despite the fact tha t the only study undertaken had been an initial 
audit by the Audit Commission in Wales. Evaluative research was 
generally acknowledged to be under-developed in primary care in 
Wales a t the time. The HAs' political efforts to maintain the sta tus 
quo reached their heights a t a  seminal meeting of the Health and 
Social Services Committee of the Welsh Assembly on 25 October 
2000. This meeting debated the future of LHGs and the HA Chief 
Executive representative spoke out against structural change 
stating tha t 'structural change now would be detrimental to the 
Assembly's own agenda since it would take the services' focus 
away from the inequalities agenda’1. The actions taken by HAs 
indicated the extent to which they saw themselves as being in the 
driving seat, and that they intended to do all that they could to 
maintain tha t position.
This analysis has illustrated the extent to which the structural 
changes enacted still left a  large num ber of tools at the Health 
Authorities' disposal, and the extent to which the Health 
Authorities used these levers to m aintain their own ability to 
direct the healthcare system.
Once the Minister announced the decision to remove the HA tier, 
in launching the NHS Plan for Wales (Welsh Assembly 
Government 2001), in February 2001, HAs were forced into a
1 Personal observation recorded in field notes by researcher present at meeting 
25.10.00
more developmental role. But, even then, the system dynamics 
worked against LHG input to the ensuing debate. A consultation 
exercise on restructuring was started, and a series of Task & 
Finish Groups created to propose models for the new 
organisations. The ten Task & Finish Groups each were Chaired 
by a  Health Authority or Trust Chairman; and although each 
Group included an LHG Chairman and an LHG General Manager, 
this level of representation was small in comparison to the 
num ber of Trust, Health Authority and Assembly representatives 
on each Group (National Assembly for Wales Newsletter No 2, 
August 2001), the combined interests and views of whom easily 
outweighed those of the LHG representatives. Moreover meetings 
were scheduled in such a  way tha t LHG Chairmen had little hope 
of getting to them. HA and T rust managers were able to clear 
diaries in a way that practising clinicians with surgeries to provide 
simply could not match:
“I think you know, again, it shows the disadvantage of an independent 
contractor-based resource against the salaried base, you know. Its 
amazing how the Health Authorities have been able to wheel out. 
You know, everybody’s gone over to the business of dealing with 
the Plan, and things have stood still a little. And the LHGs, really, in 
terms of, you know, the roles o f Chairs, their available tim e, you 
know, you’re so quickly overrun, they don’t have the capacity, they  
don’t have comparability in the resourcing and the opportunities 
and access stuff. And this process of discussion changed in such a 
short intensive way, really disadvantages them” (006.3: 18.07.001)
HAs also continued to use their financial positions to control the
primary care development agenda. No budget of any significance
was ever actually delegated fully to any LHG during the period
under study. In the early stages GP Chairmen in particular were
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struck by how little financial influence they were able to exert. 
Many contrasted their position as LHG Chairmen unfavourably in 
comparison to the influence they had been able to wield as GP 
Fundholders. This collective political naivete was evident virtually 
across the spectrum  of GP Chairmen (20 out of the 22).
“Yes but I think we have been told about this budget and that budget 
but there are strings attached to whatever they tell you to do so in the 
end you have to do what the Assembly or health authority [tell you] to, 
what the rules and regulations are. I mean there were rules and 
regulations for fundholding but...at least I had the money and I said 
‘Right, I am going to spend this money within parameters given to us, on 
services’” (011.1: 05.08.99).
Another Chairman reiterated this growing disillusion:
“We are having so much difficulty establishing what the real budget 
commitment is from the health authority so we don’t  really know 
what we can tell our constituents, I mean you can make vague 
promises and you can tell them that there are prescribing issues but 
these are still so vague.
We have delegated budgets down to practice level because we have had 
a drug budget setting from the health authority but it transpires that 
the budget setting activity for the LHGs was flawed so we are having to 
renegotiate that position with the health authority. It is also apparent 
that they have not delegated the whole of the resource down. For 
example I know that the Welsh Office budget to the LHG had a rise 
of 9.8%, well, they have only delegated down 7.4% to us so that 
somewhere in the system  they are retaining monies for whatever 
purpose. I have seen a paper which hints that these monies could be 
diverted to other sources -  well, we know where that is -  that lies in the 
Trust you see because of the Trust deficit -  so the focus of attention, 
really from the LHGs is between us and the Health Authority rather 
than us and the constituents” (004.1: 05.11.99)
“Get a budget we can manipulate -  no point in giving me a budget 
which is all tied up and gone. Which is effectively what’s happened 
this year...which when you bear in mind the amount of money we had, 
with all its flaws, in fundholding is actually a retrograde step” (015.1:
29.09.99)
“You know, one of the major things is that, you know, they talk a lot of 
money, but when you actually devolve it downwards, it doesn’t amount 
to that amount” (007.2: 24.08.00)
Budgets remained a significant contentious issue throughout the
period under study. They featured in each cohort of interviews,
and discussions were characterised by initial optimism and
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dashed hopes. LHG Chairmen highlighted early on in the process 
their belief that they could make a significant improvement in 
services locally by redeploying community nursing services. But 
budgets for these were held by Trusts, delegated by HAs. It is 
significant tha t no single Trust was ever able to identify budgets 
. for community services accurately enough to devolve them to 
LHGs:
“You see, your only power is money in this business. If youVe got 
money in your pocket. We’re having enormous difficulties at the 
moment, we’re supposed to have the Community services budget. Well, 
no money has come to us. We’re still struggling with the community to 
give us figures on, oh, what the employment situation is with the 
various practices, community nurses and health visitors. Well, it’s a 
struggle to get the information. If we had the money, we could say, 
MLook, this is what we want to purchase, and if you're not going to  
(unclear) we'll go elsewhere" (pause) and then they start to jump 
around" (004.2: 06.07.00).
HAs were very happy to delegate small amounts of money by the
beginning of year two (2000), for example, those relating to bids
from voluntary organisations, bu t this was almost risible in the
circumstances; in addition primary care development budgets
were generally devolved by 2001.
4.5  Summary
Health Authorities 'played hard ball’ throughout the early years of 
LHG development in Wales, retaining tight control over all aspects 
of LHG establishment, day-to-day operations and development. 
They did this despite the evidence of a  nationally set agenda to put 
primary care in the forefront of service delivery, and against the 
pace of English activity proceeding both more quickly, and in a
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more structured fashion, towards this aim. Decision-making on 
every aspect of LHG activity remained at the level of the health 
authority. The health authority retained accountability to the 
Welsh Assembly Government on behalf of their LHG sub 
committees, through the GM to the health authority chief 
executive; the health authority also retained financial 
accountability and held the requisite funding allocations.
Thus the structural connections served to locate decision-making 
firmly in the centre of the health  system, despite the policy 
rhetoric of devolution. But, in many ways, the HAs can be seen to 
have held all the cards bu t lost the game (as subsequently became 
clear when the decision was made in 2001, to abolish them 
altogether), so the question rem ains as to why this was so. This 
chapter has illustrated the m any structural constraints placed on 
LHGs by their inception as sub  committee of health authorities. 
These initial structural constraints continued to work to keep 
LHGs isolated from potential support a t NAW level, restricted their 
access to budgets, curtailed their attem pts to create their own 
agendas and work programmes, and limited their access to critical 
public health support. These constraints were further tightened 
through the HAs’ control over accountability links and 
employment of LHG secretariats and officers. In addition, and 
possibly most damaging, health authorities perpetrated a 
‘rationalist’ (Lindblom 1959 cited in Boyne et al 2004) model of 
service planning and development which was at odds with the
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reality of the system ’s functioning. As later chapters will go on to 
show, this model, although mythical, was very persuasive; it 
attracted the commitment and belief of the large majority of LHG 
Chairmen. In the end it is really only those Chairmen who were 
able to move beyond this model to create their own vision and 
LHG identity that thrived, as subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate.
But of course health authorities were not so powerful that they 
alone could have had such a stultifying effect on the new primary 
care organizations. The behaviour of players in other parts of the 
system, in terms of the decisions they took and the extent to 
which such decisions encompassed LHGs, also exercised a strong 
and constraining effect on LHG development. The next chapter 
explores the ways in which the new structures affected LHGs’ 
ability to establish and develop themselves in line with their “duty 
of partnership”.
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C hapter 5: S tru ctu ral In flu en ces on  LHGs: P artnership
Working
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the impact that the new structural 
arrangements had on the distribution of power in the health 
system in Wales between 1999 and 2001, from the perspectives of 
the newly created Local Health Groups, in relation to the two 
agencies accountable for them. This chapter examines the ways 
in which the new structures impacted on organizations with 
whom LHGs were expected to work as partners, and the extent to 
which these structural arrangem ents acted as barriers or 
supporting mechanisms for enabling LHGs to fulfil their remits by 
building strong horizontal working relationships.
As the Tables 4.3 and 5.1 illustrate, when taken together, the 
structural changes introduced into the health system in Wales in 
1999, outlined in the previous chapter, were counterbalanced by 
the existing distribution of power within the system as a  whole.
By June 2000, LHG Chairmen were complaining that the system 
was “in gridlock” (009). Table 4.3 illustrated the multiple ways in 
which much of the potential impact of the policy documents, and 
the specific remit given to LHGs, were eroded by the subsequent 
failure to articulate any specific developmental pathway for LHGs. 
Similarly, the National Assembly's commitment to reducing 
inequality of provision and improved access to services was
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undermined by the stronger impact of the combined operational 
pressures to reduce waiting lists and cope with winter pressures, 
as required by the central UK government's dictates, as the 
previous chapter argued. In tha t chapter, we also saw the extent 
to which the potential power of the newly-opened direct channel of 
- communication with the Minister was outweighed by the lack of 
LHG access to decision-making fora at Assembly level, and further 
diminished by the frequent changes of personnel a t the higher 
levels of the system.
As Table 4.3 indicated, financial levers, such as the introduction 
of pooled budgets and the injection of new monies from 
Westminster in Ju n e  2000, were weakened by the long time scale 
over which previous commitments of GMS and PCD monies ran. 
Financial potential was further eroded by the small amount of the 
new monies tha t actually made their way into the primary care 
arena. Table 4.3, therefore, helps to illustrate the ways in which 
central initiatives failed to effect a  significant shift in the vertical 
balance of powers within the health system.
Table 5.1 also illustrates the constraints that operated, this time 
horizontally, between 1999 and 2000. This chapter examines the 
extent to which the structural changes introduced brought about 
changes in the distribution of power and influence across the
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Table 5.1: Force Field Analysis: Pressures Facilitating & 
Inhibiting LHG Developm ent (Horizontal Linkages) 
August 2000
Facilitating forces Inhibiting Forces
LHGs’ statutory right to be 
consulted by Trusts
Shared agenda re local service 
quality
Trusts’ longer standing links 
direct to HA;
Lack of LHG decision-making 
powers as HA sub-committees 
Potential threat of 
disinvestment from secondary 
to primary sector
Establishment of All Wales Chairs 
Group & quarterly meetings with 
Health Minister
No statutory direct channel to
NAW & HA CEO presence at LHG 
Chair meetings
Changes in Personnel at senior 
levels: e.g. NHS D Director, HA 
CEOs
Devolved budgets: GMS, PCD Existing spends
Proportion of monies already 
allocated leaving marginal scope 
for manoeuvre
Skills deficit re preparation of 
effective Business Cases 8b short 
timescales required for 
production
Local Health Alliances Local Authority re-structuring
Rivalry re ‘ownership’ of public 
health agenda
Public/voluntary organisations as 
potential allies in creating shared 
understanding of needs and common 
local agenda
Non-representativeness
Press/local media’s potential to 
educate re needs and engage public 
interest
Potential to twist agenda to 
emotive aspects +/or local 
wants
Key: The features in bold type indicate a more significant impact than its 
opposite force.
Source: derived by researcher using interview data, as a tool for checking 
accuracy of interpretation with participants. August 2000. See Methodology for 
further details
health system, by exploring the impact they had on LHGs’ abilities 
to create space in the existing organizational landscape across 
Wales, and thus to influence the actions of their ostensible 
partner agencies, Trusts and Local Authorities. Section 5.2 
examines the extent to which structural linkages created helped
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LHGs’ efforts to build effective working relationships with their 
Trust colleagues, in pursu it of better integrated and more locally 
relevant services. Section 5.3 analyses LHG linkages with their 
local authorities, in term s of the impact of structures on these key 
relationships. Section 5.4 examines LHGs’ efforts to build 
alliances with their community representatives, in term s of the 
structural influences and their impact on the LHGs’ remit to 
increase responsiveness locally. In this way this chapter, together 
with chapter 4, addresses the first research question set for this 
study.
5.2 Trusts as joint service providers
The newly reconfigured NHS Trusts across Wales were key 
agencies with whom LHGs needed to build new relationships. As 
the major providers in the health service, the acute Trusts were 
dominating the agenda in the health  care delivery system. As the 
largest service providers in any given area, these organizations 
were responsible, collectively, for the majority of health care 
expenditure each year (Health Statistics Wales 2007). For this 
reason, they were also a  prime target for change in the 
government’s drive to increase expenditure on preventive services 
and to shift activity away from the acute sector, towards primary 
care. Hospital consultants, as individuals, were used to 
determining the service development agenda, largely unopposed. 
Inevitably, then, the new local health organisations could have
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been perceived as a  potential threat to this long standing 
autonomy. The experience of working with GP fundholders had 
previously ‘softened up* some consultants, and prepared them for 
the task of collaborating with local GPs. Thus, examples of 
GP/Consultant collaboration to improve local services were not 
unknown. Waiting list targets, too, had helped consultants realise 
that there were imperatives in the system other than -  and often 
in conflict with - their own quality improvement drives. 
Nonetheless, the new LHGs may not have been viewed as an 
altogether welcome, or benign, new ‘player' in the ‘game’.
As Table 5.1 shows, the 1998 reforms included a statutory duty 
on Trusts to collaborate with the new LHGs. Some Trusts reacted 
very positively to this new requirement, bringing their service 
development p lans to the LHGs for their comment. And some 
LHGs responded with alacrity to such overtures, recognising the 
scope for improved services locally. One LHG, for example worked 
with the local Trust to put together plans and a business case for 
the appointment of an additional rheumatologist. Given 
Rheumatology waiting lists across Wales at the time, this would 
easily qualify as a  win-win proposal from both perspectives:
"As soon as I was appointed as Chairman I was asked to go to a 
meeting to discuss the rheumatology problem in Xshire. And what I did 
was to look at the problem logically and obviously the rheumatology 
. patients within Xshire were having a service, but where were they 
having the service?...obviously, it was outside of Xshire, but that was 
costing money. So, you know, the solution proved fairly simple, as far as I 
was concerned, as if you could identify the extent of rheumatology from 
Xshire, then you can assess whether or not you can reconfigure a service or 
redevelop the service in another way. And in the event we have identified
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sufficient money, so now it would appear that we can apply a 
rheumatologist in Xshire. So now all of a sudden the LHG has come . 
along and got hold of a problem that has been on the back burner for 
the last 10 years...”(013.1: 13.10.99)
It is important to note tha t the initiative here came from the Trust.
Moreover, despite this Chairman's ebullience at this point, he is
also cautionary:
“The difficulty really is trying to create the partnership between  
primary and our secondary care clinicians, alright? And for both 
sides [to] seek a collaboration [which] has been of mutual benefit, 
alright? Now the LHG sits in the middle if you like...being the catalyst 
that brings them together” (013: 13.10.99)
Other LHGs however, viewed such approaches with some
scepticism, pointing out th a t such Trust-initiated developments
were simply a continuation of the previously existing relationships
and power distribution. The inequalities in the relationship
grated, as Trusts were perceived as setting their own agenda and
expecting LHGs to support them, rather than starting with a  clean
slate and building joint development plans for local services. When
asked about the extent to which they perceived Trusts as potential
allies, a  different set of views emerged:
“No they say they are but I am convinced they have their own 
agenda -  they have their own developments. They will go on 
developing, we haven’t seen any signs that they are not developing 
along the lines that we have previously asked them not to, eg within 
their orthopaedic department, in the past we have resisted any 
development in orthopaedics because they have such a vast programme 
but they just continue: it’ll become the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital of 
Wales if they have their way, rather than anything else, and other 
priorities in Cardiovascular or Cancer services will be sidelined as a 
result of it” (004.1: 05.11.99)
The existing balance of power in the system was further re­
enforced by the predominance of the technical agenda in health 
care debates about service changes, and the consequent need to
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‘earn the right to comment’ as one LHG Chairman pointed out 
somewhat ruefully:
I think the other problem is, really, that there is really a major 
technical agenda, you have to be prepared to work quite hard to be 
able to be...you know, its  about, again, earning the confidence of 
most people that you understand the agenda and be prepared to do 
the work to understand it.” (006.2: 18.07.01)
This Chairman’s comment indicates the extent to which he
perceived the prevailing health policy arena to be dominated by a
medically defined agenda, skewed towards acute services, leaving
the community oriented services and preventive activities tha t he
represented further down the pecking order of priorities. This
focus on acute services was, naturally, strongest amongst Trusts
and the physicians employed by them.
Most LHG Chairmen perceived the resulting inequality of 
relationships keenly:
“I’ve never had a letter from AZ [Trust Chief Executive] asking me 
for x,y, or z -  it just doesn't happen. I’ve had to write to him, but the 
letters don’t come back the other way. So you know, its not a 
partnership...” (007.2: 24.08.00)
In the circumstances, then, the prevailing drivers in the system
could be seen to have combined to ensure that LHGs’ interests
were a minor perturbation, and not much more than another step
to be taken to get towards the T rusts’ original goals:
“Well, we've managed to get a seat at the tripartite table, but we’re 
still perceived as a small player, which we are, with a £4million budget 
compared to theirs! But the LHG wants to be at that table, but at the 
same time it takes our eye off the ball. So the structure itself is 
distracting us from the real task, focussing us on issues of concern to 
the Trust and HA.” (002.2: 02.06.00).
These two Chairmen highlight the extent to which the new 
structural changes did little to impact on the strength of existing
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channels of communication and ways of working between Trusts 
and Health Authorities.
The new structures may have actively inhibited the development 
of closer communication, or the creation of a shared agenda 
between LHGs and Trusts, by failing to include Trusts as formal 
members on LHG Boards. With hindsight, this appears to have 
been an extraordinary omission because it may have served to 
deepen the chasm  between the acute and primary care sectors, 
and th u s made it harder to begin to bridge it. The statutory ‘duty 
of partnership’ was sufficiently vague that it allowed the Trusts to 
remain in lofty isolation vis-a-vis the LHGs. This imbalance may 
have been further exacerbated by the number of LHGs to which 
each Trust was expected to relate. Geographically, many Trusts 
in Wales had a t least three LHGs in their immediate areas, and 
this num ber could have been increased by existing referral 
patterns prevailing locally.
Thus, this existing imbalance in power was further reinforced by 
weak accountabilities in the health system as a whole. The fact 
that T rusts’ financial deficits were rarely punished, and instead, 
routinely written off, helped to bolster the view that they were 
inviolate. This tendency was widely perceived as “reward for poor 
performance” (Wanless 2003; Williams, P. 2002). It clearly 
indicated tha t any new incentives in the system were not adequate
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to encourage the sort of collaboration that would change 
prevailing patterns of service delivery. The Trusts' seeming 
inability to provide LHGs with accurate figures on the sum s they 
spent on community services in any one year was also 
symptomatic of their power and freedom from accountability in 
terms of service provision locally.
Politically, too, Trusts were powerful bodies, especially a t local 
level where they were very often the largest employer in the area, 
particularly in more rural parts of Wales and in some of the post­
industrial south Wales Valleys areas. Their position in this regard 
meant that attem pts to debate different models for formal 
Trusts/LHG relationships were difficult to get onto the agenda, let 
alone debate. This was particularly noticeable in Powys, where 
the Trust -  despite being a  community organisation rather than 
an acute one -  dominated and eventually prevailed in ensuring 
tha t the LHG did not become the main provider organisation. To 
some extent, too, the prevailing powers of Trusts combined to 
ensure that debate about alternative organisational models for 
community service delivery organisations never really got onto the 
agenda in Wales, as the outcome of the 2001 consultation exercise 
illustrated. Comments made by Trust Chairmen as the exercise 
was introduced were later borne out by the outcome, as LHGs 
became statutory agencies bu t Trusts were left intact, still 
retaining control of community services (NHS Confederation
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2003). The powerful position held by Trusts, within the structure 
of the overall health system, was maintained throughout the 
period under study, despite all of the rhetoric of government policy 
to the contrary. It has been evidenced here by the ways in which 
Trusts went about their business 'as usual’, taking decisions 
about service developments largely on their own initiative, with 
rarely more than cursory overtures to their relevant LHGs. This 
was partly due to the strong incentives operating to bolster their 
positions as providers. It was further strengthened by the fact 
that, as noted earlier, in some areas of Wales, Trusts were the 
main employers. But this strong structural position was further 
bolstered by the failure to provide stronger incentives for 
collaboration, particularly in relation to community services, or to 
embed Trust representation sufficiently in the new LHGs’ 
infrastructures.
Chapter 4 illustrated the extent to which LHGs’ operations and 
decision-making capabilities were limited, from the outset, by 
their structural relationship to, and thus dependence upon, their 
parent health authorities. This chapter has demonstrated the 
ways in which these limitations were exacerbated by the failure to 
build any additional constraints on the autonomy of acute sector 
Trusts into the structure, or to provide any additional incentives 
to promote behaviour changes on the ground. In terms of factors 
that might be seen to predispose an organization to change,
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however, while the uncertainty and lack of direction from the 
National Assembly did leave an authority vacuum which LHGs 
decried, it also created opportunities, as later chapters will show. 
For now, in terms of overall context, another powerful statutory 
stakeholder needs examination for its impact on LHGs.
5.3 Local Authorities
Given the duty of partnership enshrined in the new policy 
documents and underpinning legislation, local authorities could 
be termed key stakeholder agencies of LHGs. Considerable 
hurdles arose in building strategic links with local authorities, 
despite the structural incentives of shared geographical 
boundaries, seats on the LHG Board, and the statutory duty of 
partnership.
Welsh policy had confirmed the coterminosity principle, as further 
evidence of the importance of the local community as the focal 
point for needs assessm ent and service delivery. But how far did 
the new structures go in clarifying roles and responsibilities for 
health care provision? Social Care was an overt part of the new 
NAW Minister’s portfolio: her title was tha t of Minister for Health 
and Social Care, signalling the Assembly’s commitment to 
partnership working across health and social care. But debate 
still ranged over who should be the dominant partner. This 
debate appeared to have more impact within the new Assembly
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departments than  in the field, but it nonetheless remained a 
potent factor in NHS decision-making.1
Local Health Alliances were publicly launched during the course of 
the LHG Chairmen’s final block of induction training (2 July 
1999). LHAs were presented as having a similar structure to 
LHGs and as enabling local authorities to play an active role in the 
production of “the Health Authority’s HIP”2. LHAs would be 
responsible for health impact assessm ents and inequalities. Their 
proposals would rely on co-funding by partner organisations 
(LHGs).
The Chairmen’s initial reactions to the announcement were not 
uniformly positive, with concerns expressed about territories:
“What is the public health agenda for LHGs, then? LHGs are trying to 
come to grips with this: it’s almost half their agenda...” (002, 1.07.99: 
observation)
“It looks like the Christopher Columbus Business Plan” (009)
Other Chairmen countered with the danger, and need to avoid, 
being “too GMS focussed” (016); one expressed a view, based on 
experience of a previous pilot exercise, that the LHA “informs and 
advises the LHG of w hat’s really happening in the community” via 
the elected LA representative on the LHG Board. It was also 
pointed out tha t LHGs would need to make sure that they had the
1 Personal communication: remarks made by Director, NHS D during a meeting 
with researcher on a different topic. Sept 2002).
2 Personal observation of ensuing debate, Study Block 3 all Wales LHG Chairs’ 
Development Programme, Caer Beris Manor Wales 2 July 1999
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same input through to their Health Authorities, via their 
Chairmen, as Social Services Directors had to their Local 
Authority Chief Officers.
The majority of Chairmen appeared to be uncomfortable with a 
perceived tension between the health improvement part of their 
agendas and the management function for service provision 
(personal observation). Reconciling this tension was, however, 
central to their roles as Chairmen: they saw themselves as 
champions of service deliveiy and primary care provision locally, 
bu t the role required significant management responsibility. The 
trade offs each made, and how they made them, are examined in 
the next chapter. At this stage, the key issue is the extent to 
which the new structures facilitated the development of LHGs and 
their ability to implement their agendas. In this respect, Local 
Health Alliances were initially perceived as a potential threat, in 
term s of who owned the development agenda. And while pooled 
budgets sometimes had an impact a t a  local operational level, the 
subsequent internal re-structuring within Local Authorities 
(WLGA 1998; NAW 2000) later militated against a strong strategic 
contribution throughout the lifetimes of LHGs. Inevitably, as it 
did in the health sector, such a re-shuffling of responsibilities was 
accompanied by a focus inward, and jockeying for position, at 
least a t senior officer level, while people prepared themselves to 
apply for new, or be confirmed in, existing posts. In the ensuing
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shuffle, health interests were not always perceived as having been 
protected:
“He’s [the existing LA representative on the LHG] lost his job in the 
reshuffle, so we don’t know...weVe asked for him to continue, but 
that...the reorganisation of the local authority and nobody...I mean, 
they’ve obviously been more interested in their jobs than they have 
about, you know, what they’re doing with us” (008.2: 05.07.00)
LHG Chairmen reported this as having had two effects detrimental
to efforts to build strategic partnerships. Firstly, in several cases,
a  health remit became subsum ed within an Education portfolio at
Director-level. This implied, to the LHG Chairmen, a  loss of
expertise and /o r interest. Secondly, especially during the period
of re-structuring, participation in LHG activity, as indicated by
attendance a t Board meetings, was adversely affected:
MJust as there has been multiple Trust reconfigurations, so there 
has been multiple [social] service reconfiguration in Xshire. And 
Social Services are now in their third department in 17 months,
quite apart from the adverse reports in audit. So they're now housing, 
catering and social services, I'm not sure which it is!” (016.3: 
12.06.01)
This Chairman expressed concern that this h iatus would mean 
further delays, even after a  new appointment was made, because 
of the steep learning curve involved in getting to grips with the 
LHG’s role and progress:
“I think the sad thing is that they haven't grown up with the rest of
us. We’re growing...evolving in nature and they could come in and talk 
gobbledegook and that could prove a bit difficult” (017.2: 29.03.00)
And as for the new appointee:
“He's been a Director of Education all his life...he’s been a teacher 
and he’s never dealt with Social Services...” (017.2: 29.03.00)
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Nor was this was an isolated example. Other Chairmen reported 
similar frustrations a t Board level in forging stronger links with 
local authorities:
“Its [the LHA] in a bit of abeyance because they Ve reorganised the Local 
Authority and a lot of the officers have been re-appointed and they’ve got 
a different sort of cabinet style local authority now. The new...we 
haven’t  had a Social Services lead for some time in that the Social 
services lead, which we had a very good relationship with, took  
over Education and ranked the two departments together. And now 
with the re-shuffle, has gone to Education and we’re awaiting a new 
Social Services Director. Social Services has gone in with Housing as 
well, I think, so...” (008.2: 05.07.00)
Chairmen pointed out additional constraints on building more
effective bridges with their local authorities, including issues of
representation:
“The Health Alliance is just about ready to be set up, though the 
group that it was sort o f evolving out of is still agonising a little bit 
as to the structure...I think the issue is about elected members and 
such like, which is always the issue for the Local Authority.
But that’s going forward,...and I’m a little disappointed that its  taken  
so long, because when we started a year and a half ago we had a 
planning and collaboration group that was virtually a Health 
Alliance. I mean, that’s continued on, but it’s taken forever to evolve 
itself into the Health Alliance. I mean, I think then, you know. That will 
be our main source of alliance with the local authority.’’ (008.2:
05.07.00)
Other Chairmen spoke of the difficulties inherent in trying to set 
up a  new body whose functions overlapped with existing groups 
without a  clear steer as to which should take precedence and how 
the handover should be managed:
"Again there's a bit of confusion between alliances and the JCC, you 
know, both things are still sort of ongoing...although they probably 
duplicate things...people are not quite sure what is going to take 
responsibility for what...” (018.2: 20.06.00)
But another Chairman began to identify a way to turn this
constraint into a positive force:
“The joint working project didn’t entirely arrive out of design I suppose, 
but out of reality! But the reality is that both the Council and the LHG
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staff are reluctant to continue to support the advisory planning groups 
because it took a lot of their time to do it. The advisory planning groups 
are the main input of the users, carers and providers in Xshire...and it’s 
a good structured base and a particular way of developing it had been 
agreed, but that was before we had yet another change. And the man in 
. control now just ignored it, and said no. But out of that total deadlock 
something has come...the concept is this, that you have in local 
authority, and in health, and in the voluntary sector, three different 
planning cycles. Now if you can bring those cycles together, the 
first thing is you save an awful lot of tim e, you don’t have to wait 
for one part o f the planning cycle to complete its 180° or whatever 
it is before you can move forward....** (016.3: 12.06.01)
So, the much-vaunted changes in structures were not enough in 
themselves to overcome the existing structural barriers to joint 
working, at either strategic or operational level, in any sustained 
way. The structural barriers constraining effective joint decision­
making included lack of clear budgetary controls, and insufficient 
authority to commit resources on the part of LHGs. These deficits 
contributed to local authorities’ scepticism and reluctance to 
commit resources to joint working. This reluctance was further 
exacerbated by reshuffling activity within local authorities across 
Wales. Thus, as Table 5.1 illustrated, these factors combined to 
maintain the status quo, in relation to decision-making and joint 
planning.
5.4  Other potential allies: politicians and the public
Local and national politicians were another potential source of 
allies for the new primary care organisations. Along with the new 
Welsh Assembly Government came a  new tier of elected 
representatives a t national level. UK Parliamentary 
representatives were another potential source of support. Given 
that the devolution of responsibility for health service decision­
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making to local level was a much vaunted part of the Labour 
Government’s attem pt to ‘modernise’ public services, support from 
politicians might have been expected to be a given. Mindful of 
this, some Chairmen made early overtures to politicians, but few 
indicated tha t the effort expended had reaped rewards:
Our local MP, I made the effort to go and see him because I think he 
thought we were some sort of mini pressure group-he knew nothing 
about his own health reforms whatsoever. But, you know, he knows 
we exist now. He’s all right but he’s one of these who gets a bee in his 
bonnet all the time about different things. And I’m not sure he’s going 
to be sort of use to us, he’ll just be complaining when things go 
wrong...he still didn’t quite get it, I don’t think, even when I’d finished 
an hour with him. (014.2: 24.05.00)
And as for the Assembly representatives:
I said to our Assembly member, you know if you ever want an unbiased 
view point,...if there’s something you don’t understand or something 
about health care that you might find you want to be able to help with, 
please feel you can come to us because we are unbiased. And the 
comment I got back was, ‘well, we’ve got lots of good people in the 
ABC party’. And I thought, well, that’s a real shame, you know, she 
has somebody actually offering you free, gratis and for nothing, you 
know a bit of advice if  you ever wanted it ...and I get that sort of put 
down from a 27-year-old...I just thought it was a shame really...(005.1:
26.10.99)
So both Assembly level and UK parliamentary politicians tended to 
be viewed more as a constraint than  as a facilitating force in the 
work to establish the new organisations. No formal or informal 
communication channels existed to facilitate the exchange of ideas 
between these two groups. Even when dealing with politicians of 
the same party as the government, the perception of Chairmen 
was tha t this was yet another group which needed to be 
“educated” about the role and potential contribution of primary 
care organisations about some of the more intractable problems of 
the NHS in Wales, rather than  as an additional source of support.
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Similarly, responsiveness was another key aspect of public 
services tha t devolution was meant to promote. To w hat extent, 
then, were the public involved in the development of a  distinctive 
LHG agenda or approach to service delivery locally? Since LHGs 
were set up to reconfigure services to meet local health needs, how 
m uch influence did local people have on LHGs? LHGs were set 
up as public bodies, whose Board meetings were open to press 
and public alike. Each Board included one lay member and a 
voluntary sector representative.
Several LHGs made extensive efforts to introduce themselves to 
their local community, using newsletters, websites and public 
meetings. Nonetheless m ost reported an uphill struggle, as this 
one illustrates, 15 m onths into its life:
“Local politicians and local people in general don’t know what an
LHG is. That’s been...that’s one of the key things that we’ve highlighted 
in our [Board] Away Days and on the Press releases, people just don’t 
know what an LHG is” (018.2: 20.06.00)
This Chairman blamed the LHG’s silent entry into the arena, the
lack of any formal introduction or national campaign to explain
the role changes and their potential for service development
locally. Others pointed to the size of the task of involving the
public with such a small resource.
“I’ve gone down the road of public consultation earlier than most...but 
I’m not...I asked the Health Authority the other day what papers they 
have got on public consultation, and I met with a completely blank wall 
because there is nothing.” (017.3: 12.06.01)
“There’s a problem as to how to do it! No lack of desire, but how on 
earth do you do it, really, I mean it’s the problem that...unfortunately 
the lady who is rather difficult on the Board and on the...in the groups
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is actually represented...well, not the public but the voluntary sector, 
and that isn’t a great help to us, but she...unfortunately has several 
items on her agenda and that’s all she wishes to deal with...I think in 
terms of the various groups that we’ve had where we’ve had users and 
carers, the voluntary sector, community health councils, we have found 
. that the people who have come have been unrepresentative of the 
general public and really have had particular axes to grind and we’re not 
very happy with that...” (008.2: 05.07.00)
The evidence suggests th a t the structures for selecting lay
. representatives would not ensure representation in the electoral
sense, but nor did th is necessarily negate the development of a
more responsive agenda. On the other hand, there was only one
representative of each of the three other independent contractor
professions, so the same charge of tokenism could be made for
them. Nonetheless, taken together, the independent contractors
could form a cohesive block. This tendency often heightened
conflicts on LHG Boards, and possibly also provided a convenient
rallying point for the professional Board members. It also enabled
lay members to be branded as “troublesome” and thus to be
marginalized.
"Take the Lay Rep for example. She thinks she should be in charge 
of public consultation. But that's not how I see her role -  she’s just 
been in here, nagging the pants off T’s [GM] Number 2 because her 
poster isn’t ready. Well it’s not her job to be making posters. I think I 
know what her job is and it’s not that!” (002.2: 02.06.00).
Lack of clarity about the nature of the lay representative’s role,
coupled with the technical nature of the agenda in health, was
recognised as an  additional barrier to effective lay contributions in
an arena dominated by medical professionals.
“It is a demanding combination, really, because if you take your general 
public representative or elected member, 1 don’t think they would find 
it at all easy to enter th is world unless they've had a real, you 
know...They've got a professional background in some way or other 
that then they became an elected member. I think that being a
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representative of the people might be fine in a local government context 
in the kind of framework that we just touched on, but I don’t think it 
will do in the health one, you’ve got to combine that with a fair 
slice of a professional knowledge base” (006.3: 12.07.01)
"It is difficult because again you have to remember that medical 
and NHS jargon is not commonly known outside the health service
so people who haven’t used, even people working within - dentist, 
pharmacist, optometrist- they find it difficult how the primary care runs 
so they need to learn and lay people need to learn more than that 
because they don’t  know a n y t h i n g  about anything” (011.1:05.08.99)
- This emphasis on the technical nature of the debate may lie 
behind the reported reluctance of lay representatives to join in 
discussions about w hat they perceive as the roles of the statutory 
agencies in relation to decision-making and any consequent 
rationing of services:
“One of the interesting problems that we’ve had is that on the Mental 
Health Group when it started to make decisions about prioritising 
service, you know, who had the money and which bit was developed, 
the voluntary sectors and the users and cares said they didn’t want 
to participate in that...they didn’t see that that was their role to 
make decisions. So one of the things we feel is that to involve them in 
the decision-making process is, you know, is difficult because, you 
know, they really see them selves as...in an advocacy role, I suppose, 
and when it is, well, “You know, right, well, you can have this but so- 
and-so doesn’t have that” and then they ask not to vote on those things. 
Which disillusioned me a little...you give them a seat at the high table 
so to speak, and then if  they decline to make decisions, really, you 
query whether its worthwhile...” (008.2: 05.07.00)
So the extent to which LHGs had been persuaded into adopting a
managerialist perspective by this point in the process (twelve
m onths after launch) is interesting for the light it sheds on the
value placed on different groups’ contributions.
Added to that, the am ount of time it takes to build effective 
communication links with the local community was another 
barrier:
“In the HIP consultation, we used the X Council panel of 1,000 people 
for a consultation which was.. .which was helpful. We did engage in a 
certain amount of invited comment, but its very, very difficult. I mean,
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I'm not despondent about it, I just think you've got to be realistic 
that this is the start o f a continuing dialogue and that your first 
steps in that will not be productive. It needs to build up, people 
gradually need to think in terms of communicating with you about 
these things...” (006.2: 17.07.00)
Others tried to make tangible links with their CHCs as proxy
representatives of patients: for example, several tried to share
office premises as a  m eans of facilitating communication:
“And round that also is the point that hopefully at least we’ll have in the 
X-area our Community Health Council and LHG’s office as an office that 
somebody can have access to, and they know where they can go to to 
talk on those issues....It will also enable the LHG to give some sort of 
admin support for the CHC-i and also for the CHC to give more input 
more easily to the LHG -  saying “Oh, you don’t like this”, or, “are you 
aware that...?” It’s a way of keeping your eye to the ground isn’t it? 
(016.3: 12.06.01)
LHGs lamented the lack of any guidance or concrete advice from 
either their parent health authorities or the Assembly as to how 
best to develop the public involvement element of their remit.
But, reflecting perhaps the general lack of interest in this area 
prevailing amongst m uch of the health service management 
community a t the time, very little guidance was forthcoming 
(004.2); as one put it:
The general feeling was that “everybody’s trying, but nobody was very 
happy that they’d done it, quite honestly”. (006.2: 05.07.00).
5 .5  Summary
This chapter and the preceding one have illustrated the extent to 
which the structural changes made to the health system in Wales 
introduced in 1999, failed to change the existing distribution of 
power and influence within the system. Table 5.1 summarises the 
main changes made, in term s of horizontal structural links; the 
forces unleashed by the changes; and their effects on the
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development of LHGs as of the end of December 2000. The Table 
indicates that, although a num ber of key changes were introduced 
to support implementation of the new policy to devolve power in 
decision-making to local levels, other elements of the system 
combined to m aintain the sta tus quo, in terms of power and 
- decision-making, throughout the period under study. Thus, for 
example, the revolutionary rhetoric of Putting Patients First was 
severely undermined by the nature of the structural linkage to 
health authorities. The limited decision-making powers of LHGs 
were further curtailed by the failure to articulate, or implement, 
any sort of defined development pathway fro LHGs. When LHG 
GMs and Chairmen did, finally, begin to work in concert, to 
propose their own solutions to the perceived impasse they found 
themselves in at the end of 2000, their efforts were hampered by 
internal capacity constraints. Consequently, even the injection of 
new cash into the system, in Ju n e  2000, appeared to have acted 
more to reinforce than to change existing fault lines.
This analysis of the structural constraints inherent in the 
establishment and development of LHGs illustrates how difficult a 
task  faced the new Chairmen throughout the three years in which 
they worked to establish their legitimacy as local agents for 
change and to impact on service provision locally. Table 5.1 
illustrates the forces operating to promote LHG development, and 
the relative strength of the forces opposing this growth. It
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illustrates that the incentives provided to LHGs were too weak to 
enable them to challenge existing powers within Trusts. It points 
towards the weak accountabilities that further exacerbating this 
situation and confirms the inequality between the size of the task 
compared to the skills and capacities provided. Clearly a new 
approach would be needed. The next chapter looks a t the 
Chairmen themselves and the skills and understanding they 
brought to their task. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 examine the new 
relationships they tried to forge in order to affect service delivery 
locally. Chapter 10 analyses the tools wielded by LHG Chairmen, 
and their impacts, as they tried to play this unequally weighted 
game. In order to understand their progress, or lack of it, towards 
this goal, it is necessary, next, to explore the perceptions of the 
key actors, and their interpretations of the social institutions and 
organisational realities in which they found themselves, viewing 
both the activity systems and formative contexts in which they 
worked from a social constructivist perspective.
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C hapter 6: C hairm en as Change A gents
6.1 Introduction
The preceding two chapters outlined the political and 
organizational context in which LHGs were created. The aim of 
this chapter is to explore the ways in which the main participants 
in this story, the LHG Chairmen themselves, perceived their roles 
and key tasks. Their own descriptions illustrate different 
perspectives and assum ptions tha t the Chairmen brought to their 
new roles, that, in turn, influenced the different approaches they 
applied to developing their team s and their organizations, and to 
building relationships with other stakeholders.
A distinct narrative thread can be identified in the words and 
metaphors, or images, used by Chairmen to describe the situation 
in which they found themselves, th a t helps us to understand the 
ways in which they experienced the new context in which they 
were working, in their roles as  Chairmen. The sense that they 
made of the obstacles they encountered -  in fact, the extent to 
which they perceived different forces or pressures as constraints 
in the first place -  provides a  sharp insight into the ways in which 
they perceived themselves to be working, and the reasons behind 
the actions that they took throughout their three year period in 
office. As Weick (1995) has noted, the specific constructs that 
individuals create, as part of their on-going efforts to understand
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and make sense of their worlds, helps to determine the actions 
that they take. These actions may, in turn, exercise something of 
a  determining effect on the worlds that they subsequently 
experience. Critically, these constructs rely on individual actors’ 
interpretation of “cues” from other actors in the system, and tend
I
- to conform to, or reinforce, [their] existing notions of identity 
(Weick 1995 in Checkland et al 2007, p. 96). The metaphors, or 
descriptive images, th a t the Chairmen used throughout the study 
thus help u s to understand their individual and collective 
paradigms, in other words, the ways that they themselves 
perceived their new working context.
Section 6.2 outlines the Chairm en’s roles and responsibilities, as 
specified in the Guidance Advice (Table 6.1). Section 6.3 explores 
the electoral process to show how Chairmen came into the roles in 
the first place. Section 6.4 examines the personal characteristics 
and career backgrounds of the Chairmen. Section 6.5 explains 
their personal motivations for taking on the role. Section 6.6 
analyses the sense they made of the role in terms of, firstly, their 
interpretation of the context in which they found themselves; and 
secondly, the emerging descriptions of the leadership role they 
expressed; and thirdly, the leadership styles they evinced 
throughout the study. The distinctions which emerge reflect 
nuances which became more apparent over time, from their own 
words and images. It is im portant to note here that, since this
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study did not set out to measure leadership qualities, the 
categorizations discussed here are not fixed or innate. Rather they 
are the product of the researcher’s attem pt to distinguish between 
the different Chairm en’s approaches, based on their own 
descriptions of themselves in this context. Section 6.7 explores
I
the ways in which Chairmen defined those groups they considered 
to be their prime constituents. Section 6.8 analyses some of the 
limitations on Chairmen’s authority. Section 6.9 consists of a 
summary of the key points made in the chapter.
6.2  Role and responsibilities
As noted in chapter 4, Welsh Office guidance (1998b) stipulated 
that “LHGs m ust be vehicles for decision-making, not ju s t 
maintaining the sta tus quo”. Table 6.1 outlines the roles and 
responsibilities of the LHG Chairm an in pursuit of that 
organizational objective. The Table indicates that a strong and 
effective leadership role for the Chairm an was specifically 
articulated in the initial policy guidance.
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Table 6 .1  LHG Chair Job Description
Role o f the Chair: Key Functions Objectives
To provide leadership to the LHG
To agree with the health authority 
on behalf of the LHG the range of 
functions and responsibilities to be 
undertaken.
i
1. To reflect the position 
in an annual 
performance 
framework agreed 
with the health 
authority; and
2. To agree a  plan for 
the future 
development of the 
LHG.
To review the performance of the 
LHG and be responsible for its 
effectiveness
To facilitate the participation of all 
members of the LHG
To ensure they are 
sufficiently informed and 
supported to undertake the 
functions delegated to them
To provide sound advice to the 
health authority on all issues 
pertaining to local health needs
To ensure that all members of the 
LHG act as a  corporate team
1. [To] operate within 
the principles of 
sound corporate 
governance and
2. [To ensure that] 
collective 
responsibility is 
recognised and 
realised
To ensure that principles of good 
clinical governance are taken 
forward in the LHG under the 
leadership of an identified senior 
clinician from within the LHG who 
will take responsibility for this area 
of work
To ensure that the needs of local 
communities and the people who 
live there are at the forefront of the 
LHG’s business
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Role o f the Chair: Key Functions Objectives
To obtain full value from LHG 
meetings by:
1. being even handed, 
impartial, willing to 
listen;
2. being clear about 
aims of meetings and
3. ensuring th a t those 
aims are understood 
and shared by 
colleagues
To guide the LHG in leading the 
organization, rather than  managing 
it
To heed the 
distinction between 
the role of LHG 
members and the 
secretariat
To be responsible for the links 
between the LHG and the Chairman 
and Board of the health authority, 
the media, local MPs and Assembly 
members, CHC and others
To represent the LHG externally 1. to be as open as 
possible about 
[LHG] affairs
2. to build goodwill 
towards it [the 
LHG}
To be responsible for the effective 
induction and development of LHG 
members
[To identify] further 
development 
requirements [of 
Board members] 
through a process of 
continuous review
To ensure that LHG members have 
appropriate arrangements in place 
to consult and feed back to their 
sponsoring bodies
Working with a small executive 
committee, ensure that the 
business of the LHG is conducted 
smoothly and cost effectively
---- ........................................ ......
Source: Establishing LHGs: NHS Wales Putting Patients First. Welsh Office 
Cardiff 1998
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The Table indicates the wide range of functions and 
responsibilities expected of Chairmen, in the two sessions a week 
they were expected to dedicate to the role. The next section looks 
at how they were elected to the role, and following sections 
examine the different ways in which they interpreted that role,
" and why.
Section  6 .3  The Electoral Process for the Role o f LHG Chair
Local Medical Committees were given responsibility for conducting 
elections to the LHG itself. Each LHG then elected the Chairman 
from amongst the full membership, bu t with the clear indication 
tha t the Chairman should be a  GP. Although this sounds 
reasonable and straightforward, in practice, a  more complicated 
picture emerged from Chairm en’s own accounts of the process. 
This was partly due to the context in which the LHGs were set up 
in the first place, which included widespread pessimism about the 
concept of LHGs among GPs across Wales, as well as scepticism of 
the electoral process in term s of representativeness of local GP 
opinion (Williams 2002). Chairmen were well aware of this 
concern amongst their peers:
“...the relationships are there but I think the problem has been that 
there’s a lot of scepticism  about local health groups at the grass 
roots level. And you know a lot o f practices do not see their 
relevance and I think we will have to prove our relevance really* (008.1:
3.11.99)
The scepticism of ‘grassroots GPs’ may have been further 
strengthened by the electoral process itself, which was widely
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reported, by the survey respondents, as ‘fixed' in th a t it had been 
handled through the Local Medical Committee, and the timing of 
the process had made it hard for people from smaller practices to 
be involved. The Chairmen's own descriptions of the process 
support the idea tha t the electoral process had been neither 
straightforward nor transparent:
“The one who expected to be the Chair didn’t get voted on to one of the 
six [GMP slots] or didn’t have the support of the others to chair it. It 
wasn’t an automatic GP Chair, I mean they didn’t want it. So I was 
then asfced...well, not directly, but they wanted to have somebody, 
you know, and my name was put forward which was then supported by 
the Board which was then supported by the XXHA Board. A series of 
supports if you like” (012.1: 09.08.99)
“When it came to the elections for what was to be the LHG ...Some very 
funny shenanigans went on with the LMC...and it shows the real 
politics of it. So I had been recommended as the representative on the 
XX Steering Group, and I mean I’m not even an LMC member, which 
was very strange, so I found out at the last minute where this meeting 
was and went along to that, so I got a little bit deeper in. And at the end 
of the day I’ve agreed to stand for the LHG and in fact mysteriously 
only six people stood for the [six places on the] LHG, which I find 
strange...”(016.1: 29.09.99).
This excerpt is important because it shows the extent of 
misinformation or inadequate information that clouded the health 
system, a t primary care level, a t the time that LHGs were being set 
up, even amongst those purportedly most closely involved. This 
lack of information inevitably skewed perceptions about fairness. 
The slow process of information dissemination out to practices 
from the centre combined with many individual GPs' suspicions 
about the LMC -  “the politicos” - to create a cloak-and-dagger 
picture of the electoral process:
“There was competition particularly on the Board -  some members who 
felt they should have got on it didn’t get on it- deep down I feel there 
was a little bit of political voting on geography rather than on 
thinking what could the person bring to the Board because although 
the person who didn’t get on didn’t join in with other practices on
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fund-holding -  they went their own way -  they could have brought a
lot to the Board through his knowledge of Royal College higher politics 
and GMC politics, revalidation and stuff which would have been useful 
to the Board” (015.1: 29.09.99)
The electoral process itself was therefore perceived as skewed in 
favour of those who had previously involved themselves in local 
medical “politics” or activity. This tended to reinforce the 
prevailing reported scepticism of GPs on the ground towards the 
LHG concept itself.
This scepticism was further strengthened by the sense of 
bereavement reported to prevail among local GPs in areas where 
GP Fundholding had been extensive. Chairmen themselves used 
this term to express the feelings of loss of influence their 
colleagues were reporting:
“There are a lot of practitioners in XShire who are very irritated that 
fundholding has gone...whether people will come out [of that 
bereavement process], lots of people will come out and lots of people 
won’t come out the other side of it. They won’t do it again, iif you see 
what I mean...[they] may never be that keen on a new system. You 
know there’s this huge amount of time making it into a system, and you 
know, you take it away...” (008.1: 03.11.99)
Grassroots GPs, already sensitised by such feelings of loss were, 
perhaps, only too ready to criticise all aspects of the new LHGs. 
And the choice of the LMC as the electoral vehicle may have 
contributed further to this negative perception. The LMCs’ role 
had traditionally revolved around representation of GP interests to 
Health Authorities. This role could have been perceived to have 
been downgraded in importance once Family Health Services 
Authorities were abolished, since those primary care-oriented
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authorities understood and respected the influence of the LMCs in 
a  way in which health authorities - traditionally more used to 
working directly with Trusts -  might be less inclined to value.
Using the LMCs as the electoral mechanism might have been 
intended as a way of reducing any potential resistance LMCs 
themselves might have had to the LHG concept - particularly as 
the LMC may well have had concerns about the potential impact 
the LHGs would have on their own roles (discussed further in 
Chapter 9).
“When it came to the elections for what was to be the LHG, the XX 
doctors, who had a good group.. .were told by some of the doctors in the 
eastern side, quite inaccurately, that it had been discussed and it had 
been decided that nobody would stand for the elections for the 
LHG, for general practitioners, unless we knew how much they were to 
be reimbursed for locum fees which was quite an issue...and how much 
time would be required to be put into LHG work, and they said only 
sensible people would undertake this sort of work if they knew those two 
things. And actually that was quite true but it was untrue that nobody 
had agreed to stand and so unfortunately all of the XX doctors then, 
who were the most coordinated of the three groups, now stood down.
So I was one of the two representatives from the eastern side, and on an 
informal basis, so I went in on that...(016.1: 29.09.99)
This quote emphasizes that, despite all the efforts put into trying 
to ensure an equitable and transparen t mechanism for electing 
GPs and Chairmen in the first place, the complex environment in 
which the elections took place m eant tha t back room deal-making 
was an almost inevitable part of the process in practice. This may 
have been further complicated by the nature of the 
reimbursement for the role of Chairman. This last excerpt shows 
tha t the GP Chairmen were already well aware of the strains their 
roles would place on their GP partners, by their absence from the 
practice 2 sessions a week. In addition, almost all spoke of their
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concerns about the levels of reimbursement compared to the 
amounts of time they felt necessary to devote to the LHG role. In 
contrast to GPFH practices, there was no management allowance 
and the Chairman’s reimbursement was viewed more as an 
honorarium than a salary for the job. This arrangement might 
have been acceptable to the individual GP Chairmen themselves, 
but their GP partners were less sanguine, given tha t locum costs 
needed to be subsidised by their own personal incomes, from 
shared partnership earnings. This proved to be an added strain 
for GP Chairmen throughout the years under study. Thus, 
elements of negativity in the context in which the LHGs were being 
set up, may have been aggravated further by the arrangements 
made for electing GPs to the role of Chairman; the reimbursement 
arrangements for the role of Chairmen created an additional 
source of resentment among their closest colleagues. The next 
two sections explore the personal characteristics Chairmen 
brought to the new role and their motivation for taking it on 
against this thorny background.
6 .4  Personal Characteristics and Community Links
The 22 Chairmen finally elected by their LHGs were mainly, but 
not exclusively, practising GPs. All 22 were male; most were 
middle-aged, between 40 and 60 years old; only two were in their 
late thirties. Initially elected Chairmen included one female, but 
she subsequently resigned due to a potential conflict of interest,
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as she was married to a specialist doctor at the main NHS Trust 
hospital to which the LHG related. In a different LHG, the 
Director of Social Services was initially elected as Vice Chairman 
to a GP Chairman. However, the ex-fund-holding GP Chairman 
resigned soon after his election, and the Vice Chairman duly took 
- up the post of Chairman.
All 22 Chairmen could be said to have been firmly rooted in their 
local communities, m ost having lived and worked in the same 
locality throughout m uch of their careers. All reported that they 
had forged good personal links locally, throughout their careers, a 
feature tha t Chairmen thought would prove useful to them in their 
new roles:
“I know the Chairman o f the Trust personally, and through a number 
of other things like when he was Chairman of the Family Health 
Services Authority and having met with him when he was Chairman of 
the X NHS Trust; we haven’t always agreed, but there are lines of 
communication. And, you know, that’s all good stuff” (007.1:
23.12.99).
Others pointed to their long-standing ties with local voluntary 
groups, as advantages they brought to their new roles:
“...the Voluntary Council, 3CX Voluntary Concern’, which, again, I had a 
little input into that, into the Steering Committee, setting that up...” 
(016.1: 05.10.99)
“I mean, I Chair the St John’s Council for the county of X...so I’ve been 
involved in that for many years. I’ve Chaired it for two years.” (012.1:
09.08.99).
Still others reported the strength of their own networks with local 
GPs and the broader medical community:
“...in the event many of my colleagues in Xshire came to me because of 
my previous involvement with postgraduate education -  with vocational 
training. My involvement as a clinical assistantship with a hospital.
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And because really I had been involved in health service 
development within my own community” (013.1: 13.10.99)
“I organise social events on a fairly regular basis...technically I was 
Secretary to the XX Medical Association which started in the 1920s 
•and used to invite each new consultant to come to talk with them...” 
(015.1: 29.09.99).
Additionally, both of these latter Chairmen are emphasising their 
acceptability to other doctors, by virtue of having had educational
i
roles amongst their peers. They expected this personal history to 
work in their favour, by conferring elements of credibility and 
neutrality, and thus to dilute any concerns about potential threats 
to established interests. That these attributes of acceptability, 
credibility and safety were perceived as important assets indicated 
the Chairmen's recognition, from the outset, of the existence of 
some significant underlying difficulties to be met in taking on the 
role of Chairman.
The extent to which Chairmen had backgrounds in primary care 
development work among their peers was also perceived by several 
as having been influential in their becoming known figures locally, 
and thus in increasing their acceptability to their colleagues. All 
of these personal associations were regarded as useful ‘oil’ for the 
organisational links they were trying to forge as Chairmen. These 
descriptions of their personal histories and their perceived impact 
on their election to the Chairm anship role provide useful starting 
points for understanding their individual motivations. They also 
point towards the metaphors, or images they used to make sense
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of the expectations they perceived to be facing them in these new 
roles (Weick 1995; Morgan, 1980).
6.5 Motivation
Chairmen tried to downplay their own personal ambitions, by 
. highlighting the extent to which the role was perceived as 
unattractive by many GPs throughout 1998 and early 1999. They 
claimed that, in many areas, there was little competition for the 
post: “I don’t think that anybody else would have done it...”
(005.1: 26.10.99). This sort of frequently-made comment also 
served to emphasize their own, personal, commitment to public 
service in taking on the role, as the following extended extract 
shows:
MI became involved because I was asked to get involved in the
Commissioning Forum...and I had done that for a few years, and I 
suppose that the real reason why I did that was that I wasn’t happy 
about fundholding because I thought it was divisive, and I had a feeling 
about it that that was not the correct way to have the patient get the 
primary care services that they deserved and that they should have. .
.So I got involved because I thought it was a better way to provide 
care for patients, to influence the authorities...so I thought that 
having had the experience that I did with the Commissioning Forum, 
I could contribute something of the knowledge of that process, and the 
fact that I’d chaired Local Medical Committees, Secretary, and been 
involved with the BMA, GMSC as it was then, and also I was coming 
at it from a different perspective in that I’d been involved with 
Vocational Training, and Course Organising and was, until July of 
last year, CMB Tutor at the local Postgraduate Centre. So I thought 
that I had an input which may have had some influence on the forming 
of Local Health Groups...” (007.1: 23.12.99)
Virtually all 22 Chairmen reported a strong personal commitment 
to developing primary care in their own localities:
“I think that there is...that the crisis is here, that secondary care is 
moving ever more specialised in its outlook. ... The old-fashioned 
general physician role that absorbed all the secondary care work is 
not going to be there, and there seems to be a need for primary 
care to absorb that role, which is difficult, because if we need to
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absorb that role, then we need to find somebody else to do the role that 
we currently fulfil. And the challenge of how to manage that change 
is something that’s necessary, but very difficult.” (001.1: 6.10.99)
Many reiterated this aspect of developing primary care via 
devolving “generalist” activity from the acute sector outwards to 
the community, thus freeing up acute sector resources and, at the 
same time, adding a more sophisticated range of activities to be 
undertaken within the primary care sector. Such expression also 
reflected a key strand of government policy aimed a t reducing 
demand in the acute sector.
“I took early retirement. One of the reasons for my retirement was 
because commissioning was on the horizon. IVe been a GP for 30 years. 
IVe gone through so many changes. I was in recent years a very 
successful fundholder and all of a sudden the rules have been 
changed...so I thought...I can afford to go. So 111 go. And you get on 
with your own game. However in the event ....I realised that morale was 
low in primary care, and all of a sudden I thought, well if I do go back 
then it might give me an opportunity to be able to influence things 
for the better as far as primary care is concerned. I thought Okay, I 
looked upon it as a challenge.” (013.1: 13.10.99)
This comment also suggests that another motivating factor may 
have been a  function of the age range of the Chairmen themselves: 
many spoke of finding themselves looking round for new 
challenges, ju s t as LHGs came on stream.
“Mind you at the same time [as I was applying for the Chair] I was also 
planning to take a sabbatical as I was thinking of perhaps having a 
break from general practice and going to Australia for a year or 
something. I really fancied that but I got involved in this instead!” 
(010.1: 16.08.99)
Why GPs, as individuals, seemed to welcome this opportunity to 
be in the forefront of a  major change in direction is interesting in 
itself. For some it was a case of needing a change personally, 
while others saw it as a  chance to make a difference to services 
locally:
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"Ordinary practice life can be a bit repetitive after a few 
years...There are things that should be done that aren’t beihg done, you 
know, in the Trust and the hospitals and so forth, and so you sort of 
get this urge to change them  really.” (014.1: 16.08.99)
“I reached the age of 40 three years ago ....and 1 was feeling 
intellectually bereft so I decided I needed a challenge personally, 
and, as luck would have it XX Out of Hours service was set up and I 
was instrumental with a few others in actually making that work and we 
did this together, 10 local practices, 106,000 patients in total and we
did it in just under ,10 weeks I really eqjoyed the cut and thrust of
holding 10 very different practices together” (009.1: 20.08.99).
Key words here relate to both the perceived ability to make a 
difference, and to previous personal experience of having had an 
impact on direct patient care delivery services within a  relatively 
short period of time. All 19 GP Chairmen repeatedly expressed 
this deep personal commitment to making a difference in primary 
care delivery locally.
This personal commitment to change was expressed equally by 
non GP Chairmen:
“W ell... I see it as a wonderful opportunity to forge links -  our links 
with the health authority are there, and with the hospitals are very 
good, we have people in there and that all runs very smoothly but 
relationships in this area, in the community are ‘overdue for attention’.
I suppose in XXX we identify with the primary care agenda, a sharing of 
the Cinderella services agenda, and we see a need to control the more 
high profile high spending acute sector. I saw this really as a chance 
to make a contribution here, a real opportunity to make a strategic 
shift.” (006.1: 08.11.99).
“My wishes, my aspirations if you like, are based on the fact that there 
now is or could be collaboration between the health and social care.
1 think that could be quite advantageous, you know, if channelled in the 
right way” (012.1: 09.08.99)
So, again, the “opportunity” to make a difference was expressed by 
all twenty two Chairmen, irrespective of occupation or experience.
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But it is important to note, within this uniformity, tha t key 
variations in em phasis had emerged, right from the outset, as 
some Chairmen noted the broad strategic impact of reconfiguring 
services, whilst the majority of Chairmen referred to the local 
operational benefits they hoped to achieve in their new roles. 
Despite Chairmen's uniformly strong conviction of the potential 
value of the new organisational form in developing and changing 
primary care, and unanim ously expressed personal commitment 
to effecting such development, their motivation for taking up the 
role of Chairman was more variable across the twenty-two post­
holders.
But the Chairmen, as a  group, appeared to be sensitive to charges 
of being labelled as either “ambitious” or “political”. Negative 
connotations appeared to be associated with these characteristics 
by both GPs in the field and Chairmen themselves. Chairmen 
used a variety of terms to explain their own individual 
motivations, and to distance themselves from accusations of either 
ambition or political experience:
“Well you have to...it's a question of taking the responsibility. If
somebody has the vision for what can be done and what needs to be
done, then it’s a sort o f responsibility to try and achieve the goal"
(001.1: 06.10.99).
The following lengthier extract includes a self-description followed 
by a narrative account of how the move to Chair of the LHB came 
about:
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“I went in with the intention of being part of the Board as I feel 
myself and I think a lot of people would agree with me possibly not 
being a Chairperson as such but more of a Team Player. However 
things changed and the initial feeling was that I should become Vice 
Chair as the Chair was having problems sustaining initial support for 
some local political issues...Following on from there, there were internal 
disputes with the Chairman’s practice: all the partners felt they had the 
work put on them because she was at meetings so often and as it 
happened her partner in her practice was also going for Clinical 
Governance Lead. It was a big practice, 6 or 7, but 2 people were away 
for long periods of time so she had an ultimatum from the other 
partners...so the natural person to turn to was the Vice Chair...” (021.1:
08.11.99).
This second account shows the extent to which the respondent 
was keen to distance himself from any concept of having actively 
sought a  leadership position. Similarly, other Chairmen tended to 
respond modestly when asked why they had gone for the lead role:
"I think that the concept I found attractive. I think that IVe always 
been interested in medical politics and this is probably the first 
opportunity, I feel, that doctors in primary care have had the chance to 
alter their work and have a direct influence on how they work...The 
reasons I’m the Chairman...is I think is Fm a job sharer, so I am  
able to, I can give the time commitment to do it.” (022.1: 28.10.99)
This Chairman was unique in admitting an interest in ‘medical 
politics’ bu t was also noteworthy for the way he countered this 
with the suggestion that he was only elected to the role of 
Chairman because he was perceived, by his GP colleagues locally, 
as having more time available than other GPs. This widespread 
reluctance to admit to ambition or leadership qualities may have 
made it more difficult for Chairmen to come to terms with the 
realities of the new context in which they needed to work, since, 
as was pointed out in section 6.3, the LHG Chairmen’s expressed 
commitment to making a difference in services to patients was in 
stark contrast to the perceptions of the role expressed by
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“ordinary” GMPs in the run-up period before LHGs became 
operational.
6.6 Sense-Making: Interpretation of Context
6.6.1 Prevailing Paradigms 
- Clearly, individual actors do not make decisions or interpret 
others’ decisions, in a  vacuum. The context is part of what needs 
to be taken into account, but, in addition, each Chairman brought 
to this new role an underlying set of assumptions or view of the 
« world that, in turn , influenced his efforts to make sense of the 
new context into which he had entered (Weick 1995). Examining 
these perspectives, or paradigms, is an essential prerequisite to 
understanding the rationale behind each Chairman’s definition of 
his new role, and the approaches each took to fulfilling what they 
saw as the key tasks implicit in the role. In exploring these data I 
have found Weick’s approach useful as a  way of making sense of 
what is being said. By using the set of questions recommended 
by Weick (e.g. ‘who are we?’, Svhat makes us different?’ and V hat 
causal beliefs do we use?!, it emerged that the majority of 
Chairmen espoused a rational and linear model to describe the 
new context in which they found themselves. This model may 
have reflected their biomedical education and training. In this 
vein, many of these Chairmen tended to try to describe the policy 
world, and the decisions of the WAG, for example, using 
straightforward terminology which reflected belief in a step-wise
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and linear developmental pathway. One Chairman frequently 
used the metaphor of hum an growth, from childhood to 
adolescence to m aturity to describe the LHGs as an evolving 
organism:
“...we [the LHGs] are the front gear, and we’re very juvenile 
and perhaps an appropriate analogy is that we’re teenagers,
I think we are in the throes of the teenage thing, and that we’re 
learning, and perhaps by the time the three years are up we’ll be 
in our early twenties. I certainly don’t think we’ll have achieved 
that middle-age type of situation...” (007.1: 23.12.99)
Many Chairmen also used simple cause-and-effect chains to try to
understand the actions of other actors in the environment.
Virtually all expressed belief that “planned” and “orderly”
evolution was the ideal way to develop their organisations, in a
stepwise progression:
“it’s a natural process” (007)
“Need to build on what we’ve achieved in order to move forward”
“We’re told to take things slowly and not bite off more than we can chew 
(014)
“...can’t run before we can walk” (007)
This expressed belief in the prevalence of a natural order of
things, and the rightness of evolutionaxy progress, implied, for
many, the necessity for, or a t least the appropriateness of,
guidance and direction from a central authority, or ‘parental’,
figure (Welsh Association of LHG Chairs 2000). Such a model
neatly reinforced the prevailing tendencies towards control
inherent in many bureaucratic organizational systems (Harrison
et al 1992, p. 14). In addition, the Welsh structures which limited
the LHGs to advisory roles as sub committees of the much larger
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(and more experienced) Health Authorities further reinforced this 
impression. There was a constant undercurrent of belief, amongst 
the majority of LHG Chairmen, in the ability of the LHGs to 
influence upwards if only they could be seen to “toe the line” and 
be delivering the goods first, via a  sort of earned competence. The 
difficulties began to be evident when different players’ (eg WAG, 
HAs’, LHGs’, and T rusts’) definitions of what constituted the 
sought-for products surfaced.
Chairmen universally expressed belief in the power of information 
and evidence to effect change and influence the other players in 
the system to see things they way they did: “If we’ve got the right 
information, people can’t argue with facts” (014). A constant 
source of frustration, therefore, was what they saw as the inability 
to get “hard  information”. Over time, the Chairmen gradually 
began to realise how far outside the existing information channels 
their new organisations actually lay:
There’s a six lane highway running between the Trust and the health
authority. The little LHG minivan can hardly get on the access ramp...
(006.1: 08.11.99)
The lack of up-to-date prescribing information was put forward as 
an example of this information deficit, and seen as a serious 
handicap for interventions tha t had been expected to be fairly 
straightforward and to yield quick returns. The reality was that 
LHGs’ access to information was controlled by health authorities 
and Trusts, and it was very inconvenient for Trusts to find
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themselves being asked for figures on community service spends, 
which they regarded as an important part of their own, already 
over-committed resource base. LHGs’ collective inability to wrest 
this information from Trusts, as demonstrated in chapter 5, 
hindered their ability to make effective changes to community 
- support services, a  key plank to shifting demand from the acute to 
the community setting. This impression of being outside the 
mainstream of action and decision-making was further reinforced 
by the obstacles tha t independent contractor Chairmen faced, 
throughout 2001, in trying to contribute to the consultation about 
future models for primary care organisations in Wales. As 
explained in Chapter 3, their “day jobs” of scheduled clinics and 
patient appointm ents were arranged weeks in advance, thus 
committing their time; even when they could re-schedule, finding 
locum cover was almost impossible in some areas, even with 
advance notice. In contrast to this, the salaried managerial 
members of Trusts and health authorities were easily able to clear 
diaries for last minute meetings throughout the day:
“Its amazing how the health authorities have been able to wheel
[everybody] out” (006.3: 18.07.01)
Moreover, by the end of the third tranche of interviews, in October 
2001, most Chairmen still referred to their organisations as weak 
and powerless, because they lacked -  and had failed to acquire -  
control over the budgets, and the information, as well as the skills
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and expertise which they deemed necessary to develop primary 
care services.
The speed a t which the agenda seemed to change was also 
significant, throughout the period under study. Chairmen tried 
valiantly to identify clues as to what the Assembly actually wanted 
from them and to steer their organisations to deliver it, in line 
with a  belief tha t this would earn them more autonomy and a 
larger share of the pool of resources.
Their own commitment to primary care development never 
wavered b u t they gradually grew to detect that a different 
definition prevailed among their WAG and health authority 
counterparts.
“Everybody’s gone over to the business of dealing with The Plan and 
things have stood still a little” (006.2: 17.07.00)
Chairmen bemoaned their collective lack of knowledge about how 
to influence upwards more effectively:
“We need proper lines of communication...to get the Assembly to listen 
and to hear what is acceptable to LHGs” (007.1: 23.12.99)
And they expressed a “constant fear of manipulation” and of 
“being politically cornered” (007.1).
Nonetheless, the belief tha t evidence would be enough to sway 
vested interests prevailed, despite their ongoing experience. This 
may reflect the technical nature of the medical role in the health
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service, with a  corresponding disregard for “politics” as being 
messy, ambiguous and somehow unwholesome. Idioms used by 
most Chairmen referred to structures and planning processes and 
of the value of an  outcomes focus in order to build an evidence 
base for change. They spoke of continuity and systematic 
- development as essential elements to progress. The term “politics” 
on the other hand was used negatively, to refer to empire building 
and game playing. There was virtually no recognition or 
understanding of the complex “soup” that is the world of policy 
makers. When faced with this complexity, many Chairmen tended 
to react by becoming more focussed on specific local medical 
service developments a t operational level. This approach was 
often expressed by the view tha t GPs were ideally placed to “know” 
local service needs. The flaw in this perspective was the 
individual patient orientation implied and a failure to recognise 
the fallacy of generalising from such individual encounters. The 
power of this perspective was, however, a key pillar of the way the 
system functioned, and its prevalence dominated definitions of 
local need throughout the years under study. As the one 
Chairman with a social services background commented, looking 
back at the end of the study:
“IVe become focussed around the health agenda [of GMS] rather than
contributing the social services perspective” (006.3: 18.07.01)
The power of these underlying assumptions, or paradigms, can be 
seen further, in the following analysis, of the Chairmen’s’ 
descriptions of their roles, and the ways in which they articulated
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the aims of their LHGs. These role definitions tended to flow from 
a technical model of biological (natural) development which 
appeared to conflict with the organisational reality of the world in 
which they found themselves. In addition, the way in which 
Chairmen perceived the role can be seen to have been strongly 
influenced by their previous organisational histories, which, in 
turn, influenced the way they approached the work and 
implemented it over the study period.
Variations in the descriptors Chairmen used to explain their new 
roles may have also reflected their general lack of concrete 
management experience, by virtue of working in relatively small 
and flexible organisations. Moreover, corporacy as a concept had 
not previously been a feature of the independent practitioner 
ethos. The independent contractor relationship to health 
authorities did not, historically, foster a sense of joint working 
towards a common agenda. Instead, rather more adversarial 
relationships may have developed around claims for payment for 
services rendered, and the. relatively recent introduction, via 
FHSAs, of a  monitoring and checking function in relation to those 
payments. Given their backgrounds and experience, therefore, the 
views they expressed of the Chairm an’s role don’t fall neatly into 
traditional organisational or leadership categories.
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6.6.2 Leadership Styles: Chairmen's Descriptions
Section 6.5 illustrated that all twenty-two Chairmen expressed 
commitment to the role of the LHG as a  change agent locally. But 
they varied in they way they described the leadership aspects of 
the role of Chairman. In the first tranche of interviews, Chairmen 
were asked specifically about the nature of their roles. From the 
initial analysis, some distinctions began to emerge between the 
ways in which Chairmen described their own approach to the role. 
A small num ber of Chairmen described it in terms of a broad 
focus on community needs, elicited by developing communication 
links across the community as a whole. Other Chairmen took a 
narrower focus, emphasizing local medical service provision. Table
6.2 illustrates the differences identified.
Table 6.2 Chairmen’s Focus as Leaders
Focus Strategic Operational
Remit Health needs of local 
community
Local medical 
service provision
Definition of 
constituents
Whole community Local professional 
provider community
The Table indicates tha t some Chairmen interpreted the task of 
improving local services rather more narrowly than others. The 
Chairmen were unequally distributed across the two typologies, 
with seventeen that could be seen to be more operationally and 
pragmatically focused, and five tha t could be seen to be working 
more strategically, a t the end of the first tranche of interviews.
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Section 6.7 examines the extent to which Chairmen defined their 
constituents broadly or more narrowly. This section looks first at 
the. definitions of leadership expressed by Chairmen.
Naturally, Chairmen's interpretations of their roles might be 
expected to change over time. Thus it is not suggested here that 
their interpretations were either fixed, or intrinsic, features of 
their own personalities. But distinctions did emerge in their own 
descriptions of the areas of the role that each emphasised above 
others, and in the styles of behaviours that they tended to use to 
describe the ways in which they carried out their own roles. For 
example, some described the role itself as an active force for 
change, using labels like ‘Leader' and ‘Catalyst'. Others described 
the role more as a  vehicle for enabling new relationships to be 
built (‘Focal Point’ and ‘Referee')1, which would, in turn, enable 
change to take place. Still others expressed the role as mainly 
providing leadership among local professional community 
members, or ‘Lead Clinician', in the words of one Chairman (007). 
Inevitably, too, their perceptions of the role changed considerably 
- among some Chairmen, a t least -  over time, as their 
organisations grew and developed. Some actually used the term 
“leader” to describe their roles, and this echoes the language of 
the Guidance Advice (1998b), but, in practice, their descriptions of
1 ‘Referee* is a label accorded by the researcher to this type of role description; 
the other labels are Chairmen’s own.
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the role varied over time and correlated more with their individual 
professional backgrounds and career histories. The impact of 
structural constraints was also evident throughout the process of 
coming to term s with the role over time, tending to re-enforce an 
inward focus, for many, which, in turn, proved to act as a 
. constraining, rather than  as a  liberating force on the Chairmen's 
views of the nature and scope of their roles.
Thus, the five sub sets of leadership styles described above could 
be discerned within these two broad overarching approaches: 
strategic or operational. Together, these five styles could be seen 
as a continuum, from active to more passive in approach, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.1. At the more active end of the spectrum 
were those whose own descriptions of the role seemed to match 
most closely to commonly accepted definitions of a Leader, 
articulating a  vision of the way ahead and persuading others to 
work together to fulfil it. A second group included those who 
described their leadership role as Catalyst. In addition to these 
two groups, were those who saw their roles as Lead Clinicians. 
The Lead Clinician role implied a narrower focus, and a more 
operational orientation, than did the Leader or Catalyst 
descriptions, but was still a  dynamic role. At the more passive 
end of the spectrum were those who seemed to describe 
themselves as focal points, around whom people could rally. An 
additional group, termed 'Referee' by the researcher, described an
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enabling function, in  w hich ru les an d  processes were im portan t
constraints on action and aspirations. This latter group were,
almost by definition, pragmatic, and operational in their outlook.
Figure 6.1 Spectrum o f Leadership Styles Described by 
Chairmen
Focal Lead Referee
Point Clinician
Before proceeding to examine some of the distinctive features of 
these five emerging styles, it is important to remind the reader 
that these labels are used here for convenience, as a means of 
distinguishing between reported types of behaviours. They are 
relevant only to this study in this time and place, and in light of 
the peculiar structural context under study here. Nonetheless 
using these labels, although the researcher's own, provides a 
useful device for reporting emerging distinctions among the 22 
Chairmen.
6.6.2.1 Leader: Interestingly, the Chairman as Leader is the least 
commonly expressed definition among the 22 participants. Those 
who used this term tended to link it to concepts of Vision' and 
'strategy':
"Well, I try to sort of put forward the vision at an early stage and say, 
look, this is what needs to be done, this is what you were doing in fund- 
holding in effect...and maybe it’s something we need to formalise in a 
much more structured way*” (001.1: 06.10.99)
Another Chairman expressed this aspect of the leader's role with a 
stronger emphasis:
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“Well I think we have to try to keep driving the process forward.” 
(010.1: 16.08.99).
Most Chairmen, including the most operationally oriented GPs, 
reported a change in their understanding of their roles, by the 
time the second interviews took place:
“I am trying to change my role from being a GP representative to 
representing primary care interests” (001.2: 22.06.00)
“...it’s a job, a job you have to do, you’re the tough representative of 
the doctors, and you’re doing this job and there are certain rules
you have to follow and there are certain things you can initiate yourself. 
It’s something that -  I don’t see myself as - 1 don’t see m yself just as a 
representative -  I have, I have to lead if you like -  that’s how I see
the job ... But the climate out there is really one of inertia. GPs are not 
terribly interested...I think you have to persuade them” (019.1:
10.08.99)
Here, two of the more operational, pragmatic Chairmen were 
reflecting on the need to broaden their approach. The extent to 
which they felt tensions between their natural instincts to 
represent their medical colleagues, and what the “rules of the 
game” allow seemed, however, to limit their understanding of their 
boundaries, and thus the am ount of room for manoeuvre that 
they actually had as Chairmen. The second quote emphasises the 
extent to which this Chairman already felt hemmed in, from the 
outset. In the event, neither of these Chairmen’s descriptions of 
themselves moved out of the operational mode throughout the 
study.
Several Chairmen spoke of the need to use persuasion as a key 
tool in bringing their grassroots colleagues on board effectively:
“They’re not very good at obeying orders, are doctors; I mean, we 
don’t give orders, we don’t work like that; once you start giving
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doctors orders, you know you’ve lost, but I mean its still a matter of 
persuading people to a point of view...” (019.1: 10.08.99).
This pragmatic and operational Chairman expressed his 
recognition of the need to engage colleagues, implicitly 
recognising, further, the limited authority he perceived that the 
. LHG actually had. This awareness of the LHG’s limitations may 
help to explain why the definition of the leader's role in terms of 
its implementation was so frequently expressed in somewhat 
limited terms:
“The Chair role is about tone, you know, direction, vision, you know, 
occasional use of strategic...isn’t it?” (002.3: 13.08.01)
Here, the very fact of posing the question, a t the end of the three 
year period in post, illustrates how far uncertainty about their 
roles as Chairmen prevailed, stemming perhaps, from their 
uncertainties about the boundaries of their own authority in the 
leadership role. And, although many Chairmen's views of their 
roles developed and changed significantly throughout the course 
of the study, the leadership concept was not often expressed in 
terms of a Leader figure, even by the end of the study:
“..then, I saw it as a facilitator. I saw it as more hands-on as we 
were, certainly originally, because we had so little staff capacity.
And I certainly had less of a vision of a split between operation and 
strategic. I hoped that we would build up a communication
network We need to build up a team relationship in the relationship
with the Board, and the Board and the team with each other, and to be 
clear who does what...and increasingly I think the Chairman has to 
take a more strategic view that the role is to try and actually get the 
Board with that and get it interpreted and implemented at an 
operational level” (016.3: 12.06.01)
This illustrates the scale of the challenges faced by Chairmen in 
carrying out such a complex role as that of the LHG
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Chairmanship turned out to be. Whilst recognising the leader's 
role in creating a vision and persuading people to work towards it, 
was expressed by a  minority of Chairmen, the way the role was 
carried out in practice often failed to live up to this description, as 
they faced strong tensions between their intentions to act 
" strategically and the drivers in the system which combined to 
push them into more operational modes, particularly a t the 
outset, whilst they were responsible for establishing their own 
infrastructures.
6.6.2.2 Catalyst: Those who saw the role as a catalyst for change 
tended to see this as a  multi-dimensional activity, encompassing 
local services as well as having an impact a t a national level:
“I don’t see the issue as the Chair having to force the policies through, I 
don’t even see it as the role of the Chair to formulate the policies in the 
first place -  at the beginning you do set the agenda but then you let 
other people run, finding the ones that run early on, that’s good then 
because other people get a bit of confidence’’ (009.1: 20.08.99).
So the role of the Chairman as instigator, ‘setting the hares 
running', is expressed here by a particularly strategically oriented 
Chairman. Here the em phasis is on putting up the issues for 
discussion and debate as the prime focus. Three years later this 
Chairman reiterated his view:
“Whoever chairs it definitely needs to be able to motivate and facilitate, 
but m ost importantly, understand...” (009.3: 31.08.01).
This is an im portant perspective, as it illustrates the role of the 
Chairman as listener and enabler. These qualities appear to be 
correlated with the inclusivity of this Chairman's definition of his
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constituents, and with the strategic approach he adopted 
throughout his tenure in the role. More importantly perhaps, it 
also reflects his commitment to a grassroots-led or “bottom up” 
approach to change. Such an approach seems to equate to WHO's 
description of “community development” (World Health 
Organization 1978). This Chairman never really used the word 
“leader” to describe his role, bu t the descriptors he used portray a 
strategic approach to this work.
Fourteen months into the process of establishing the LHG, this 
same Chairman defined the LHG’s success in terms of sparking 
debate, nationally as well as locally: “I think we've been 
successful in agitating the debate...” (009.2: 20.06.00), thus 
reaffirming his belief in the catalyst aspect of the role. This 
interpretation of the leadership role is the one most strongly 
correlated with a strategic approach to the job and the work of the 
LHG. This community development type approach was not a 
passive one however, as the mobilisation of the community was 
systematic and deliberate!, and proved to have had a very powerful 
impact (006; 007; 009; 010; 022):
“I think we are starting to change the agenda” (009.3: 31.08.01)
“We managed to keep our own agenda running” (009.3)
This Chairmen went on to refer to the “energy generated” amongst
the local community of primary care providers and users, through
this approach, reaffirming his initial views that local engagement
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and ownership would prove crucial to success. An equally 
strategically oriented Chairman expressed this role as a  multi­
layered one:
“I feel it is important that the Chair is a link to build up good 
relationships with all the other parties you know, eventually the local 
authority and the Trusts as well as links in the Health Authority and the 
community. I think it is whenever one has the opportunity to 
strengthen the relationships and the links, I think that that is a very 
crucial role for the Chair” (010.1: 16.08.99).
6.6.2.3 “Focal Point"
At the other end of the spectrum, a  more passive interpretation of 
the catalyst role was also evident among a sizeable group of 
Chairmen. This definition of the role, as focal point, is one of 
providing a rallying point for Board members. From the data, this 
comes across as more passive than active, and revolves around 
“enabling” and relationship-building:
“I Ve thought through and if you like what the LHG might want to do 
from the point of view of directions and I am trying to be a catalyst in 
the middle rather than the instigator” (012.1: 09.08.99)
“I mean basically as far as I’m concerned, I'm just the sort of person 
up front if you like, with regard [to] holding the fort” (012.2: 24.08.00)
lay a t one end of the this part of the spectrum. In the first excerpt 
this Chairmen uses the term “catalyst” but in a more passive 
m anner than those Chairmen included in that definition above. 
The second excerpt confirms this difference in emphasis. Another 
Chairman presents a similar definition, but from a more 
opportunistic standpoint:
“So, you know, carrying the Board along in that sort of direction...it was 
really focussing in on a problem that everybody was aware of as far as 
Xshire was concerned...I'm really, I suppose, the enabler as far as 
this is concerned because although these meetings have been initiated
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by the LHG, and really I want them to feel that this is a meeting between 
primary care and secondary care, really I am sitting there in the middle,
I am Chairing it" (013.1: xl3.10.99)
Here, there is a suggestion of leadership in the sense of bringing 
people together to address an  issue of common concern, and 
providing the forum in which solutions could be generated. In 
this instance the issue in question is interesting, too, because it 
exemplified a  particular definition of “everybody”, ie the medical 
community, with an assum ption tha t this implicitly incorporated 
patients' views, while the issue itself was one initially highlighted 
by the Trust as a  service deficit. Nonetheless, the LHG Chairman 
was particularly pleased to be included as central to the process of 
brokering a solution:
“I think its great to be part of something that is all of a sudden dealing 
with us” (013.1: 13.10.99)
illustrates ju s t how far out of the decision-making process GPs 
had been until the creation of LHGs. Reducing the distance from 
the seat of power was a  prime motivator for GP Chairmen to take 
on the role, but most still limited their conception of the role to 
the operational level.
On the other hand, the sheer size of the agenda facing the LHG 
required a willingness to concentrate on taking an overview, right 
from the start:
“I think basically in pulling it all together as I say there is no way you 
understand it all” (017.1: 11.08.99)
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“The role I have got in this first year is setting up an LHG! And letting 
Joe Public know what XY and the LHG are all about. And practice 
managers and whatever you want to talk to, that’s where we should be 
focussing” (017.2: 29.03.00)
But only a few Chairmen managed to put that sort of strategic 
intention into action in practice.
6.6.2.4 Lead Clinician More operationally oriented Chairmen, on 
the other hand, tended not to speak of having a vision of their 
own:
“I felt I had a few things in my mind of how we were going to progress, I 
felt that the people who were going to take part should have to be 
very much committed and they should have a viewpoint. I’m not
talking in terms of theoretical point of view, seriously, I very sincerely 
feel that there should be some way of improved health 
provision... ”(003.1: 15.11.99)
At the end of the study one particularly pragmatic, ex-GPFH 
Chairman, referred to the difficulties of trying to achieve on-the- 
ground service changes whilst the debate on futures and new 
structures whirled around him:
“We press on, we press on with the planning and the delivery. And 
at a general level we’re trying to occupy our minds whilst the 
redevelopment goes on, with another development...in conjunction 
with the Trust, around musculo-skeletal services. So we’ve taken 
on...its quite a ...well, we’ve elected to have a go at a part of the service 
that is...that is a difficult part of the service, but on the other hand it 
means that lots of minds will be occupied in trying to get to grips 
with the service” (003.3: 01.06.01)
This urge to concrete action, to “get to grips with the service” is a 
common theme for more operationally focussed Chairmen, 
especially GP Chairmen, who had previous experience as GP 
Fundholders. With the benefit of hindsight, one Chairman 
expressed it as the distinction between a Chairman's role and that
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of the Lead Clinician, implying tha t many of the GP Chairs had 
played more of a  Lead Clinician role:
“If you look at the Chair of the Trust, I’ve certainly worked completely 
differently to the role of the Chair...I’ve worked more as a Lead 
Clinician...it’s a different kind of operation. I mean, the lay Chair of 
a Trust works at purely a political level really. They get fed 
everything they need and...I...say they’re purely a figurehead. It’s a 
different role, a much more operational...” (018.3: 11.06.01).
So, with the opportunity of being able to look backwards in time, 
this Chairman reflected on his own more operationally focussed 
interpretation of the role. Again, this interpretation may be linked 
to the working history of m ost GP Chairmen, who aimed above all 
to be seen to be “getting things done”.
Amongst the majority of Chairmen, this practical focus was 
expressed more strongly as the period under study progressed, 
and the agenda grew, but “progress” seemed slow:
“trying to keep tabs on it all is real...the stuff that’s happening in with 
the links with the local authority, of the planning group, or the 
community safety strategy or, you know, keeping tabs on it all. I mean, 
I’m still ok with the primary care bit, that’s where I came in. But 
some of the big picture stuff...” (002.2: 02.06.00).
“I don’t understand all th is management stuff, but I think about it 
like tennis or golf, I’m not interested in tennis or golf. I think I’m there 
to kick ass and get things done...” (019.2: 22.05.01).
This latter Chairman’s frustration with the rate of progress, or 
lack of it, and the increasing pressure he felt himself to be under, 
to be seen to be delivering something, acted to reinforce a 
narrower definition of the role, and tended to work to strengthen a 
drive to control what he could, rather than to work to unleash 
creative forces in the wider community. Health authorities’
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actions may have reinforced these tendencies by ‘delegating’ to 
LHGs work tha t more properly came within their own 
responsibilities, rather than  supporting the LHGs’ efforts to 
develop a new and different focus (010.2).
6.6.2.5 Referee: This image of the role seems to be more about 
bringing together a  clear consensus and presenting a  united Voice 
amongst the LHG Board members themselves. In this view, 
concepts like “fairness’’ predominated:
“I made clear right at the very beginning, the very first meeting, thi* tQ 
all the members of the Local Health Group, this was the doctors, tbe 
nurses and as far as I was concerned as a chairman I wouldn’t 
tolerate any inner groups within local health groups, in other %0r<|8 
I wasn’t there as a doctors' representative, that I was there to 
represent the whole of the Local Health group and I certainly would^ 
tolerate any little huddles or sub groups agreeing policy beforehand, g0 
that has been made extremely clear right at the very beginning that anv 
decisions we make are open...” (022.1: 10.08.99)
This same Chairman expanded on this theme three years later:
“I would like to think, whether it’s true or not, that as a Chairman, j 
wouldn't tolerate people who sort of step out of line. I think t^ t>g 
the role...I mean we had an understanding from the beginning that 
people who...if you felt strongly about something, you know, you 
would voice it within the Local Health Group but what you didn’t 
do is go outside and...if that’s how you feel about it you should ret^* 
(022.3: 12.06.01) ^
So, here, presenting a united front was important to this 
Chairman. And the commitment to a form of corporacy emerging 
also reflects a specific element of the Job Description. As noted 
earlier, this idea of corporate responsibility was a new issue for 
GPs, more used to working independently, and being free to 
express their views as professionals. This new cultural imperative 
created problems for several Chairmen, as the following excerpt
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indicates, from another Chairman, impatient with one of his 
Board members, who doesn't ‘toe the line’ in his view:
“I think they don’t appreciate the discipline of the corporate 
governance, they don’t understand that they have been elected and 
selected to a publicly accountable body, and that they have to be very 
careful that they don’t  align them selves to groups which may cause 
conflict of interest...” (019.1: 10.08.99).
These Chairmen also tended to refer to the need to “tell” people 
what to do, and to focus m uch of their energies on being seen to 
be competent managers of the process, emphasising the 
importance, for example, of running meetings efficiently:
“I always like to have people sitting in named positions. I don’t  
like people sitting anywhere. You know, the same people sitting  
together, you know. That doesn’t enhance anything. The office 
manager always puts the name contact, before they are in it, and then 
they sit where their name is.. .we split the groups up if you like. So I 
think that is important....so I go around the room afterwards to make 
sure they are quite clear what happened and to ask if they’ve any 
contributions or any other comment to make, you know. So I like to 
do that. I think that is something that is the responsibility of the chair, 
if you like. You’ve got obviously to have a bit of discipline, so that 
the conversation doesn’t go off at a tangent...”(012.1: 09.08.99)
“I think that there is a sort of figurehead part of it in that somebody [has 
to] try to pull things together and formally at meetings. So taking 
control of the meeting. So that’s more the official and figurehead 
side of the job really. But as far as the day to day work is concerned 
there is a lot more to it than that....I sort of feel that I want to do a bit 
more than that really, because we have got a number of pressing issues 
and problems and we are told to take things slowly and not bite off more 
than we can chew and that’s fair enough. But unfortunately we do have 
quite a lot of pressing problems locally and I think just being a bit 
more dynamic about it, hopefully other people will follow as 
well...”(014.1: 16.08.99)
These two excerpts illustrate one end of a continuum of 
approaches to the Chairman's responsibilities for the business 
aspects of the LHG. This aspect of the role was closely aligned to 
health authorities’ concepts about how their sub committees 
should function.
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Although these five “categories” can be seen to emerge from 
Chairmen’s descriptions, it is important to note that they are not 
exhaustive or m utually exclusive. And each reflects an aspect of 
the role outlined in the Chair’s Job Description, as shown in Table 
6 . 1.
In general, the over-arching distinction drawn between 
Chairmen’s emerging focus, between strategic and operational, 
can also be equated to two different typologies referred to in the 
literature on leadership: transactional and transformational (Bass 
1985). In this study, the first of these two types tended to be 
correlated with those who tried to effect change a t an operational 
and local level, working within the prevailing system. The more 
transformational Chairmen, on the other hand, tended to be 
working around the system. This latter type tended to work more 
strategically, and inclusively of the whole community, whilst the 
more transactional chairmen focused more on specific medical 
issues and often spoke of the local GPs as their main constituents. 
More transformational Chairmen, on the other hand, focussed 
more on the wider community and its needs.
6.7  Limits on Authority: Structures and Processes
A focus on the practical aspects of the role was, of course, 
embedded in the infrastructure, and further reinforced by the way 
in which LHGs were first set up, leaving Chairmen responsible for 
all the practical aspects of finding office premises, and their
198
continuing reliance on health authorities for staffing and support 
services. Trying to balance these operational tasks and maintain 
a strategic focus proved an impossible bridge to cross for many of 
the Chairmen.
More crucially, perhaps, was the emphasis on structures and the 
consequent need to be seen to be playing by the rules, prevalent 
among this group of Chairmen:
"The powers that be have certain rules...in procedural terms, things 
tend to be a lot slower because you have to present things to lots of 
committees, and there are ways, formalised ways of doing things...”
(019.1: 10.08.99)
Perhaps the single most important distinction amongst Chairmen 
was tha t some did find ways round these rules, whilst others 
found themselves increasingly dis-empowered, almost by virtue of 
trying so hard to work within them:
"...there are strings attached to whatever they tell you to do so in 
the end you have to do what the Assembly or Health Authority tells 
you what the rules and regulations are...I think they try to keep reins 
on us really, that’s what it is” (011.2: 24.03.00).
This latter Chairman was pretty sanguine at the outset, however, 
anticipating that this situation would change as soon as LHGs 
were able to gain experience and demonstrate capacity:
" Perhaps in a year’s time they should really be loosening the grip on us 
and say look, this is yours’” (011.1: 05.08.99)
Seven m onths later, this was not yet the case, and the Chairman's 
frustration was clear, as was his feeling of being “hemmed in” and 
unable to progress because of uncertainty about regulations,
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and the need to work within them. These restrictions were all the 
more chafing as he tried to deal with changes in key personnel.
His own General Manager had been re-deployed, by the health 
authority, to another LHG, leaving him without a  vital link in the 
information chain, and he still had no office space to call his own, 
a full year after the LHG’s inception, leaving him feeling 
marginalised. By the end of the third year, his anxieties about the 
rules and room for manoeuvre were increased:
“You can’t change the system  until, you know, the structure
comes in, you know” (011.3: 01.06.01)
Three years on, this Chairman expressed an overwhelming feeling 
of frustration and inability to operate effectively due to ‘system’ 
constraints, and a feeling of being ‘out of the loop’ in terms of 
ability to influence the shape of the new organisations which 
would supersede LHGs. His constant concern with those very 
structures implied a conviction tha t to work within them was the 
only way to be effective, but, in the end, his account describes the 
many ways they constrained him.
These “Referee” Chairmen initially defined their roles largely as 
interpreters and keepers of the rules, and worked to identify ways 
to make the systems work more effectively within existing 
boundaries, and to keep their Boards ‘in check’ and working 
alongside them. But each found that this strategy constrained 
rather than liberated them. These Referee Chairmen, on the 
whole, were fairly narrowly focussed, both in terms of their
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definitions of their roles as leaders and in relation to the groups 
they referred to as their main constituents. Many, bu t not all, 
were ex fund-holding GPs. All, as practising independent 
contractors, were small businessmen. As such, they had 
experienced the effectiveness of using delegated budgets to effect 
- service changes, on a  small scale, for their practice populations. 
They had become accustom ed to being able to effect such changes 
fairly quickly, since there were no intermediate hurdles between 
making a  decision and implementing it, within the confines of 
their own small businesses. This experience had inspired them - 
and led them  to believe th a t larger system-change could be 
effected by 'more of the sam e’ sorts of strategies. This proved not 
to be the case however. Moreover, many of the ex Fund-holding 
GP Chairmen had another limitation: they tended to define their 
constituents in term s of the local GP community. This 
parochialism created problems for them in terms of narrowness of 
vision as well.
6.8  D efinition o f C onstituents
Ju s t as definitions of the role of Chairman varied across the 22 
LHG Chairmen, their definitions of their constituencies varied 
considerably. Some Chairmen expressed their new remits as 
embracing the wider community, whilst others limited their 
definitions to either the local professional community, or even 
restricted this further, to local GPs, as indicated in Table 6.1.
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Looking at how Chairmen defined their constituents in the first 
place proved to be correlated with the extent to which they might 
take operational or strategic approaches to their roles. Some, very 
operationally focussed Chairmen, found it difficult to break away 
from the LMC mould, wherein they were expected to put the 
interests of the profession as a  whole to the forefront of their 
thinking. This, in turn, may have reflected their previous working 
experience. In addition, other ex fund-holding GPs expected to 
use the LHG as a platform for making a difference to service 
configuration across the patch, in the same way that holding their 
own funds had enabled them to provide an expanded range of 
services to their own patients. These Chairmen also had a more 
operational approach to their roles as Chairmen, throughout the 
study.
A minority of Chairmen, on the other hand, spoke of their 
responsibilities to the people of the locality as their prime concern. 
Only a  few LHGs stand out as exemplars in this respect (005; 006; 
007; 009; 010). These same Chairmen also took longer range and 
more strategic approaches to their own roles and to that of the 
LHG. On the whole, those Chairmen who took both an inclusive 
approach to their definitions of their wider constituency, and also 
took a strategic approach to the LHG’s role, were, by the end of 
the study, both more content in their roles, and perceived their
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organisations as having been more effective, than those who 
adopted narrower definitions of their constituents. For example, 
one Chairman explained his interest in the LHG role in these 
terms:
“...we began to think more instead of what patients* services there 
were, we began to  think in terms of what patients needed...it was a
totally different concept...and I found it gave me far more professional 
pride and restored a lot of my morale” (010.1: 16.08.99)
By the end of the three years under study this Chairman looked 
back and reported:
“it created far more difficulties achieving that than I originally thought, 
but we are achieving it! We’ve actually put into being a structure 
right across X area with four locality steering groups which reflect 
all the stakeholders, representatives of primary care, and varying 
members from primary care, there’s not a predominance of one 
member...we also have representatives of .the Trust, the CHC, the 
voluntary sector, and the local authority” (010.3: 24.07.01)
Another exemplar Chairman in this respect provided a different 
explanation of similar change in personal viewpoint as underlying 
the approach adopted by the LHG:
“Anyone who works here can realise that there is an odd mix between social 
care and health care...and the way we supply services has been to fit them 
within localities and the actual localities within the area change very 
dramatically so we get pockets of deprivation within quite affluent areas, 
whereas in the Y and in the Z you have large areas of deprivation that just go on 
endlessly, so my ideas had changed...so that became the mind fix from 
moving from the patient contact as an individual to the patient as part of 
the bigger picture, so that was interesting and I was very lucky because I had 
lots and lots of colleagues, who are veiy good doctors, and very good nurses, 
and very good health visitors who have also stimulated the debate -  they 
have brought the challenges....I have found that everyone is committed to 
' something and making a difference and that is what we’ve committed ourselves 
too - making a difference in XYZ area” (009.1: 20.08.99)
Those strategic and inclusive Chairmen also tended to have had 
experience of leading, or working in, commissioning groups or 
total purchasing pilots before taking on the role of Chairman of 
the LHG. This experience may have enabled them to see beyond 
the interests of individual practices and GPs as a professional
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group. On the other hand, ex fund-holding Chairmen tended to 
be more operationally oriented - and all the more frustrated with 
their inability to effect change as time went on. On the whole, ex 
fund-holding Chairmen expected to be able to get their hands on 
specific levers, which they mainly defined as budgets or 
commissioning powers, in order to effect change. Their ensuing 
frustration with their inability to access these levers may have 
blinded them to the existence of other potential tools. They 
tended also to be more focussed on process and on “rules of the 
game”. More strategic chairmen, on the other hand, tended to 
find ways around perceived obstacles and to be able to take a 
wider view of the community and its needs, and thus to rise above 
the general melee of health authority-oriented in-fighting. This 
approach also enabled them to align their LHG’s agendas more 
closely to those of the Assembly - and, again, to be rewarded for 
doing so:
“I think it’s about helping the process of encouraging ideas, its about 
trying to enthuse communities with the idea that they really can 
make a change if they’re prepared to make an effort...and, as we’ve 
been so encouraged in the process, although not in its origins, we’ve 
been encouraged...and when the gentleman from the New Opportunities 
Fund came...he did say that [one of the bids submitted under the 
auspices of the LHG but emanating from a deprived community] it was 
the best bid they’d received in the United Kingdom...”(010.3: 24.07.01)
When asked about ways in which the LHG Board prioritised its 
efforts this Chairman replied:
“ No, it wasn’t that difficult, because when you look at our initial 
agenda, the idea for why LHGs were set up, you look upon the various 
ideals that were enshrined in Better Health, Better Wales, etc., they’re 
all fairly self-evident, really” (010.3: 24.07.01 )
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A different bu t equally strategically oriented and inclusive 
Chairman took a different approach:
“At the local basis, I think that we’ve managed to identify areas 
where there is...there are possibilities to move and I think we have 
to identify those avenues where movement can happen” (009.2:
20.06.00)
He went on to point to the effectiveness of having concentrated on 
primary and community care opportunities initially:
“I think there's a new feeling about working together, for sure.
Some of the professional barriers are beginning to weaken. There is 
a greater acceptance of the need for change. I think there’s a greater 
awareness of the role that others can take part. I think people now 
understand that the interface areas are more...there’s more to be gained 
than to be lost” (009.2)
And a year later this Chairman reflects on the progress made in
getting his agenda aligned with national priorities:
“Yes we managed to keep our own agenda running. It’s nice to see that 
some of our agenda is reflected in the national agenda” (009.3:
31.08.01)
These Comments seem to indicate tha t taking a more strategic 
definition of the LHG role relied on taking more inclusive 
definitions of both constituents and needs, but that it then thus 
enabled a closer alignment with Assembly policy and strategy to 
be created.
6.9  Summary
This analysis of Chairmen’s approaches to their new roles 
highlighted the clear distinction which emerged from the data, 
over time, between those Chairmen who tried to work within the 
system (‘transactional’) and those who worked around the system 
and existing structures to effect broad change (‘transformational’) 
(Grint 2001). Although all twenty two of the Chairmen might be
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said to have shared the same positivist paradigm, by virtue of 
their training, those who were confident enough in their 
interpretation of the LHG’s revolutionary remit to act to exploit the 
power vacuums created by frequent changes of personnel at the 
most senior levels of the system, were those who reported the 
- highest levels of satisfaction with their efforts and achievements. 
These Chairmen recognised the need to influence a wider 
constituency in order, in tu rn , to influence the Assembly 
effectively. They worked to develop and empower this broader 
community as a  m eans to creating their own power base:
“It’s got to be bottom-led; the LHG’s strength is that it can access the
opinions and views at a low level” (009.1: 20.08.99)
These Chairmen formed unique and broad partnerships across 
their local communities, and through these groupings, aligned 
themselves with the Secretary of State’s somewhat radical agenda. 
In doing so, they managed to release sufficient creative energy to 
transcend the more bureaucratic and rule-bound approach of 
health authorities’ restrictions and constraints. They developed a 
form of strategic leadership which gathered strength and 
momentum from its broad grassroots base, rather than from their 
titles or positions in the system. Their leadership styles built upon 
their own strategic visions for primary care development. The 
breadth and inclusivity of their definitions of their constituents 
helped them to m atch their development approaches to their own 
ideological commitment. This combination of personal 
commitment to primary care development, combined with their
strategic and inclusive approaches, appears to equate to Butler's 
(2003) Ideological Vision as a  key factor in developing 
organizations receptive to change. These Chairmen built local 
organisations which managed to thrive and grow, partly by the 
relationships they forged, and by the capabilities they identified 
. and developed within their organisations, as the following four 
chapters will illustrate.
On the other hand, those who adopted more restricted definitions 
of their roles became embroiled in the thicket of local power 
structures and prevailing Svays of doing things'. These more 
transactional and operational Chairmen remained handicapped by 
the limited views they took of their roles, strengths and potential. 
These limited views neatly complemented the health authorities’ 
definitions of LHG roles and responsibilities as being restricted 
both in range and scope.
The following three chapters explore the ways in which Chairmen 
went about creating new relationships with key stakeholders, to 
“play” the game of institutional politics in order to get their new 
organizations recognised and accepted forces within the 
organizational landscape. Chapter nine examines the strategies 
and tools they used to develop their organisations to meet the 
challenges facing them, and the constraints they identified in 
trying to do so.
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Chapter 7: Institutional Politics: Building Vertical 
R elationships w ith the Welsh Assembly Government and 
Health A uthorities
7.1 Introduction
As h as been argued in chapters 4 and 5, Local Health Groups 
were established with very little going for them, in structural 
terms. They were given wide ranging responsibilities, but no real 
authority or power to deliver their remits. Their parent bodies 
controlled both money and information flows, and directly 
employed both their chief officers and secretariats. Moreover, the 
prevailing organisational structures and communication channels 
precluded any formal or direct communication with the newly 
devolved assembly government (NAW). These structural 
arrangem ents tended to inhibit the partnership-building 
behaviours they were ostensibly designed to promote.
On the other hand, LHG boundaries were drawn coterminously 
with those of the local authorities. The newly appointed Secretary 
of State for Health & Social Care continuously hea t the drum ’ of 
partnership working (NAW 2000; NAW 2001; LHG Conference, 
March 2000). Thus LHGs were charged with a specific duty to 
work in partnership with organisations whose services overlapped 
with theirs, to improve patient care locally. This duty of 
partnership was later enshrined in legislation, making it a
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statutory responsibility. In light of this context, this chapter, 
together with the following two chapters, analyses the ways in 
which the new LHG Chairmen undertook this statutory 
responsibility, and the impact they thought their efforts were 
having on changing the configuration of services provided locally.
- Whereas chapters 4 and 5 illustrated the extent to which existing 
structures tended to locate decision-making powers centrally, the 
aim of this section of the analysis is to explain local decision­
making. This section introduces the concept of Institutional 
Politics as a key leadership behaviour. Section 7.2 introduces 
relationship domains as building blocks for creating and 
sustaining effective working relationships. Section 7.3 examines 
Chairmen's assessm ents of the importance of relationship- 
building. Section 7.4 examines relationships with the National 
Assembly for Wales, while Section 7.5 explores the complexities of 
relationships between LHGs and their health authorities. Section 
7.6 summarises the key points raised in this chapter.
The capacity to build effective relationships was highlighted by 
Kanter (1958 in Pettigrew et al 1992) as a  critical factor in 
effecting organisational change. Pettigrew et al (1992) concurred, 
based on their own empirical study of organisational change in 
the NHS. Pettigrew et al developed this concept further in light of 
their research, terming the capacity to form and sustain cross­
boundary working relationships “Institutional Politics”. This label
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added an im portant dimension to Kanter’s concept, that is 
particularly noteworthy in relation to this study. Chairmen's 
abilities to identify appropriate organisational partners in the first 
place, coupled with the capability to hone in on specific gains to 
be achieved for both partners, and then to lead their teams on to 
" work towards them, appears to have been critical in effecting 
cultural change within their own organisations. This ‘political’ 
dimension appears to be integral, therefore, to success, in the 
LHG context studied here.
7.2 Effective Relationships: The Domains
In order to understand the nature of the factors influencing the 
formation of effective relationships between LHGs and their 
stakeholder organizations, two conceptual frameworks were used 
to report on the emerging analysis. The first framework was the 
organizational map designed by the researcher to use in the 
second tranche of interviews, and referred to in Chapters 4 and 5, 
as a  m eans of identifying those organizations that Chairmen 
deemed to be key stakeholders of LHGs. This map was later 
adapted by the researcher to enable Chairmen to discuss the 
nature of their organizational relationships, with these 
stakeholder agencies, as of Spring 2001. In the third tranche of 
interviews, therefore, Chairmen were asked to describe the quality 
of their organisational relationships with the different agencies 
deemed to be potential partners. The ranking key on the bottom of
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the chart was used to prompt discussion of Chairmen’s views of 
the relative merits of their relationships. The key ranged from “1” 
indicating a  relatively poor relationship with little dialogue 
established, to “5” indicating the existence of two-way 
communication, with regular meetings and joint work being 
undertaken. This was not an  attem pt to measure relationship 
quality per se. Chairmen varied in the extent to which they 
referred to the map: some were not comfortable with using it; 
others did not have it to hand  when the interview took place. The 
map was m eant to stim ulate discussion, and produce relative, 
rather than  absolute, indications in any case.
The second reporting device used, in this and the following two 
chapters, was one originally designed to assess the quality and 
depth of inter-personal relationships. This tool, developed 
originally by Schulter and Lee (1993), for the Tavistock 
Foundation, was subsequently applied, by Meads, to Primary Care 
Groups, as they then were, in England (Meads and Meads 2001). 
The use of the underlying concepts, as opposed to the 
measurements, helped the researcher better to understand the 
context under study, and th u s to organize the analysis presented 
here.
Table 7.1 sum m arises these indicators. The left hand side of the 
Table lists each dimension of relationship quality, while the right
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hand side gives descriptive illustrative behaviours of each 
dimension. Although Meads and Meads (p.58) noted that these
Table 7.1 Relationship Quality Indicators
Dimension Descriptor
Directness:
. • Medium of communication
• Accessibility & responsiveness
• Style 8b skills
Quality o f the com m unication  
process
Channels maximise information 
exchange
Direct, minimal delays 
Listening, openness, honesty
Continuity:
• Amount, regularity of contact
• Length/stability
• Managing change
Shared tim e over tim e
Investment of time/sufficiency of 
contact
Consistency of contact 8& 
commitment
Maintaining continuity through 
change periods
M ultiplexity:
• Organization
• Task /  function
• Personal understanding
Breadth o f Knowledge
Awareness of work constraints 8b 
opportunities
Understanding role/skills of other 
Informal contact, goals, values
Parity:
• Participation
• Fair benefits
• Fair conduct
Use and Abuse o f Power
Involvement in decision-making 
Fair distribution of risk 8b reward 
Common behavioural standards eg 
respect and integrity
Commonality:
• Shared objectives
• Common culture
• Positive diversity
Valuing sim ilarity fe differences
Common views of objectives, 
priorities 8b means of achieving 
them
Ways of working match shared 
understanding
Valuing different perspectives
Source: Adapted from Meads G & Meads T (2001) Trust in Experience: transferable 
learning for primary care trusts. Oxford: Radcliffe Medical Press p 59
five dimensions were each “necessary but not sufficient”, the 
analysis presented here suggests that not all of the dimensions
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were equal in importance, in this context. This chapter, therefore 
first examines Chairmen’s own descriptions of the importance of 
relationship-building in their own terms, before moving on to 
explore the underlying factors tha t contributed to these 
assessm ents.
Figure 7.1 depicts the organisational landscape prevailing in 
Wales during the period under study. It is the same ‘m ap’ shown 
in Chapter 4, bu t with the addition of the indicators used by 
Chairmen to describe the nature and quality of their relationships 
with the relevant external agencies. The map is reproduced here, 
with the additional ranking key, for ease of reference.
7.3  Chairmen’s assessm ents o f the importance o f relationships
The extent to which the Chairmen collectively identified the 
potential value of establishing new relationships with other 
existing organisations appeared to be closely related to their 
career histories and the approaches they took to their roles, which 
were outlined in the previous chapter. Thus, those who took a 
wide ranging, inclusive and strategic approach to carrying out the 
LHG’s role were more likely to place a  higher value on, and put 
more effort into, creating relationships outside their existing 
networks of local professional peer groups. They were also more 
likely to see the potential for influencing health policy decisions by 
building relationships with their AMs, members of the NAW
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Health & Social Services Committee, and with local councillors, 
than were their counterparts who took a more limited definition of 
their roles. Thus, in the context of relationship-building, the 
distinction between approaches taken by more strategically aware 
Chairmen arid those of their more operationally focussed 
. colleagues was notable. Chairmen who adopted a  strategic 
approach, and tried to build relationships across a broad range of 
stakeholders, reported more satisfaction with their relationships 
with partner organizations, over time, than did those who adopted 
a more narrowly focussed approach.
Although Chairmen displayed differing levels of interest and 
commitment to creating and maintaining relationships with 
potential partner agencies, most recognised the importance of their 
own roles in this process:
“There’s a role, I think, of the Chair, I think, is building up relationships 
all over the place...” (010.3: 24.07.01)
But how different Chairmen prioritised their relationship-building 
in practice proved to be illuminating. Chairmen's own 
assessments of the quality of the relationships they had forged 
were important indicators of the value they placed on this part of 
the process of building their LHGs as organizations.
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Figure 7.1: O rganizational R elationships in  Wales 1999-2001
National Assembly for Wales
Health Authority
Politicians: 
(AMs, M P s^ 'v
Local Authority^. . .  
Local Health Alliances
Voluntary
Sector
LHG
Relationships
NHS Trusts
Press/
*
General
Media Public;
CHCs
Key:
Relationships already in existence: eg Trust<->HA: 
Relationships to be forged by LHG:
Professional
Communities
(Independent 
Contractors, 
Nurses, 
PAMs, etc) 
LMCs 8 b 
(LDCs, 
LPCs,
\  LOPs)
Local community 
councils 
Local politicians
  solid lines
 dotted lines
Quality rating:
1= poor: little dialogue established
2= fair: some dialogue in process, mainly 1 way and meetings infrequent/ad hoc 
3= good: 2 way dialogue, initiated mainly by LHG
4= very good: 2 way dialogue, meetings regular and plans constructed for joint working 
5 = excellent: 2 way communication regular meetings and joint working underway
SW 24/05/01
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In the third tranche of interviews (Summer 2001), Chairmen 
reflected on the strength of the relationships they had created, 
using the scale on Figure 7.1. These assessments could also be 
seen to reflect Chairmen's perceptions of the structural 
constraints prevailing at th is point in the process of LHG 
development. For more operationally-oriented Chairmen, these 
assessm ents tended not to have changed by the end of the study 
(October 2001); for more strategic Chairmen, their assessm ents 
were, in general, reported as being more positive by the end of the 
study period.
In general terms, relationships with health authorities tended to 
be described as relatively poor (2-3 on the scale); local authority 
relationships tended to be described as being relatively good (3-5 
on the scale). Relationships with the Assembly were discussed in 
negative term s throughout the study period, but were described as 
relatively poor (3) in this exercise. More strategically oriented 
Chairmen tended to report reasonable quality of relationships (if 
any a t all) with politicians, whilst more operationally-oriented 
Chairmen tended not to have forged such relationships. A 
similarly divided picture prevailed for ratings of relationships with 
the public. The most strategically oriented Chairmen reported the 
strongest relationships with their local GPs and professional 
communities too. These reported ratings of relationships were not 
static but changed throughout the period under study. It is the
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underlying factors contributing to these ratings, and their 
changing shapes over time, which repay further analysis.
7.4  History as an Additional Domain o f Relationship Quality
As explained in Section 7.1, Schulter's and Lee's (1993) pre­
conditions for effective relationships were applied by Meads to 
primary care organisations in England. These five dimensions are 
shown in Table 7.1: Directness, Continuity, Multiplexity, Parity 
and Commonality.
The Table indicates that, for example, for an inter-organizational 
relationship to thrive, direct communication links should be in 
place, enabling partners to be accessible to each other, and to 
communicate directly, rather than  through intermediaries, using 
similar styles and language. Similarly, continuity in the 
relationship is fostered by stability in the personnel in place, as 
well as by the am ount and regularity of contact between them. 
Multiplexity refers to the num ber of linkages at different levels of 
the partner organizations. Parity refers to the extent to which 
risks are shared, or perceived as shared, equally across the 
partner organizations. Commonality, on the other hand, refers to 
the extent to which organizational aims are shared or conflicting. 
These dimensions proved to be useful devices against which to 
report Chairmen's descriptors of the conditions in which they 
found themselves, charged with a  statutory duty to form
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partnerships to foster more efficient and better integrated services 
at local level, and the problems they encountered in trying to do 
so.
This analysis suggests that, in term s of indicating a framework 
around which to build relationships, within the primary care 
setting, a t least in so far as Wales is concerned, a sixth element 
should be added to Schulter's and Lee’s typology: History. It 
appears, from this data, th a t preceding organisational history 
significantly coloured perceptions of partners, adding an 
im portant barrier which needed to be overcome before effective 
working relationships could begin to develop positively. This 
element may only be relevant in the context of this group of 
largely-GP Chairmen. But since GPs as Chairmen were an 
integral feature of the structures, the impact of previously shared 
history needs to be taken into account in order to understand the 
quality of relationships which were reported.
As Chapter 6 argued, GPs as Chairm en brought a particular set of 
characteristics and backgrounds to their new roles. Twenty-one of 
the twenty-two Chairmen had been working as independent 
contractors within their local catchm ent areas. Both the nineteen 
GPs, and the two pharm acists, had  previous working relationships 
with many of the agencies with whom they had to create new links 
in their roles as LHG Chairmen. In particular, they had a  shared
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organisational history with -  bu t very different culture from -  their 
health authorities. This shared history included several 
organisational restructurings, which changed the responsibilities 
of health authorities vis-a-vis GPs, but never fundamentally 
altered the relationship from tha t of independent contractor- 
payer. The last preceding reorganisation, which amalgamated 
FHSAs and Health Authorities, could be viewed as increasing the 
distance between the two parties, since it removed the agency 
which had been solely responsible for the reimbursement of 
independent contractor professions, amalgamating them into the 
general pool of health service providers (Welsh Office 1997). This 
contractor and payer relationship included an element of 
monitoring performance, after 1990, thus adding another layer of 
potentially adversarial interactions between the two parties. In 
addition, health authorities became the accountable agency for 
commissioning services, and for developing primary care. The 
experience of trying to facilitate take-up of GPFH among local GPs, 
and monitoring independent contractor performance by people 
more used to working within clear hierarchies in bureaucratic 
organisations did not leave health authority personnel unscathed 
either. Where health authorities had tried to facilitate 
commissioning team s among non fund-holding GPs, relationships 
may well have taken a  more constructive turn, as working 
partnerships gave rise to greater understanding of roles, functions 
and constraints. But, as Chapter 4 argued, the ways in which
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health authorities implemented the new structures, keeping tight 
reins on their LHG sub committees, fanned the flames of 
dissension in m ost areas across Wales. An attitude of suspicion - 
and sometimes outright hostility -  characterised the perceptions 
of most GP Chairmen, right from the outset:
“It looks that the health authority is hanging on and clinging to  
their powers and their budget holding, but then again they have been 
instructed by the Assembly, or Welsh Office what to do with that, so we 
feel we should have more freedom than we do now” (011.1: 05.08.99)
“I think that over these months [our priorities] are ones to establish 
the actual structure of the organisation and its going to take us through 
to about October to get there...The task alter that is the credibility 
issue, of sorting out regular meetings with things like the Trust, and we 
become the actual focus o f decisions. Because I don't think you 
can ever gain credibility if you are having to scuttle back and 
discuss it with our people" (018.1: 05.08.99)
“My concern in all of this one’s that...I mean the health authority was 
quite a dysfunctional beast before the chief executive went, they 
really didn't work together as a team terribly well and there was a 
very strong, sort of, ‘if  we did all th is, what's left for the health 
authority?' issue there, which is still there, I think” (005.1: 26.10.99)
Thus this shared history contained enough negative features to 
tend to predispose GP Chairmen to be suspicious of health 
authority motives and actions, as these comments, made in their 
initial interviews, indicated. This suspicion may have been 
strongest among ex-GPFH Chairmen, and least among those who 
had been part of commissioning groups, however informally 
structured. The impact of a shared history may be an element 
unique to primary care in Wales for two reasons. Firstly, the drive 
to focus on one organisational model to develop primary care was 
pushed more strongly in Wales than across the rest of the UK, 
largely because of the then Secretary of State's strong political
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commitment to fund-holding (Redwood, 1993-5). Secondly, the 
Welsh model of primary care organisation was the only one in the 
UK to be predicated upon such a heavy GP presence, specifying a 
GP Chair and six GP Board members (Welsh Office 1998b), thus 
emphasising this element more strongly than in models developed 
in other parts of the UK.
Against such a  background, it may be that all five of Schulter’s 
and Lee's relationship quality dimensions (Table 7.1) would need 
to be met in order to build and sustain more effective working 
relationships between LHGs and their health authorities. But this 
analysis suggests th a t some elements may be more important 
than others. In addition to the role played by history, analysis of 
Chairmen's views as they reported them over the three years of 
this study suggests tha t commonality may have been more 
im portant than any of the other five elements. However this 
analysis also suggests th a t commonality needs to be supported by 
changes in parity, to the point, perhaps, of positively 
discriminating in favour of the weaker partner. This hypothesis 
will be discussed, taking each of the different organisational 
relationships formed in tu rn , to assess the relative impact which 
each element appeared to play over time. This chapter examines 
the vertical, or hierarchical, relationships between LHGs, and the 
NAW, and then the health authorities; the next chapter explores 
the horizontal relationships developed to implement the duty of
221
partnership under which the statutory agencies laboured. Chapter 
9 examines relationship building across the wider community, in 
support of the policy drive towards increased local responsiveness.
7.5 National Assem bly for Wales (Welsh Assembly 
Government)
As highlighted in Chapter 4, no direct links existed between the 
Assembly government and LHGs, thus violating the first of 
Schulter’s and Lee's dimensions: directness. This structural 
constraint became increasingly problematic for Chairmen, as the 
study progressed. The ways tha t different Chairmen perceived their 
relationships with the WAG was a  good indicator of the way that 
they saw their own roles. For example, it was one of the most 
strategically oriented Chairmen who initiated, in July 1999, the 
quarterly series Of meetings with the Minister, which became so 
pivotal in influencing their future as organisations. These meetings 
proved to be effective in enabling LHG Chairmen to get the 
reassurance they needed from the Minister that they were, in fact, 
meant to be “contributing to strategic thinking” about NHS service 
delivery, and “not ju s t  another departm ent of the health 
authority”.1 Such endorsem ents were essential for LHG 
development, in the face of the obstacles they faced. But not all 
LHG Chairmen responded to them  in the same way. The more
1 Jane Hutt, Minister for Health &Social Care, LHG Conference, 16 March 2000, 
The Metropole Hotel, Llandrindod Wells.
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strategically oriented Chairmen identified the opportunity to align 
their LHG’s agendas to the WAG’s strategic agenda and thus lifted 
their sights above the interests of the local medical political arena 
by building m uch broader coalitions of interests, across their local 
communities. Less strategically oriented Chairmen, on the other 
hand, expressed the lack of central direction emanating from the 
WAG as a  form of abandonm ent and tended to flounder in the wake 
of it. Notwithstanding th is distinction, all Chairmen universally 
bemoaned the lack of clear direction from the centre, noting it as 
having had a significant negative impact throughout the study 
period:
“I think that from the Assembly’s point of view, I think it’s they 
that maybe should have done things differently...because when we 
started doing what we were doing, we didn't know what on earth to  
do. .1 think maybe it would have been useful for us to have a better 
understanding of what was intended. It’s all very well seeing a few 
flashy documents and so on, but actually to spell out what we were 
intended to do and so, in turn, we [would have] had the opportunity to 
say what practical problems were likely to occur by virtue of trying to 
involve activists in primary care to develop into Boards’’ (010.3:
24.07.01)
This Chairman was decrying the lack of clear direction, against 
the background of three years’ experience without it, but, in doing 
so, he was also highlighting the unidirectional flow of 
communication tha t prevailed throughout the period under study, 
and contrasting tha t with w hat he felt should have been the case, 
of continuous dialogue between policy maker and policy 
implemented Given the degree of organizational flux illustrated in 
Chapters 4 and 5, this skewed pattern of communication may
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have been due to the relative immaturity of the health system in 
Wales between 1999 and 2001.
Such Assembly capacity problems were worsened by another, 
sudden change a t the top of the system, when the Director of NHS 
Wales post became vacant in 2000. The vacuum thus opened up 
at the apex created additional concerns for this Chairman:
“Its difficult to know whether that still is the strategic direction of 
NHS Wales, because we don’t know how that fits in, really. Although it 
fits in with all the Better Wales documentation and things, but it’s not 
really knowing what sort of...what sort of structure does NHS Wales
see in the future? Nobody knows that yet” (005.2: 12.06.00).
Such a vacancy of course further compromised both continuity 
and commonality in this crucial relationship during this period, 
making the Ministerial communication link more important to 
Chairmen.
Nonetheless the LHG Chairmen's creation of that direct
communication channel to the Minister was not welcomed by
health authorities. Despite the existence of a  regular forum for
health authority and Trust chief executives to meet with the NHS
Wales Director (NACE: National Assembly and Chief Executives
Group), some health authority chief executives expressed concern
about the newly created direct NAW/LHG communication
channel.1 Throughout 2000, efforts were made by health authority
chief executives to encourage the Welsh Association of LHG Chairs
1 Speech made by Graham Coomber representating HA Chief Executives at the LHG Conference 
on 16 March 2000, at the Metropole Hotel, Llandrindod Wells: “LHGs have better access to Jane 
Hutt than HA Chief Executives do”.
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to become an all Wales LHG group; some Chairmen viewed this 
proposal as an attem pt to dilute their direct link with the Minister, 
and the support it gave them. But this directness of 
communications between LHG Chairs and the Minister proved to 
be pivotal, despite its informal and oft-threatened sta tus. This 
appears to have been because it enabled Chairmen to recognize 
the commonality of their own agendas and that of the Assembly, 
and thus to persevere in their efforts to build their own local 
identities and agendas, a t the expense of that expressed by their 
health authorities. Thus, in relation to the NAW, directness of 
communication was the m ost valuable relationship dimension, 
because it enabled commonality of aims to be developed. And, of 
course, there was no previous history to colour perceptions of 
either party. This was not the case in relation to health 
authorities however, as the next section demonstrates.
7.6  Health Authorities
7.6.1 Directness could be said to have been a feature of the 
relationship between health authorities and their LHGs, since 
LHGs were sub-committees of the health authorities. In theory, 
therefore, direct communication channels could be considered to 
have been in place from the beginning. As noted in chapter 4, 
budgets continued to be held within the parent authorities; LHG 
senior-most personnel appointm ents were made through the 
health authorities; performance agreements were made between
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the LHGs and the health authorities; and General Managers -  the 
LHG Accountable Officers -  carried shared portfolios of health 
authority responsibilities alongside their LHG responsibilities.
LHG Chairmen attended health authority board meetings, and 
health authorities held several places on LHG Boards. Initially,
. health authorities sanctioned every aspect of LHG activity, 
including the allocation of premises and distribution of office 
space (eg 010; 006; 022).
Thus the potential for direct communication, via this wide range of 
direct channels, was established from the outset as part of this 
close accountability chain. In practice, however, direct 
communication was challenged by a number of competing 
elements. In particular, a lack of commonality characterised LHG- 
health authority relationships from the start. Health authorities 
were under growing pressure from the centre to reduce their 
deficits:
“Well, as many of us thought, you know, primary care doctors thought, 
leading up to the formation of the LHG, our big concern, especially in X 
area, was this is it. And then we...hang on a minute we don’t want to 
become part of th is scenario where we’ve got a stone around our 
neck and, you know, be the cause of us drowning" (013.1: 13.10.99)
The health authority reportedly countered such concerns with 
reassurances: “No, no I don't think you’ve got much to worry 
about” (013.1) which soon turned sour: “And you know what’s 
happened since, obviously, is that we’ve been exposed to the 
full blast of the debt” (013.1). As this remark indicated, strong
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central pressure led some authorities to adopt a number of 
creative strategies to manage tha t deficit to the perceived 
detriment of the LHG:
“For example, we have a prescribing budget, and we were given an 11%- 
15% uplift, I think. . . and then we find, hang on, they’re top slicing 
3% of that. So hang on a little bit, how can we top slice?...’ah, we’re 
keeping that centrally’. ..And then of course instead of starting off 
on a decent sort of playing field, they take 3% away anyway, all 
right?” (013.2: 14.06.00)
The conflicting pressures on the health authorities to reduce 
deficits and to develop primary care organisations at the same 
time coincided with the new Assembly's attempts to get to grips 
with their own roles, and W estminster's renewed determination to 
exert stronger control over performance in England. This 
downward central pressure on health authorities may have made 
it difficult to balance the conflicting demands they faced. This 
was no doubt exacerbated by the fall out from organisational 
restructuring of both health authorities and trusts still working its 
way through the system in Wales, a t the time, as chapters 4 and 5 
illustrated.
7.6.2 Continuity
Consequently, five out of the six Health Authority Chief Executive 
posts changed hands during the year following the inception of 
LHGs. This high turnover rate, a t the most senior post in the 
agencies responsible for commissioning, impacted adversely on 
relationships along a num ber of domains. Directness of 
communication suffered as temporary arrangements were put in
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place - or not, as was more often the case. It was a further 18 
months after LHGs had been launched, before all the HA Chief 
Executive posts were filled. Whilst this vacuum was seen by some 
LHG Chairmen as an  opportunity to develop their own 
interpretations of their rem its, others experienced an anxiety that 
stifled action and forward planning:
“We had problems only because of the structural changes that have 
had to go on in Xshire. Well, I mean the Chief Executive’s been sacked, 
and the Director of Contractor Services is leaving at the end of October, 
but no signs of any replacements, you’ve got...I mean, you’ve basically 
got no staff. I mean the only thing that is left intact is the Finance 
Department and the less said about the Finance department the 
better...” (005.1: 26.10.99)
In the space opened up  by these vacancies at senior officer level, 
and consequent lack of direction, this Chairman took a strategic 
leap forward, organising a meeting of Local Authority and Trust 
Chairmen, and invited the Minister, Jane Hutt. This meeting gave 
the LHG the encouragement they needed to move forward along 
the lines they had drawn for themselves:
“I think for all of us in XLHG, I think the last six months have in a sense 
been quite frustrating in a way, not really knowing whether our 
vision and direction was what everybody was signed up to and, I 
think, Jane Hutt’s meeting just managed to do that. So, we felt, I felt 
quite relieved after that I was able to say ’well, great, you know, we’ve 
got sign up from the centre’ ” (005.1: 26.10.99)
But these same anxieties re-surfaced as the delay in getting a new 
Chief Executive into post in th a t health authority lengthened:
“I suppose the difficulties for us at the moment are knowing how our 
strategic direction, if you like, fits in with what the health authority 
wants for us” (005.2: 12.06.00).
So, even a strategically-oriented Chairman expressed concern at 
the continuing lack of direction. Again this highlights the
228
importance of continuity, as well as of commonality of objectives. 
Thus, in relationship effectiveness terms, real failures in terms of 
directness and continuity indicators were reported to be impacting 
adversely on the ability of LHGs to develop their roles, midway 
through the study period. These failings, in turn, impacted on 
Chairmen’s views of the commonality of their objectives and those 
of their health authorities. Such breaches also emphasized the 
prevailing lack of any form of parity between the LHGs and their 
health authorities. Throughout this period (1999-2000) LHGs 
reported their sphere of action to be severely limited by 
relationship difficulties with their health authorities, as the 
following excerpt illustrates:
“Probably 2 probably. I think the difficulty...I mean, I don’t think 
that’s due to anything else -  you know, if you had to put an explanation 
underneath that it would be basically because there’s been so many 
changes in personnel. There actually isn't anybody in the health 
authority to have a relationship w ith .. .we’ve got no Director of Public 
Health, we’ve got no...I mean the only person we’ve got is a new Chief 
Executive and an old Director of Finance. The rest of it is just not there 
-  there’s no Commissioning Manager, there’s no Director of Patient Care 
any more, there’s no...well, we’ve got a locum Director of Public Health. 
There used to be a Director of Policy...” (005.2: 12.06.00).
Thus directness as a  dimension of relationship quality between 
health authorities and their LHGs was more often violated than 
supported, not least because the nature of the communication 
channels established were dependent upon the individuals in 
post, or, more often, not, th u s adversely affecting the continuity 
dimension too.
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The preceding quotation emphasises the numerous continuity 
failures in the health authority/LHG relationship. Because this 
high turnover rate a t senior level within the health authorities 
coincided with the birth of the new LHGs as organisations, the 
adverse impact on LHG relationships may have been more 
. exaggerated than similar turnover rates occurring later on in the 
proceedings.
7.6.3 Parity The lack of continuity may have had a stronger impact 
on parity in the relationships between the LHGs and their health 
authority parent organisations on more operationally oriented 
Chairmen than on their strategically oriented colleagues, who, on 
the whole, were able to carve out distinctive agendas by building 
wider networks. Operationally oriented Chairmen expressed the 
need for external approval frequently:
“I think the most important thing is going to be, you know, to sustain 
the interest of the Board members, to see what we can do as LHG and 
not being, you know, directed by the Centre...I think that’s the biggest 
thing, you know, one has to consider...Okay its not going to happen in a 
day or two, but there should be some sort of sign saying that, right, 
you know, we are progressing towards that goal, you know” (011.2:
24.03.00)
This Chairman, speaking one year into the LHG’s life, perceived 
this need for affirmation as a  central issue affecting the motivation 
of his 18 Board members. Pertinently, it also affected his own 
understanding of the limits of his scope for action. Although he 
repeatedly stressed the need for more autonomy for LHGs, he was 
pessimistic about getting it:
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“We’re hoping, but we doubt it you know, because the health authority 
them selves don’t  agree...But again I think, you know, the problem is, 
of course, that we are sub committee of the health authority, so 
anything that has to  be done has to be via the health authority and
not directly with us, you know” (011.2: 24.03.00)
And although this Chairm an perceived the Health & Social Care 
Minister to be a significant light a t the end of the tunnel, he 
recognised the constraints on her ability to unlock the system:
“We are putting forward suggestions [to increase LHG independence] to 
the Assembly, particularly to the Secretary of Health. But then she's 
got to take it through the Assembly" (011.2: 24.03.00).
This Chairm an’s increasing frustration at the lack of LHG 
autonomy was expressed repeatedly throughout his years in post. 
He attributed the constraints on the LHG as emanating from the 
health authority’s determination to hold onto their existing roles 
and power to the exclusion of the LHG’s development. As his 
frustration grew, so his focus diminished further, onto the 
constraints he experienced in regards to staffing, office 
accommodation, and the lack of any real monetary levers in the 
form of budgets or incentives which he perceived as essential to 
effecting changes locally. Throughout his period in office he 
attributed the perceived lack of progress towards obtaining these 
levers to the relationship problems, i.e. to the lack of more 
directness and continuity o f communication between the LHG and 
the Assembly; the lack of parity in the relationship between the 
LHG and the health authority, and the lack of commonality of 
agendas among the health authority and the LHG.
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7.6.4 Commonality of organisational interests, as perceived by the 
Chairmen, is one of the most interesting areas of divergence 
between strategic and operational Chairmen. This is because it 
illustrates the differences among the Chairmen so clearly. 
Strategically oriented Chairmen were more likely to be able to 
align their LHG’s aims with those of the overall strategy of the 
Welsh Assembly Government. In doing so, they not only built 
wider coalitions of interests among their constituents, but they 
lifted their organisations above the health authorities’ controlling 
powers, by making it almost impossible for their parent 
authorities to disagree with their aims. In this way, these 
strategically oriented Chairmen also changed the balance of the 
relationship, overturning the structurally-determined lack of 
parity between their LHGs and their health authority parent 
organisations. This would indicate that, in this context, the 
commonality dimension may have been amongst the most 
influential of Schulter’s and Lee’s five indices.
Demonstrating the importance of the commonality domain from 
smother aspect, Chairmen who defined their constituents more 
widely than  their GP colleagues, to include the local community 
itself, tended also to have a broader definition of their population’s 
health needs. This, in itself, helped them to align their 
development agendas with those of the Welsh Assembly. 
Fortuitously, too, the Assembly’s agenda was broad and focussed
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on reducing inequalities in health experience through partnership 
working. The statutory duty of partnership created gave a  clear 
message -  bu t was heard  and responded to differentially. Those 
Chairmen who recognised the links between the deprivation levels 
of their own communities and used this to tailor their agendas 
were markedly more effective in aligning their agendas with the 
Assembly, and then, eventually, with their health authorities, 
than those who did not. Interestingly, however, not all of those 
Chairmen serving the m ost deprived areas responded equally to 
this challenge. This differential response again strengthens the 
hypothesis that the more operational the focus, the less effective 
the Chairman, in term s of relationship building and, ultimately, 
LHG development. Building th is broader vision of needs from 
amongst the local community was not a  quick process. Moreover 
it, too, was partially dependent on the history of activity between 
the health authority and the GP community locally:
“It was interesting because we spent about three or four months, no, 
well, probably, six months really, in shadow form, spending a lot of time 
really doing workshops and trying to get everybody’s ideas of what they 
were in the Local Health Group for, what they were trying to achieve. 
And we came out with aims and objectives for the Local Health group, 
really from the start of April, which we had agreed...and a lot of it was 
very much...you know, the main aims and objectives were to take 
forward clinical governance and rational prescribing. But the real big 
ones were that everybody wanted to go into it for the integration of 
health and social services. And that’s very much was the driver 
forward. And that’s actually one of our priorities in our Health 
Improvement Plan this year” (005.1: 26.10.99).
This LHG, then, was ready on Day 1 to move forward down an 
agreed pathway which they had already broadly paved. This 
Chairman also, however, pointed out that this agreement had
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been achieved because of what he perceived to be the area’s head 
start in term s of being able to build on an existing model of local 
commissioning, via a  previous putative Total Purchasing Pilot 
experiment in the area. Thus, both history, and the decision to 
use a  process to articulate a  broad vision from amongst the LHG 
members themselves, combined here to help develop a  more 
inclusive and strategic interpretation of the LHG’s remit. By the 
end of the three years under study this same Chairman was able 
to look back and say:
“I mean, I don’t think there was any doubt all along that she [H&SC 
Minister] thought Local Health Groups were the way forward, and
that was all part and parcel of Putting Patients First. And I do think 
that’s quite true, and I do also think that she felt that LHGs should -  I 
think at the beginning, I think she felt LHGs should move towards 
primary care trusts. But she realised that if the process went ahead too 
quickly, there would be too much...” (005.3: 30.08.01)
This Chairm an’s conviction, th a t the new models then (2001) 
being proposed to strengthen LHGs were closely aligned to the 
model th is LHG had been working towards all along, was clear. 
This conviction was later substantiated as the LHG became a 
pathfinder pilot, in 2003, following the 2001 consultation exercise 
on the future of LHGs. Because of so many other factors at work 
during th is period, discerning w hat the Assembly government’s 
agenda actually consisted of, however, was a difficult task, as the 
quote above illustrates. So, the process of aligning that agenda 
with the WAG’s was a  constant effort of reinterpretation and re­
alignment, during which the health authority became a less 
im portant player and the Trust a  much more important one.
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This Chairm an’s experience was mirrored by that of other 
strategically focussed Chairmen:
“Well what weVe done is weVe had several Away Days where we’ve 
looked at what the needs are, not as a group solely, how we develop 
our skills, how we expand our knowledge, how we work together as a 
group, but also are these priorities right..." (007.1: 23.12.99)
This Chairman went on to point out tha t the needs assessm ent 
built on existing information and previous special studies in the 
area. And he also pointed out the problem that the lack of direct 
channels of communication with the Assembly had created in this 
respect:
“Yeah, I’m concerned about the Assembly, and I’m concerned 
because I’m not sure how lines o f communication exist into the 
Assembly, and how things com e back out. One has a constant fear 
of manipulation, and... what’s the word?...I just wonder if we won’t be 
politically cornered to do things, because my understanding of Local 
Health Groups were put in place to serve the needs of their 
communities....”(007.1).
This clear commitment to serving the needs of the local population 
-  “that should be the light th a t we follow” -  was the crucial lever 
which lifts these strategically focussed Chairmen onto another 
level of activity outside th a t of their local health authorities’ 
concerns. It enabled them  to find a  path  through the tangled 
underbrush of health authority priorities and delegated 
workloads, to continue building their understanding of their 
populations’ needs. In contrast to this, the more operationally 
focussed Chairmen either became too entangled to find their way 
out from under the weight of different priorities: “...it takes our
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eye off the ball...” (002.1: 24.09.99); or they strengthened their
operational service delivery focus even more:
“But about the LHG, well we really could have been going somewhere by 
now sind we’re not. We’ve gone about it the right way, done all the 
right things: focus on primary care, referrals, Outpatients, Prescribing, 
Emergency Admissions -  and we’re trying to build on our strengths.
But the budgets and th e deficit and secondary care are taking all 
our tim e...” (002.2: 02.06.00)
“...negotiations with our health authority are, I won’t say protracted, but 
they are flawed; we can’t  get hard issues out of our Finance 
Department because th ey  have their agendas to m eet...” (004.1:
05.11.99)
In both of these cases, the Chairmen became heavily embroiled in 
the detail of financial flows, and therefore the ensuing lack of 
progress on delegated budgets weighed heavily, on the latter 
Chairman in particular, throughout the period in office. The 
direct channels of communication between LHG and health 
authority did not help in th is respect:
“...we have a monthly Policy Board meeting where the [LHG] Chairs 
and the [GMs]managers m eet w ith the authority to thrash out 
various policies but that becom es a debating shop rather than a 
policy-making shop and we find that the policies that you think have 
been decided come up on the next agenda and your assumption is that 
things are sorted and they are generally not; it’s typical health 
authority -  the way th ey  work.” (004.1: 05.11.99).
Again, in this case, history can  be seen to be playing a  part in the 
health authority/LHG relationship. The Chairman's frustration 
was further exacerbated by the link in his mind between how 
things worked efficiently in fundholding, and the divergence from
this model of the LHG:
“...having worked in fundholding at the sharp end you make a 
decision and its done and you know its over and done with. It was a 
hell of a shock after a few meetings to learn that certain points you
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thought were in the pipeline of becoming policy and they hadn’t really 
been decided. It’s very wearing and disheartening as well” (004.1).
This Chairman continued trying to extrapolate from the 
experience of fund-holding as a  decision-making model for the 
LHG. He continued to focus on changes in the GMS budget as the 
_ principle tool for service development, and thus the LHG’s role:
“Well we Ve had a certain devolvement of budgets with GMS and, as you 
know, there’s been an increase in the allocation as well, so there’s 
surplus money now in GMS so that we’re attempting to spend it. So I 
was at a meeting last night with X town GPs, and encouraging them to 
put in applications for GMS money, for staff...clerical staff and nursing 
staff... particularly nursing staff, because I feel that if we can 
improve...developments with disease management, sort of asthma, 
diabetes, coronary artery prevention clinics, those sort of things” (004.2:
06.07.00)
By 2001, his mastery of the detail of the financial flow processes 
was impressive, bu t his relationship with the health authority was 
no further forward. Communication channels were, if anything, 
even less direct than previously:
“We have a slight problem locally with communication with the local 
contractor services in the health authority, in that they 
communicate directly with the professional community, ie the GPs, 
and they don’t copy us in...for example, there have been some 
problems with the Section 36 monies locally, on decisions on minor ops, 
and that sort of thing. Well, they’ve been communicating to the GPs, 
saying that ‘Yes you will be paid, but you will be paid by the Local 
Health Groups’ - and we actually don’t have any money for this!
And it does impinge on our resources if they’re being told a different 
story to us and also with relationship to our budgets which are heavily 
committed elsewhere.” (004.3: 01.06.01)
This breach in communication might appear to be a minor issue, 
but it was these health authority relationship issues and the focus 
on medical services which continued to be the dominant issues for 
discussion with this Chairman throughout the three years of the 
study. Thus, the skirm ishes with the health authority, even after
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announcem ent of its impending demise, continued to impact 
negatively on the quality of the relationships formed, to the 
detriment of LHG development.
Another Chairman in the sam e health authority catchment area
reiterated the challenges inherent in the LHG-health authority
relationship:
“It’s very difficult really certainly it’s a very difficult 
relationship...really, as an organisation, they need to be fundamentally 
changed” (008.1: 03.11.99).
And again, in terms of continuity and directness of 
communication, the close enm eshing of LHG staffing with health 
authority roles could have been expected to act as a bridging 
mechanism. Most Chairmen saw this as an additional obstacle to 
effective communication however:
“You see, all the people here...they don’t do exclusive LHG work, 
you know. They do a lot o f work for the centre as well...so all of the
staff are sort of...had two roles. But you know, what they are trying to 
do is enmesh the LHG within the health authority, sort of together, and 
I don’t think itll work” (008.1)
This Chairman articulated a  reasonably strategic vision:
“Yes it’s [the LHG] great potential. I mean its something that’s got great 
potential for, you know, rembdelling health services. It’s how to do it 
without power. Talking of power sounds awful, but you can’t do it 
without that and if the National Assembly or the health authority just 
can’t see themselves through to doing it then it won’t work...” (008.1)
but was conscious from the s ta rt of the potential for that vision's 
implementation to be thw arted by the different agendas of more 
powerful players. Again the im pact on the Chairman's changing 
focus was illustrative of the trend to limit objectives, in response:
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“I’m trying not to  get too embroiled in secondary care, though 
obviously it’s very relevant, you know, the interface, and its relevant to 
primary care. But I think, you know, sometimes in the past we've got 
too involved with the problems of secondary care really...I mean, to 
engage the practices, that's what we've got to do, and that's, I 
think, what we should be doing” (008.2: 05.07.00).
Here again the very close links - and shared staff - between the 
LHG and the health authority  served to divide rather than to 
support the relationship, because objectives so often conflicted 
rather than complemented, emphasising the importance of the 
commonality dimension.
Within those shared staffing arrangem ents, each LHG General 
Manager had health authority-wide remits for commissioning 
certain service groups. Rather than  being perceived as a 
development opportunity for LHGs, or a cementing of 
relationships, these arrangem ents proved to be another bone of 
contention:
“So each of the commissioning portfolios have been allocated out to the 
LHG. But it's not true that the LHG are commissioning those...the 
officer who are the general managers in the LHG are commissioning 
those [services]. But the LHG Board has no...we don’t deal with 
that...it's really fulfilling a health authority role in the LHG offices, 
it's not, if you see what I mean, it's not an actual LHG role.”
(008.2).
This shared accountability could have strengthened the 
commonality factor. But as far as this Chairman was concerned, 
this ostensible link served only to deepen the divide. 
Commissioning was seen by many Chairmen and their Board 
members to be an im portant tool for changing service 
configuration locally. But in this health authority, it was
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perceived as a  symbol of the different agendas, and differential 
power bases, of the two parties in the relationship. So 
commonality of in terests was not furthered by an increase in the 
directness of the channels of communication. As a result, the 
relationship was dam aged not improved. It may well have been 
LHG attem pts to carve out a  more distinctive agenda of their own, 
as a means of building their own power base amongst their 
professional provider constituents, th a t prompted many Chairmen 
to adopt a more operational focus in the first place. From that 
perspective, it may have seemed th a t such a limited focus was in 
fact the best way to reduce the potential for conflict with the 
health authority parent body.
7.7  Summary
Given th a t health authorities were responsible for both developing 
and monitoring LHGs, it can not have been easy to manage the 
tensions inherent in these conflicting roles:
“I think it’s a basic lack o f understanding at health authority level 
about what the way forward is for primary care. And a lot of dead 
wood, in the sense that they’re in their old model, and I feel there is a 
major problem. I feel they’ve just created 6 more health authorities with 
the same people, and it’s not an effective way forward.” (020.1: 07.12.99)
Moreover, health authorities were under pressure from the 
Assembly government to deliver on priorities and targets set by 
Westminster, in particular to meet waiting list targets. Their 
deficits were a further source of em barrassm ent to the Assembly, 
particularly with an election looming in which devolution and
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performance could be expected to be issues. In these 
circumstances, then, the system dynamics were weighted in 
favour of the larger established health authorities from the 
beginning, to the inevitable detrim ent of their new offspring 
organisations, thus violating parity. The structures themselves 
" seemed to promote dissension and separation of interests, making 
commonality of aims more difficult to achieve. In the case of these 
vertical, or hierarchical relationships, history may have played a 
particularly significant role, overriding the multiplexity inherent in 
the num erous structural connections between HAs and LHGs. 
This m eant tha t Chairmen needed to exercise sophisticated 
‘political’ skills in order to influence their more powerful HA and 
Assembly colleagues.
The next two chapters explore the extent to which LHGs were able 
to form effective horizontal relationships, focussing firstly on 
efforts to create links with T rusts and  Local Authorities as 
statutory organizations, in chapter 8, and secondly, in chapter 9, 
the LHGs’ efforts to build relationships with the wider community.
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Chapter 8: Institutional Politics: Building Horizontal 
Relationships and Influencing Strategies 
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter used Schulter’s and Lee’s relationship 
domains to explain Chairm en’s descriptions of their efforts to 
build effective working relationships with the two agencies 
responsible for their development and operation. The analysis 
showed the impact tha t previous organizational history, in this 
case, had on LHG Chairm en’s efforts to build constructive 
relationships within a  hierarchical organizational structure. It 
showed that continuity, commonality of agendas and parity were all 
essential components to effective working relationships, perhaps 
overriding the directness and  multiplexity domains, in this context. 
This chapter explores the extent to which Chairmen were able to 
exploit the statutory duty of partnership  that covered LHGs,
Trusts and Local Authorities, in order to build effective horizontal 
working relationships with the two key agencies with whom they 
shared responsibility for service provision in their localities.
8.2 Trusts
As we have seen, LHGs, as organizations, were very much 'new 
kids on the block’, suddenly appearing on the scene, and charged 
with responsibility for roles which the health authority had 
previously held in term s of commissioning services to meet local
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needs. The existing relationships between Trusts and health 
authorities were perceived by Chairmen to have been cosy ones, 
with communication links between Trusts and health authorities 
already well established. Moreover, as was noted in considering 
the lack of structural links with LHGs in Chapter 5, Trusts held 
"well established and powerful positions in their localities, as both 
the main providers of acute care and, often, too, the largest 
employer in the area. Supporting this powerful position further, 
the structural reforms had not included any real mechanisms to 
limit T rusts’ spending:
“You know what youVe got, don’t you with the Trust! You’ve got a sort 
of autonomous organisation that doesn’t believe that any other part 
of the health service ex ists, really...I think in terms of the size of the 
Trust and what goes on within it in Xshire, it’s  a problem” (008.1:
03.11.99).
This Chairman’s view of the T rusts was widely shared among 
other LHG Chairmen, perhaps limiting their expectations of the 
possibilities of changing things very much. But looking a t these 
budding relationships between Trusts and LHGs through the lens 
of Schulter’s and Lee’s typology provided a useful way of 
explaining how and why such relationships eventually developed 
and flourished. And here, too, as in the case of the NAW and 
health authorities, more strategically oriented Chairmen reacted 
differently to the relationship challenges presented by Trusts and 
Local Authorities than did their more operationally focussed peers, 
as the following excerpt, from a strategically oriented Chairman, 
suggests:
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“...it was about everybody talking together, the particular trusts, that if 
they had plans they should discuss them with the Local Health Group 
who, in fact, would be buying for their locality healthcare from Trusts.
So I think we need to talk a bit more and we need to look and plan 
together for the future rather than perhaps hospitals or people 
. within hospitals thinking that ‘we’ll make the decisions and we’ll 
tell them what’s available’ ” (007.2: 24.08.99)
This Chairman clearly saw the need to create different incentives 
- and forms of communication if the aims of LHGs were to be
realised. To th a t end, w hat sorts of channels did Chairmen try to 
^create, and how did they deal with these historically entrenched 
working patterns and relatively long standing relationships, 
exacerbated by what many Chairmen saw as the health 
authorities’ “ambivalence ” (006.1) towards primary care 
development, illustrated in the previous chapter?
8.2.1 mpact o f Previous Organizational History 
The Chairmen themselves reported mixed feelings about the 
potential for creating productive partnerships with Trusts. And 
here again, history may have had a  stronger impact on the 
effectiveness of the developing relationship than  some of the other 
relationship quality dimensions noted in Table 7.1. For example, 
those GP Chairmen with experience of fund-holding, and those 
with a large num ber of ex-fundholders on their patches, were fully 
aware of the difference in the relationships between the GP 
cpmmunity and their acute sector colleagues brought about by 
having had their own budgets. GP Chairmen who were ex-fund- 
holders looked for similar changes, bu t on a wider scale, from
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their LHGs. For these, largely more operationally focussed GPs, 
early initiatives from their T rust colleagues were welcomed as a 
means of establishing a  new and practical basis on which to work 
together:
“What happened was that [our] priorities unfortunately were set  
aside because we thought that the sub group on commissioning has to 
continue, to carry out the priorities we set then. Then what happened 
was...as soon as we came in there was a slight issue about 
neighbourhood facilities which the Trust wanted to bring in...they  
wanted some sort of a com m unity hospital to replace XY’s, and a few 
other places, ABC health centre. It was with the health authority 
before the Local Health Group was formed; when the LHG was 
formed that decision came onto us” (003.1: 15.11.99).
It is important to note the reported impact of this initiative, from 
the Trust, in that it effectively changed the LHG’s own newly 
formulated and agreed priorities, indicating that historical 
agreements and previously agreed plans of Trusts and health 
authorities were holding sway. The LHG Chairman noted th a t the 
idea for the new community facility “had been with the Trust for a 
very long time” but insisted th a t the LHG’s role had been 
influential:
“...I tell you very frankly, and I don’t know how much this is appreciated 
now, but on the other hand, LHGs took a very active role in that. We 
had about 3 or 4 meetings continuously, the Trust came and 
presented and the health authority’s point of view and eventually we 
supported the whole thing. We were part of the health authority 
meeting then. The whole thing is now in process...” (003.1)
This Chairman reported that the new relationship was developing 
appropriately, but the words he used appeared to tell a  different 
story. In this case, the relationship remained skewed in favour of 
the Trust, a t least in terms of commonality, and parity, as the next 
excerpt illustrates:
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“It doesn’t...you remember last time when I spoke to you about the 
neighbourhood facility, I don't know how much progress that has 
happened, I haven’t had a chance to ask” (003.2: 06.07.00).
This excerpt indicates th a t the Trust remained the dominant 
partner in this venture, which it had initiated, throughout the 
study period. And, having obtained broad agreement to their 
plans from the LHG, satisfying a  rudim entary form of commonality 
perhaps, the Trust went its own way to develop them, indicating 
ongoing parity issues.
Another Trust quickly created specific liaison posts with each LHG 
to foster collaboration (011.1: 16.08.99) and approached the LHG 
for support for a new Community Hospital facility. In this case 
the initial drivers were external, b u t the initiative came from the 
Trust:
“At the moment we’ve got an acute problem which is the Y Unit at ABC 
Hospital...weVe got a problem about recognition by the Royal Colleges. 
It’s been in all the newspapers. But we are at the stage where there was 
an enquiry, you know, by the NHS on this Y Unit, and 
recommendations were, you know, that it wasn't safe...and there 
was a possibility o f closure altogether...” (011.2: 24.03.00)
Such pressure from the Royal Colleges however was irresistible, 
taking precedence over any other issues, in this Chairm an's view 
(011.2), perhaps indicating an  underlying commonality of purpose, 
sparked by a shared understanding and sense of priorities, a t a 
deeper level, with his medical colleagues in the acute sector.
In general terms, the more operationally-focussed GP Chairmen 
tended to tu rn  first to T rusts to identify service development
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opportunities. And ‘switched-on’ Trusts were often ready and 
waiting with a  wish list. Possibly flattered by this new attention 
from Trusts, m any GP Chairmen responded positively when 
approached by Trusts, bu t the degree of influence which the LHGs 
actually had on such proposals may have been minimal:
“We can’t  tell exactly at the moment because it’s not a cottage 
hospital, it’s not a district general hospital, but it’s something in 
between, we might call it sort of intermediary...intermediary hospital, 
you know...They’ve got a Project Manager appointed...and he’s the 
one who is in charge o f all the management planning, you know, 
involving everybody, you know, clinicians and other agencies...” (011.2:
24.03.00).
Such invitations from the Trusts, however, did help to initiate 
dialogues which, in turn , influenced the shape of emerging LHG 
agendas. For the more operationally focussed Chairmen, this 
approach brought further challenges, as the following excerpt 
indicates:
“You know traditionally they’ve done what they want to do and, you 
know, if they wanted to change a service they’ve just gone ahead and 
changed it, quite honestly, I mean...and its how to stop that 
happening which is the problem because they are providers” (008.2:
05.07.00)
Thus the history of working relationships between Trusts and 
their GP colleagues had a  continuing impact on the nature of the 
relationships evolving with their LHGs. This history was not 
helped by the lack of directness between the two parties.
8.2.2 Directness
As noted in chapter 5, there were no direct channels of 
communication established between LHGs and their local Trusts 
via the introduction of LHGs. LHGs were not independent 
agencies in their own right, although Trusts were under a
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statutory obligation to work in partnership with their LHGs. 
Crucially, Trusts were not given any formal representation on LHG 
Boards; in fact, they were the only agency on the patch to have 
been so excluded. Thus it was up  to Chairmen to create new 
channels:
“Yes I think its been adversarial in the past, but we’re beginning to 
be cooperative, and we’re having presentations each year of what 
their aims are, so that’s great. They come to the commissioning 
forum here to talk things through. WeVe had special meetings with 
the paediatricians and the clinical director form X Trust. ...We’ve made 
representations with cancer services, because they came to talk with 
us with the audit people, the oncology. We’re a bit disappointed with 
the outcome of that after we said, but we understand that it had been 
taken on board...” (007.2: 25.07.01)
This excerpt is evidence of the seeds of a  more joint approach to 
service development, even though largely Trust-initiated. But it 
may also be that some Chairm en's responses to Trust overtures 
inadvertently emphasised the responsive nature of the 
relationship, thus confirming the historical bias towards the acute 
sector. This was especially so for more operationally focussed 
Chairmen, who tended to be more responsive in their 
relationships, generally.
Another example of efforts to create more directness in 
relationships between T rusts and  LHGs was the development of 
clinician-to-clinician channels. These sorts of communication 
mechanisms were pursued by several Chairmen, who sought to 
exploit common cultural norm s and shared values as medical 
practitioners as a  m eans of developing more equal partnerships 
organizationally:
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“It’s the single m ost positive thing that’s come out, really, because 
one can start to enter into meaningful negotiations with the Trusts
-  clinical pathways, for example. Because previously who did the Trust 
negotiate with over clinical pathways? There was the LMC but they just 
represented doctors really on a well...from a Terms of Employment point 
of view really. And the BMA was not really local, and again it’s a trade 
union for doctors, really. So in terms of primary care’s widest 
concept -  practice nurses, district nurses, you know, the whole 
shebang -  it’s  the first tim e there’s ever been a really strong 
structure that is in place” (008.3: 13.06.01)
Here, although the clinician-to-clinician channel was defined by a 
focus on medical services, the pathway element did include an 
orientation towards redesign of services rather than simply 
responding to requests for more of the same. The limitations of 
these channels became clearer, however, when it came to 
discussions about broader system change and re-configuration:
“At the end o f the day it’s in their gift as to what the structure will
be...So I feel we’ll influence the process and are influencing it as much 
as we, you know, can do, but at the same time it may be a small chorus 
of people who will actually have the say...I think that it’s always top 
heavy, th is secondary care, because even in the Primary Care 
Strategy Group, there’s very few working general practitioners 
there...” (008.3).
It would appear th a t exploiting common cultures and shared 
values was one way of crossing the interface effectively between 
primary care and secondary care physicians about service issues 
where real power bases weren’t a t stake. But once issues about 
relative power came onto the agenda, battle lines formed along 
traditional interests:
“What I'm getting now is the impression that the Trust is trying to 
scapegoat us and to  tar us with the same brush as the health 
authority. We have a little problem here about the Trust wanting a new 
position, but the whole business o f how they’ve gone about it is 
divisive and not how we would like to see this sort of thing done. But 
you’re trapped in a situation where your friends and colleagues in 
the hospital are pressurising you with all sorts of emotional 
blackmail, if  you like, to  say that we need this appointment. And 
yet when you come back and say, ‘well, we haven’t got any money,
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things need to be done in a structured, planned way’, they say Veil, its 
just like the health authority, it’s hopeless’. And there is the risk that 
they will use their media and political contacts to cause trouble, 
which is exactly what we don't want. And what we're trying to do is 
co-ordinate a programme of service development for the future 
.rather than to just do ad hoc appointments all over the place, which 
is what’s happened in the past, and which has led to chaos” (001.1:
06.10.99)
There is very little evidence here of a  willingness to share a new 
vision for the future, or risks of any sort, in favour of maintaining 
the existing situation. Thus directness in terms of shared cultural 
values, language and norm s was not enough to counter-balance 
the weight of opposing organizational agendas and power bases. 
This again emphasises the im portance of the commonality domain, 
and thus may help to explain some of the power of the approach 
adopted by more strategically sophisticated Chairmen.
8.2.3 Commonality
More strategically focussed Chairm en went about the business of 
building relationships on the patch  proactively and systematically. 
This approach tended to have the effect of putting the Trust in a 
different position vis-a-vis the LHG’s emerging agenda, rather than 
in the driving seat. It may well have served to promote increased 
commonality between the two parties, too. For example, one, more 
strategically oriented, Chairm an took a  carefully structured and 
deliberate approach to relationship-building with his local Trust, 
recognising that the primary and  community care-oriented 
strategy of the LHG “frustrated our secondary care colleagues”:
“I think they have a real...I think there’s a real problem with secondary 
health care professionals. I th ink they feel out of it. Much of the 
next phase is to make them  feel part of it...by establishing working
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parties for joint clinical pathways, that’s one [way]. By joint 
training and education. And to ensure that, we’re going to try and 
attempt to ensure that they are...that their views are taken on board 
with the next version of the Local Health Development Plan. One aim is 
to have a joint Social Care Plan and Health Development Plan...and we 
are leading on the formation of a new D Intermediate Care facility, 
and also on the developm ent o f C in Community Care facilities. So 
we’ll use them  as the vehicles to, if you like, pen everybody into 
the same ring!” (009.2: 20.06.00)
This Chairman saw the need to develop the LHG’s vision within 
thd local community as the first step, then to bring in the acute 
sector through a series of educational and developmental 
activities, structured around creating a  common aim of quality 
improvement. Such avenues were ad hoc in one sense, but they 
were created to support the building of a  broad consensus of aim 
and partnership, in which the T rust was not paramount, but one 
player among a host of others. Efforts such as this one could be 
seen as attempts to strengthen the commonality of agendas across 
the patch. The multiplexity domain was also addressed, through 
the variety of fora created to feed into this process, where more 
direct channels were absent from the structures.
Another Chairman recognised the limitations imposed by trying to 
work through existing medical fora in term s of communication 
with his Trust-based medical colleagues, as the following excerpt 
illustrates:
“I have been to the meeting of the HMSC1 and I have discussed things 
with the consultants and so on and the cardiac advisory group but they 
are very much left out at the mom ent and we have to very much 
try to bring them  into th ings...”(010.1: 16.08.99)
1 Hospital Medical Staffing Committee
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But this comment also indicates that, right from the start for this 
strategically focussed Chairman, Trust relationships were 
important for implementation of, bu t not central to the 
development of, the LHG’s agenda. Clear recognition of the LHG’s 
responsibility to include the Trust in the debating process to 
determine local health needs was expressed by this Chairman, 
whose commitment to ensuring a  bottom up process of identifying 
local health needs remained constant and consistent throughout 
the years of study. In the case of th is particular Chairman, the 
fact that he had three Trusts to relate to a t the outset, which 
merged into one Trust during the first 18 months of the LHGs 
existence, may have helped ra ther than  hindered this process. 
Another, equally strategically focussed, Chairmen reported a 
similar approach to relationship-building with the Trust in his 
area:
“It’s got to be bottom-led; the LHG’s strength is that it can readily 
access the opinions and the views at a low level, and the bit that we are 
yet to crack is the patient level but from the service providers’ point of 
view I don’t think I want to be an Emperor with no clothes, in fact I 
would not like that at all. So it is  all about ownership of it and I 
think the ... trick has been to  show that the strength of having 
XLHG is that it is a big welly and the Trusts have recognised 
this...we have 58% of their commissioning so the XY patients are very 
important to that Trust and yet they have always been the poor 
relation, so one o f the things in being an X LHG has been ....we 
[have] been able to  put a much more aggressive message but to be 
fair the Trust has responded really well....the other thing we are 
concentrating on is community care having shifted it into secondary 
care trusts I think there is a real risk that they don’t  understand, so 
it is our role in life to ensure there is clarity of understanding...” 
(009.1: 20.08.99).
Three key points are relevant here. Firstly, recognition of the 
LHG’s strength in relation to service provision in the locality
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appears to be jointly shared a t th is early stage, helping to boost 
the parity dim ensions of the relationship. Secondly, the impact of 
the Trust reconfiguration during this period, with community 
services being brought into the acute sector as part of the 
preceding restructuring m eant th a t the Trust’s management 
Energies were likely to be focussed more inwardly than outwardly, 
especially in view of the focus on deficits, as this Chairman 
recognised: “when you’ve got a  T rust in recovery it’s not likely to 
want to be a real player and  it tends to be cynical” (009.1).
Thirdly, however, and perhaps m ost importantly, there was a clear 
emphasis on building a  community-wide view of needs, in terms of 
“examining how we really share th e agenda” (009.1).
This approach pu t the T rust’s potential role as a partner, with 
shared goals, into broader perspective and potentially reduced 
some of the power they had traditionally wielded. Here, again, the 
lack of direct channels was overcome by creating new ones which 
would also foster continuity (once the restructuring turbulence 
quietened down). But the very different focus -  on needs of the 
community, rather than  on existing services -  also helped to 
create more commonality o f interests, while the am ount of 
business the LHG potentially influenced [“58% of their 
commissioning”] contributed to increased parity within the 
relationship between LHG and  Trust.
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The most strategically oriented Chairmen (005; 006; 007; 009 & 
010) tended to focus their attentions on the wider community, as 
a means of developing a  shared agenda across their localities, 
whereas more operationally focussed Chairmen tended to put 
stronger em phasis on medical services and relationships with 
their secondary sector medical colleagues. For example, the 
strategic Chairmen hardly mentioned the Trusts in the first 
interviews, em phasising instead the HA relationships and 
relationships with the com m unity and primary care providers. 
When prompted, one replied:
“...I think that if there are changes that will affect a particular service 
then they are going to have to be involved and their expertise will be as 
needed as ever” (010.1: 16.08.99)
This comment indicates a  very different approach to the acute 
sector and to the LHG’s role as a  whole, than  the comments of 
more operational Chairmen, who mentioned the Trusts far more 
frequently, and tended to adopt T rust initiatives as a  first step 
towards generating activity locally. The more strategic Chairmen 
started from a different point, describing the role of the LHG as a 
means of building a  new vision of primary care provision, which 
was bottom up, inclusively cross-sectoral and community- 
development oriented. In th is approach, almost by definition, the 
Trusts would play a  supportive, rather than  defining, role. This 
sort of approach provided a  stronger base for LHGs and provided a 
bridge across to their secondary sector colleagues by offering a 
vision to which they could both contribute and align themselves.
254
In many ways, contacts with the Trusts were promoted indirectly 
via the .health authorities’ delegation of work to LHGs:
“Do you want me to tell you what our agenda is? This is what we've 
just been presented with. The management of the consultation of 
DBF NHS Trust Clinical Services Strategy changing for the better. .. 
and management o f the consultation process on Orthopaedic 
Services across AB [HA]...and management of the local action team on 
Emergency Admissions in DEF Trust....” (010.2: 06.04.00)
Much of this dominance reflected the direct employer/employee 
relationship of the LHG General Manager to the HA, discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. But, in th is case, then, the challenge for the 
LHG Chairman was to keep the community-needs based strategy 
to the fore in the face of strong opposing forces towards the 
HA/Trust’s definition of the agenda. By the end of the study 
period he had successfully m anaged to tu rn  the tables in the 
relationship with the Trust:
“On the Open Day [for a new cross-sectoral project] none of the Trust 
representatives turned up. So [the General Manager] and I had a 
meeting with the Chief Executive and the Chairman of the XY 
Trust, and we gave a very good argument why they should be 
involved, for a whole variety of reasons, and since then they've been 
very attentive in turning up for meetings...They are all senior people; 
we told them we wanted people who could deliver...” (010.3: 24.07.01).
In this case, the Trust had been brought in to support the LHG’s 
agenda, not vice-versa. Reinforcing th is change, this Chairman 
emphasised th a t the T rust was no different than  any other partner 
when it came to bidding for money or putting proposals forward:
“They just have to present their case as well. They’ve got to go 
through various tools to analyse whether a bid should go forward...And 
if it doesn’t have these tools, it doesn’t pass the test, it doesn’t get on to 
the next stage...as it passes through the process, they'll either be 
refined in a way that we can achieve what we want, or they’ll be 
kicked back into touch ...” (010.3)
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These latter two Chairm en quoted above, 009 and 010, possibly 
the most strategically oriented among the 22, both sought to 
create distinctive LHG agendas focussed around community 
needs, before taking steps to bring their secondary sector 
colleagues on board. It is interesting to note that both of their 
reports focussed around broad partnerships and community 
development throughout the years under study. In both these 
examples, the T rusts did no t figure prominently -  in fact Social 
Services and the local authority  got more mentions in interviews 
with these Chairmen than  did the Trusts. In both of these cases, 
parity increases came about as  a  resu lt of efforts to create 
commonality of agendas; directness and continuity issues appeared 
to have been viewed by both Chairm en as secondary ones.
Other, more pragmatic Chairm en took more service-oriented 
tacks, that also implicitly recognised the need to build more 
commonality of agendas, ranging from latching on to Trust 
initiatives “our m utual in terest is  com m on, we have an interest 
which is very m uch m utual” (003.2: 06.07.00) to grouping 
together with other LHGs to presen t a  service delivery initiative to
the Trust as a united block:
“We’ve elected to have a go at a part of the service that is a difficult part 
of the service, but on the other hand it means that lots of minds will be 
occupied in trying to get to grips with the service” (004.3: 01.06.01)
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Here the LHGs within one HA area banded together themselves 
and selected a cross-sectoral service delivery problem as a means 
of finally getting a dialogue with the Trust underway:
“We had an agenda, yes. We had already decided that this was a 
subject that we’d like to grasp. There were other points that we wanted 
to make with.reference to more contact, but we thought this was a 
good starting point” (004.3)
The. service selected resonated with the T rust’s view of its own 
problem areas, if not with the LHGs’ service development 
priorities:
“He [the Trust Chief Executive] has problems obviously within his own 
organisation that possibly need to be addressed, and if we can 
help...and you know, if the blocks can be removed and we can 
organise...and if  we can make th is  work as far as X services, it will 
demonstrate that th is is a service change, rather than a monetary 
system change” (004.3)
In explaining why they took th is approach the Chairmen went on 
to say:
“They have their own com m itm ent to  various developments within 
the structures. We’ve pointed out the inadequacies of some of 
those development processes, and again, it’s the poor specialities that 
haven’t got the management structures or are too busy or haven’t got 
enough time, they’re over-worked. You know the larger specialties who 
have more consultants, who are well organised, who are rich and 
famous, they can organise themselves into getting a good case together 
to say ‘we want more of this’...in doing so, we're going to pull in some 
of those specialties that can’t organise them selves, they're in 
desperate need o f resources. Well, this is a way of tapping into a big 
resource for them” (004.3)
So, although it took this grouping of LHGs about two years to 
begin to rally around a  new and  more uniquely defined 
commonality of interests, their approach did manage to begin to 
skew the relationship more equally. Interestingly, too, the opening 
was created, and initially developed, through managerial (albeit at 
Chief Executive and Chairm an level) rather than  through medical 
routes. Thus this d a ta  does appear to support the notion that
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commonality was one of the m ost powerful relationship domains, if 
not sufficient by itself, to ensure effective working relationships, 
within this context and  against the weight of previous 
organizational history.
8.2.4 Continuity as a  domain was fostered by a  history of personal 
relationships in the patch. As was discussed in Chapter 6, most 
Chairmen could point to a  personal history of having lived and 
worked in their respective areas for m any years. And this stability 
had enabled them  to become known and respected figures locally, 
as this excerpt illustrates:
“And I know the Chairman o f the Trust personally, and through a 
number o f other things like when he was Chairman of the Family 
Health Services Authority and having met him when he was Chairman 
of the X Trust; we haven’t always agreed, but there are lines of 
communication. And, you know, that’s all good stuff” (007.1:
23.12.99).
So, a shared history of com munity service within their localities 
was a common feature of m ost Chairm en's backgrounds. This 
continuity of service and working relationships was prized by 
Chairmen. But, for many, even existing personal relationships 
were not enough to offset the realities of power differentials and 
different agendas.
8.2.5 Parity The lack of concrete power was perceived as a  real 
limitation by operationally focussed Chairmen:
“There’s no relationship at the m om ent with the Trust. It’s  again 
because we’ve got no financial clout. They’re doing back door deals, 
we know they’re doing the deals, and they’ll just go on with their 
- development. The long term agreements we’ve been involved in a very 
minor sort of way. It’s lip service to it at the moment. As soon as we 
get the m oney they’ll start taking notice of it. You know when we 
were fund-holders with m oney in  our pocket they were knocking on 
your door, but, you know, w ithout money you have no power” 
(004.2: 06.07.00)
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The extent to which Trust/LHG relationships exhibited any real 
sharing of risks and rewards varied according to area and the 
Chairman’s approach to the role. But even the more strategically 
aware Chairmen often expressed discouragement a t the 
differential power bases of the two agencies, noting the extensive 
efforts they made to get their agenda heard and understood within 
the Trusts.
Furthermore, there w as little sign of equality when it came to 
sharing out “rewards”; the distribution of the new monies in June 
2000 illustrated Chairm en’s concerns:
“You know, all the new m oney is going to the acute Trust rather than 
any of it coming into primary care which is always a bit concerning...” 
(005.2: 12.06.00)
“Trust and health authority's recovery plan puts primary care on 
the back seat as o f last Wednesday...they were told that any money 
not formally committed is to go back to the centre. No primary care 
development funds, GMS funds, you shouldn’t spend it...not much 
point in having an LHG, really!” (015.3: 16.07.01)
The pressures on the health  authorities to reduce deficits were 
perceived as having a  stronger im pact on distribution of 
resources, including the new monies specifically aimed at 
“modernisation” of services, th an  other strategic intentions 
outlined in the policy docum ents. Thus Trusts were perceived to 
have gotten first call on any additional money injected into the 
system, a t the expense of pum p-prim ing new approaches aimed at
changing the sta tu s quo:
“Undoubtedly what's been going on these last few weeks has been 
extraordinary see-saw from famine to feast to back to...well, not
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to famine again but...it’s extraordinary, really, I mean the health service 
hasn’t seen such an injection [of money], but the feeling is that 
we’re...that it’s...we’ve been managing expectations down again because 
of the way they did the tranches. And I don’t  think primary care has 
actually seen  very much as a result o f that as a share of the 
resources. The proverbial Trust pulling power has...has once again 
exerted itself, really” (006.2: 17.07.00)
Although Chairm en differed as to the extent to which they viewed 
financial resources as  their chief lever of power, the LHGs’ lack of 
parity or “clout” in relation to T rusts was one of their most 
frequently voiced concerns throughout the study period. The 
impact of this imbalance was also affected, of course, by the 
number of LHGs to which any one T rust was expected to do 
business. In some areas of Wales T rusts had four or five LHGs to 
which to relate, potentially diluting the impact of any single LHG 
in the eyes of the Trust.
This imbalance was particularly evident in relation to community 
services budgets. Community services budgets were seen, by 
Chairmen, as an  im portant lever for changing service delivery 
patterns locally. But community services budgets became part of 
Trusts’ funds in the 1998 re-structuring which merged community 
services with acute sector hospitals. This structural change was 
accompanied by increasing focus on T rust overspends - so it may 
be that the funds associated with the takeover of community 
services were a  welcome addition to T rust coffers. Despite many 
promises from Trusts to devolve these budgets, common across 
LHG areas, over the full period under study, no Trust in Wales
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managed to either provide LHGs with figures on the number of 
community nursing staff employed by them, or to provide any sort 
of estimates on expenditure on this staffing group, thereby 
effectively preventing any changes in configuration at local level. 
Yet this was one area of service highlighted by Chairmen, from the 
earliest days of the LHGs’ existence, as being one in which they 
could usefully make a pronounced difference to patient care in 
their localities. One Chairm an, for example, had used figures 
available two years previously (under the previous structure where 
community services budgets were disaggregated) to identify a 
significant variation in spends across the sub-areas of his LHG:
“we had a variation in district nursing [expenditure] within X HA per 
patient provision, was something like £60 to something like £91 per 
patient [but] our com m unity is fairly even, you see, each one of the
valleys, the population, the people, the problems, they don’t vary a 
lot...they’re sort of evenly deprived, if you like...” (014.2: 24.05.00)
He saw this issue as being an  appropriate one for the LHG and 
thus an opportunity to do w hat the larger health authority 
couldn’t, because of conflicting interests within the larger area 
and lack of incentives in the system:
“So I think for a health authority area, that’s probably too big a problem 
to take on. But we can actually hopefully get down to much 
more...You know, we know what’s  going on.” (014.2: 24.05.00)
He opened up channels of com m unication with the Trust to
discuss the issue:
“what we wanted to do in our [community services] budget is to  
even those [variations] up a bit, you know, so that patients are 
getting a sort of fairly even distribution of what is needed. But we 
haven’t actually got the budget yet; because we can’t have it 
because they don’t have the figures. So, although, you know, we’re 
talking to the community managers, we can’t really do anything 
concrete about it” (014.2: 24.05.00).
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And although he had  succeeded in getting the issue onto the 
agenda a t both health  authority and Trust level, he was 
continually frustra ted  by the LHG’s inability to get either the 
budget itself or sufficiently detailed information to support the 
case:
“a large part o f the com m unity budget overall was supposed to have 
come to us on 1st April, but the Trust couldn’t  identify, you know, 
how much each bit was costing. It was a complete shambles, actually 
-  dreadful! We never have been able to  get th is information, but
they did know that we needed this information .... but as I say, its 
historical, really... So somehow, in the past, the health authority must 
have been spending a big tranche of it, but you know, they don’t seem to 
be aware of, in any remote way, as to how they’ve been spending it, 
they’ve just paid the bills...” (014.2)
By the end of the period under study, the position had not 
changed:
“So, we're supposed to have it now [the community services 
budget], but we’ve got the notional budget, which means that we 
can't really actually do anything yet to  change the service. It’s been 
a cause of a lot of talk and frustration between the Local Health Groups 
and the health authority and the Trust” (014.3: 01.06.01)
This comment indicates how LHGs were effectively prohibited from 
developing the sort of locally responsive services they were set up 
to create, by blocks in the system th a t remained too strong 
throughout the entire lifespan of the LHGs. Even the decision to 
remove the health authority tier, taken some six months 
previously, had not been enough to unlock this particular block.
In this case, the T rust in question covered all the LHGs in the 
health authority area. B ut even the concerted efforts of the 
constituent LHGs was not enough to overturn the existing 
situation:
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“We’re having enormous difficulties at the moment we’re supposed to  
have the com m unity services budget. Well, no money has come to
us. We’re still struggling with the community to give us figures on, oh, 
what the employment situation is in the viarious practices, community 
nurses and health visitors. Well it’s a struggle to get the 
information. If we had the money we could say ‘Look this is what we 
want to purchase, and if you’re not going to give it we’ll go elsewhere’ 
and then they start to jump around” (004.2: 06.07.00)
As one of the Chairm en p u t it:
“Yes, 1 mean, when the Trust doesn’t  want to do anything, it 
doesn’t really have to do it, is  one problem. And secondly they don’t 
actually know what they’re doing and so being asked creates a problem 
for them” (014.3: 01.06.01).
This comment supports the interpretation th a t the system re­
organisation had done little to change the dynamics operating 
within it. If anything, the vertical integration of the Trusts had 
strengthened the position of the acute sector, in terms of 
autonomy and budgets, w ithout any parallel strengthening of the 
ability of LHGs to influence their behaviour, or incentive for health 
authorities to monitor the outcom es of their own commissioning 
processes, further embedding the parity  imbalance. Although the 
data excerpts used in this last example come from within one 
health authority area, the picture was mirrored across Wales 
without exception. It would appear from this analysis that the 
existing relationships between the health  authorities and trusts 
were never materially disturbed by the arrival or existence of 
LHGs. The existing channels of communication, and the shared 
management culture and beliefs which favoured the acute sector 
a t the expense of the primary and  community sector, remained 
intact. Thus directness favoured T rust and health authority 
relationships, further strengthened by history. Collaborative
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approaches across LHGs succeeded often in getting specific issues 
on to the health authority agenda, but never managed to effect 
any real change in the balance of power (parity) prevailing 
between the acute and community sectors:
"Well the biggest problem...the problem of the Trusts is they’re an 
independent organisation, and what they wish to achieve is self 
maintenance, isn't it, you know, immortality and all that?... so I mean, 
you know, their focus isn ’t  on the patient or the client group, it’s on 
organisational furtherance, to ensure that this organisation continues 
to exist mostly in its current form...” (002.2: 02.06.00)
This drive to self perpetuate was evidenced most overtly on an all 
Wales basis during the Welsh Assembly Government's 
consultation exercise exploring further structural change, carried 
out following the appointm ent of a  new Director of the NHS in 
Wales, and as part of the information gathering which informed 
implementation of Improving Health in Wales, the NHS Plan for 
Wales (NAW 2001). This exercise consisted of establishing a  series 
of “Task & Finish Groups”, in August 2001, reflecting the various 
parts of the system deemed to be in need of attention if not reform 
(NAW Structural Change Newsletter Series 2001). Each Task & 
Finish Group consisted of selected senior representatives of Trusts 
and LHGs, constituting a  form of expert panel on each issue, eg 
Workforce Development, Performance Management, etc. Although 
LHG Chairmen and their General Managers acted promptly to 
take up their places on these Groups, they soon found that the 
cards were stacked against them. Meetings were chaired by 
senior Trust or health authority managers; they were called at 
short notice, and the date for subsequent meetings wasn't set
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until the end of each meeting, effectively excluding non-attendees
systematically. LHG Chairmen found it almost impossible to
commit to attending such meetings because, as practising
clinicians, their diaries were committed to personally providing
services m onths in advance:
MWe don't have any power at the moment, and this is the difficulty. 
We can lobby, we can talk. The Minister does listen but obviously 
didn’t listen hard enough. I know that the Director has the right view of 
the future, but I don’t think that she has a lot of support” (001.3:
06.09.01)
Trust managers, practised in the mores of such consultation, and 
well organised as a  group, bolstered by national lobbying groups 
such as the NHS Confederation, and their position politically as 
the largest employers within many LHG areas, saw an opportunity 
to influence the proposed structures in their favour, promoting an 
option to integrate primary care within their structures:
"1 feel particularly frustrated by the structural change process, 
having been so closely involved with it, and having contributed 
considerably to what we thought was going to be a very decisive 
pattern o f change, and then...by then it was watered down 
politically...because the obvious conclusion of the structural 
changes, it was originally seen, would have been a major shuffle in 
the way that trusts were re-organised, and that was felt to be 
politically unacceptable. So we’ve had to go through this pathfinder 
process, which leaves the whole thing up in the air again” (001.3:
06.09.01)
In this Chairm an’s eyes, the tru sts  had sufficient power 
collectively to block proposed change, even if insufficient to swing 
the pendulum  completely in their direction:
"And its still in danger o f being scuppered. The Trusts: ‘we’ll be 
non-viable, we'll have to close' etc, Because of what they’ve done in 
the past in terms of using the funds from the community services to 
support the acute services” (001.3).
Health Authorities supported the T rusts’ positions, but from a 
different angle, arguing for the preservation of the status quo, on
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the grounds th a t further structural change would detract 
attention from the Assembly’s wider agenda of tackling 
inequalities.1
8.2.6 Summary Throughout the period of study, then, LHGs 
remained under the domination of both of their more powerful 
- organisational neighbours, despite concerted collective and 
individual efforts to build more m ature and effective relationships. 
In terms of effective relationship domains, this analysis has 
showed that, firstly, the im pact of organizational history made the 
task  of building cooperative working relationships with Trusts an 
uphill struggle, further exacerbated by failures in the directness 
domain. Secondly, against th is obstacle, this analysis has 
demonstrated the problems m et by Chairmen trying to create 
common agendas with Trusts, aggravated by the lack of parity 
between the potential partners. Even the directness of 
traditionally close clinician-to-clinician channels was offset by 
failures in term s of continuity, despite the efforts of strategically 
sophisticated Chairmen to bolster the multiplexity of linkages 
between the LHG and their T rust colleagues. In the end, too, even 
involvement in discussions about their futures was perceived, by 
Chairmen, as an additional distraction from the LHG’s core 
purpose:
1 Chief Executive Bro Taf Health Authority, in response to a question posed by the 
Chairman of the NAW Health and Social Services Committee, discussing the 
future of LHGs at the meeting held, 25 October 2000, Committee Room 2, 
National Assembly for Wales. Agenda Item HSS-18-00. Recorded by researcher 
in own field notes and corroborated by Minutes published subsequently.
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"I think it’s very difficult. I think we have a lot of dialogue on this, 
we’re more or less...th e recent discussions have all been about 
political m atters and the future development, rather than what is 
actually going on in our patch. (010.3: 24.00.01)
Nonetheless, m ost LHG Chairm en felt tha t relationship-building 
had been am ongst their m ost im portant achievements during the 
period under study. The Audit Commission's initial review (2000) 
of LHG activity supported th is contention. This view seems to be 
based largely on their perhaps unexpected success in building 
effective relationships with Local Authority colleagues.
8.3 Local A uthorities
In terms of Directness, Local Authorities were in a good position 
vis-a-vis LHGs: the new system, and supporting infrastructure 
changes, was specifically designed to promote closer partnerships 
with Local Authority colleagues, particularly those involved with 
Social Services-linked activities. The statutory duty of 
partnership, included with the enabling legislation to establish 
LHGs, was an im portant steer. B ut perhaps more effective was 
the inclusion of two local authority  representatives on each LHG 
Board, with the stipulation th a t one should be a member of the 
Executive Committee (Welsh Office 1998b). These specific and 
concrete arrangem ents should have facilitated reasonably direct 
communication between the two agencies. A num ber of features 
however combined to thw art th is in several areas. Notably in one 
LHG, the Local Authority Chairm an refused to allow any
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representation on the LHG Board until the issue of whether the 
representatives should be drawn from the elected members or the 
officers was clarified. One year into the LHG’s life, this was still 
unresolved:
“I would like to see the relationship with the local authority becoming 
more firmly entrenched and representatives actually beginning to take 
their place on the Board and make an active contribution...” (010.2:
06.04.00)
This strategically oriented LHG Chairman was effective in 
supporting the development of informal links with social services 
(010.1:16.08.99) to compensate for the Local Authority 
Chairman’s intransigence, bu t his real weapon was the design and 
implementation of his community development strategy itself:
“...Since that period we’ve actually put into being a structure right 
across XTown with four locality steering groups, which reflect the...all 
the stakeholders, representatives of primary care and various members 
of primary care, there’s not a predominance of one member...We also 
have representatives of the Trust, the CHC, the voluntary sector, and 
the local authority...they’re all on the four areas around the city which 
follow basically Assembly member constituency boundaries...the 
structure we eventually settled  on was enthusiastically received by 
the local authority...” (010.3: 24.07.01)
This example of a  strategy aligning local priorities with national, 
together with the creation of a  structure to enable needs to be fed 
in from the “bottom up”, from within small localities and across 
professional groups, enabled the LHG to m arshal local authority 
support, despite structural constraints and representational 
disputes th a t were more extreme than  in any other area of Wales. 
In this instance, new channels had to be created to enable the 
partnership to grow, where the stipulated statutory channels had 
been left in abeyance. The implementation of this strategy
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revolved around creating new channels of communication that 
enabled direct communication on a variety of levels. In this way, 
multiplexity in the relationship building was fostered too.
8.3.1 History The majority of Chairmen, whether operational or 
Strategic, faced practical difficulties in trying to set up and 
maintain relationships with their local authority colleagues. 
Ironically, in some ways, relationship building may have been 
initially easier a t operational level, benefiting the more 
pragmatically-oriented Chairmen, a t least in the shorter term:
“Well our local authority links -  although our local authority isn’t the 
most wonderful local authority, it’s had a lot of bad press lately -  we 
have developed a good working relationship with them...take the 
refugees-oops, asylum seekers! We have a chance to make it all 
come together: housing, services, the lot...also Intermediate Care is 
quite good; through the Primary Care Development money we’ve been 
able to put some money into primary care and some into local authority 
services so we can complete the circle, so we can ring up for a sitter for 
Mrs Jones in the middle of the night and get that sorted.” (002.2:
02.06.00)
As a GP, this Chairman may, historically, have had a somewhat 
distant relationship with Social Services colleagues because of the 
differences between the “9-5” culture which GPs’ perceived Social 
Services to work within, as opposed to their own 24-hour 
commitment; moreover previous re-organisations within social 
services, away from geographically-organised services towards 
functionally-organised services, often m eant that the idea of the 
named social worker for each practice disappeared, intensifying 
rather than alleviating relationship barriers. So the sort of 
practical bridge-building referred to above was attractive in terms
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of local service delivery improvements, providing a way round 
previously frustrating hurdles. Similar early successes were 
frequently mentioned, particularly by more operationally-focussed 
GP Chairmen.
In areas where Commissioning Teams had been actively 
encouraged, history appeared to have helped rather than 
hindered:
“But we are very fortunate here as far as Pm concerned, you see, 
because the [LHG] General Manager was the County Commissioning 
Manager, the Joint Commissioning Manager was already on the team, 
two of the GPs on the LHG were two of the three GPs on the 
commissioning team...”(012.1: 09.08.99)
Further direct channels were created with the establishment of 
Health and Well Being Partnerships, in the wake of Improving 
Health in Wales. These groups were intended to look across 
health and social care boundaries to identify issues which 
impacted upon the local population's health and well being in 
order to pinpoint specific actions within constituent partner 
authorities' decision-making structures, to tackle them. Since 
Chairmen saw relationship-building across the patch as one of 
their own key roles, meetings a t Chief Executive/Chairmen level 
were reasonably quickly instigated:
“But the thing I am very pleased about...and I guess where I haven’t  
really changed my mind, is the opportunity o f health & social care 
being merged. I mean, IVe sat in on quite a few seminars and Pm 
giving quite a bit of my time up to this at the moment from my other 
work...It’s the first tim e I’ve m et m ost o f these people at all, to be 
honest and they were looking at it from a different aspect than I'd 
looked at it, you know. From common sense aspects. So they’d say 
‘what’s the point of giving someone anti-depressants if the cause of their 
depression is that the house is damp and water is flowing down the
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walls’...that’s a very sensible sort of, you know, a reflection as that really 
is what, you know, this is more of opportunity” (012.1: 09.08.99)
8.3.2 Commonality This growing awareness of the potential to 
create a  shared agenda in a  concrete sense was also fostered, at 
least in theory, by the requirem ent to produce Health 
„ Improvement Plans:
"The Local Health Alliance has a real contribution here; I could see 
how the LHG could commission the Local Health Alliance to do things 
for it, to contribute to the needs assessment, to inform the HIP (006.1:
08.11.99)
In practice, however, both tim escales and pre-existing mores 
militated against this initially: “The interim HIP was ju s t waved 
past, it was already written by the health authority; now we're 
working hard on next year's” (006.1).
Nonetheless, this feeling of widened opportunities and of a 
welcome different perspective was frequently mentioned by the 
majority of Chairmen. Strategically oriented Chairmen were keen 
to capitalise on opportunities presented by the establishment of 
Joint Health & Social Care Partnership Boards: 010.3 reported 
that both the Chairman and the General Manager had seats on 
their local Boards. In one LHG area the dialogue was stimulated 
by creating awareness of a  health  issue tha t impacted on all 
sectors of the community, coronary heart disease:
“I’m sure there’s going to be increased contact between ourselves as a 
Local Health Group, and Local Authority. And, you know, I think we’ve 
made...I think X as an LHG have particularly made good impact on 
the Local Authority, more probably than any other LHG in Wales, that 
would be my guess...” (022.2: 10.08.00).
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This initiative grew and  acted as a  “binding force” across various 
interest groups in the community, despite the fact the Local 
Health Alliance never really got off the ground in th a t locality 
(022.2: 12.06.01). In the sam e way, the community development 
approaches of 009 and  010 acted as unifying forces across 
" agencies. But, all too often, both existing policy, structural 
changes, and work patterns militated against developing cohesive 
constructive new partnerships.
8.3.3 Continuity A lack of continuity in structures and members 
presented the biggest challenge to LHG/LA partnership working 
across Wales. The decision to re-shuffle local authorities, during 
this period of time, had  the effect of turning officer attention 
inwards, ju s t as it had, earlier, during health authority and trust 
re-structuring. In m any LHG areas, the re-shuffling acted as a 
significant brake on the development of Local Health Alliances in 
the first place:
“Everything hinges on this HIP, and [Local] Health Alliances haven’t  
taken off...we’ve had a problem in that in X Shire we’ve had one...the 
Director of Social Services was suspended last July or August so we 
haven’t seen him...the Director of Public Protection was seconded to an 
authority in Y in October so we haven’t seen him, so we’ve had 
absolutely no input for six  m onths from the local authority...” 
(017.2: 29.03.00)
Thus, in the case of local authorities, an  additional barrier to 
partnership-building was created by the amalgamation of key 
departments, so th a t social services, for example, was merged 
with education, as was noted in Chapter 5, in the discussion 
about structural influences on LHGs. Such changes were
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reported, by C h a irm e n , a s  a  loss of crucial experience and
knowledge. And, as noted earlier, the difficulties of new members
joining an established  team  would be made worse by lack of
knowledge of the issu es  and the brief. A year later the Health
Alliance in this area h ad  yet to get going:
“It’s kicked off, b u t not with a lot of teeth. It seem s to be 
floundering on issu es  where the County needs to respond. We don’t 
have a problem responding, because our remit is probably a lot simpler 
and more easily measurable...” (017.3: 12.06.01)
This was a  common report, emphasizing that in addition to 
structural constra in ts on partnership working, each agency’s 
cultural differences were further emphasised by different 
accountability chains and performance m easures. This 
Chairman’s report w as not unique; it reflected the majority of 
LHGs’ experiences w ith their local authority-led health alliances. 
These differences added to the effects of the well-known and long 
standing barriers of different funding stream s and budget cycles. 
In addition, the lack of continuity of interest as well as 
representation proved to be problematic across Wales:
it’s awkward when they don’t turn up. There's a tendency to 
send a deputy w ho’s nearly as good but not quite...and then, worst 
of all, you know, th ey  say they’ll do som ething and then do 
som ething e lse ...I mean, if this [top] team can’t mean what it says, how 
do you expect your middle management team to do it? I mean, actually, 
how do you expect your deliverers on the ground, your social carers, you 
know, your district nurses, general practitioners or whatever -  how are 
they going to do it and why should they?” (002.3: 13.08.01)
In addition to re-shuffling, the discontinuities in representation at 
meetings led to barriers in commitment and action, thus 
militating against efforts to sustain  commonality o f agendas when
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it came to implementation stages, as well as raising parity 
concerns.
8.3.4 Parity In term s of structures, both Local Authorities and 
LHGs had m uch to gain from closer working relationships. Local 
- Authorities historically had sought closer working relationships, 
and the ability to assert more control over service provision, since 
the 1974 reorganisation’s removal of community services from 
local authorities’ responsibilities. Traditionally, too, each partner 
tended to apportion some of the blame for delayed transfers of 
care to their opposite num ber’s ways of working or lack of 
resourcing. Structural changes intended to enable closer joint 
working had been accompanied by strategic exhortations for the 
preceding 30 years, with Jo in t Care Planning Teams and Joint 
Consultative Committees being formed to look at issues of 
common concern, notably the development of tools to enable 
common needs assessm ents and  resolution of disputes over 
boundaries (whether a  bath  is a  health  or a social need, for 
example). But different accountability structures, different 
cultures and working patterns, different budget stream s and 
financial year calendars were all hurdles to be overcome along the 
way. The new LHGs were conceived as a  bold leap forward in the 
direction of real partnership, with coterminous boundaries, 
representation a t Director-level, and strategy supported by 
statute. Pooled budgets were introduced as an additional
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sweetener, with legislation enshrining additional elements of 
flexibility in new spending powers. Given that neither agency had 
hierarchical control over the other, parity should have been 
enhanced by these m easures.
- In addition, existing constrain ts were released to create new 
flexibilities to support jo in t spending. Interestingly, however, these 
new monies were rarely m entioned by Chairmen as being helpful:
“Well we have some pooled budget work already, in substance 
misuse...but we’re really awaiting the implementation of the 
flexibilities.. .The Continuing Care budget would be a prime candidate 
for pooled budgeting but XYZ  Health Authority doesn’t  actually set 
a budget against its continuing care...so there isn’t a resource 
which you can actually work w ith together, and that’s really not 
helpful to pooled budgeting...” (006.2: 17.07.00)
Efforts to work together appeared to be built more on managing to 
create shared agendas either strategically (009, 010, 007, 022) or 
pragmatically on specific projects more limited in scope (eg 002), 
than on any examples of shared risks.
8.3.5 Multiplexity The creation of Local Health Alliances led by 
Local Authorities could also have been intended to provide 
additional direct channels of communication and thus to promote 
closer relationships with LHGs. But the initial launch of LHAs1 
was met with some suspicion and hostility by newly appointed 
Chairmen, still struggling to define their own agendas and 
“territories”. This uncertainty, and lack of clarity about respective
1 Personal observation by the researcher, corroborated in field notes made at the time, of the 
debate that followed the launch of LHAs by two Directors of Social Services, at the final Study 
Block for LHG Chairmen, 2 July 1999, Caer Beris Manor, Builth Wells, Powys, Wales.
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remits, bedevilled LHG relationships with many external agencies. 
And restructuring had  to overcome historical working patterns, 
relationships and  organisational understanding, so that for some, 
Local Health Alliances acted as a  brake on progress whilst 
everyone changed h a ts  and places, even in areas where,
- previously, jo int working had been going strong:
“Again, there's a bit o f conlhsion between [LH] Alliances and the 
JCC, you know, both things are sort o f still ongoing...although they 
probably duplicate things...people are not quite sure what is going to 
take responsibility for what...” (018.2: 20/06/00).
These initial difficulties were gradually overcome by virtue of 
selective use of the small num bers of players in the same pool:
“Also the cross representation we've got. Because XY is the 
effective officer lead for the Local Health Alliance, and he Chairs 
the Local Health Group Health Improvement Programme Working 
Group. And what the Local Health Group is doing is commissioning 
work from the Alliance, particularly, let’s say, in sexual health strategy, 
to get them to do some work on some of these areas, which then comes 
back into the Local Health Group and hopefully we can then take it on 
in the executive way, which gives some value to the Alliance’s work” 
(006.2: 17.07.00).
This echoes the reports of 010, which highlighted the value of 
common membership on key committees, a t executive level. The 
seniority of the role was seen as as likely to be important here as 
the person’s interpretation of the role and willingness to take risks 
within it:
“The big problem for us working with the Local Authority is, I don’t 
think X is a risk-taker...X is Y’s Number Two...Y took the risks and X 
was a safe pair of hands, I think. Now we Ve got the safe pair of hands, 
he’s a master team of safe hands, but there's no one to take risks, 
there’s no one”(002.3: 13.08.01)
Thus it may be tha t the building up  of shared history and 
understanding, and the consequent development of trust, was 
more effective in building relationships across agencies than any
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other single factor, since a  high degree of tru st was an essential 
pre-requisite to effective exploitation of any new opportunities 
presented by legislative or structural changes. This could indicate 
that multiplexity and  history may outweigh other factors, at least 
in situations where the playing field is relatively level, as it was in 
the relationships between local authorities and their LHGs. In 
this case neither had executive power over the other, but each 
enabled access to key constituents needed by the other in order to 
deliver services locally. It may also be tha t the budding 
relationships between local authorities and LHGs required 
relatively low levels of risk taking, for both parties, a t this early 
stage of jo int working. Nonetheless, as the analysis above 
illustrates, commonality of aims, which might have been implicit, 
was ham pered from developing by continuity problems.
8.4  Summary
Applying the sort of hum an development analogy, favoured by 
many Chairmen, to understanding the relationship challenge 
faced by LHGs in attem pting to create their own identity in an 
already crowded organizational landscape, health authorities 
could be seen to have been acting in loco parentis mode. Health 
Authorities presented a  view of the world which had worked for 
them, and attem pted to instil amongst their fledgling LHGs a 
variety of behaviours which they deemed appropriate for success 
in the health system as they perceived it. Pursuing the analogy
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further, T rusts could be seen to have been behaving in the role of 
T>ig brothers’: looked up  to and respected by their LHGs, perhaps 
feared to some degree, bu t also a  sibling of whom the LHGs had 
certainly got the m easure. Local Authorities, in this vein, then, 
may have been perceived as ‘sisters’: unthreatening, meddlesome, 
and needing to be cajoled into working towards and supporting 
the LHG’s agenda. LHGs, as youngest offspring of the ‘parent’ 
HAs, struggled to create their own identities, distinct from and 
unique, and capable of operating effectively in a new 
organizational configuration. Nonetheless the shared history of 
this ‘nuclear family’ did provide common reference points around 
which to stimulate debate.
But these immediate ‘family’ members were not the only 
stakeholders with which LHGs needed to contend. A wider 
stakeholder group presented a  series of different challenges and 
opportunities for LHGs, which the next chapter examines in 
detail.
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Chapter 9: Engaging Stakeholders in the Wider Community
9.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, it was argued that LHG Chairmen encountered 
a number of obstacles in forging effective working relationships 
with the two agencies with whom they shared responsibility for 
providing services and a  statutory duty to work in partnership. It 
was dem onstrated th a t some Chairmen managed to circumvent 
the structural obstacles th a t impeded effective relationship 
building, while others found these harder to surmount. Applying 
Schulter’s and Lee’s (1993) relationship quality dimensions 
indicated that, despite the advantages conferred by such heavy 
duty incentives, relationship quality was affected by failures in 
directness, parity and commonality aspects in relation to Trusts, 
but more by failures in term s of continuity in relation to Local 
Authorities, with whom parity was less of an  issue. This chapter 
uses the same domains to examine LHG Chairmen’s efforts to 
address policy directives to increase responsiveness and public 
involvement locally.
As new agencies expected to meet the health needs of local 
communities, Local Health Groups had to create ways, firstly, to 
identify those groups th a t they considered to be their 
constituents, and, secondly, to find effective ways to communicate 
with them. This was wholly uncharted territory for the majority of 
Chairmen, so analysing the ways in which they tackled this aspect
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of their rem its tells u s  m uch about their own views of their roles 
and priorities. Responsiveness was a  key policy aim (Welsh Office 
199.8a, 1998b) in setting up LHGs in the first place, but Chairmen 
differed notably in term s of the different groups they included in 
their own definitions of their ‘constituents’, and thus to whose 
interests they responded, and to the priority they accorded these 
different groups. Again, in th is aspect of their work, the divide 
between strategically oriented Chairmen and their more 
operational counterparts was evidenced by the different 
approaches each took to the task  of engaging and building 
relationships with these varied groups of stakeholders. For some, 
this responsibility to increase public involvement and 
responsiveness was central to their view of the LHG’s remit. For 
others it was a  lower priority, ‘tacked on’ to the LHG’s agenda, 
and, thus, to which they paid less attention.
Because relationships with these groups were not laid down by 
statute, the task  of developing them  required the exercise of subtle 
skills. As was argued in Chapter 7, such skills in managing 
‘institutional politics’ were considered to be essential leadership 
competences in creating new organizations capable of change and 
development. And, again in th is section of the analysis, Schulter’s 
and Lee’s (1993) relationship domains have proved to be a useful 
tool in distinguishing between, and reporting on, the ways in 
which Chairmen dealt with the opportunities and challenges
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presented in developing relationships with these disparate groups 
of stakeholders. This chapter examines, in turn, the more 
“peripheral” groups noted on Figure 7.1. LHGs were directed to 
“engage closely with local professional advisory machinery” from 
an early stage (Welsh Office 1998b, p.4)), so the first group 
considered here are Local Professional Committees.
9.2  Local Professional C om m ittees
As noted in chapter 6, Local Professional Committees (LPCs) held 
dual roles as advisors to health  authorities and as representatives 
of the independent contractor professions locally. These twin 
roles m eant tha t they were im portant stakeholder organizations of 
LHGs. But the precise nature of their relationships to LHGs was 
not stipulated in either the policy documents or guidance issued 
for establishing LHGs (Welsh Office 1998a and 1998b). Therefore, 
new linkages needed to be developed, and new boundaries drawn. 
In the case of LPCs, th is was complicated by both previous 
organizational history and lack of clarity about roles. All four 
independent contractor professions responsible for primary care 
provision were formally represented on LHG Boards. Nurses, as a 
professional group, were also represented, but there were no 
formally constituted professional advisory groups with the same 
Status as LPCs to represent n u rses’ interests. Many argued, 
therefore, th a t the LHGs’ constitution simply re-enforced existing 
fault lines, and did nothing to ensure that the voices of those
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actually on the front line, in term s of service delivery within the 
community health  services framework, were represented 
effectively. Health Visitors, District Nurses, Practice Nurses and 
Midwives were all subsum ed under the general banner of Nursing; 
Professions Allied to Medicine were left out of the structure 
completely, as were primary care managers. These representation 
challenges were further reinforced by the approaches taken by 
most Chairmen, who tended to prioritise relationship-building 
with local GPs and with LMCs, and then to leave the rest to 
chance, or to other Board members, to take forward. But even 
given this prominence, relationships with their Local Medical 
Committees presented special dilemmas to all nineteen GP 
Chairmen.
9.2.1 History LMCs had played the role of appointing bodies for 
GP representatives in each locality, as reported in chapter 4. This 
directness of involvement, from the beginning, might have served 
to reinforce the connections between them  and their GP nominees. 
But two specific challenges countered this: role overlap and 
representation. Firstly, confusion over roles, or, more precisely, 
perhaps, territories, m eant th a t the arrival of LHGs was not 
universally welcomed by LMCs, as the following excerpt indicates:
"They [the LMC] seem  not to  be sure of their role. There is plenty for 
them to do but, for instance, IVe had a letter from a Chairman who sent 
a letter to all the LHG Chairmen about correspondence from hospitals 
and discharge summaries and so forth and that always used to be an 
LMC issue, but since we’ve had the commissioning group, like you 
know, weVe been dealing with that kind of thing and one thing we won’t
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deal with is doctors’ union-type issues...we would like the LMC to stick 
up for doctors’ Union-type issues. And there is plenty of work for them 
to do and no one else is going to do that so if they would just 
concentrate on that and well deal with the consultants with regard to 
discharge summaries and stuff and all of this administrative type of 
. thing -  you don’t need an LMC for that. But you know, I mean, I had a 
letter back in reply to  that and the chairman still feels that he 
would still like to  be doing that so we still haven’t  resolved that one 
yet...and I might be wrong, you know what I mean? No others 
completely know, like nobody has said ’this is what each body will 
do’, you know. So a lot of it is just down to evolution, isn’t it?” (014.1:
16.05.99)
This Chairm an's report illustrated the underlying tensions 
between the LMCs and new LHGs, explaining the extent to which 
LMCs feared loss of authority  and role in the face of the new 
organisations. Many LHGs worked round this problem by 
maintaining their joint m em berships of the two bodies: in many 
cases the GPs elected onto the LHG were also members of the 
LMC. Some Chairmen considered th is dual membership to be a 
benefit, as the following excerpt dem onstrates:
“And professional committees, LMCs, professions allied to medicine and 
so forth. There hasn’t been really the involvement, other than...at local 
medical committee involvement there is, because there are regular 
meetings between the Chairs and the LMCs and that aspect is good 
-  I would say “4 ” for that. But when it comes to other professional 
committees, there hasn’t been the close involvement” (022.3: 12.06.01)
This Chairman gives a  relatively positive description of the 
relationship between his LHG and  the LMC. But this dual 
representation, whilst perhaps supporting one aspect of the 
directness dimension of Schulter's and Lee's typology, nonetheless 
may have made it difficult for some GPs to see a distinction 
between the functions of the two bodies. The comment above, for 
example, made by a  relatively strategically oriented GP Chairman
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indicated that, for him, despite his emphasis on inclusiveness and 
the value he placed on multidisciplinary working, his own role, in 
terms of relationship-building, was focussed on the LMC; he left 
the relationships with other professional committees to the 
relevant LHG representative member. Such approaches might 
- have reinforced an  im pression th a t GPs’ interests were more 
important than  those of other professional groups. And, since 
representation was heavily weighted towards GPs anyway (ratio of 
six to one) this impression would be further strengthened. Here, 
therefore, both history and  directness may have been strengthened 
by the multiplexity of contacts through existing communication 
channels a t the expense of building new, broader, ones.
At the same time, the fact th a t LMCs were not directly represented 
as such on LHG Boards, may have added to their concerns about 
role overlap. Local Professional Committees historically focussed 
their efforts to influence health  authority policy by representing 
the interests of the relevant independent contractor profession. 
Mindful of the LPC’s traditional role in this regard, one 
independent contractor Chairm an gave it a wide berth from the 
start:
“I think the problem is that the LMC and the LPC...think they can 
control the [independent contractors] on the Boards - 1 haven’t been 
to an LPC meeting on purpose because...I don’t take the view that I need 
to be dictated to...but th ey  have tended to think...that the Board 
report to them  and its not that way at all...” (017.1: 11.08.99)
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In this case, history provided a warning sign of troubles ahead
which this C hairm an was keen to avoid. He saw clearly that it
was the narrow  focus implicit in this background that could
potentially have conflicted with the LHG’s wider remit. His
prediction proved to be prescient, as the next excerpt shows,
. taken from another Chairm an’s account of the difficult
adjustm ents some of his Board members (also LMC members)
were having to make:
“We have som e dysfunction around some of the group, because one 
of the doctors has insisted he wants a doctors' group, which I didn't 
think was appropriate and we've had some harsh words about it,
and weVe had to agree to disagree, sort of thing....I think there are one 
or two people who really don't understand what they've let 
them selves in for...they don’t understand that they have been elected 
and selected to a publicly accountable body, and that they have to be 
very careful that they don't align them selves to groups which may 
cause conflict o f interest..." (019.1: 10.08.99).
Balancing these conflicts was particularly challenging for more 
operationally focussed Chairmen, especially those who were GPs, 
trying to find their way towards building an agenda for practical 
local action:
“What we've decided I think is to  look at things in terms of, well, 
what are the real concrete problems we've got. The real problems 
we've got are prescribing, the costs, and the uh sort of policy 
issues. The other big one, which is, yeah, never mind health 
improvement plans, a big issue, is bed blocking in the X Hospital.
Those are two things, two areas, where we think we can help” (019.1:
10.08.99)
Adopting this approach, however, added to the pressure he
subsequently experienced:
“I need really though to be projecting m yself more to the local 
professional community. I find I’m establishing good relationships at 
the top of the hierarchy... [but] it’s a communications level problem -  I 
am being asked by the local professional community: ‘what are you 
actually delivering?, and the problem is that I have insufficient 
support to deliver more” (019.1).
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Ironically, then, th is narrow and operational focus on medical 
services may have actually made it harder for this Chairman to be 
seen to be ‘delivering’, in the eyes of his LMC constituents. In 
addition, the com munication process he described above is mainly 
one-way: from the LHG outwards. At the same time, however, he 
appears to be holding onto an  implicit notion of accountability 
back to the LMC. In such cases, history, combined with 
multiplexity and directness of links, may have contributed to 
increased confusion about respective roles as well as to the 
definition of a  narrower agenda for the LHG. Chairmen tended 
not to refer to other LPCs in their reports, reinforcing the idea that 
their focus remained restricted to the LMC. This left LPCs to rely 
on the efforts of the nom inated independent contractor 
representative on the LHG to represent their views, though this 
representative may not have been a  member of the LPC. But for 
groups without an LPC, such as nurses, or other non-independent 
contractor professions, bringing a concerted professional 
viewpoint to the LHG was made even more difficult.
These groups, on the other hand, did not have any previous 
history of power and influence locally such as LMCs brought to 
the LHG. Thus, being relatively new to the decision-making 
process, these groups may have been grateful ju s t to have gained
286
a seat on the LHG Board in the first place, as this Chairman 
intimates:
“I think the GPs on the Board, the morale is poor, because they’ve 
been involved w ith com m issioning and things before, and they 
can’t...th ey  see that really nothing is happening. For the other 
members of the Board, like, you know, voluntary services...it’s the first 
time they’ve been involved with medical stuff, so I think from their 
point o f view things are not so bad” (020.2: 14.08.00)
. In this Chairm an’s view, groups new to the process perhaps 
perceived a  stronger opportunity to try to redefine the agenda for 
LHGs, beyond existing medical services, than  did those with an 
existing LPC history. It would appear, however, tha t the ways in 
which some LHGs worked in practice militated against this. A 
review of LHG Board M inutes confirmed tha t the contribution of 
nurses to Board meetings had been limited and, on the whole, 
confined to nurse-specific issues, e.g. nurse prescribing and 
community services, throughout the period of this study. One 
Chairman tried to support his nurse representative, asking her to 
lead a particular development bu t his view of her contribution was 
not wholly complimentary:
“We even had a Nurse Chair for the group to give it more credibility, and 
we got a paper written pretty quickly, but it’s June and we’ve still not 
got it out! It’s all bogged down in Nurse-ology” (002.2: 02.06.00)
Such comments tended to reinforce the impression of tokenism in
relation to nurse representation.
“Well I think the majority of the Board have been alright but I think a lot 
of them seem to be on it for their own professional interests, like the 
increase in various item fees for their particular group. So I’m a bit 
dubious about the role o f these allied groups, and how they actually 
fit into the structure, and it seem s to me when we’re talking and 
discussing, it seem s they go for whatever will improve their, like, 
more funding for pharmacists, or more for optometrists, rather 
than the corporate view...and I think some of them are still searching 
for why they are actually there, because a lot of the issues are basically 
general practice issues and prescribing issues and I think they feel
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(a) they're not clear what their roles are and perhaps even 
understanding o f some of these issues..." (020.1: 09.11.99)
Here then direct representation on the LHG Board was not enough
to counterbalance the weight of the multiple links between GPs
and the LHG Board, and the historic dominance of GPs in the
decision-making process. This Chairm an's attempt to square the
inherent contradiction between the representation required by the
LHG’s infrastructure and his own underlying view of the role of
the LHG as being concerned in the main with “general practice
issues and prescribing issues" was very telling. The weighting of
representation in favour of GPs a t the expense of other
professions, the stipulation th a t the Chairm an be drawn from the
ranks of the GP representatives, and be elected by them was
further strengthened by the historic predominance of the GP
professional advisory structure com pared to the other
independent contractor professions, nurses, Professions Allied to
Medicines, and lay and voluntary sector representatives.
Chairmen tended to play a  leading role in building relationships
with their Local Medical Committees, bu t were content to leave
relationships with other professional committees to the relevant
independent contractor representatives, thus potentially
distancing themselves from the concerns of other independent
contractor groups (022.3). The composition of the Board thus
tended to reinforce a  silo com munication pattern and a focus on
operational issues and, therefore, to make the task of engaging
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local professionals more problematic. It would appear from the 
data in this study tha t, in relation to LPCs, and wider professional 
engagement, history continued to exert a  powerful effect, 
outweighing the im pact of either directness or multiplexity. For 
some individual professional representatives, multiplexity was 
- enhanced by their m em bership of both professional committee 
and the LHG, whilst others, such  as nurses, had no such avenues 
available.
9.3  Engaging ‘grassroots’ GPs
As argued above, relationship-building was influenced by 
individual Chairmen's views of the LHG's role and function, so 
that the more operationally focussed Chairmen put a  high priority 
on medical service development and thus on responding to local 
GPs’ concerns, while more strategically oriented Chairmen tried to 
build definitions of need around the wider community's views, 
rather than along profession or agency lines. The following 
section, therefore, examines the ways in which Chairmen worked 
to engage their local GPs directly with the work of their LHGs, and 
the relative priority accorded them.
9.3.1 Directness All Chairm en were conscious of the need to 
persuade and to influence their GP colleagues, but were also 
acutely aware of their lack of concrete authority or financial 
powers in this regard:
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“you’ve got to  persuade them  [the local GPs]...the reality is we’re 
hesitant about doing too much because we’re not sure how much 
budgetary freedom we’ve got” (022.1: 28.10.99)
To offset this, and  engage clinicians directly, many Chairmen 
expressed in terest in various forms of incentive schemes, 
especially in relation to prescribing behaviour:
“There are a number of initiatives we would like to put in place -  
practice-based initiatives, you know, basically in the areas of clinical 
governance: prescribing is the big problem, the big practical 
problem w e’ve got ... (022.1: 28.10.99)
But even these initial efforts to directly influence GP behaviour 
were compromised by structu ral constraints. As was pointed out 
in Chapter 4, efforts to create a prescribing incentive scheme 
failed to get off the ground:
“The incentive scheme for medics is another one. We’re rolling out 
formularies here. We’ve got no incentive schem e except they all want 
to back it up. We’ve produced an incentive schem e...we’ve 
presented it to the health authority, and they can’t do anything 
because the Welsh Assembly won’t make a decision” (017.2:
29.03.00)
This Chairman had taken the precaution of checking the proposed 
incentive schem e's viability and feasibility with District Audit 
before taking it to the health authority. Despite obtaining 
approval from this independent government advisory body, the 
final go-ahead was not forthcoming. The impact of this was 
powerful, on both Chairm en’s morale bu t also on their perception 
of their own influencing ability. Such reverses tended to reinforce 
existing prejudices and frustrations:
“...the sad thing is that we’ve got to  persuade doctors to alter a 
culture, and the culture is that they write on a bit of paper exactly what 
they want. We’ve got to persuade them otherwise, and the only way
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you can persuade them  unfortunately is with a bit of money, a bit 
of dosh” (017.2)
So, even efforts to deal with a  problem of these practical 
dimensions were limited by constraints within the decision­
making process further up  the line. This set back was doubly 
frustrating for Chairmen, because m ost looked on effecting 
reductions in prescribing as a  reasonably straightforward “early 
win” for LHGs, the effects of which would promote engagement of 
local GPs, as well as achieve significant savings for health budgets 
locally and nationally. Here again, then, lack of sufficiently direct 
communication between the LHGs and the Assembly hampered 
progress locally, and caused Chairm en to question the Assembly’s 
commitment to LHGs as vehicles for change. By the end of 2001, 
when LHGs were metam orphosing into the new organizations they 
would become, the issue of prescribing incentive schemes was still 
being debated and discussed (LHG Board meetings Minutes, 002).
Despite this failure to operationalize incentive schemes locally, GP 
Chairmen still traded heavily, throughout the study, on the fact 
that they were practising GPs themselves. These GP Chairmen 
noted the value of “being one of them ” in terms of persuading GP 
colleagues to engage with the LHG agenda:
“Selling what we’re trying to do to them from that stance, that’s fairly 
important” (003b.3: 19.07.01)
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“Talking the sam e language” and “being in the same game” were 
also cited as crucial supports in promoting GP engagement, 
together with the ability to “understand what their views are and 
what they m ean when they say things”. This, of course, reflects 
another im portant aspect of the directness domain noted by 
- Schulter and Lee. "Being one of them ’, however, was not sufficient 
to ensure engagement of local GPs in the LHG’s agenda when they 
perceived their own in terests to be under threat (Williams 2002). 
More strategic Chairm en were aware of this and, rather than 
relying on history, multiplexity, or directness to deliver the loyalties 
of local GPs, they tried to engage them  by taking a different tack.
9.3.2 Commonality Such Chairmen tried to foster commonality of 
understanding and agendas. This was a  two pronged approach of 
broadly defining the groups included as stakeholders, and, in 
parallel, fostering a  wide definition of their LHG’s aims.
Many used their local professional networks as one mechanism for 
enabling GPs to feed into th is process of defining the local 
communities’ needs. But ope Chairm an went a  step further, to 
formalise this process, by building a  series of inter-linked 
communication networks, across the LHG’s area, over the study 
period:
“WeVe actually put into being a structure right across X with 4  locality 
steering groups, which reflect the, all the stakeholders, 
representatives o f primary care and varying members from primary 
care, there’s not a predominance of one member...well basically their 
essential remit is to win the hearts and minds of primary care, to have
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a proper dialogue with communities that they represent...** (010.3: 
24.07.01)
This Chairman used  the existing networks of GPs as a bridge 
across to the wider community, including a wide group of 
providers. And the aim  of th is larger network was to create two- 
way communication with the local community. For the more 
strategic Chairmen, focussed on creating ways to listen to the 
local community, the task  of building relationships appeared to 
become easier in line with the extent to which they adopted a 
broader definition of both need and constituents. Such Chairmen 
also distanced themselves personally from the task  of “meeting 
and greeting” their GP colleagues, delegating this to others, such 
as the Clinical Governance lead. Again, this distancing from the 
more operational issues strengthened their ability to work 
strategically, whilst a t the same time taking their GP colleagues 
along with them. At the same time, the creation of these two-way 
communication channels may have added to local GPs’ 
perceptions of influence, by moving towards increased multiplexity 
in the relationship.
In a  similar fashion, another GP Chairman, who had become 
increasingly strategic in his approach, over time, reported a 
complete volte face  in term s of m echanism s for engaging local 
GPs, by the end of the study. At the beginning of the study, he 
spoke often of resource constraints, in term s of too few personnel 
on the ground, and  lack of financial incentives. By August 2001,
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however he spoke of the need for influencing strategies built 
around engendering ownership and achievability of goals:
“What really works for me is the ownership...build[ing] people’s need, 
and desire and ability to achieve targets...lighten the load. There’s no 
point in telling people to achieve targets...you have to just make it 
possible for them  to  achieve them ” (002.2: 13.08.01)
Another Chairm an em phasised this support function differently, 
recognising the real workload pressures tha t reducing demand in 
the secondary sector created for GPs:
“What we do is actually pressurise people even further, but we can sell it 
in terms of support. Because the skill is in finding out which things 
are required anyway...‘so we can help with that. So let’s take some of 
the load off you’” (003b.3: 19.07.01)
Both of these Chairmen had recognised the need to strengthen the 
commonality dimension of their relationships with local GPs by 
fostering shared understanding of problems and then working 
together to develop common agendas. Creating fora for providing 
information about the LHG’s plans and inviting comment came to 
be seen as a  more valuable tool for encouraging commonality of 
aims by the end of the study, than  a t the beginning. But all of the 
Chairmen cited lack of time as a  significant constraint on their 
abilities to engage their colleagues in such ways.
On the other hand, many of the more operationally focussed 
Chairmen tended to emphasize the need to influence their peers in
a distinctly more controlling way:
“Somebody has to be around and keep nosing about and giving them 
things to do otherwise they just don’t think you’re there and then you’re 
not actually doing anything” (001.3: 06.09.01)
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This Chairman reiterated the perception that LHGs were viewed 
by his colleagues as a  poor substitute for fundholding, noting the 
better match between doctor’s ways of making decisions in terms 
of speed and autonom y which th a t model conferred:
“Its influence and people don’t feel as though they’ve got any” (001.3) 
For this Chairman to say this, after nearly three years in post and
on the cusp of seeing LHGs transformed into statutory agencies, 
illustrated ju s t how rough a  road had been travelled and how 
difficult the experience had  been, in his eyes. Despite the very 
high hopes he had expressed on taking up the role of Chairman, 
and the strategic vision he had expressed throughout the study, 
he was retiring from the fray, battle scarred and weary, leaving 
general practice altogether, as  well as the Chairman’s role.
Despite the advantages of being a  GP Chairman, trying to 
maintain his practice com m itm ents and to be seen as “one of 
them”, the leadership role had  required maintaining a degree of 
distance and thus isolation, and this may have taken a high toll. 
He was not alone in this, as, by th is point in the study, several of 
the Chairmen expressed similar discouragement. It may be that 
the isolation from peers, implicit in taking on the leadership role 
of the LHG, was a  factor here. On the whole, however, those 
Chairmen who viewed their GP colleagues as one among many, 
rather than as their m ain constituents, did not experience this 
same degree of isolation. Rather they seemed to gather strength 
from building a  broader base across the primary care community.
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Those Chairmen, who were keen to emphasize the need to build 
common agendas, tended also to try to create a range of 
opportunities for communication with their constituents. This 
appears to indicate the value of commonality and multiplexity, in 
addition to directness in this context. Parity, in this context, 
seems to have been considered to have been implicit throughout, 
perhaps by virtue of their roles as practising GPs.
9.4  Building Public Involvem ent and Voluntary Sector Links
The same could not be said, however, for lay and voluntary sector 
representatives. The charge of ‘tokenism’ in relation to 
representation on LHG Boards was particularly evident in relation 
to non prdfessional groups. Each LHG Board included one 
representative of the general public; they also included a 
representative from the voluntary sector, often elected by the 
relevant "umbrella group” organisation for each county area. 
Despite the policy directive, m any LHG Chairmen themselves 
reported some reluctance to be too proactive in involving the 
public for a  num ber of reasons. Trying to establish confidence, 
coherence and corporacy am ongst their 18 Board members was a 
difficult task, w ithout having to conduct meetings in public, as 
they were required to do. The ambiguity of the LHG’s agenda also
acted as a  brake for some:
“Well...weVe been a bit low profile. I mean they [the general public] 
come to our meetings, the Community Health Council, they come on a 
regular basis and we have the public at our meetings, our regular 
monthly meetings, so there’s not a problem with that but we haven’t  
really advertised ourselves too much because we weren’t sure what
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we could achieve. You don’t want to build up expectations at the 
moment until we're sure where we're going and we're clear what the 
benefit is, even if it’s a very minor thing, I don’t think we can attract 
people” (020.1: 09.11.99)
Most Chairmen expressed similar anxieties about both the 
concept and conduct of public involvement throughout the study 
period. These anxieties prompted many Chairmen to adopt a 
. carefully structured  approach to Board meetings:
“We have tried to develop a situation where we have pre-meetings 
where the lay members are briefed on various items so that when 
you go into the [Board] meeting there are not prolonged silences or 
questions asked...so we brief the lay people or perhaps our dental or 
optic colleagues on what is happening" (004.1: 05.11.99).
This stage-managed approach to the LHG’s business was not 
atypical. The majority of Chairmen expressed doubts about the 
wisdom of the policy promoting public involvement in the first 
place. But even those more strategically sophisticated Chairmen 
who welcomed it, expressed concerns about the extent to which 
their Lay Representative could be expected to “represent” the 
community adequately. These Chairmen tended to take a much 
broader view of w hat constituted community interests, and 
therefore, to look a t a  variety of ways to stimulate dialogue. Thus, 
whilst the more operationally oriented Chairman quoted above 
saw little potential for involving the public in the debate about 
primary care development, others saw real opportunities for
building alliances:
“I frhfalr its  [public involvement] a vital aspect, I mean that it’s been 
useful - 1 mean there are a lot of jokes about it, but the Viagra debate 
has been useful in showing that the cash is limited and there is a flood 
of other new products coming along the line which are going to be in the 
same vein, all about -  its not just the next one to hit us will be flu 
medication, but people are going to have to understand what the 
debate is ail about, its  not ju st a matter of one government not
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fu n d in g  som ething, its  an issue way beyond that. We cannot afford 
th e  health service that we’re used to, and people are going to have to 
m ak e decisions about what is funded and what isn’t” (018.1: 05.11.99)
This co m m en t also echoed the concerns expressed by GPs in the 
run up  t o  the establishm ent of LHGs: that they would simply push 
the fo cu s  of decision-making, and therefore the blame, outwards 
from th e  central government to the new local agencies on the 
periphery. Here then both history and culture presented 
significant barriers to effective lay involvement, at least on an 
individual basis. Chairmen who looked at the issue more 
strategically, focussed less on their individual representatives, and 
more o n  community groups.
9.4.1 Commonality The m ost strategically oriented Chairmen 
brought th e  local community into the LHG’s decision-making 
s tru c tu re s  in a num ber of ways, from involvement in the debate to 
creating channels through which they could contribute to setting 
the LHG agenda. One LHG developed a multi-tiered approach to 
facilitating professional and public involvement, devising 
questionnaires for primary care professionals and for the general 
public, t h e  latter under the auspices of the CHC, which they
termed “ setting the agenda”:
“ E v e r y b o d y  has had the opportunity to say in the questionnaire what 
th ey  think of priority areas...so as regards identification of the issues 
[everyone] has been involved right across the spectrum” (022.1:
28.10.99].
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Others used public meetings to stimulate broad-based
engagement:
“We’re about to  start a more intensive community 
consultation...and that will be aimed at a fairly saturated consultation 
process to get people to -  to talk about how they see their health -  and 
with community links of various kinds to get them to think about the 
health care agenda....
I just think th at you’ve got to  be realistic that this is the start of a 
continuing dialogue...and that it needs to build up, people gradually 
need to  think in  term s o f communicating with you about these 
things...”(006.2: 17.07.00)
Similarly, another strategically aware Chairman changed the 
LHG’s sub group infrastructure to encourage the public’s 
involvement in the LHG’s work across the board:
“The public participation group which was set up, and with all kinds of 
airs and graces, and then the penny dropped that every sub group, 
everything that the LHG did should have public participation. So
having a group seemed to isolate -  so it reflected on that and then 
decided to disband itself, and it came to the conclusion that it should 
disband and brought it back to the Board and said: ‘Although you said 
this is what we should be doing, we don’t think we should be doing it. 
We think it would be best if  everybody took it on as a 
responsibility’ ” (009.3: 31.08.01)
Implementation of th is policy was strengthened by setting up 
support systems within the LHG decision-making structure to 
encourage each Board member to take personal responsibility for 
involving the public in any initiative (009.3). Approaches like this 
one appeared to be more effective than  those which relied on 
health authority policy steers, which tended to be hastily pulled 
together to meet required deadlines, rather than  carefully thought 
out or comprehensive docum ents.
299
Such approaches to strategies for involving the public may have 
reflected mixed policy intentions. The dual messages emanating 
mirrored the NHS’s long held resistance to involving the public in 
what were, historically, thought to be the business of 
professionals.
CHCs still existed in Wales during the period of this study. These 
groups had the potential to bring another dimension to 
Chairmen's efforts to involve the public (eg 005; 022), although it 
is fair to say th a t CHCs had their own challenges to meet in 
establishing relationships and raising awareness of their roles 
among the wider community locally. In some cases, Chairmen 
tried to forge formal links with their CHCs, to their mutual benefit. 
One LHG shared premises with the CHC (012), and produced a 
joint Newsletter for the public; others had regular “slots” in their 
CHCs newsletters. O thers co-opted a  CHC member onto the LHG, 
affording speaking, if not voting rights, bu t also enabling more 
direct communication between the two groups. In one area, where 
the CHC had been particularly vocal about local health issues, the 
Chairman was reluctant to strengthen links, again illustrating the 
effect of history on relationship-building. But CHC links might 
have helped to offset the potentially negative effects of isolation of 
lay members on LHG Boards.
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9.4.2 Directness
As noted above, lay representatives, as individuals, struggled with 
a difficult brief: “Well it’s very difficult, isn’t it? How do you 
represent the public as an  individual? ” (018.1: 11.08.99). Other 
Chairmen were less sym pathetic to this problem: “The public 
„ knows nothing” (004.1: 05.11.99). This dismissive view may have 
reflected the tradition within the NHS generally to debate issues in 
technical term s (Harrison et al 1992) bu t it serves to highlight the 
cultural barriers prevailing and  th u s the size of the challenge 
which 'public involvement’ presented to these predominantly 
medical Chairmen.
Despite their direct presence on the Board, many lay sector 
members were subject to com plaints about their lack of any real 
representative-ness, due to the lack of a  clearly defined 
constituency; this charge often underm ined their legitimacy and 
thus the credibility of their contributions. The voluntary sector 
representatives, on the other hand, may have been able to be 
more effective because the obverse was true for them. Moreover, 
once LHGs took over responsibility for allocation of the health 
authority budgets for voluntary services, there was a  ready-made 
commonality of agendas. The more strategically focussed 
Chairmen capitalised on th is m echanism  from the start:
“We’re trying to get local groups to sign up to our Compact, you know, 
the agreement with local voluntary service groups in this locality? We 
did this, and launched it last week; Alun Michael came to launch it and 
we have contacts through that, and we’re using the network which is
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there. Because I th ink that people in the community, they’re 
comfortable w ith the way they can communicate their feelings
whereas a big consultation exercise, very often, in our experience, it 
doesn’t work because you have two men and a dog turning up, and they 
may not be representative...” (007.1: 23.12.99)
These channels were perceived by this Chairman as being a 
vehicle for collecting information about community needs, which 
would then be fed into the Health Improvement Programme in an 
iterative process (007.1).
These “compacts” were also used as springboards for broader local 
activity, sometimes to stim ulate debate, as well as to build local 
ownership of the agenda. The ensuing dialogue was strengthened 
through the num ber of channels used: The CHC had been offered 
Observer s ta tus on the LHG Board and patients' organisations' 
representatives also regularly attended Board meetings in this 
area. This approach was a good example of the value of 
multiplexity in enhancing relationship development. In this case, 
the strength of the local authority 's interest and commitment was 
seen as an  additional spur to voluntary sector communication 
about health needs in th is area. Access to the voluntary sector 
budget was however not universally available across Wales:
“We were hoping to take over more of the voluntary sector budget...last 
year it was nominal because by the time we got the information it was 
too late, because, you know, to do anything. And this year it’s still not 
clear how much of the decision making will come down to the Group...” 
(020.2: 14.08.00)
Here the language is revealing about the levers of power and the 
LHG's position in relation to them acting as a brake on
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development. Where budgets were devolved, their value may have 
lain in their ability to act as a spur to gathering increased 
resources over time. For example, another strategically oriented 
Chairman, faced with real difficulties in terms of local authority 
representation built links through a  longer term strategy, creating 
geographically based channels initially and then providing support 
for working up  bids for additional financial support to different 
community based groups:
"And the intention  has been to develop locality groups which cover 
a whole area...a m eans by which people in a particular area of the 
city can feel th ey  can have a route through the decision making 
process...I think it’s the only way that we can tackle the quality 
problems...[and] address issues within the locality, we just can’t tolerate 
such variations in health outcomes and so on and we had to tackle 
these issues...and we felt that it ought to be a natural development that 
should be allowed to go on in these various areas which would allow the 
process of encouraging people to participate and feel they can make a 
contribution” (010.2: 06.04.00)
By the end of the study th is Chairm an was able to report:
"We have a huge range of community developments in X, we have an 
absolutely huge range, and it’s so many that I couldn’t even begin to list 
them all for you” (010.3: 24.07.01)
This approach had not only proved successful in encouraging 
community support and involvement for the LHG, but had put the 
LHG at the service of the local community. It had also had the 
effect of opening up  access to a  range of funding for different 
initiatives, thereby increasing the flow of money into the 
community and enabling the LHG to, effectively, increase the 
resources available to stim ulate service development and quality 
across the service provider community. (010.3)
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This synergy between the local authority, the voluntary sector and 
the LHG sprang directly from the community development 
approach adopted by this strategically oriented Chairman. Here, 
although directness was compromised through lack of statutory 
representation, the direct responsibility for the budget allocations 
helped to stim ulate commonality of agendas in a meaningful way. 
Multiplexity was encouraged by such an  approach too. Parity may 
not have been achieved, bu t this may not have been possible 
within the short timescale of the study. In addition, the lack of 
any previous formal relationships between these groups may have 
weakened the potentially adverse effect of shared history.
9.5 Politicians
LHG Chairmen's efforts to introduce their new organisation into 
the local community did not always recognise the potential value 
which politicians could add to the process. Where Chairmen did 
try to use this avenue, however, they met very mixed responses.
One Chairman, working in a  geographically cohesive area, was 
delighted by the extent to which local politicians responded to the 
LHG’s presence. This Chairm an used the media effectively to 
highlight key health problems facing the community:
“Well, basically, because of the headlines that we’ve got on the coronary 
heart disease initiative and the fact that we were given a half hour slot 
in the Council chamber and it went on for an hour, you see!* (022.2:
10.08.00)
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This link had been created firstly by the LHG’s invitation to the 
Chairman of the Council to officially open the LHG. This astute 
move generated publicity locally and stimulated local authority 
engagement:
“You know and no doubt we, well there’s no doubt, I’m sure we’ll be 
invited to go there again to talk on health issues as well, so I’m sure that 
there’ll be, you know, there’ll be a forum for us there, really.” (022.2)
This localised approach was often more effective than trying to 
interest politicians with a  national remit. One Chairman (014.2: 
24.05.00) reported his disappointm ent with how little interest in or 
knowledge of LHGs his own MP, a  member of the dominant party 
at the time, evinced. Despite the strong centralist tendency of the 
government, interest in the new local groups was not high 
amongst national representatives, according to Chairmen’s 
reports, as noted earlier, in chapter 5.
In contrast to this, the local political dimension was deemed both 
essential and effective by one Chairm an, reflecting on lessons 
learned during his three years in office:
“I think the things which I th ink are very important and is 
something which I am doing now is to  foster relationships with the 
local authority and the local politicians. Because I think that the 
way ahead really is for politicians to be aware of what’s happening in 
health locally. And that’s something you would need to do. Because 
that way they can vent feelings with their networks and they will 
know exactly what problems are being laced...”(022.3: 12.06.01)
This Chairm an’s views reflected the reality of the political 
responsibility and control on health  service decision making, but 
not all Chairmen attem pted th is approach, many feeling shy of 
promoting themselves in the face of lack of clarity about the LHG
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agenda. The lack of a  clear steer from the Welsh Assembly 
Government was bem oaned by many Chairmen, throughout their 
period in office, as one of the m ost crippling factors they faced.
This may well have added to their reluctance to make more 
overtures to their politician colleagues. But, whereas commonality 
of agendas might have been predicted to be a  useful lever in 
relationships with national politicians, the experiences reported by 
Chairmen in this study indicated th a t this was more the case at 
local and national (AM) level, than  a t the UK level, via MPs.
9.6  Press
Chairmen approached the media with even more circumspection. 
Again many expressed reluctance to try to broadcast messages or 
“raise public expectations” until they were clearer about their own 
agencies' roles, functions and potential contributions. Only a 
small minority even tried to be proactive in this regard:
“Well I think it’s  important -  we’re going to have to involve the public 
and that is not an easy thing to do, so the first thing we have tried to do 
is to create an association with the local press. I think certainly with 
two of the local papers we’ve got an agreement to have a regular slot 
in the paper so that we can link that into the Board meetings so we 
can follow on from the Board m eetings with a monthly slot in the 
local papers.” (018.1: 11.08.99)
This LHG Chairman was also among the first to create an LHG 
Newsletter to com municate with constituents. In this case, the 
media was seen as a  bridge to another, wider group, and thus was 
perceived as useful. Most Chairmen, however, viewed this 
channel as bringing more costs than  benefits. Nearly all 
Chairmen remarked on the need for caution with this
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unpredictable potential partner whose need to sell papers through 
stimulating controversy would inevitably conflict with their need 
to explain complex issues. The commonality of agendas here was 
reported as low, alongside w hat many Chairmen deemed to be a 
much larger parity imbalance too.
9.7  Summary In th is chapter and the two preceding it, it has 
been dem onstrated th a t relationship-building was an important, 
but difficult, area for m ost LHG Chairmen. Schulter’s and Lee’s 
typology indicated th a t effective relationships needed to be built 
along several dimensions more or less simultaneously. These 
dimensions included commonality of aims, tru st and risk sharing 
(parity) fostered by direct com munication links, preferably on a 
number of different levels (multiplexity). It would appear from the 
data gathered in this study th a t the structures and tools put in 
place via the establishm ent of health  alliances and pooled budgets 
were often counter-balanced by other structural constraints 
placed on the evolving health and  local authority systems. These 
often made it difficult to jointly exploit opportunities effectively. In 
addition, previous local history has been shown to have had a 
strong impact on the formation of relationships locally, making 
the development of tru s t a  slower and more arduous process. If 
clarity of objectives and shared purpose is an  essential element in 
the process of building tru s t between partner organisations, then 
the lack of this clarity may have been one of the most important 
constraints on LHGs’ development:
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“But you haven’t really got an Assembly strategy for the Local Health 
Groups, you*ve got expressions o f goodwill and words, but no actual 
policy documentation that really sets it on any course in the context 
of this general structural management of the health service” (006.2:
17.07.00)
The single most im portant relationship, in terms of impact on the 
development of LHGs, was th a t forged between the Secretary of 
State for Health and Social Care and the LHG Chairmen as a 
group. In a  structure in which no statutory links or direct 
channels existed between the Assembly and the new local health 
care organisations, and  so little clarity about LHG purpose from 
the WAG, this direct link enabled the Chairmen to get reassurance 
that their vision was shared by the Minister and that their efforts 
were supported. This assurance was much needed in the face of 
so many violations of Schulter’s and  Lee's pre-conditions for 
effective relationship building. Those Chairmen who did perceive 
that their efforts to build relationships had been effective tended 
to be those who had adopted a  broad and inclusive definition of 
the LHG’s constituents, and who worked to develop a holistic 
definition of community health  needs. In addition, they worked 
systematically and deliberately to create communication channels 
between the LHG and community groups, to foster on going 
dialogue. The next chapter examines the specific levers that 
Chairmen used to create unique identities for their LHGs, which 
enabled them to develop as organizations themselves receptive to 
change and growth.
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Chapter 10 Building Organizational Identity and Capability
10.1 Introduction
This chapter looks back over time to analyse the ways in which 
Chairmen, as leaders of their new organisations, selected specific 
features of their LHGs to create distinctive organisational identities 
and then built upon these features to create new organisational 
capabilities (Miller et al 2002). This analysis examines both the 
features selected as distinctive to their organizations, and the 
processes that identified Chairmen applied to exploit them. This 
leveraging process has been referred to, in the literature, as 
“managing from the inside out” (Miller et al 2002, p.40). This 
chapter illustrates the ways in which Chairmen succeeded in mining 
their organisations’ skills and knowledge bases to build unique 
products that not only worked to increase their organisations’ 
capacity, but also helped them to differentiate themselves from other 
potential competitor organisations. This leveraging process also 
ultimately enabled these Chairmen to lift their LHGs out of the 
political treacle which embroiled and swamped many of their more 
operationally focussed counterparts across Wales.
The Chairmen identified as exemplars in this chapter are those five 
who emerged through the course of the study as describing a more
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strategic orientation to their roles a s  Chairmen, as argued in chapter 
6. As was explained in Chapters 4 and 5, all twenty two LHGs had 
been established to the same specification (Welsh Office 1998a and 
1998b). It would seem, then, th a t there was very little room for 
working differently within these stipulated guidelines. Nonetheless, 
as previous chapters have dem onstrated, more strategically aware 
Chairmen, with the breadth of vision to articulate a unique approach 
to using their LHGs as vehicles for developing their local 
communities, and the leadership skills to build key relationships and 
alliances to persuade others to support their aims, were more able, 
more consistently, to move around the prevailing structural and 
political obstacles to create distinctive organisational forms locally.
We saw in Chapter 6 that 'strategic vision’ -  the ability to articulate 
an attractive picture of a desirable future state of being, and to 
persuade others to engage in the development and implementation of 
that vision, as chapters 7, 8 and 9 demonstrated, was a 
distinguishing feature of some Chairmen’s behaviours, throughout 
the study period. But, in addition, some Chairmen 'played to their 
strengths’ further, by exploiting their unique organisational 
positioning as the one group th a t could legitimately lay claim to 
represent the whole community’s health needs. LHGs were the only 
group that could claim credibility to lead multi-agency partnerships
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to reconfigure health services locally. Trusts had more incentives, 
financially and culturally, to maintain the status quo in service 
delivery terms, since they were paid according to activity. And, 
despite the cbntinuous fog of uncertainty and ambiguity in which 
they were working, many of these identified Chairmen showed the 
ability to maintain a  more consistent focus on their own emerging 
agendas. While virtually all the Chairmen seemed sure of their roles 
in developing and changing primary care locally when LHGs were 
first established, many grew less certain about what this meant and 
how to operationalize it, as time went on. By the autum n of 2001, 
almost all were anxious and uncertain about what their future 
organisations would look like and what the roles of GPs might be 
within them -  if indeed they would have a  role at all. This degree of 
environmental uncertainty destabilised the actions of many of the 
Chairmen. Only a handful displayed, through their own reports, a 
consistent ability to rise above this confusion to concentrate their 
own, and that of their organisations, energy on delivering a unique 
contribution locally.
This ability, to exploit their organisations’ potential effectively, 
differentiated these Chairmen from many of their Chairmen 
colleagues. Looking back over the study period, this chapter 
examines the ways in which these identified Chairmen leveraged
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their organisations’ assets and capabilities, thereby enabling them to 
“locate power and self identity” and then to build on this achievement 
to “win greater freedom of action” (Giddens 1999 in Butler, MJR 
2003. p. S49); ‘Leveraging’ refers to the “mobilization of skills and 
resources” (Miller et al 2002, p .37) and “the mechanisms used by 
leaders to shape and influence policy implementation” (Butler 2003, 
p. S54). Section 10.2 outlines the specific organisational assets and 
opportunities that these Chairmen identified; Section 10.3 examines 
the ways in which these identified Chairmen “leveraged their 
asymmetries” (Miller et al 2002; Butler 2003) by exploiting these 
organizational assets over time. Section 10.4 explores the ways these 
Chairmen capitalised on the opportunities identified, over the time 
frame of the study. Section 10.5 concludes the chapter by arguing 
that this process of mobilisation, or leveraging, enabled these 
Chairmen to develop a capacity for implementation within their LHGs 
that in turn created a degree of receptivity to change which was 
unique to their respective organisations in comparison to the other 
17 LHGs in Wales. This receptivity to change is increasingly 
acknowledged to be a  key characteristic of successful organisations 
in both the public and private sectors (Pettigrew and Dawson 1994).
This analysis of organisational assets and opportunities has been 
undertaken longitudinally, across all three stages of LHG
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establishment and development, between 1999 and 2001. The three 
tranches of interviews can be said to mirror three reasonably distinct 
phases of LHG evolution during the course of the study. The initial 
phase, April to December 1999, could be termed the formation stage. 
In reality most Chairmen reported that the formation of their 
organizations was still being undertaken during the second tranche 
of interviews, because of the instability in the environment locally 
and nationally. But it is also clear that, by that period, March to 
September 2000, they were all heavily engaged with the business of 
trying to create local initiatives and develop their organizations as 
well. In the final interviews, conducted between January and 
October 2001, consultation on further structural change was already 
underway, forcing Chairmen's attentions on to the future, so this 
could be termed the ‘evolving' stage. In some ways these three 
stages: formation, development and evolution, can be viewed as 
similar to Adair’s (1986) typology of the three stages of development 
which groups pass through, in the process of becoming effective 
teams: forming, norming and storming, as they come together as a 
disparate group of individuals to form a team, move on to develop 
standards to which to adhere in working together, and then testing 
those standards to the limit as they move on to settle into effective 
performance modes as teams. These three stages of growth provide a 
convenient way to look at the ways that identified Chairmen appear
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to have, firstly, honed in on specific organizational assets and 
opportunities, within their LHGs, in the initial phase, of LHG 
formation, from April 1999-Summer of 2000, (the Torming’ stage). 
And secondly, the ways in which these Chairmen capitalised on 
these features and exploited these opportunities in the second 
(‘performing’) phase of LHG development, to create distinctive 
organizational identities and capabilities by the third (‘evolving’) 
stage. These three ‘stages’ are artificially constructed, but they do 
appear to fit the data emerging from the interviews throughout the 
study.
10.2 Organizational A ssets and Opportunities
From this longitudinal analysis, seven features stand out as 
differentiating the activity of these five LHGs. Three relate to 
organizational characteristics that were distinctive to each LHG from 
the outset: (1) the existing level of practice development; (2) the 
nature of the infrastructure and resources initially allocated to them; 
and (3) the level of instability in their local environments. Because 
they are specific to each individual LHG these are termed “assets”, or 
‘assymetries’ in Miller’s et al’s (2002) terminology. In addition to 
capitalising on these distinctive existing organizational assets, these 
identified Chairmen also exploited four key opportunities presenting 
to them: (1) the formation and development of their Boards; (2) the
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development of an over arching agenda focused on primary care 
development; (3) putting clinical governance at the centre of the 
LHG’s agenda; and (4) applying a  learning orientation towards their 
roles as Chairmen. These four opportunities were, of course, common 
„ to all twenty two Chairmen. Indeed, the first three are specifically 
noted in the Chair’s Job Description detailed in Chapter 6. The 
distinguishing behaviours here, though, are the ways in which these 
identified Chairmen used  these opportunities, to go on to create 
unique organizational identities locally, and, in so doing, to create 
organizations that were themselves receptive to change. The 
following sections of this chapter explain how this was accomplished 
for each of the assets and opportunities identified.
10.3 Leveraging Assym etries
When LHGs were first established, in April 1999, existing levels of 
practice development locally varied considerably across Wales. 
Against this backdrop, however, positive features noted by identified 
Chairmen included geographical spread, IT uptake, and previous 
experience of commissioning of services.
During the Torming’ stage, in each of the five selected LHGs, the 
existing level of practice development was embraced by the LHG 
Chairman as an asset, rather than  a  liability. In one LHG, where the
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Chairman had personally facilitated the establishment of a local Out 
of Hours (OOH) cooperative in the face of a  relatively lower level of 
practice development and a  higher number of single-handed 
practices, this same relative weakness was articulated as a strength 
(009.1). Similarly, another strategically-aware Chairman, covering a 
rural area over which a  large number of practices were dispersed, 
making physical contact with them time-consuming and difficult, 
nonetheless noted this as a  strength:
“And the other thing as well in Xshire is that most of the practices are at 
the same sort of structural and organisational level.” (005.1: 26.10.99)
Thus the willingness of these Chairmen to accept the existing level of
practice organisation and development and build on it, rather than to
term it an obstacle, was noteworthy in this study. In contrast, many
other LHG Chairmen reported similar levels of practice development
as problematic (e.g. 011.1; 004.1),
Similarly, identified Chairmen referred to the geography of their 
“patches” as an asset, particularly in relation to its impact on the 
spatial distribution of practices across the areas for which they were 
responsible for service provision.
“Well I think X...it’s easier, and being relatively small, I think that’s 
one big thing” (022.2: 10.08.00)
This Chairmen could rightly have complained about his relative 
isolation, but, instead, he noted that the small size of the area was
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helpful in enabling him, physically, to get around to each practice, 
and .thus to develop dialogue through personal contacts. In larger 
areas, this responsibility was sometimes delegated to the Clinical 
Governance Load, bringing with it a  more distant relationship to the 
Chairman.
The extent to which general practices were connected to Information 
Technology services, and were using this to generate data relevant to 
performance management, was also perceived as a  real asset (e.g. 
006.1), by these Chairmen, because it enabled an effective 
monitoring process to be conducted, giving feedback to practices on 
relative performance. This was especially useful for areas of concern, 
such as prescribing rates. Accessing up to date prescribing data 
across Wales was reported to be problematic throughout the first two 
years of the study, so being able to access and use locally generated 
data was a real bonus.
Finally, previous experience of commissioning local services was 
another aspect of the existing level of practice development tha t these 
identified Chairmen tended to view positively. They reported both 
their own, and their GP constituents’ previous experience, whether of 
fundholding or of locality commissioning, as assets, providing a good 
springboard for future development activity. Other Chairmen,
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however, tended to emphasise the negative aspects of such 
experience. For example, more operationally oriented Chairmen, 
especially former fundholders, emphasized the consequent loss of 
services, and of organisational and information management skills in 
, the wake of fundholding’s abolition:
“One of our problems is that because half of the practices in Xshire were 
fundholding, we have had the deterioration in our own practice 
administration in that we have had the redundancies and sackings in the 
various organisations so staff are demoralised, patients are not getting the 
service they used to get and so they wonder why; there is a bit more chaos 
in the waiting rooms -  so there has been a deterioration in service” (004.1:
5.11.99)
Previous involvement in either form of commissioning, on the other 
hand, was perceived by these identified Chairmen as indicative of 
interest in and commitment to a broader quality improvement 
agenda, too:
“...we had locality commissioning groups for one...and we had the TPPs. So 
in a sense we are slightly head of the game in terms of the mutual trust 
between practices (005.1: 26.10.99)
From the outset, then, these features were referred to by Chairmen 
as indicative of local GPs’ willingness to engage in the effort to 
change their way of practising and providing services to patients.
As they moved into the ‘performing’ stage, the second stage of LHG 
activity, the existing level of practice development was leveraged by 
those Chairmen who used any putative locality groups to construct 
two way communication channels with the LHG. These channels
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then fed issues and views on needs directly to the LHG in bottom-up 
fashion. By definition, they enabled a wider constituency to be 
included in this process. In one LHG, by the end of the study, in the 
‘evolving’ stage, this approach had become an integral part of the 
community development strategy:
“..weVe actually put into being a structure right across Xshire with four 
locality steering groups, which reflect the...all the stakeholders, 
representatives of primary care, and varying members from primary care 
there’s not a preponderance of one member...Their essential remit is to 
assist this dialogue between the community and the LHG” (010.3:
24.07.01)
This outcome, of course, was not accidental; it had proved to be an
i
arduous and uncertain process to establish such extensive and 
comprehensive communication channels:
“It created far more difficulties achieving that than I originally thought...but 
we are achieving it! (010.3).
Despite the time and effort involved, this Chairman had shaped this 
existing channel into a useful tool for collecting a  wider range of 
information on health needs from an increasingly broad spectrum of 
the community:
“Increasingly the agenda is coming together in terms of primary care 
development, clinical governance, local health action plans...[then] we had 
a formal launch...and we didn’t let them go away until they’d begun to 
prioritise some early issues...” (010.3)
This excerpt shows that, by the third stage of LHG development, the 
‘evolving’ stage, a local agenda was being articulated. This is a good 
example of the way in which an existing organizational asset, which 
though perceived as problematic by some Chairmen, was identified,
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and shaped positively, and then leveraged to enable a unique 
organisational capability to be developed.
These identified Chairmen took similarly positive and proactive 
. approaches to deloping their infrastructures. In the Torming’ stage, 
as chapter 6 indicated, GP Chairmen’s day jobs as independent 
contractors gave them independence and autonomy, both in terms of 
how they worked and their personal priorities. This brought an 
element of history which complicated their relationships with health 
authorities. This background was initially problematic in Torming’ 
constructive working relationships with their General Managers. 
However, those Chairmen who were able to develop this key 
relationship over time were able to work more constructively to 
strengthen the LHGs’ sense of identity and purpose. LHG Chairmen 
who were content to accept the constraints imposed by their 
positions as sub-committees tended to accept premises and 
secretariat staff proposed by the health authorities. This often meant 
sharing premises within the health authorities’ own headquarters. 
Since the general managers were employees of the health authority 
and directly accountable to the Chief Executive, loyalties as well as 
responsibilities were blurred, as earlier chapters outlined. General 
Managers were under strong pressure to give their first loyalties to 
the health authorities. At the same time, General Practitioners, as a
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group, were traditionally neither well understood nor regarded by the
secondary sector management community. Yet each of these
strategic Chairmen managed to wean their GMs away from these
hierarchical and cultural pressures to conform to health authority
interpretations, to work with them to create their own local
organizational identities. Chairmen initially approached this key
relationship with some misgivings, expressing concerns about both
the recruitment process and skills levels of the newly appointed
General Managers:
“Unfortunately there wasn’t enough money given in the salary structure to 
get in people to General Manager jobs. Where they could stand up to 
executive directors at the health authority” (005.1: 26.10.99)
Strategically oriented LHG Chairmen were keen to build a  unique 
vision for their LHGs; the divided loyalties of general managers 
imposed considerable constraints on their ability to support this. 
During the ‘forming’ stages of LHG activity, Chairmen, as we have 
seen earlier, adopted pragmatic and operational roles in order to get 
their LHGs functioning1. By the end of this period, however, many 
were beginning to question the wisdom of this approach, on grounds 
of both time commitment and expertise. Once they had successfully 
recruited General Managers, several Chairmen recognized the need 
to step back from the operational role. Those who reportedly
1 The researcher’s field notes record the difficulties that most Chairmen had to operate within in terms 
of lack of LHG premises (many worked from their practice libraries, for example); lack of secretarial 
support (difficulty with locating papers was an inevitable consequence); and relative isolation.
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accomplished this did so by a  combination of reflection and 
negotiation.
In the fcerfofming’ stage, these strategic Chairmen, despite their 
roots in -  and expressed preferences for -  rolling up their sleeves and 
getting their hands dirty -  learned to step back from the day-to-day 
responsibility for running the office and implementing their agenda, 
and to concentrate on their own sphere of responsibility. They 
appeared to learn the need for, and the ability to, delegate effectively, 
and their General Managers responded by rising to the challenges 
given them. This enabled a more effective working relationship to 
develop, in which each partner was able to play to his and her own 
strengths:
“And then, I believe, you’ve got to delegate down from that, that the office 
should be run by the General Manager, and that the General Manager 
should make the [secretariat] appointments. All th is the Chairman needs 
to know about, but you have to  ask that the responsibility be taken by 
the General Manager, and her im m ediate team; you have to allow the 
process to go on" (007.1: 23.12.99)
“So, it comes down to...it’s very interesting what happens is that XX and 
I have to take a joint approach. She does the sort of trying to get 
around with, trying vejy hard to  persuade everybody, and then she 
com es back to me and says, ‘he won't le t us spend this GMS money 
because he thinks that we ought to....’...[and then] it is my job to try and 
persuade [them] that th is is  the right way to go forward. But, I mean, 
that, to me, is something that I’m easily trained for. I enjoy the sort of 
battles with the health authority..." (005.1: 26.10.99).
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In 2001, this latter Chairman looked back on the relationship and its 
evolution during the period of study, to describe how this change had 
taken place:
“I think the first of it is to realize that you have been criticized many times 
in the past of being far too much of an executive chairman, and that’s true 
to a certain extent. I think, as the years have gone on, I’ve got much less at 
that. But at the start, when you’re setting up som ething new, you 
want to be, you know, you want to be in there doing it all the tim e.
And actually it’s a m atter o f learning trust between yourself and your 
general manager, really, and allowing [her] to get on with it. And that’s 
a relationship that’s grown very well* (005.3: 30.08.01).
This Chairman identified the absence of a Chief Executive at health 
authority level as one of the features that had both aided the 
development of a joint approach between him and his GM, but also 
which had left his GM isolated and under-supported (005.3). The 
absence of the Chief Executive, however, also created space, which 
enabled this approach and relationship to develop beyond the 
constraints imposed by the existing structures, thus allowing a more 
effective working relationship to develop between Chair and GM.
In the final phase of the study, the ‘evolving’ phase, the general 
managers, as a group, had grown in sufficient confidence to decide to 
‘throw in their lot’ with that of the LHG. This was, no doubt, further 
helped by the decision to remove the health authority tier, 
announced at the beginning of 2001. But it was the all Wales GMs 
Group that led the work on developing a “Futures” paper for the 
Assembly, detailing options for organizational structures for the
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future. During this process, the Trusts emerged, re-energized, to put 
in cpunter proposals which would have seen LHGs become integrated 
into Trusts. Despite this, LHG GMs and their Chairmen worked 
effectively together to develop a more primary care oriented vision for 
- die future, which, eventually, was implemented by the Assembly. It 
is perhaps a  measure of these identified Chairmen’s skills that they 
had managed to win such loyalty from their GMs, in the midst of a 
process dominated by health authority and Trust managers, and 
against the history of their respective backgrounds and experience.
Finally, identified Chairmen also stood out for the approaches they 
took to managing uncertainty. As Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated, 
the health system in Wales was in considerable flux when LHGs were 
established, creating a unique set of opportunities and challenges for 
newly appointed LHG Chairmen. A number of senior posts changed 
hands during this period, creating numerous vacuums in authority. 
Those Chairmen with the ability to exploit this situation, to create 
freedom of action, tended to thrive in this environment. Others 
reported to find the lack of concrete direction a further hindrance to 
development activity. These vacuums were used as opportunities by 
all of the strategically-oriented Chairmen, bu t in different ways, 
depending on their local situations and contexts.
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Strategically-aware Chairmen were frustrated by the strictures 
imposed by their Health Authority parent bodies but were rarely 
really constrained by them. These Chairmen implicitly recognised 
- that real power resided in the Trusts and in the Assembly. 
Consequently they tended to tailor their influencing strategies 
towards these key agencies, even during the initial Torming’ stage:
“The LHG arranged a m eeting with Jane Hutt...and we had the Chair of 
Social Services there, the X Trust Chair, ourselves and the [health 
authority] chairman, and sort of presented our aims and objectives and 
our future direction. And basically got her to  sign off that really th is 
was the sort of thing she wanted to see ...” (005.1: 26.10.99).
By the middle phase of LHG development, the <performing, stage, 
some Chairmen had decided that the most effective strategy was to 
bypass the health authorities as m uch as possible, and work to align 
their stated aims to those of the Assembly, and in particular, the 
policies of the Health and Social Services Minister. This was not 
always a comfortable path however:
“I think there is total frustration [among the LHG Chairs] that there is no 
direction from the centre. Jane Hutt keeps coming out and saying Local 
Health Groups are the way forward and everything else, but I don’t know 
what she tells the health authority...it’s very difficult being in the 
position where you are getting the bricks thrown when you don’t  really 
know which...where you’re going” (005.2: 12.06.00)
A smaller sub set of these Chairmen also carefully aligned their 
LHGs’ agendas with that of the Assembly itself. Doing so proved to 
be a constant challenge, however, as the Assembly’s lack of clarity 
and direction was continually bemoaned by most of the Chairmen
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throughout the study. But by making concerted efforts to align their 
LHG’s policies with those of the Minister, and by continually 
checking that alignment, these five Chairmen gained confidence in 
their ability to progress their aims, despite the obfuscation of formal 
political pronouncements:
“Because I think for all of us in X Shire, I think the last six months have in 
a sense been quite frustrating in a way not knowing whether our vision and 
direction was what everybody was signed up to” (005.2: 12.06.00)
whereas securing Jane H utt’s approval of their vision and direction 
had a real liberating effect: “and, I think, Jane Hutt’s meeting sort of 
ju st managed to do that. So, we felt quite released; after that I was 
able to say Well, great, you know, we’ve got sign up from the Centre’”
(005.2).
Here the combination of a  vacuum at the top of the health authority, 
requiring the authority Chairman to play something of an executive 
role, together with the LHG Chairm an’s strong commitment to 
integrated partnership working, which the LHG had adopted as their 
main aim, enabled a direct link between the LHG and the Minister to 
be created and subsequently exploited, to the LHG’s benefit. It is 
unlikely that this link would have been established without the 
Minister’s prior commitment to quarterly meetings with the all Wales 
LHG Chairs’ Group, bu t it proved to have been a useful and effective 
tool for this otherwise rather isolated LHG. Given the local Trust
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Chairman’s close personal links with the Minister (005.3: 30.08.01), 
the LHG had to persist strongly and sensitively, during both the 
‘performing’ and ‘evolving’ stages, in putting its case for farther 
growth and development forward. Here again, LHG Chairmen were 
hampered by a  lack of any training or development -  and certainly of 
encouragement by their health authorities -  to go down this route. 
And since the Assembly was such a  new organization, there was no 
map or history of effective lobbying to use as a  template. The three 
Chairmen who did use this approach, 007, 010 and 013, of 
identifying local needs and building community wide coalitions to 
address them, and carefully tailoring the expression of those local 
agendas to Assembly policy initiatives, also appeared to have engaged 
the Assembly’s interest and support by the end of the study
These three assets: the existing level of practice development, the 
infrastructure within the new LHG, and the nature of the vacuum in 
authority prevailing locally, can all be termed as organizational 
“asymmetries”: features that were distinctive to the LHG in question, 
and that LHG Chairmen identified as such and then leveraged, or 
exploited, to build a  distinctive organizational identity locally. The 
following sections take this argum ent a  stage further, by examining 
the ways in which these same Chairmen exploited specific 
opportunities presenting themselves.
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10.4 Exploiting Key Opportunities
The four opportunities listed in section 10.2 were, of course, common 
to all LHGs, as pointed out earlier. But these identified Chairmen 
used them in ways tha t enabled them to optimize their effects, and 
thus contributed to the development of unique local identity and 
purpose.
The first of these opportunities was noted by most Chairmen as a 
real challenge: the formation of a  cohesive Board. Chairing a Board 
is generally regarded as a  demanding leadership task (NLIAH 2006), 
usually allocated to individuals, a t later stages of their careers, able 
to draw on credibility and authority gleaned from previous experience 
and seniority, usually also a t Board level, from a variety of 
organisations. The ability to take a  strategic view is a particular 
asset for the role. LHG Chairmen lacked that sort of experience, but 
were expected to create a  cohesive group from a singularly disparate 
collection of individuals, including other professionals who were more 
experienced in working independently than collaboratively. Virtually 
no training was provided for th is role, other than the Job Description 
noted in Chapter 4. Consequently, most expressed concerns about
this aspect of the role:
“I felt the groups were too large and I wasn’t clear what the roles of the 
other independent contractors are, why they had to be full members, so I 
was sceptical from the start [laughter] and I’m even more sceptical now! I’m 
still not sure that there is a clear role for each of the members. It is a
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rather disparate group actually. I said it’s a large group, eighteen
members plus hangers-on, it’s not a good number for group work”
(020.1: 07.12.99)
The excerpt above highlights two aspects of this challenge: the size 
and diversity of the Board membership. Any group of eighteen people 
presents challenges to the individuals responsible for facilitating or 
leading them. LHG Boards were larger than most corporate Boards, 
consisting of between 10-15 people. Belbin (1981) argues that nine 
is the optimal number of people who can work effectively as a team.
The size of the Board's membership was compounded by the variety 
of backgrounds, knowledge and experience of health services 
possessed by the individual members of each Board. Although 
Boards had been constructed to represent the major stakeholder 
groups relevant to primary care service delivery, GPs had been given 
multiple voices, thus their views of the purpose and function of the 
LHG Board was likely to predominate. Medical expertise and 
experience was potentially more heavily weighted, and more highly 
valued, than that of other Board members, each with fewer votes. 
This disparity in experience was particularly pronounced in relation 
to lay members, and voluntary sector representatives, whose 
perspectives were not always equally valued by their Chairmen ( e.g. 
002; 004), as was demonstrated in Chapter 9.
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But identified Chairmen stood out among the rest of their colleagues
for the inclusivity of their approach to these problems, even during
the initial forming’ stage of LHG development. Each of these
strategically oriented Chairmen was noteworthy for the intrinsic
value they accorded to the views of all of their members, irrespective
of background. Indeed, they positively embraced the diversity
presented to them as being a  source of legitimacy to speak on behalf
of their local communities:
“Anyway I think in the bigger picture of the LHG the other thing that 
was interesting was having to  s it round the table with other players - 1
thought that was quite funny particularly our group -  amazing people, 
such a diversity of personality types and I've warmed to it, it has been 
a bit frustrating the velocity of it, but perhaps that’s wise that it hasn’t been 
very fast; we have made good relationships which didn't exist before"
(009.1:20.08.99)
This Chairman capitalised on members’ individual commitment to 
improving services for their communities, to foster the notion of the 
LHG as a community-wide resource:
“One of the tricks we’ve been able to  move towards is being seen as 
part o f the localities, not as some kind of Big Brother” (009.2: 20.06.00).
Several Chairmen took this inclusivity a step further by using the 
CHC as a  channel for eliciting the views of the local community, 
distributing baseline questionnaires for the HIP via supermarkets, or 
holding focus groups to discuss specific issues. These Chairmen 
embraced, from the beginning, the multiple perspectives brought by 
their Board members and leveraged them to legitimate the LHG’s 
position as the voice of the local community’s perspective on health
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care. Less strategically aware Chairmen viewed this multiplicity of 
representation as a  negative feature, and yet another hurdle to be 
overcome, rather than  as an opportunity.
GP Chairmen also lacked experience of inculcating corporate 
accountability. But, as noted in the Job Description, each Chairman 
was expected to develop a degree of corporacy amongst his LHG 
Board members. As Chapter 9 indicated, many Board members’ 
views of what this m eant varied tremendously (e.g. 019). Though all 
Chairmen struggled to generate a  sense of corporate responsibility, 
more strategic Chairmen tended to do so by encouraging individual 
member’s responsibilities from the start:
"So all these sub groups [were set up] and I made it  quite clear I 
expected each and every Board member to be an active participant in 
one or more of th ese groups, so every single person, and actually, 
some are in two or three, but everybody is involved in the sub groups so 
they are actively working to  som e sort of direction which reflects the 
core work of the LHG** (010.1:16.08.99)
Clarifying individual roles and responsibilities appeared to foster 
members’ commitment, from the outset. Board formation was further 
facilitated, by the more strategically aware Chairmen, by paying 
careful attention to the selection and appointment of sub group 
leads:
“We thought that there were people with skills who could lead those sub 
groups, perhaps to finish jobs going on and help keep up the pressure... . 
So, we’re happy that we have quality people to lead these groups from 
within the Group. I think it  gives them  identity, it gives them the 
responsibility and m akes them  feel more part of the Local Health 
Group** (007.1: 23.12.99)
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Rather than  relying on volunteers, this Chairman systematically 
matched skills of his members with the needs and remits of the 
different sub groups. This was seen as an important part of the 
Board development strategy by these Chairmen, and this impression 
solidified, as one reflected, looking back over the three-year period:
"We thought very carefully about the people who would be involved in
the subsets [working groups of the LHG], and we thought that perhaps 
those were the people who would be best suited to become involved in 
those areas. We haven’t been far out, I don’t think” (007.3: 25.07.01)
This in tu rn  helped to engender a  feeling of shared responsibility and
corporacy. And of course, as noted earlier, those Chairmen who used
the shadow stage to facilitate members’ articulation of a shared
agenda fostered this sense of cohesion further.
Once formed into a more or less cohesive and corporately focused 
group, Board members needed further development in order to 
perform their roles effectively. But this was another area for which 
Chairmen received little formal preparation, training or resources. 
Chairmen referred to the skills needed to ensure equitable 
contributions from members, as well as the need to ensure that 
meetings were focused. But that limited definition gave no inkling of 
the sort of skills that would be required in the LHG Chairman’s role. 
As might have been expected, the more operationally oriented 
Chairmen approached this task  very pragmatically, many simply
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‘circling the wagons’ by focusing on the GP community 
representatives and expressing the agenda in primary medical service 
delivery terms. But during the second stage of LHG activity, the 
‘performing’ stage, more strategic Chairmen capitalized on the 
diversity of membership to create broader agendas:
“At the local basis I think we've managed to identify areas where there 
is, there are possibilities to  m ove and I think we have, I think what we 
have managed to do between us is to identify those avenues where 
movement can happen...I think there's a new feeling about working 
together, for sure. Some o f the professional barriers are beginning to 
weaken. There is greater acceptance of the need for change. I think 
there's greater awareness o f the role that others can take part. I think  
people now understand that the interface areas, there's more to be 
gained than to be lost". (009.2: 20.06.00)
This Chairman’s reflection on the success in building a cohesive local 
agenda, only 14 months into the process, illustrated his growing 
confidence in the approach he had taken. He went on to show how 
he intended to broaden the local coalition of interests further, to 
embrace secondary care clinicians:
“And we are leading on the formation of a new X Intermediate Care facility 
and also on the development of Y [area] in Community Care facilities. So 
we'll use them as vehicles to , if  you like, pen everybody into the same 
ring! I have to say that Social Services in particular have been very 
encouraging...So the groups of people we’re now working with, I don’t think 
you call them, I think they are communities rather than voluntary bodies. 
And I *t»i«k we're beginning to  open the debate as well with 
com m unity, problems specific to  particular communities” (009.2).
This approach to building a  jointly articulated vision from among the 
Board was common to strategically oriented Chairmen, but not their 
operationally oriented colleagues, who tended to take a more GMP- 
focused approach and to expect their non-medically trained 
colleagues to then “catch up” as best they could.
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Also, during this ‘performing’ stage, several Chairmen noted that a 
two-tier structure was emerging, de facto, within the Board, which 
initial guidance on the Board’s structures seemed to perpetuate:
“I think the non-execs, if you like, of the LHG Board feel that they’re not as 
involved as they would like to be. ...Partly to address th is lack of 
involvem ent, we’re trying to get the non-execs involved in some Group 
work...I want them  to form them selves into a little group that can, as I 
say, performance manage -  or not performance manage, but look at the 
performance, monitor the performance of the LHG Board, who will basically 
hold the Executives to account, if you like.” (005.2: 12.06.00)
Changes like this one reflected Chairmen’s growing confidence in
their roles and their ability to shape their resources to meet their
own needs. Sub Committee structure had been stipulated in the
initial guidance (Welsh Office 1998b), but by mid 2001 some LHG’s
Board members themselves were gaining in confidence, as the
following excerpt indicates:
“The Public Participation [Sub] Group, which was set up, and with all kinds 
of airs and graces, and they gave it all kinds of airs and graces, and then 
the penny dropped that every sub group, everything the LHG did 
should have public participation. So having a [separate] Group seemed 
to iso late...so it reflected on that and then decided to disband itself, and it 
came to the conclusion that it should disband, and brought it back to the 
Board and said ‘Although you said this is what we should be doing, we 
don’t think we should be doing it. We think it would be best if everybody 
took it on as a responsibility’ ” (009.3: 31.08.01)
This was a  fairly radical step to take but indicates the extent to 
which Board members felt engaged and empowered enough to trust 
their own interpretations of the LHG’s remit.
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By the beginning of the ‘evolving’ stage of LHG developm ent Board
member frustration was a threat frequently cited by Chairmen. The
“pace of change”, or the rate at which LHG Boards were ‘allowed’ to
progress, coupled with the time tha t planned developments actually
took to implement, worked together to “de-motivate” Board members,
in many Chairm en’s eyes:
Well, the thing is, we can’t make a clear...you know, we’ve sorted out the 
primary care money, which is about the only thing we’ve had to sort out, 
and we’ve done that. So in that sense, we’ve had meetings, we’ve made 
decisions...but we’re very stuck on anything else, really, because 
nothing else  is  really com ing through. So we are stalled. And I think, 
you know, after eighteen m onths we should be a lot further forward, in 
my opinion” (020.2: 14.08.00)
The Assembly’s continuing failure to articulate clear direction in
term s of LHG development exacerbated the difficulty of keeping
individual Board members engaged and actively participating in the
LHG’s work, reportedly becoming progressively more challenging as
the study progressed. But more strategic Chairmen worked closely
with their Board members, taking them into their confidence about
this issue and its impact:
“I don’t really have much need to gee them up. They wanted to change the 
world overnight. It was a matter of, I mean I’m frustrated enough by the 
pace. They were even more frustrated so you know I just had to take 
them  on board in term s o f what th e difficulties were and try to get 
them  to  realize th at th is is part o f a change which is going to take time 
to bed in and with a bit of luck in a year or two down the line we will be 
able to look back and think we made a lot of progress” (010.1: 16.08.99).
Those Chairmen, on the other hand, who did not adopt such an 
approach, became somewhat isolated, and reported feeling 
embattled. The extent to which Chairmen were comfortable taking
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such a partnership approach to their Boards may well have been 
determined by their own personal commitment to learning and 
development. This is explored further in later sections of this 
chapter.
It would appear, therefore, th a t Chairmen who regarded the size and 
diversity of their Boards as  obstacles, rather than as opportunities, 
missed out on the opportunity to leverage them. Instead, their more 
dismissive approach tended to breed dissent amongst members as 
they increased the LHGs’ focus onto medical services. This, in turn, 
had a negative effect on motivation and  engagement of individual 
members, which eventually became disaffection, as they progressed 
through the subsequent stages of ‘performing’ and ‘evolving’. More 
inclusive Chairmen, however, used  their diverse Board membership 
to create a wider agenda focussed around community needs, not 
existing medical services. They used their lay members to support 
this perspective by opening up  channels of communication with a 
broad group of constituents.
The Chairs’ Job Description (Chapter 4) clearly specified the 
importance of clinical governance. And earlier chapters have 
indicated that Chairmen viewed the implementation of clinical 
governance as presenting particular challenges for both them and
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their organisations. Despite initial fears among the general
practitioner com munity th a t clinical governance would be used as a
stick (Williams 2002), astu te  Chairmen used it to appeal to
professional vanity, right from the start:
“And it really is a case of, you know, they’re all saying ‘well, we don’t have 
enough money to do this and clinical governance and all the rest of it’, and I 
said to them V eil, actually, you want to  be in the forefront o f primary 
care, don't you' and th ey said ‘yes'. Well, this is really only just good 
clinical practice really* (005.1: 26.10.99).
“Yes I think it has been hard work, but 1 think we've tried to remove the 
threat, and the threat having gone I think people see, you know, they know 
that it’s here, we have to work with it, and I think the threat of governance 
was everybody was going to take something away if we don’t do. It's not 
that, it ’s  about enabling people to go forward" (007.2: 24.08.00).
Both of these Chairmen exploited clinical governance further, to
place the concept at the heart of the LHG’s remit:
“...the whole clin ical governance thing as the driver and everything else 
will fall out of that, and...once we start looking at outcomes we’ll say, Veil 
hang on a minute, we could actually do that better in primary care’. And 
there’s that ethos in X Shire anyway, is that you will only send it to 
secondary care if it’s absolutely necessary....because m ost of the GPs who 
have com e to  X Shire actually com e there because they want to be 
that sort o f fam ily doctor, who does as much as he can...” (005.1: 
26.10.99)
This linking of professional quality improvement and increased scope 
for skills development, with the move towards more integrated care, 
appealed to local GPs, partly because it helped them to gain a feeling 
of increased control over the services they were providing. Where 
clinical governance was used as a  vehicle for individual and practice 
development, during th is initial Torming’ stage, it was effective in 
engaging the local professional community. Perhaps it was most
337
effective when it also embraced the other independent contractors, 
beyond GPs (022).
During the second stage of LHG development, the ‘performing’ stage,
- one Chairman further exploited this perceived opportunity by 
identifying specific local health  service challenges as quality 
improvement issues. This redefinition of issues as key professional 
concerns, rather than  as managerial responsibilities, was 
instrum ental in helping them  to wrest the agenda back into 
clinicians’ sphere of influence and th u s  their control. It also enabled 
a developmental rather than  a  punitive approach to be taken, as this 
excerpt from the quote above emphasizes:
“...once we start looking at outcomes we’ll say, ‘well hang on a minute, we
could actually do that better in primary care’” (005.2: 12.06.00)
Despite Chairm en’s fears, putting Clinical Governance at the centre 
of the LHG’s agenda eventually proved to be an effective tool for 
rallying professional support for their new organizations. These 
identified Chairmen were exemplary for the way in which they 
grasped this particular nettle. By the ‘evolving’ stage, the most 
successful approach appeared to have been to embrace the concept 
as central to the LHG’s role. W hereas many other Chairmen 
remained intimidated by the challenge, or attempted to distance 
themselves from its implications, some even hiding behind their 
Clinical Governance Leads, these identified Chairmen used it as a
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focal point and essential plank of the LHG’s remit, redefining that 
remit in term s of quality improvement. This approach was insightful, 
reflecting a  deeper aw areness of the factors which motivate 
professionals, than  some of their other colleagues demonstrated.
This insight may have been gleaned from experience as educators 
but not all those Chairmen with educational backgrounds adopted 
this line as strongly. The approach also seemed to be correlated with 
Chairmen’s in terest in community development as a strategy for the 
LHG, again illustrating the value of using these factors in 
combination to maximise leverage.
Common, too, to m ost of the strategically-aware Chairmen’s agendas 
was a  focus on health care and local needs, as opposed to health 
services. The articulation of a  primary care-oriented agenda, right 
from the outset, in the ‘forming’ stage, immediately distinguished the 
LHGs’ interests from those of the local Trusts. It enabled Chairmen 
to reach out to, and engage, a  broad spectrum of support. This 
enabled them to stake a  claim to im portant -  and attractive -  new 
territory. The words ‘prim ary care’ need a  caveat because they 
denoted a  broad and inclusive definition of local needs for care at the 
first point of contact, encom passing care needs traditionally met by 
community and social service providers. This contrasts with the
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narrower definition more commonly adopted by general practitioners 
as a  profession, denoting GMS services and /or people employed by 
the GP practice to provide care to the patients on their practice lists. 
This narrower definition limited both the thinking and the scope for 
action of the more operationally oriented Chairmen, as demonstrated 
in previous chapters. More strategically-aware Chairmen could tap 
into the broad church  enveloped in the wider definition, cutting 
across employing organisations’ boundaries, to create a unifying 
agenda, conceptually and practically. This agenda gave credence 
and legitimacy to the idea of reconfiguring services “on the ground” 
at local level. It was also, however, a  bold approach, given that Acute 
Trusts had only ju s t been restructured vertically in Wales, in 1998, 
to incorporate community services, a  few m onths before the creation 
of LHGs.
The new territory carved out was distinctive to LHGs: no other 
organization could claim to represent the same interests with such
legitimacy as an  LHG:
I think weVe made a cause majeure, and I think that in a way the health 
authorities must have been aware of this before, and there has been great 
resistance in the past to anything intrusive, whereas th is is  certainly 
locally owned and w ill be locally led...but I think we've -  one of the 
tricks we have been able to  m ove towards is being seen as part of the 
loca lities, not as som e kind o f big brother...” (009.2: 20.06.00)
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The lack of a  coherent strategy for public health at this point was 
another contributing contextual factor enabling LHGs to seize that 
agenda:
Yes, anybody who works here can realize that there is an odd mix 
between social care and health care and maintaining good health  
and...the way we supply services for the patients has been to  fit them  
w ithin loca lities ...so  m y ideas had changed quite dramatically and it
was quite interesting to see Public Health standing there not knowing 
where it was going and waiting for its green paper...(009.1: 20.08.99).
While public health professionals played a  waiting game, and a 
Teeling of inertia, em anated from the new Assembly’s immaturity and 
uncertain leadership, savvy LHG Chairmen stepped in to “agitate the 
debate” (009.2; 007) to build “an  increased understanding of the 
necessity to move on” (009.2):
MAt the local basis, I th ink th at we’ve managed to identify areas where 
there are possib ilities to  m ove and I think what we have managed to  
do betw een us is to  identify th ose avenues where movement can 
happen... there’s a new feeling of working together for sure. Some of the 
professional barriers are beginning to weaken. There is greater acceptance 
of the need for change. I think there’s a greater awareness of the role that 
others can take part. I think people now understand that the interface 
areas are more -  there’s more to be gained than to be lost” (009.2).
This approach represented a perceptive reading of the Assembly’s
agenda. It was bom  out of the optimism that characterised these
Chairmen’s first few m onths in office. It was closely tied to their
personal commitment to “developing primary care locally” which
characterised most of the Chairm en’s underlying motivations for
taking up their roles in the first place. Again, as noted in Chapter 6,
this ‘inclusivity’ was a  second distinguishing characteristic of more
strategically oriented Chairmen.
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During the second phase of LHG life, the ‘performing’ phase, 
identified Chairmen took their primary care focus a  step further, by 
identifying specific local health issues and using them as focal points 
for LHG activity. Such local developments provided key opportunities 
" for LHGs. In one area, the Community Services Review was 
underway as LHGs went live, having started about a  year earlier 
(005.1). Canny Chairm en used  these tools to develop an additional 
strand of their agendas: involving the local community.
The local community had been perceived as playing a useful and 
constructive role in the Community Services review:
"...they had a panel o f patients who looked at all o f the issues...and  
when the LHG and the patien ts’ panel actually com pletely and utterly 
agreed w ith the certain direction, the local politicians didn’t know 
what to  do. Because normally they’re in the situation when they can sort 
of do this in a dividing line and sort of playing one off against the other, but 
when the two of them got together, they couldn’t cope..." (005.1: 26.10.99)
This Chairman used this unexpected congruence of agendas to seize 
the initiative with local politicians, and then to begin building direct 
links with them, to bring them  “on side” by helping them to 
understand and appreciate the role and function of LHGs. This LHG 
also built on their CHC link to inform the wider community directly 
about its aims, taking a  regular slot on the CHC’s newsletters. This 
helped them to be seen as fitting into the organizational landscape in 
a complementary ra ther than  competing fashion. In contrast, more 
operationally oriented Chairmen (e.g. 012) made efforts to create
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links with CHCs, via shared premises for example, but failed to 
exploit the relationship’s potential beyond this level. Another LHG 
reached out to the wider constituency via its initial Questionnaire 
survey to inform the LHG’s contribution to the HIP:
“We constructed a Questionnaire which we hope will be sensitive, and that’s 
gone out, and we hope to get the returns from that to help us make 
prioritizing decisions on the Health Improvement Program. We’ve sent it  
to  various groups because of course we’re trying to encourage local 
groups to  sign up to  our Compact, you know, the agreement with local 
voluntary service groups in  th is locality? We did this, and launched it 
last week; Alun Michael1 came to launch it, and we have contacts through 
that and we’re using the network which is there. Because I think that 
people in the community, they’re comfortable with the way they can 
communicate their feelings whereas a big consultation exercise, very often, 
in our experience, it doesn’t work because you have two men and a dog 
turning up and that may not be representative...”(007.1: 23/12/99)
This Chairm an’s strategic use of the voluntary sector agreement is in 
stark contrast to another, more operational, Chairman’s approach. 
That Chairman (016) was perhaps even more aware of the voluntary 
sector’s potential as a  service provider having been linked to the 
formation and development of a local consortium of voluntary groups 
for many years as a  local GP, bu t in th a t case, the link was never 
exploited or developed into any sort of two way dialogue.
In the ‘evolving’ stage, another Chairm an used the area’s relatively 
high CHD mortality rates as a  focal point around which to raise 
awareness of its impact among the wider community. Although not a 
new issue, the opportunity to use it as  a  community awareness
1 Alun Michael MP for Cardiff South was also the First Minister of the Welsh 
Assembly Government at this time
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raising tool presented itself by the congruence of two events. The 
first was the introduction, in England, of a new National Service 
Framework for Coronary Heart Disease (CHD); the second was an 
invitation to address the local council. This Chairman used the NSF 
to raise awareness of CHD’s impact, including social costs, at local 
level through a  one off invitation. He further leveraged this 
opportunity to cement relationships with local politicians through on 
going dialogue, which in tu rn  created a more supportive environment 
politically for the LHG. The examples noted above show the ways in 
which identified Chairmen managed to identify and capitalize on 
their focus on local health needs to raise awareness of these among 
the wider community, and in so doing, to highlight the LHG’s role 
and contribution to addressing them.
These initiatives became self-reinforcing, in terms of identified 
Chairmen's growing awareness of their organizations' increasing 
effectiveness locally. Despite the structural obstacles to their 
contributions, several Chairmen did report that they had managed to 
make an effective contribution to the health debate locally.
The data appear to suggest th a t those Chairmen who adopted more 
facilitative m anagem ent styles were most successful in generating 
broad inclusive agendas, which were also locally responsive. These 
Chairmen tended to have had backgrounds in educational work
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amongst their GP communities, and appeared to apply principles of
adult learning to their work as LHG leaders. They tended to speak of
their LHG in the second person plural, and to have a strong
orientation towards organisational learning:
“The difficulty is that people in the community wish to see things done now, 
we have noticed that you can’t do things ‘now’ but you have to try and do 
things as quickly as possible but be open about it. Say Veil, OK, adopt, 
we’ll take that on board, we’ll look at it and come back to you, and if we 
think it’s, the outcome is going to be positive for the future then we’ll go 
ahead and make every effort to do so’. We’ve had one difficult public 
m eeting...but we’ve learnt from that and we would hope that we can 
get the com m unity to  grow w ith us along some proposals which we are 
going to  put to  them ” (007.2: 24.08.00)
This approach to problem solving, using the opportunity to learn as 
an organization, typified this Chairm an’s approach to his role and 
the LHG’s work. He pointed to “the knowledge which has been 
obtained over the past two years” as one of the key forces driving the 
LHG forward by Ju ly  2001.
Reflecting further on this process, th is Chairman recognized the 
strength of the facilitative approach he’d adopted:
“Well, we’ve done a lo t o f facilitating work together, we have taken a 
board developm ent approach, we’ve been using that....W e’ve taken
out to  throw th ings around...we’ve sat down and talked about it and 
did that and we’ve asked them for what their needs are...so, you know, it’s 
been a very dem ocratic process, it  hasn't been a one-sided thing” 
(007.3)
This emphasis on organizational learning became stronger as the 
period of study progressed. He explained his approach to generating
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shared  objectives am ong  the  professional provider comm unity, using
CPD as the vehicle:
“We are going to try and take half days out of practice, on a monthly basis, 
so that all practices have the opportunity to attend. Locums would be put 
in place so there is no excuse for people not attending. Go on the Doncaster 
model as an educational tool, and also an informative one” (007.2: )
This was the first LHG in Wales to adopt formalized CPD sessions, for 
the whole practice team, across the patch. The idea met opposition 
from some quarters (including his clinical governance lead) initially. 
This Chairm an’s response was to open up the debate further, to try 
to find solutions, rather than  to impose his view as to what should 
happen:
“We're having to review some of the planning that we've put into that in 
order to make it more primary care friendly, I think...because there are 
misgivings about people giving up time and having to work harder the 
following day. And we are going to try and brainstorm that and work 
through it...” (007.3: 25.07.01).
During this ‘evolving’ stage, professional ownership of the quality 
improvement agenda was further enhanced by leveraging Clinical 
Governance as  a  central plank of the LHG’s agenda, exploiting it 
further by using it as a tool for joint learning across practice teams
(007.3). Even th is approach was not without its detractors locally
(007.3), bu t the Chairm an’s longer range vision, and his learning 
oriented style supported the eventual implementation of this 
initiative. This LHG’s approach to implementing clinical governance 
remained consistently developmental and inclusive of the four 
independent contractor professions “so rather than impose, this is
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the developmental thing, with the trainer doing it all... so we have a 
common aim” (007.3).
In terms of the Chairm an’s role, too, the emphasis was on listening
in  order to learn:
“That you have to  listen . You can't be blinkered and you may have to  
accept things which you don’t  agree with but the majority do [and] you 
have to run with that...You have to learn not to say too much and to allow 
others the time to say what they want...It’s a listening process and trying 
to pick out the threads o f it  a ll” (007.3)
This em phasis on the need to listen to the community was 
emphasized by all of the more strategically oriented Chairmen: 
“Whoever chairs it needs to be able to motivate and facilitate, but 
most importantly, understand ...” (009.3) and to enable others to 
understand by:
“Taking those filters off and making it safe. And being able to make it clear 
as to what is being discussed and its implications. Perhaps you yourself 
can’t do it but you can enable people on the board to get that...” (009.3:
31.08.01)
The Chairmen who used this facilitative style, and emphasized 
organizational learning, appeared to draw on their own previous 
educational skills and roles. They also appeared to demonstrate the 
ability to exploit this background courageously to enable consensus 
to emerge, rather than  to tiy  to impose their own views. This was not 
a management style prevalent among the career managers within 
NHS Wales at the time, nor was it one tha t was particularly 
encouraged by the increasing em phasis on performance management
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that was being introduced by the centre. Nor did the approach get 
much air time a t all Wales Chairs' Group meetings. But, by using 
such an approach, these Chairmen did appear to effectively tap into 
the ‘underlying value system s of their organizations' and to effectively 
influence the development of their organizations' power structures, 
control systems and paradigm s (Miller et al 2002, p. 38) to build 
unique organizational identities which attracted and mobilized the 
engagement of their local communities. Interestingly now, some five 
years later, the relevance of organizational learning to performance, 
is becoming increasingly recognized, within NHS Wales, as a  key 
organizational competence (Crompton et al 2003).
10.5 Summary
In this chapter, by taking a  processual approach (Pettigrew 1990) to 
the analysis of activity reported by Chairmen, it has been possible to 
isolate distinctive organizational assets and opportunities that 
identified Chairmen selected and applied to the process of creating 
unique organizational identities. The combined effects of these 
organizational features, together with they ways in which these 
Chairmen identified and exploited them, enabled their LHGs to grow 
into organizations th a t were receptive to change. They had each 
developed unique capabilities and communication channels that
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promoted dialogue with their constituents that in turn informed their 
strategies and their operational activity.
In the final phase of the study, the stage in which a  large part of the 
LHG Chairmen’s attention was dominated by anxieties and 
discussions about w hat LHGs would become in the wake of the 
decision to abolish health  authorities, Chairmen were asked to 
identify some of the lessons they had learned from their work since 
1999. In this ‘evolving’ stage, the identified Chairmen all expressed 
more confidence in themselves and their visions for the future as 
being “right’’ for the needs of the population, if less certain in 
structural term s. They pointed to the effectiveness of approaches 
which focussed on local problems and needs; the ability to 
understand and respect the differences in roles and contributions of 
the Chairman and the chief officer; the value of peer group learning 
and collaborative links across LHGs. Most of them also emphasised 
the value they continued to place on the contribution of each 
individual Board member. All five also expressed the wish to have 
had the confidence, in retrospect, to have exploited the uniqueness of 
their positions more strongly.
In each case, it was the Chairm an’s perception of the specific asset, 
or opportunity, as potentially beneficial tha t enabled him to leverage
349
it effectively. It is also worth noting tha t it is unlikely that any one of 
the specific characteristics noted would be sufficient, independently, 
to have a  transform ational effect. It appears to have been their 
combined effect which was m ost powerful. So it may also be that it 
was the Chairmen’s abilities to apply these assets in combination 
which enabled them  to be leveraged effectively. This ability to 
identify and then to build upon specific organizational features in 
such a way th a t new organizational capabilities are created may be 
similar to w hat Butler (2003) term s “implementation capacity”. This 
increased organizational capability, together with strategic vision, 
and the ability to manage institutional politics to build spheres of 
influence, despite decision making being located elsewhere in the 
system, appear to combine to create contexts receptive to change and 
growth (Miller et al 2002). These identified Chairmen reported these 
abilities more consistently over time than  their colleagues; they also 
expressed a  higher degree of en thusiasm  for the future and 
confidence in the present than  their more operational and inwardly- 
focused counterparts across Wales.
It could be argued that, given the nature and extent of the structural 
constraints within which LHGs emerged and evolved, it is not 
surprising th a t more LHGs did not develop into receptive/high 
change organisations. This analysis has indicated that relatively few
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Chairmen succeeded in acquiring and consistently applying the 
behaviours needed to foster high change organisations. Those 
Chairmen who did adopt these behaviours appeared to do so by 
virtue of their commitment to organisational learning and continuing 
personal and professional development, rather than as a result of 
any externally provided Chair development activity. The training and 
development offered to Chairmen focussed on specific topics 
identified by the Assembly Government’s Health Department civil 
servants, rather than  on new skills which Chairmen might need to 
acquire. At no stage were skills relevant to influencing effectively in a 
political arena considered or addressed. Several Chairmen noted 
that they felt the need for more skills in managing a  large Board, in 
dealing with the Press, in involving the public, and even in managing 
meetings more effectively. Many of these skills would normally be 
addressed in standard m anagem ent development programmes. The 
assumption seems to have been th a t such skills would have been 
absorbed and acquired along the way - illustrating the gaps in 
understanding and expectations between the centre and the field at 
local level.
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Chapter 11: D iscussion , Recomm endations and Directions for 
Further R esearch
11.1 Introduction
This study set ou t to identify and examine factors tha t influence 
organizational change in prim ary care, with reference to Local 
Health G roups in Wales between 1999 and 2001. The case study 
approach w as selected a s  providing the m ost appropriate vehicle 
for studying the process of organizational change in primary care, 
prospectively, w ithin a  defined geographical area, and over a finite 
period of time, using  the occurrence of the implementation of a 
specific policy: devolution of decision-making to local health 
professionals. The aim  of the policy was the delivery of higher 
quality, more efficient and  responsive primary care services to 
local com m unities (Welsh Office 1998a). The policy intentions 
were, thus, broadly sketched outlines, ra ther than  detailed plans. 
As vehicles to im plem ent th is policy, 22 Local Health Groups 
(LHGs) were created across Wades. These new organizations 
provided a  useful m echanism  through which to explore the 
“processual” (Pettigrew et al 1992), as opposed to episodic, nature 
of organisational chainge. The study design enabled examination 
of the process of change over time, in parallel with the content of 
the changes taking place, aind in light of the environment and 
context in which the changes were attem pted (Butler 2003; 
McAuliffe and  McKenzie, 2007).
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LHG Chairm en were responsible for leading the formation and 
development of these new organizations, and for driving the 
change process locally. This study has, therefore, charted the 
experiences of the Chairm en of the 22 local primary health care 
. organisations, from sta rt-u p  in April, 1999 to the decision to 
reconfigure LHGs, taken  a t the end of 2001. This study explored 
the extent to which these Chairm en saw themselves as having 
created local organizations receptive to change and development. 
This study did not se t ou t to m easure organizational effectiveness 
or to evaluate the achievem ents of LHGs. Rather it set out to 
capture C hairm en’s own views of their experience over time, in 
forming and developing new organizations capable of driving 
change locally. That some eventually described themselves as 
having acquired influence locally, and a t Assembly level, emerged 
from the analysis as one of their own indicators of success.
The empirical da ta  captured  from three sets of interview cycles 
has been collated and  analyzed to identify emerging themes 
relevant to issues of leadership, organizational relationships and 
influence within the prim ary care arena. The themes which have 
emerged help to build a  picture of the factors which promote 
successful im plem entation of NHS policy, a t local level, through 
the creation and  development of organisations which are receptive 
to change. Therefore, the findings are pertinent to current
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challenges facing the  Welsh health system today, in the face of 
proposals for an o th er round of organizational restructuring, 
announced in April 2008.
This chapter p resen ts  a  brief overview of the findings, in Section
11.2 in relation to research  questions 1 and 2. Section 11.3 
explores the im plications of the findings on leadership behaviours 
in relation to recent academ ic literature. Section 11.4 examines 
the implications of the  findings in relation to recent literature on 
inter organizational relationships. Section 11.5 relates the 
findings to cu rren t issues in policy implementation literature. 
Section 11.6 d iscusses lim itations to the present study. Section
11.7 offers recom m endations arising from the lessons learned 
from this investigation, in line with research question 3. Section
11.8 concludes the d issertation  by providing directions for further 
research.
11.2 Overview o f  th e  Main Findings
Research Question 1: What structural and organizational changes 
were made fo r  the formation and development o f LHGs?
As was shown in C hapters 4 and  5, the policy docum ents (Welsh 
Office 1998a; 1998b) articulated significant expectations on LHGs 
in term s of prom oting change locally. Better integrated care would 
result from increased responsiveness, improved efficiencies, and 
closer alignm ent of clinical and financial responsibilities at local
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level (Welsh Office 1998a). However it can be argued tha t there are 
inherent contradictions in these policy intentions, between, for 
example, responsiveness and  efficiency, and demand and need. 
Local prim aiy care organizations were intended to “rationalise” 
service delivery according to evidence of local need. This would 
indicate th a t service efficiency was a  primary policy goal. But a t 
the same time LHGs were m eant to increase public involvement, 
to promote more responsiveness, th u s  implying giving local 
dem and a  high priority.
These policy contradictions may have contributed to the wide 
variations in the range of experiences reported, both over time, 
and across the twenty two LHGs. In addition, the structural 
arrangem ents created LHGs as sub  committees of “parent” health 
authorities. The guidance docum ent (Welsh Office 1998b) 
indicated th a t th is would be a  tem porary connection from which 
LHGs would quickly move tow ards independence. And it could be 
said th a t therein lay the root of m any of the subsequent problems. 
At no time during the entire lifespan of LHGs was a clear 
developmental pathw ay ever articulated or proposed (though some 
discussion abou t using  King’s Fund standards was briefly mooted 
and quickly discarded, according to Chairm en’s reports).
Chapters 4 and  5 explored the im pact of the constraints this 
structu ral relationship imposed on LHGs’ abilities to create 
independent identities and  to build more effective vertical working
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relationships. They dem onstrated the extent to which health 
authorities were able to retain  dominance over all aspects of 
LHGs’ operations th roughou t the study period, and thus, in large 
m easure, to define the term s of the agenda for primary care 
development. The large m ultidisciplinary LHG Board was m eant 
to broaden representation  and  promote increased responsiveness 
locally, b u t the health  au thorities were given few incentives to 
change the way they worked: responsibility for commissioning, 
frequently promised, w as never devolved. Public health 
physicians, who m ight have helped to bridge the gap between 
health authorities and  LHGs, continued to prioritise the demands 
of their health authority  employers, over the needs of their new 
colleagues. Moreover, om itting T rusts from representation on the 
LHG Boards did more to em bed separation than  to foster 
integration between prim ary and  secondary services. The 
Assembly responded by pu tting  a  statu tory  duty of partnership in 
place and enacting legislation to enable easier pooling of budgets. 
But when new m onies came into the system through the Labour 
government’s injection of additional cash in June  2000, the lion’s 
share went to health  au thorities and  Trusts.
Looking horizontally, coterm inosity with unitary authority 
boundaries was in tended to foster closer integration of health and 
social service delivery. B u t these policy intentions were 
underm ined by the practical effects of reshuffling within Welsh
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local au thorities during  the years under study, as Chapters 5 and 
8 showed. J u s t  a s  s tru c tu res  acted more to constrain than to 
facilitate change a t organizational level, delays in decision-making 
at both Assembly and  health  authority level impeded LHGs’ efforts 
to provide incentives to effect behaviour change at individual and 
practice level during the years under study here. Thus, the 
structural arrangem ents for setting up  LHGs could be said to have 
created a  form of pa th  dependency (Wilsford 1994), acting more to 
re-enforce th an  to change the existing distribution of power and 
influence w ithin the health  system across Wales. But, as Ferlie et 
al (1996) pointed out:
“...the adoption of a new organizational structure may be seen as a
legitimating device to maintain outside support and funding...” (p.228)
In th a t sense, then , the setting up  of LHGs was congruent with 
centrally determ ined, UK-wide policies of devolution and 
decentralisation. Ferlie et al and  Wilsford (1994) before him, are, 
however, pointing to the success of the centrally imposed reform 
project in the UK public sector. Ferlie et al (1996 p .230) go on to 
identify key elem ents th a t have promoted the implementation of 
such efforts, notably a  broad vision rather than  a  blueprint for 
implementation, a  proactive com m unications policy to sell the 
reforms, and  the selection and appointm ent of key figures at 
Board level. In th is  case, the then  Minister for Health and Social 
Care could be said to have had the requisite “broad vision” 
especially in the sense of partnership  working for integrated
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service delivery, enshrined  in the composition of the new LHGs. 
But very little in the way of a  proactive communications policy 
could be discerned during  the time under study. This study’s 
findings suggest th a t the environm ental context may well have 
dem anded stronger m easures, in any case.
The literature indicated th a t the environmental context in which 
organisational change is a ttem pted  can play a determining role in 
the outcome of the change process. This study’s findings have 
extended th is view. The context in which the inauguration of 
LHGs took place was highly complex. It was further complicated 
by the high degree of instability  prevailing within it, especially 
throughout late 1999 and  m ost of 2000. Pettigrew, Ferlie and 
McKee (1992, p.278) point to a  need for both continuity and 
stability in the effective m anagem ent of strategic change.
However, th is study has indicated th a t it is not the environmental 
instability or complexity itself th a t is influential, bu t rather, it is 
the way th a t the ensuing, or accompanying, ambiguity is 
perceived and used by different change agents tha t may be 
predictive of organisational “success” or, conversely, of a  failure to 
thrive. In other words, the political and leadership skills of some 
of the key actors proved to be critical in this study.
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Research Question 2: w hat leadership behaviours did the selected 
health professionals apply to their roles as Chairmen?
This study's d a ta  suggested th a t power vacuum s and policy gaps 
could be exploited positively by skilled leaders confident enough to 
do so. Thus it em erged th a t it is how the different Chairmen 
reacted to, and  exploited, th is  vacuum  th a t explains much of the 
variability in the ensu ing  formation and development of LHGs as 
organizations, across Wales, between 1999 and 2001. As Pettigrew 
et al (1992) and B utler (2003) have indicated, it is the interplay of 
context, leadership, and  relationships th a t helps to determine 
organizational receptivity to change. Butler (2003) points to the 
need for organizational leaders to have clear ideological vision, and 
the ability to negotiate institu tional politics by forming effective 
working relationships. However, Butler's study looked at 
situations in which decision-m aking power had actually been 
devolved. This study h as  explored the way ideological vision and 
strategic thinking h as  been necessary attributes in a context in 
which power is contested. It has also shown the challenges 
involved in firstly, forming effective horizontal relationships, and 
secondly, in the continuous effort required to re-shape and realign 
emerging visions with the centre 's overarching policy aims. Miller 
et al (2002) have pointed, additionally, to the need for skills in 
leveraging asym m etries to build organizational capacity. The 
findings indicate tha t, despite an  inauspicious context, some 
Chairmen dem onstrated these abilities.
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For LHG Chairm en, those individuals selected to lead the new 
organizations, their three years a t the helm could be said to have 
been roller coaster rides: they entered their new roles with high 
hopes; these were repeatedly dashed by the realities of the 
. obstacles and im pedim ents they faced. These set backs were 
frequently interspersed with brief surges of optimism: the promise 
of new resources in Ju n e  2000, and the repeated promises by 
health authorities th a t budgets would be devolved. Chairmen 
dealt with these challenges differently, both in terms of the sense 
they made of their new situations, and  the approach they took to 
their roles.
The findings identified the com peting perspectives, and wide 
differences in understanding , of the policy aims and processes, 
prevailing am ong the key actors in th is study. The Chairmen, all 
clinically trained health  service professionals, brought a  strong 
personal motivation to effect change and development in primary 
care to their roles as leaders of the newly forming primary health 
care organizations. B ut m any were ham pered by their views of 
the policy m aking process, which could be termed those of “naive 
rationalists” (Russell et al 2008), in th a t they assum ed a linear 
progression for their organizations in term s of development and 
autonomy. This som ew hat simplistic view of their environment 
does not m atch the reality of the m odem  policy making process
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(Lister 2005). Some w riters have characterised this process as a 
“soup”, a  complex mix of a  wide variety of influences, the outcome 
of the coming-together of which is rarely based on evidence or 
rational planning. H ealth authorities, of course, colluded with 
this line of thinking, in effect, through the nature of the controls 
they imposed on LHGs’ activity and  development, and the nature 
of the work they delegated, geared more to “the furtherance of 
their own organizations”, in the words of one Chairman, than to 
the development of au tonom ous new organizations.
Thus the selection of GPs to be lead figures (Chairmen) of the 
newly formed Local Health G roups was interesting in itself. GPs, 
as health professionals, work as independent contractors, and 
therefore, as self employed heads of small to medium-sized 
businesses. Their leadership  development would have been 
largely experiential and  self directed, often tailored to meet the 
dem ands of their CME requirem ents.
But implicit in the central UK government's policy aim to devolve 
decision-making to local health  professionals, was the underlying 
assum ption th a t these people were those best placed to 
understand local needs and  to engage other local health 
professionals. Local Health G roups were structured so tha t GPs' 
views would have the m ost weight, since they held 6 places out of 
the 18 on the m ultidisciplinary Board. But evidence that GP-led
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commissioning, or even purchasing, had achieved much in the 
way of significant change in the configuration of secondary care 
services w as weak (Smith et al, 2004). Nonetheless, a t the 
beginning of the study, m ost GP Chairmen reported tha t one of 
their key strengths w as indeed their own local knowledge, and 
their understanding  of p a tien ts’ needs based on their experience 
a t the coalface.
The key strengths th a t emerged from the data, however, tell a 
different story. The d a ta  indicated th a t those Chairmen who 
instinctively em braced a  com m unity development approach in 
their roles as  leaders were the m ost successful in term s of creating 
and m aintaining a  un ique agenda for their LHGs. Their approach 
was both strategic and  inclusive of the broader community. These 
Chairmen tended to focus on creating new communication 
channels to promote listening to the com m unity’s views of its 
needs, and developing s tru c tu res  and feed back channels to 
enable professionals to work towards delivering services differently 
to meet those needs.
These Chairm en tended, also, to exercise astu te  political skills in 
influencing upper tiers in the system, notably the Welsh Assembly 
Government and their p aren t health  authorities. In addition, their 
commitment to com m unity needs and focus enabled them to 
transcend the health  au thorities’ more operational views of LHGs’
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roles as their in ternal sub  committees, and thus to create their 
own unique agendas and power bases. These Chairmen exhibited 
skills in exploiting the authority  vacuum s and ensuing 
uncertainty  th a t prevailed during the early stages of their work 
towards establishing their LHGs. In many ways, then, for these 
strategically skilled Chairm en, the absence of direction, from both 
the WAG and the health  authorities, freed them up to develop and 
implement their own visions for the future, and thus, ultimately, 
to report more satisfaction with their achievements than  did more 
operationally focused Chairm en. This may equate to Butler's 
(2003) ideological vision as a  key leadership element in creating 
organizations receptive to change. However, these Chairmen's 
abilities to exploit the prevailing ambiguity were an essential 
prerequisite to developing th is  vision in the first place. Thus this 
finding extends Butler's (2003) concept of ideological vision by 
highlighting the im portance of context and the effectiveness of the 
ability to both interpret and  exploit it to meet organizational 
needs. This finding th u s  extends the earlier work by Pettigrew et 
al (1992), who noted the im portance of a stable organizational 
context. This study 's findings point to the ability to tolerate 
uncertainty and environm ental ambiguity as more critical in 
tu rbu len t working environm ents as section 11.7 will argue, 
highlighting again the im portance of focussing analytical attention 
on the interplay of context, leadership and relationships.
364
The variation in strategic vision among the 22 Chairmen emerged 
over the course of the  study. Those Chairmen who adopted wide 
ranging and ‘inclusive’ definitions of their constituents, coupled 
with a  com m unity developm ent focus for their organizations, were 
able to effectively exploit the absence of clear direction a t the 
assembly governm ent level. From this perspective, moreover, they 
were able to identify distinctive features within their organizations 
and then lead their staff to work to combine those resources in 
new ways tha t, in tu rn , gave their organizations unique identities 
and capabilities (Miller e t al 2002).
Many of the more operationally focussed Chairmen, on the other 
hand, tended to try to develop their LHGs according to the model 
they had perceived a s  m ost successful in their own experience, GP 
Fundholding. They expected their LHGs to be able to work in a 
similar, b u t broadened, fashion, reducing variations in services by 
focussing on their local populations* needs, rather than  on those 
of their smaller, separate  practice populations, bu t with the same 
degree of flexibility and  alacrity implicit in holding their own 
budgets.
At the same time, m any of these more operationally oriented 
Chairmen were suspicious of more formal techniques, such as 
health needs assessm ent, and  saw little point in devoting 
resources to such  processes. They felt th a t the instincts they had
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built up  during their experience as practising GPs gave them 
intim ate familiarity with the needs of their patients, and tha t they 
could extrapolate from these across their extended LHG areas.
This failure to realise the gap between individual experience and 
broader, more holistic, needs assessm ent was symptomatic of the 
difference between them selves and their more strategically 
oriented colleagues.
These Chairm en also tended to express more disappointment by 
the end of the study period, in relation to their perceived control 
over money or budgets. Since very few budgets were actually 
devolved to LHGs, and  those which were had largely been 
previously allocated, these Chairm en were almost bound to be 
disappointed and  tended to express frustration more frequently.
These operationally oriented Chairm en frequently emphasised 
money and information as key tools to ‘unlock’ the system, but at 
the same time, they found it increasingly difficult to influence 
their health  authorities effectively. Their own underlying 
assum ptions seemed to im prison them  within a game whose rules 
kept changing; when the goalposts also changed they became even 
less sure of the way forward: they expressed bewilderment and 
ultim ately disenchantm ent. Their efforts to try to read the ‘script’ 
for GPFH, with which the health  authorities appeared to collude, 
in term s of their own discourse, led them  to focus increasingly on
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operational detail a t the expense of overall strategy. This narrower 
focus also served to isolate them  further from other potential 
sources of support in the wider community.
These more operationally-oriented Chairmen also tended to focus 
on The rules’, and  soon becam e bogged down in procedural detail. 
This concern with ru les an d  procedures may well have suited their 
‘parent’ health authorities. Health authorities had steered 
discussions with their LHGs, from the outset, around the physical 
structure and composition of the  new bodies rather than 
focussing on fostering new organizational orders (Pettigrew et al 
1992, p265). Moreover, the authorities, using the sort of 
managerial discourse bounded in rationality (Green and 
Thorogood, 1998), effectively steered the content of negotiations 
with these LHGs (Pettigrew et al, 1992, p. 266). They bolstered 
this linear view of the world through  a variety of command and 
control mechanisms such  as performance agreements. They 
legitimated their resistance to devolving budgets through the 
language of corporate accountability and fiscal responsibility.
This approach tended, over time, to render the more operationally 
focussed LHG Chairm en increasingly powerless.
In contrast, however, their com m unity development-oriented and 
more strategic colleagues ‘rewrote their scripts’, and thereby 
succeeded in working around  the obstacles the health authorities
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presented. Their approach supports Senge’s dictum  (cited in lies 
and Sutherland 2001) for effecting change: when resistance is 
strong, work to reduce the resisting forces rather than  to 
strengthen your own efforts in opposition. This ability to 
circumvent obstacles appeared to be an im portant feature, 
subsequently enabling them  to report satisfaction with their 
progress.
Thus the leadership skills evidenced in this study included the 
expected abilities to create a  shared vision, persuasion and 
influencing ability, b u t coupled with a  broad political awareness, 
and, more particularly, the ability to tolerate and exploit 
ambiguities in the prevailing power structures. This finding 
corroborates Pettigrew et al (1992, p. 279) who highlighted the 
effectiveness of “leadership exercised in a subtle and pluralist 
fashion” and the power of the combined abilities of planning, 
opportunism , and good tim ing in effectively managing 
“incoherence”. The d a ta  from th is study extends Pettigrew et al’s 
thesis by highlighting the im portance of this ability to tolerate and 
exploit uncertain ty  as a  key leadership skill in building new 
organizations, especially in situations where power and decision­
making have not actually been devolved in practice.
The ability to build effective organisational relationships emerged 
as another key leadership skill, and a  significant factor in
368
renabling the newly-formed LHGs to establish themselves within a 
crowded, and  som ew hat hostile, organisational landscape. 
Pettigrew et al (1992, p .265) point to the central role that inter- 
organizational netw orks play in term s of a  change project’s 
success. And although relationship building alone was not 
predictive of success, m ost LHG Chairmen, throughout the three 
years of the study, pointed to their newly forged relationships as 
their m ost solid achievem ent, in term s of building power and 
influence locally.
Chairmen frequently referred to th is relationship-building activity 
as a struggle -  an  “uphill battle” -  for which there were few 
tangible prizes. And the d a ta  showed the extent to which previous 
organizational relationships and  history added to these 
difficulties. In fact, those Chairm en who viewed relationship- 
building as  a  m eans of influencing the distribution of resources 
were frequently disappointed by their inability to overturn the 
prevailing power im balances. Indeed, “getting a seat at the 
tripartite table” seemed to have been a  pyrrhic sort of victory when 
the T rusts and  health  au thorities reportedly paid little attention to 
their new partners. Here, too, there was a  correlation between 
those C hairm en who worked to become accepted as equal players, 
with a  voice in the distribution of the other players’ assets, and a 
perceived failure to influence the agenda.
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The more strategic Chairm en, however, addressed relationship- 
building differently, by stim ulating the formation of new coalitions 
across the spectrum  of prim ary and social care provider 
organisations and  users. This bottom up approach helped them 
to build broad visions based on “services not hospitals”. This 
broad based approach also helped to build new shared 
understandings and  th u s  to reduce the destructive power of the 
prevailing “local histories, group ideologies and power relations” 
illustrated by th is study  and  reported by Pettigrew et al (1992, 
p.266) as significant negative factors in terms of developing 
change-receptive organizations.
In contrast, those who attem pted  to get a firmer grip on the 
vertical relationship ladder found it dangerously slippery and 
unstable. These vertical relationships were relatively easy to 
obstruct, as T rusts and  health  authorities continued to negotiate 
together in tried and tested fashion and opportunities to build the 
tru s t necessary to cem ent budding new relationships were often 
derailed by historic and  stru c tu ra l work patterns.
The ability to build relationships to support a  broad vision seemed 
to be more effective, in term s of building power and influence 
locally, th an  focusing on operational detail. This may have been 
because of the degree of th rea t perceived by potential partners, 
whose control of resources would have been negatively affected,
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perhaps too early in the process. Those Chairmen with an 
orientation tow ards com m unity development tended to foster 
relationships across organisations with a view to creating service 
configurations which could a ttrac t new sources of funds or 
external development monies. This approach enabled them to 
build horizontal partnersh ips, as  well as to strengthen the local 
com munity’s sense of identity. In these sorts of relationships, the 
LHG became the source of support and  strength for new 
organisational groupings. Knight et al (2001 p. 140, 146) point to 
the size of the challenge in m aking such  collaborative working a 
reality ‘on the ground’ and the value of approaches tha t aimed to 
create a  common sense of purpose, whilst a t the same time 
embedding them  within the institu tional context to legitimate 
them further.
Those Chairm en who could then  proceed to align their LHGs’ 
visions with those of the Assembly found themselves empowered 
even further. For example, we saw in Chapter 5 tha t one 
Chairm an referred to testing his LHG’s vision for community 
based services a t a  forum specially convened for tha t purpose with 
the M inister for Health and Social Care. Her approbation 
emboldened him  further, to the point where he used the 
Community Services Review process to strengthen ties with the 
local com m unity and  to oppose the T rust’s views, which local 
politicians were then  supporting. By year three of the study, these
Chairmen had reported their delight in seeing their agendas 
progressing -  and  a t the im pact they saw themselves as having 
had on the Assembly’s strategic aim s for health and social care 
delivery.
The data  from th is study, therefore, emphasizes the importance of 
building relationships and networking skills, in constructing new 
organizations and in developing the web of links tha t served to 
embed them  in the wider com m unity. Thus, abilities to exploit 
ambiguity, to work strategically to build new organizational 
agendas, then  to weave a network of organizational relationships 
in support of those agendas, and  then  to align those agendas with 
those of the Assembly, have been shown to be im portant 
leadership skills in th is study, in term s of strengthening their 
spheres of influence locally. B ut these data also point to the value 
of another set of leadership skills: the ability to recognise and 
effectively exploit an  organization’s distinctive features.
In addition, some Chairm en displayed an ability to identify tacit 
skills and knowledge from w ithin their new organisations, and to 
tap into th is to build unique organisational capabilities. 
“Leveraging” these “asym m etries” (Miller et al 2002) in this way 
enabled some Chairm en to differentiate their LHGs’ products from 
those of other organisations in the area and to be seen to be 
offering som ething new and  uniquely valuable to potential
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custom ers and clients. The findings of this study thus 
corroborate B utler’s (2003) conclusion tha t the ability to leverage 
asymmetries is a  critically im portant leadership quality in terms of 
building im plem entation capacity and thus facilitating receptivity 
to change:
The ability of a sub-se t of Chairm en to, firstly, accept the existing 
state of practice organization as an  asset and then to build on this 
to create broad com m unication channels across the wider 
community enabled them  to build a  primary care focussed rather 
than  medical service led agenda for their LHGs. In addition, some 
Chairmen developed their in frastructu res in such a way tha t they 
were able to build organizational capability to deliver tha t agenda. 
For example, those Chairm en who were able to build effective 
working relationships with their General Managers also reported 
higher levels of satisfaction with their achievements. At the outset 
of the study, the m ajority of Chairm en bemoaned the recruitment 
and selection processes applied to these key appointments. 
Moreover, the General M anagers were viewed by Chairmen (and 
saw themselves) as employees of the health authorities, to whom 
they were both accountable, and  culturally and historically 
oriented towards. Strategically aware Chairmen learned to value 
this ‘alien’ experience and  to respect it. They evolved 
complementary working relationships and soon weaned their GMs 
away from their health  authority  orientation to work as full
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partners tow ards a  different se t of goals. This relationship 
transform ation was by no m eans universal. More operationally 
focussed Chairm en never really managed to change their 
perspectives on th is crucial relationship. Their failure to build a 
more trusting  working relationship with their chief officer tended, 
in turn , to m irror their relationships with their health authorities 
throughout the study period.
Ferlie et al (1996) pointed ou t the critical role th a t an effective 
Board could play in developing an  organization’s competence, 
noting the im portance of Board development in this respect, both 
individually and collectively. B ut a s  th is study has shown, LHG 
Chairmen were given very few resources or guidance in relation to 
the development of their Boards. Some Chairmen embraced the 
diversity presented by their 18 Board members, and engaged their 
commitment by giving them  central roles and responsibilities in 
developing and shaping the LHGs’ agendas, and helping to solve 
problems arising. These Chairm en stood out from their 
colleagues, who saw the Board as more problematic. In addition, 
Chairmen who applied a  learning orientation to their role were 
more likely to value th is diversity and to use it constructively.
Similarly, those Chairm en who seized the clinical governance 
agenda as an  opportunity ra th e r than  as a threat, and placed it at 
the centre of the LHG’s agenda, created a  unifying force, both
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among their clinical constituen ts and their local client and user 
communities. This service quality orientation, couched in the 
language of clinical governance, became an effective tool for 
engaging social service and  voluntary sector provider colleagues 
too. In the event, clinical quality improvement became an effective 
rallying point for local clinicians, and  a  useful bridge uniting 
primary and secondary sector based clinicians.
Focussing on specific local health  issues also proved to be an 
effective tactic for engaging both local clinicians and the wider 
community. In these instances, the definition of local health needs 
tended to be informed by evidence ra ther than  individual 
experience. Such an  approach differentiated the LHG from local 
hospital tru sts , for example, and  enabled them  to build coalitions 
aimed a t stim ulating service provision rather than  protecting 
existing structu res and  buildings. This approach also facilitated 
the engagement of local business leaders and local politicians, 
raising the com m unity’s aw areness of health needs relevant to 
their interests. This increased aw areness was adroitly turned into 
broad based support over time.
One of the m ost striking aspects of the Chairmen’s struggles, 
however, is th a t the harder some of them  tried, the more difficult 
it became, and the fu rther away they appeared to be, from 
succeeding. Lewin’s (1951 cited in lies and Sutherland 2001)
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Force Field Analysis may help to explain th is perversity, 
postulating that, when meeting forces resistan t to change, the 
most effective strategy is to work to reduce the strength  of the 
resistance, rather than  to strengthen argum ents favouring the 
proposed change. Those Chairm en’s efforts to strengthen their 
case for more resources only served to unite and strengthen 
health authorities’ resisting forces. The consultation process on 
re-structuring initiated by the new Director of NHS Wales in 2001 
gave those resisting forces an  ideal platform to come together as a 
united front. And as we have seen, the consultation process itself 
disadvantaged GP Chairmen as players, ham pering their ability to 
present their case. As a result, the Assembly’s decision to remove 
the health authority tier was the only way forward for LHGs.
The new statutory sta tus subsequently conferred gave the LHGs 
(as LHBs) the opportunity to “cross the boundary” of 
organisational politics, and to “become co-creators of the new 
reality” (Webster 2004) of NHS Wales. W hether th is was to prove 
to be the blessing it appeared to be would have to be the subject of 
a future study.
11.3 Im plications o f the findings in relation to  recent 
literature on leadership. The leadership behaviours identified in 
this study differ from those usually referred to in classical 
leadership texts a t the time the study commenced. They were
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certainly not noted in any of the developmental workshops 
provided to Chairmen a t the outset of the study. But as Chapter 2 
argued, the context in which public sector organizations are 
operating has been changing rapidly over the past twenty years. 
Sandfort and Milward (2008) point to the “hollowing ou t of the 
state”, sparked by the drive to improve productivity, and 
increasing reliance on private m arkets to achieve public ends, 
leading to increased decentralisation and organizational 
fragmentation. They also point towards a  parallel increase in 
service orientation and more em phasis on tactics to enhance 
accountability for results (p. 147). These competing drivers have 
been further complicated by growing aw areness of the lim itations 
of individual agencies to tackle presenting public problems, 
prompting calls for more 'cross cu tting’ approaches, requiring 
collaborative working arrangem ents, particularly in relation to 
public service delivery. In such contexts, em phasis has turned to 
shared provision of services. Such contexts also imply shared 
resources and power. But, as Sandfort and Milward point out 
(p. 151), shared does not mean equal.
And, as was noted in Chapter 2, organizational responses 
included more partnership working, more networking and 
horizontal linkages replacing more traditional vertical or 
hierarchical relationships. Pettigrew and Fenton (2000) pointed 
out tha t these new organizational forms gave rise to new dualities
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and tensions. Managing such  challenges effectively would require 
different sorts of leaderships skills and behaviours th an  those 
predicated in the hierarchical and m arket models prevailing in the 
1980’s and 1990’s. Alimo-Metcalf and  Alban-Metcalf (2006) refer 
to the emerging model of leadership as "nearby” in con trast to the 
more remote and ‘heroic’ individualist leader models of these 
earlier decades (pp. 295-6). Their 14 leadership constructs 
include a  mixture of traits and behaviours, derived from their own 
empirical studies, which combine to portray transform ational 
leadership (p. 299). This model purports to build on G reenleafs 
concept of the “servant leader” to extend it to “leadership in 
partnership” bu t still seems to be more relevant to those working 
within more traditional, albeit complex, public sector 
organizations, with its em phasis on team building, thoughtful and 
sensitive delegation, etc. Grint (2001) highlighted the importance 
of leadership which takes account of stakeholders, em phasising 
the positive value of diversity, especially in relation to 
informational and societal contributions to leadership 
effectiveness. Grint’s Review for the Cabinet Office (2001) also 
picked up the servant/partnersh ip  theme, bu t highlighted the 
potential impact of the m aturity of followers in contributing to 
leadership effectiveness. He also pointed to the im portance of 
negotiation and persuasiveness skills in securing agreem ent to 
pu t collective needs above individual wants, and the ability of 
leaders to negotiate their way through multiple accountabilities
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and conflicting dem ands, harking back to Pettigrew’s and Fenton’s 
(2000) prescription. Pedersen and Hartley (2008), noting the 
impact of the disintegration of traditional hierarchies of roles and 
procedures, extend G rin t’s (2001) work by pointing to the 
emerging need for leaders who can both create decision-space and 
recognise m utual in terests. They call th is the ability to:
establish an independent platform from which the manager can become 
an accountable part in positioning and creating frameworks...for 
relations with stakeholders, users and employees (p. 336).
In essence such leaders have to negotiate both their own
legitimacy and power bases, alm ost on an  issue-by-issue basis.
Perhaps it is this latter aspect a t which the more transform ational
LHG Chairmen showed themselves to be m ost adept. They worked
continuously to reshape their working contexts bu t in addition
they then continually adapted their emerging priorities to align
them with central planks of the WAG’s own overarching agenda.
The ability to read the political priorities and to then reinterpret
and express them  cogently in ways th a t multiple stakeholders
could embrace was critical to their success in building supportive
organizational relationships. In addition these Chairmen showed
an astu te  capacity for engendering learning across their
organizations. This em phasis on facilitating collective learning
from their emerging experience may have contributed to
strengthening their organizations’ capacity and resilience (Stewart
and O’Donnell 2006). Oddly, however, the ability, noted by Miller
et al (2002), to build capacity by identifying and strengthening
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tacit organizational asse ts  is absen t from these more recent 
academic studies of leadership, though Hartley’s review, 
commissioned by the NCCSDO and  not yet in print, may well 
address th is gap. This study noted the ability to identify tacit 
organizational assets and to build on them  to create new 
organizational capacity a s  a  key leadership behaviour. The 
importance of context h as  been noted by more recent literature. 
Vangen and Huxham (2003) have pointed to the need for 
leadership and m anagem ent th a t is “embracing, empower[ing], 
involving and mobilising” in order to build and sustain  effective 
collaborative arrangem ents locally. Again this model recognises 
implicitly the need for continuous re-negotiation of legitimacy and 
authority. Hartley (2008) calls for more recognition of “public 
value outcomes” in relation to leadership and proposes a 
m ultidimensional model which incorporates such longer term 
consequences equally alongside context, concepts, characteristics, 
capabilities and challenges in seeking to define and m easure 
leadership effectiveness. Since this study did not test or m easure 
leadership qualities, more empirical research to test th is model in 
practice is needed now.
11.4 Im plications o f the findings in relation to recent work 
on inter organizational relationships LHG Chairmen themselves 
pointed to organizational relationship building as one of their 
most im portant if difficult achievements. Recent research in the
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field of inter-organizational relationships illustrates the complex 
and multifaceted natu re  of this task  (Cropper et al 2008). 
Chairm en’s efforts to forge horizontal relationships exemplified the 
underlying need to negotiate legitimacy and decision-space 
(Hartley 2008) with each of their stakeholders, again on an 
ongoing and case-by-case basis throughout their tenure in office. 
That th is came as som ething of a  surprise to these Chairmen is 
probably an  understatem ent. Yeung (2008) refers to the way in 
which the concept of power has had to be reinterpreted and 
expressed to fit new organizational realities across collaborative 
arrangem ents. In these new contexts, power emerges as the ability 
to influence a wider variety of other actors, and thus is a 
mediating behaviour, ra ther th an  an  asset vested in position or 
resources (p. 484). Another difference in these collaborative 
working contexts is the need for continuous renegotiation of 
legitimacy.
Within the emerging field of inter-organizational relations, this 
study could be said to be set within a social psychological 
approach, in th a t it looks a t “‘real organizations’ and their 
interactions...relevant histories, and future perspectives...and the 
dynamics occurring a t various system levels” (Cropper et al, 
p.726). But in doing so this study is only a  beginning: the short 
lifespan of the LHGs as organizations emphasizes the time
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consuming and  lengthy processes involved in building effective 
organizational relationships.
In a context where organizational restructuring  is the norm not 
the exception, there is rapid turnover of (often the same) personnel 
within short periods of time. This study has highlighted the 
importance of history as a  relational dimension. Experience has 
shown th a t changing ‘h a ts ’ does not erase previous organizational 
or personal history in a small geographical region. Previous 
history, a t individual and collective level, has been shown to 
impact on tru s t and may play a  stronger role a t the early stages of 
relationship formation, th an  a t later stages.
Schulter’s and Lee’s (1993) typology proved to be a  useful 
analytical device in so far as it provided a  range of relational 
dimensions along which to consider and understand  complex 
relationship quality issues. It may be th a t it is m ost useful for 
examining the early stages of forging partnerships and 
collaborative working arrangem ents. It highlights issues to be 
considered and their potential impact. Issues of how power and 
influence are developed a t th is formation stage may well be 
different from how power is m aintained a t later stages in the 
partnersh ip’s evolution. Thus, a t later stages, when collaborative 
arrangem ents are more firmly established, attention can turn to 
what Lotia and  Hardy (2008) term  “collaborative and resource
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dependencies”: how the partnership  itself works to enable 
member organizations to increase their collective power by 
increasing their ability to access resources and “manage 
dependencies" (p. 368).
11.5 Im plications o f  the findings on policy implementation
This study’s findings have identified the roles which individual 
LHG Chairm en and their LHGs have had  a t a  micro level in terms 
of policy implementation. While the study period has been 
relatively short, some tentative conclusions have emerged in terms 
of policy implementation. We have seen th a t the immaturity of the 
newly formed Welsh Assembly Government did not help them to 
provide clarity or consistency of direction. Nor did it help them to 
anticipate the num erous challenges to be faced in ensuring 
implementation or reducing local variation. At the same time, the 
challenges presenting, especially in term s of changing power 
relations locally, were proving particularly intractable. The 
structural changes introduced had  had  little effect on the 
dynamics prevailing within the health  system across Wales. In 
such circum stances the M inister’s decision to meet regularly with 
her LHG Chairs could be seen as creating a useful feedback 
m echanism  on policy im plem entation aspects. Her decision to 
further restructu re  by abolishing HAs, and making LHGs into 
statutory organizations could be seen as responding appropriately 
to the collective com plaints of LHG Chairmen. The problem was
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tha t it d idn’t  go far enough to have an impact on the real 
powerhouses in the system , the combined Trusts. This highlights 
again the complexity of the issues presenting and the difficulty of 
using a  s truc tu ra l m echanism  to address them  (Walshe and 
Rundall 2001).
Moreover, the policy aim s them selves were unclear. Exworthy et al 
(2001), am ong others, note th a t competing policy objectives 
impact negatively on local im plem entation. The policy aims in this 
case were further clouded by failure to articulate any clear 
developmental pathw ay or criteria for the new organizations. This 
m eant th a t their paren t organizations were free to create their own 
definitions of progress, and  associated performance measures, 
thus muddying the already m urky w aters further. Smith & 
Goodwin (2006) note th a t lack of clear and appropriate 
performance m easures for PCOs in England is part of a  larger 
international problem, claim ing th a t policy m akers have been 
overly influenced by process, in term s of setting up  primary care 
organizations based on m odels used  in different countries and 
health systems. They call for more attention to be paid to the 
effect of different models on health  outcomes (p. 194). Again the 
constraints imposed by context need more attention.
In such circum stances Cropper et al (2007) call for mechanisms 
th a t promote more “policy learning” through more interactive
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policy m aking, including piloting and  testing, th a t would in turn 
encourage wider forms of learning (p. 41). The LHG Chairs Group 
might well have been an  appropriate vehicle for developing that 
sort of dialogue had  it no t been hijacked by more powerful players 
and the announcem ent of another structu ra l change.
11.6 Strengths and W eaknesses o f  the Present Study The
study has followed the fortunes of all 22 of the key actors selected 
at the ou tset of the study. This represen ts 100 per cent 
compliance th roughout the two and  a  half year study period. It 
also includes, in three cases, the Chairm en who replaced those 
who left the role before the end of the study in the final tranche of 
interviews, (and, in one case, includes the retiring Chairman as 
well). This willingness of subjects to participate throughout such a 
demanding and  tu rb u len t period of their own professional lives is 
both u n usua l and  highly gratifying. As noted in Chapter 3, it may 
indicate th a t Chairm en attached  some degree of value to the 
process, in th a t participation afforded them  rare opportunities for 
personal reflection. It may also point towards the isolation and 
loneliness of the Chairm en's positions in the organizational 
landscape throughout the study period. At any rate, this 
compliance provided a  uniquely rich set of data. This richness 
was strengthened by the fact th a t the study covered virtually the 
whole organizational life cycle of LHGs. This was not the intention 
at the outset, because a t th a t point there was no indication that
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the LHG life cycle would be so short. It could be argued tha t it is 
only because so few concrete steps were taken to develop and 
strengthen these new organizations, beyond the sub committee 
sta tus th a t they were originally given, th a t such a  major statutory 
transform ation was eventually required. But announcem ent of 
this structu ra l change did m ean th a t Chairmen were amenable to 
reflecting upon the lessons learned during their tenure in office, 
and onto advice they m ight give to their successors. Looking back 
over the period as a  whole helped increase their awareness of 
what they had achieved as well a s  of all the challenges still ahead. 
However, the depth of exploration, analysis and understanding 
achieved by the study design m ay have been a t the expense of 
more roundedness of experience. Individual paradigms, decisions 
and actions could be given a  gloss th a t triangulating with LHG 
Board M inutes and other grey literature could not remove. An 
alternative study design incorporating the use of a  smaller 
num ber of case studies, say five to give one per HA area, would 
have incorporated the viewpoints of more actors, possibly the 
whole Board, or the Executive Committee. Arguably this would 
have provided a  more rounded picture of the fortunes of the LHGs. 
However the com m itm ent levels and  contribution of individual 
Board m em bers is inevitably variable, especially over time. And 
Executive Committees in English PCOs have been criticised for 
being overly dom inant (Smith and  Goodwin 2006, p. 209). 
Moreover, none of the Board m em bers held the degree of personal
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accountability or responsibility th a t the Chairmen held. Finally, 
since the aim of the study  w as to capture the experience of 
leadership, the focus on the responsible individual was preferable 
to a  more diffuse study  of a  broader num ber of participants. Had 
the aim been to evaluate effectiveness, or progress, however, then 
the broader case study  approach  m ight well have been preferable. 
As it happens, and  in the circum stances prevailing, the decision to 
focus on the experiences of the  selected key actors has provided a 
rich collection of data, filtered by individual reflection tha t also 
afforded a degree of distance, w hilst still retaining temporal 
immediacy.
Another possible w eakness of the study is th a t it deliberately 
avoided any attem pt to evaluate achievem ents. The decision not 
to evaluate was taken because of the peculiar circum stances of 
the researcher and the prevailing culture within NHS Wales 
throughout the period u n d er study. As pointed out in Chapter 3, 
the researcher’s In sid er’ role as an  academic within the regional 
medical school helped facilitate access to participants, 
acceptability of research aim s and  credibility of research process. 
But her role as a  senior employee of Wales’ NHS managem ent 
development agency brought significant constraints. Care needed 
to be taken to avoid any h in t of acting in concert with the Welsh 
Assembly Government, or as  its agent, as th a t would have 
seriously compromised the researcher’s credibility in the eyes of
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the study partic ipants. In th is role, the researcher was 
constrained by additional political considerations: her Chief 
Executive was keen to ensure th a t the research “did not 
em barrass the W elsh Assembly Government”.1 This m eant tha t a 
somewhat awkward balancing act was needed to distance the 
researcher sufficiently from the centre and its directives and, at 
the same time, to dem onstrate aw areness of the prevailing 
organizational context and  the policy pronouncem ents emanating 
from the centre.
Furthermore, boundaries imposed by the structu ral relationship 
of LHGs to HAs had  to be respected. W hilst LHG Chairmen were 
happy to participate as  subjects, there was every indication that 
they had not asked perm ission from their HA Chief Executives to 
do so, and several indications tha t, had  they done so, permission 
would not have been granted. As noted earlier (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.12, p. 48 and  C hapter 4, section 4.4, p. 130) HA Chief 
Executives reacted furiously and  speedily to overturn an  initial 
WAG agreem ent to fund an  evaluative study proposed by the 
researcher and colleagues, on the stated  grounds th a t permission 
to study their sub  com m ittees should first have been sought from 
them, and th a t these LHG sub  com m ittees were, in their view, 
already ‘over-researched’. These sensitivities made it impossible to 
carry out more evaluative studies. As a  resu lt the only outcome
1 Personal verbal communication July 1999
m easures applied were “soft” ones, based on LHG Chairmen’s own 
descriptions of them selves. These included a  focus on “progress” 
which m eant increased autonom y. Another implicit indicator was 
the extent to which the WAG appeared to respond to their local 
agendas. Whilst th is m ight be considered a  weakness in one 
sense, the resulting study h as  provided a  rich picture of the 
experience and process of policy implementation, in all its 
variability, within one relatively sm all and  unified geographical 
area. As such  it goes some way to fu rther understanding of the 
factors contributing to variations in policy implementation. The 
findings th u s  add to earlier work in th is area, notably by Exworthy 
et al (2001).
Finally, comments are in order in relation to key conceptual 
frameworks employed in th is study. Schulter’s and Lee’s (1993) 
relationship typology was especially useful in term s of 
understanding the often seemingly contradictory data in 
Chairmen’s reports. It was also helpful as a  reporting device, 
because it enabled m aterial to be organized thematically, and 
discussed longitudinally. However, because Schulter and Lee 
(1993, as adapted by Meads (2001) did not fully differentiate their 
categories in sufficient detail, some dom ains appeared to overlap 
with others. This limits the typology’s usefulness as a  m easuring 
device.
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The concept of organizational receptivity to change proved pivotal 
to the analysis in th is study. Pettigrew et a l’s (1992) empirical 
study of how organisations react to strategic changes within the 
NHS identified eight factors th a t need to be in place to enable 
organizations to react positively to policy changes. Butler (2003) 
subsum es these eight factors down to four in his empirical study 
of local authorities, reactions to a  new policy imperative. Butler’s 
study also linked receptivity to capacity building. This study 
differs from the earlier stud ies in th a t it focuses on newly forming, 
rather than  existing, organizations. Secondly, in both earlier 
studies, decision-making au thority  had actually been devolved, so 
tha t attention was able to be focussed on implementation. That 
was not the case in th is study. B ut the earlier works did provide 
robust frameworks for analysis. The frameworks also provided 
crucial links to organizational theory and change managem ent 
literature. They gave useful s truc tu re  to the emerging data  
analysis, enabling deeper testing and com parison of concepts, 
within a  unified and tested  theory. This study’s findings add to 
these earlier works in term s of specific leadership behaviours 
identified. The analysis h as  shown not only w hat behaviours were 
effective, but how they im pacted, over time.
In term s of leadership qualities p erse , however, the study might 
have been further strengthened by incorporating quantitative 
m easures of leadership traits or competences. W hilst such an
390
approach m ight have given greater clarity to the findings, it might 
also have limited the focus of attention on to those dimensions of 
leadership then  extant; and  this might have made it more difficult 
to identify and isolate the behaviours which differed from earlier 
concepts th a t emerged from this study. No 360 degree appraisal 
systems were in use w ithin NHS Wales a t th is level during the 
study period. The M inister for Health and  Social Care was 
responsible for appraising Chairm en and it is possible that 
incorporating her views of leadership effectiveness into the study 
would have helped to corroborate findings. It is debatable 
whether such an  elem ent of personal evaluation would have been 
acceptable to Chairmen. The lack of clarity in role and 
expectations would have m ade th is an  interesting exercise.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is fair to say tha t the study 
has achieved its aims in th a t it has provided a  unique picture of 
the challenges and opportunities faced by those responsible for 
leading the implementation of a  major policy initiative locally, over 
a defined period of time and within a  bounded geographical area. 
The study's findings are, of course, peculiar to this context. But 
they may also have resonance for similar contexts across Europe, 
where regional governments have responsibility for policy 
initiatives and implementation, especially in relation to health and 
social care delivery. The insights provided by those 'at the sharp’ 
end help u s  to see the startling gaps between rhetoric, intention
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and reality w ith fresh clarity. The prospective nature of the study 
means th a t a  reasonably complete picture has been possible, of 
implementation challenges over time, and throughout an 
organizational life cycle. This “processual” (Pettigrew 1973) 
approach has also enabled a  clear picture of leadership 
behaviours to emerge and to be clarified over time, as having been 
effective in identifying and capitalising on opportunities for 
facilitating organizational change and  development, within a 
turbulent policy environm ent in which decision-making was never 
really devolved.
11.7 Recomm endations Arising from the Study
Research Question 3: What lessons can be learned for leadership, 
and policy implementation at local level?
Recommendation 1: Leadership Development Programmes, 
especially those aimed a t clinicians, or a t building organizations 
receptive to change, need to foster the development of the skills 
shown in this study to be effective in creating change promoting 
organizations. More focus on political skills in getting round 
structural constraints, the ‘how’ of change, rather than  on the 
content and structures them selves, or the V h a t’ of change, would 
be helpful in such programmes. The contested nature of power 
and influence in collaborative working arrangem ents also needs to
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be highlighted in development programmes, together with effective 
strategies for securing and  m aintaining “decision-space”.
The isolation experienced by clinical leaders is another area for 
attention. Clinical leaders in particu lar would benefit from more 
individual coaching and  m entoring support. Peer support groups, 
properly facilitated to encourage structu red  reflection, could 
address this need.
In addition, clinical leadership development initiatives need to 
incorporate elements which prom pt partic ipants’ to challenge their 
assum ptions about policy making, and  the myriad influences 
which impact on the policy process, to enable them  to work more 
effectively within the complex health  sector environment. In 
particular clinical leaders need to learn the limitations of so-called 
“evidence-based policy making” and  how it differs crucially from 
evidence-based medicine. Blackler et al (1999) note the potential 
for using ‘activity theory’ to promote clearer understanding of 
“perspective-making...and shaping processes and their 
relationships” to this end. Leadership Development programmes 
also need to support the acquisition of the ability to understand 
this environmental complexity and  exploit uncertainty  effectively. 
McAuliffe and McKenzie (2007, p. 208) suggest use of 
“retrospective policy analyses” a s  a  useful step towards achieving 
this goal.
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Recommendation 2: Inter-organizational Relationship Building and 
Community Development approaches The value of adopting broad 
based approaches to the wider com m unity and  creating 
opportunities for continuing dialogue with stakeholders needs to 
be emphasized in leadership and organizational development 
programmes, especially when the object of the exercise is to 
promote change and innovation. Because institu tional politics 
emerged as so im portant in th is study, such  program m es could 
usefully include analysis of how factors th a t promote effective 
working relationships am ong stakeholder agencies work in 
different contexts. M aintaining collaborative relationships over 
time and changing circum stances also needs addressing in such 
programmes.
Recommendation 3: Organizational Learning h as  increasingly been 
recognised as a  core competence of effective organizations (Senge 
1990; Easterby-Smith et al 1998; Crompton et al 2003, Cropper et 
al 2007). It appears from th is study th a t those Chairm en who 
applied such an  approach to their LHG’s development expressed 
more satisfaction with their progress, th an  their counterparts who 
did not do so. Many of the Chairm en who spoke m ost frequently 
of the need to learn, and supported their organizations in doing 
so, had held previous educational roles, often as CME Tutors, for 
example. But it was their em phasis on facilitating o thers’
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learning, both w ithin the LHG and across their geographical areas 
tha t had the m ost impact, as Chapter 10 showed. The Chairm en’s 
Group was originally set up, a t the end of their initial preparatory 
development program m e, in Ju ly  1999, to foster this sort of 
shared learning am ong the Chairm en, as peers. But, by 2001, th is 
Group’s focus had become dom inated by discussions about future 
structures and models. This m eant th a t the Group no longer 
functioned as a  m eans of sharing learning and  new approaches to 
common problems. The m em bers’ own agendas could be said to 
have been hijacked by the cen tre’s concerns by th is time.
The opportunity cost of th is w as the shared  learning foregone, as 
attention focussed around ways to influence the future shape of 
LHGs. Sucked into playing the political game they professed to 
detest, many of the Chairmen becam e embroiled in it, and thus 
were distracted from w hat m ight have become one of their core 
strengths - the ability to share learning and  experiences. Again, 
however, this core competence of a  high performing organisation 
was never discussed during their initial training.
More use of structured reflection as  a  learning tool would also 
help in this respect. The Chairm en appeared to welcome the 
opportunity to discuss their perceptions over time, bu t the role of 
the researcher in this study made it impossible to adopt a  
facilitator role in that respect. Yet arguably the m ost powerful
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learning m ight well have been achieved through such facilitated 
structu red  reflection, either on an  individual basis or through 
action learning sets. Sm ith and  Goodwin (2006) call for more 
active involvement of PCOs in organizational research, to aid 
understand ing  of how different organizational models and 
governance fram eworks im pact on service quality and health 
outcom es locally. Miller e t al (2002, p .50) acknowledging the 
difficulties of engendering com petences in leveraging assymetries 
note the value of continuous action, experimentation and 
reflection in order to identify, develop and embed new 
organizational capabilities over time. Given the importance of this 
area in building receptive organizational contexts, more attention 
to funding facilitated learning across PCOs is needed.
Recommendation 4: improving policy implementation at local level: 
Confusion abou t policy aim s ham pered implementation in this 
study. This enabled d ispu tes abou t boundaries and authority to 
flourish. Sm ith and  Goodwin (2006) point to the tendency of 
policy m akers to adopt m anaged care models from other contexts, 
paying insufficient atten tion  to the importance of contexts. The 
negative effects of th is  m ight be lessened by more action research 
in th is area.
The value of on-going dialogue between policy makers and 
im plem enters h as  been shown, in this study, through the
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Chairm en’s efforts to hold quarterly meetings with the Minister. It 
may be th a t building sim ilar continuous feedback loops into the 
process of policy im plem entation would help policy makers to 
identify u n in tended  consequences early on in the process, and to 
take avoiding action where possible or desirable. Adopting Cropper 
et a l’s (2007) proposals for building interactive learning into the 
im plem entation process would enable both policy makers and 
policy im plem enters to increase their own reflective capacity, as 
well a s  th a t of the ir PCOs.
Additionally, policy m akers need to recognize the length of time it 
takes for new organizational structu res to form and then become 
operational. Chairm en, in th is study, frequently pushed back the 
time fram es of the ir expectations, pointing to the fact their 
em ergent organizations were still forming, well into the second 
year of the study, an d  their LHGs’ life spans. This mirrors the 
experience of PCOs in England (Smith and Goodwin 2006).
Policymakers also need to acquire a  better understanding of the 
conditions needed for facilitating intersectoral collaboration in 
general, and  organizational relationships, in particular. This 
study h as  highlighted the im pact of history as being particularly 
im portant. Again tim e is an  im portant factor because of the 
lengthy period of time it takes to build tru st among key players
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and organizational leads. Such tru s t is of course a  prerequisite 
for any form of risk  sharing to be attem pted.
Finally, a lthough  th is  study did not set out to measure 
effectiveness, the  findings suggest th a t innovation can be 
stim ulated and  supported  within a  publicly funded sector 
provided th a t a tten tion  is devoted to ensuring tha t the requisite 
skills are in place and  appropriate strategies pursued. The 
requirem ents of sustainability  may conflict with the realities of 
short term  central funding, in a  politically led service, bu t this 
issue needs to be resolved. Therefore the current interest in social 
en trep reneursh ip  h as  to be bu ttressed  with skills in spreading, 
em bedding and  susta in ing  innovative services if social gain is to 
be realised. In th is sense, paying more attention to the 
developm ent needs of those charged with responsibility for 
im plem entation is a  key challenge for policy makers and 
educators alike.
11.8 D irections for Further Research
Supporting and Sustaining Collaborative Working 
The com m unity developm ent and learning oriented approaches 
applied by the more strategically oriented Chairmen in this study 
indicate the effectiveness of such  approaches in fostering local 
engagem ent and  ownership in the process of developing service 
delivery partnersh ips. Perhaps the real question remaining, then,
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is the extent to w hich such  new partnerships can best be 
supported over the  longer term , given the constraints of short 
term  and  non recurring  funding patterns.
Leadership Behaviours
Further research  is needed to test the leadership behaviours 
identified in th is  study. The analysis has shown th a t the factors 
which helped LHG C hairm en to grow their organisations are 
sim ilar to, b u t no t identical to, those identified by Butler (2003), 
Miller e t al (2002) an d  Pettigrew et al (1992). And it is clear from 
this study  th a t none of these behaviours would have been enough 
by itself. W hether th is  com bination is sufficient in terms of 
specific outcom e m easures, and  in different contexts than that 
studied here, need fu rther research.
Organizational Research
The study 's findings highlight the importance of conducting 
research into organizations within the health sector, as well as the 
time consum ing an d  expensive natu re  of such research in 
addressing the really interesting questions about the relationships 
between policy changes, organizational responses and leadership 
behaviour, and  the ir effects.
In the case of LHGs in Wales, the opportunity to assess the effects 
of their co-optation into the m ainstream  by becoming Local Health
399
Boards w ith s ta tu to ry  powers for commissioning has now been 
lost since they are to be restructured  afresh. But new questions 
arise from the cu rren t restructuring  proposals. W hat impact might 
the new s tru c tu re s  have on their ability to innovate, for example? 
More research  into organizational models th a t promote changes in 
service delivery is needed, alongside strategies to sustain  such 
collaborative service delivery partnerships. Studies into the 
am ount of “decision space” (Bossert 1996; Exworthy 2008) created 
by s tru c tu ra l change, and  the resulting im pacts on organizational 
effectiveness and  hea lth  gain could also be valuable research 
stream s, in view of the  findings from this study.
Clearly ano ther key question arising from this study is the effect 
th a t setting u p  LHGs had  on the range and quality of local service 
provision. There is a  need for further research into the effects of 
struc tu ra l and  organisational change on the quality and quantity 
of service provision. Such studies are needed a t all levels of the 
health and  social care system: regionally, across the four 
countries of the UK; sub-regionally, within PCTs/LHBs and across 
sub-groupings, particularly  as new commissioning arrangem ents 
begin to bite; and  more locally, to compare and contrast the effects 
of s tru c tu res  in the  post industrial areas of the Welsh valleys with 
those of m arket tow ns and  u rban  areas.
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Finally, th is  s tu d y ’s findings have dem onstrated that, while 
s tru c tu ra l changes are im portan t levers for change, they are not 
the end of the  story b u t the beginning. In this study it was the 
leadership behaviours an d  political skills of key actors th a t were 
m ost influential in creating organizations receptive to change and 
prom oting change locally. And, a t the end of the study, it is 
sa lu tary  to rem em ber, and  to contrast, the Chairmen’s own 
modesty, via the ir descrip tions of themselves, as leaders (Chapter 
6), with the n a tu re  of the ir achievem ents in this role. None would 
have u sed  the m anagem ent labels applied here to describe their 
efforts. B ut it is only th rough  eliciting their stories, as this study 
has, th a t it h a s  been possible to dissect and uncover the 
leadership styles and  behaviours th a t ‘worked’ in this context, and 
why.
401
Post Script
This study has covered the period from January 1999 to December 
2001. It thus begins at the point at which LHGs became operational in 
shadow form. The study ends after the point at which the decision had 
been taken to abolish the HA tier, and to strengthen the organizations at 
primaiy care level. By the time the study ended, consultation on the 
form that the organizational restructuring would take had been 
completed.
Local Health Boards were duly constituted as statutory organizations on 
1st April 2003. The composition of the Boards remained largely 
unchanged, but they were expanded to include additional lay 
representation. The chief officer post was strengthened to reflect the 
increased responsibilities at this level, becoming Chief Executive rather 
than General Manager. Remaining staff at HA level were largely 
absorbed by the new organizations, in an effort to provide increased 
capacity especially in relation to new commissioning responsibilities. 
Another significant change in the system occurred at the same time, 
i m p a r t i n g  on capacity at primaiy care level. Public Health professionals 
became independent in that they were employed by, and accountable to, 
a newly created but separate agency, the National Public Health Service. 
This move enhanced the profile of public health as a profession but, 
arguably, created further problems in terms of conflicting 
responsibilities and accountabilities. Each LHB was entitled to 
specialised public health support through named individual Directors,
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but these individuals were, at the same time, accountable to the newly 
appointed Director of Public Health for Wales, who was, in turn, 
accountable to the Welsh Assembly Government.
It is fair to say that the new restructuring plans for NHS Wales 
announced in the autum n of 2008 were aimed at addressing system 
imbalances still remaining in the wake of the 2003 restructuring. 
Anecdotally, LHB Finance Directors have complained of inadequate 
capacity to effect changes in service delivery locally, and the hoped- for 
benefits from LHB commissioning have not materialised. Consequently 
the Welsh Assembly Government Minister for Health and Social Care, 
Edwina Hart, announced the abolition of the internal market in health 
and social care across Wales in June 2008, and consultation on the new 
organizational structure to implement this policy has just been 
completed (end September 2008). A new National Advisory Board will be 
created. A separate Delivery Board, to oversee day-to-day operations, 
will also be established, chaired by the Chief Executive of NHS Wales. 
Seven newly vertically integrated Trusts will be responsible for providing 
health services across Wales. The role of the body responsible for the 
commissioning of specialist services is still under review at the time of 
writing, as is the structure of the soon-to-be formed Unified Public Health 
organization. Present proposals indicate that executive responsibility for 
public health will reside with the new Trusts, but that this responsibility 
will be shared at national level. There will also be a new public health 
presence within local government.
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Personal C om m unications and  Observations
Personal observation of debate between LHG Chairmen and Director 
and A ssistant Director of Social Services, presenting the launch 
docum ent for Local H ealth Alliances across Wales, 2 Ju ly  1999, Study 
Block 3 of the NHS Staff College Wales Development Programme for 
LHG Chairm en. Caer Beris M anor, Builth, Wales.
Personal com m unication (verbal) to researcher from (then) line 
m anager, NHS Staff College W ales, Hensol Hospital, Pontyclun, Wales, 
Ju ly  1999.
Personal com m unication from GM 003 to researcher during a  
telephone conversation to arrange next interview with Chairman, 
August 2000.
Personal observation of the  proceedings of the Health and Social 
Services Com mittee m eeting held on 25 October 2000, Committee 
Room 2, National Assembly for Wales. Agenda Item HSS-18-00. 
Recorded by researcher in own field notes and corroborated by 
M inutes published  subsequently .
Personal com m unication to the  researcher from an Independent 
Medical Advisor to the Chief Medical Officer of the Welsh Assembly 
Government, during  a  m eeting held for another purpose. 15 August 
2001. Notes recorded in researcher's  field notes made immediately 
following the meeting.
Personal letter from HA Chief Executive to researcher arguing against 
proposed research  into LHGs Ja n u a ry  2001.
Personal com m unication to researcher from Director, NHS Wales in 
which the need for cau tion  in dealing with Social Services colleagues 
was em phasized, in particu lar, the im portance of avoiding any action 
or initiative th a t m ight imply NHS dom inance over Social Services 
activity. Septem ber 2002.
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Appendix A Invitation  and Consent Letter
Letter A — distribution list attached
Please reply to Ext 3770 
Email: Williamssa@cardiff.ac.uk
«LHG_Chairmenaddress» 
Dear «Salutation»
It was a pleasure to meet you on Friday during the last Module of the LHG Chairs 
Commissioning Course at Caer Beris Manor.
When we met, I asked whether you would be willing to participate in a research 
project on Local Health Groups. You kindly indicated interest, and I agreed to write 
to you with more details, so that you could make a decision after time for reflection.
The attached flyer outlines the aims of the research. Basically, the establishment of 
LHGs provides a unique opportunity to learn valuable lessons about the 
management of change within primary care. I would like to carry out a qualitative 
study based on the perceptions of the key players: the LHG Chairmen themselves. 
In order to do this, I would like to arrange an initial meeting with each Chairman in 
the next couple of months, followed by a series of telephone interviews at quarterly 
intervals, culminating in a final interview in about 18 months time. The first and 
final meetings might last up to an hour; interim conversations might take half an 
hour or so.
I am hoping that the process will be an enjoyable one for participants, and that the 
opportunity to reflect on the previous months' activity afforded by the telephone 
interviews will be valuable in itself.
I would be very grateful for your agreement to participate in this study. I think 
there is real potential for NHS Wales to learn some important lessons about policy 
development and implementation from the results.
Would you kindly complete and return the form attached to indicate whether or not 
you are willing to participate in the study? I would be grateful for a reply by the end 
of July. If you would like any further information about the study before making a 
decision, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Thank you very much for considering this. 
With best wishes 
Yours sincerely
Stephanie Williams
Lecturer Health Service Management
Enc
Primary Cara Development Study of the formation of Local Health Groups
1. I am willing to participate in the above study. I understand that you will be 
contacting me in mid September to arrange an initial meeting.
I am not willing to participate in this study because:
Name:.
Address:.
Telephone:.
Email:____
Signed:___
Please return this form to:
Stephanie Williams
Lecturer Health Service Management
Department of Medical Education
School of Postgraduate Medical & Dental Education
UWCM, Heath Park
Cardiff CF14 4XN
By 30 July 1999
H:VSMpMUH6Cnrtd)AfnvMtr2A.doc
PRIMARY CARE DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
Background: Setting up Local Health Groups is an important landmark in the 
development and evolution of the NHS in Wales. It presents a unique 
opportunity for research into factors relevant to the development of primary 
care. Studying the opportunities and constraints inherent in the process can 
help us to learn key lessons, both for policymakers, and for educators.
What? This project aims to capture learning points as they are emerging 
from the natural process of setting up and establishing Local Health Groups.
How? I am proposing to undertake a qualitative study of the viewpoints of 
the central figures in this process -  LHG Chairmen.
Process: The study would involve a series of interviews with each Chairman 
over a period of 18 months. The interviews could be carried out mainly by 
telephone, at times to suit each individual, at approximately 3 month 
intervals. The Initial and final interviews would ideally be face-to-face. The 
first and last interviews would take up to about an hour; subsequent 
interviews would last about half an hour. All information would be treated in 
strictest confidence; only aggregated anonymised data would be used in any 
reports. If possible some participant observation of peer group support 
meetings will be included as a means of triangulating data collected from 
Interviews.
Outcomes:
For participants:
♦ Regular opportunities to reflect on activity
♦ An independent listening ear
♦ The potential for development activities to be created to 
meet emerging needs
For NHS Wales:
♦ A deeper understanding of the context in which primary care 
works
♦ Feedback on the implementation process for policymakers, 
hopefully helping to reduce the gap between rhetoric of 
policy and the real world of practitioners
Next Steps:
1. To meet potential study participants informally during the July workshop, 
to discuss the proposal.
2 . To write formally to each LHG Chairman to invite 
participation in the study.
3 . To schedule a series of initial interviews for 
September/October 1999.
I will be in Builth Wells on Friday 2nd July; I look forward to 
seeing you then.
Steffi Williams Dep't of Medical Education, School of PG 
Studies UWCM
Appendix B: Exemplar Interview  Summary In t 1: DrXYZ 018.1 11.8.99 
Chairman's Motivation & Role:
• See role as extension of fundholding, and national level committee work, GPFH 
Consortium
• 'Direction" from HA, via selection to help with Development Programme
• Not a lot of competition in some areas
• Enjoy the management issues & cut & thrust of politics
• Chairman as political figure: independence from HA to speak more freely (cf GM)
• Need for neutrality & openness to everyone's points of view
• Political action: taking agenda forward via Jane Hutt
Developing the Board:
• GPs & Director of Social Services already knew each other well, and GM so Board 
gelled very quickly
• 2 Day Time Out scheduled for Sept, to focus on HIP: "No game playing"!
Set up Tasks:
• Time taken to get established: Seeing Year 1 "as lost cause": 4 out of 6 posts 
now authorised but only GM and PA actually in post
Relationships w ith other agencies:
• Health Authority:
• Changing CEO-not really an issue
• Regular forums with CEO and Chairman, fortnightly meetings with HA 
Exec Team
• Shared resources: Finance, Public Health support
• Trust:
• Need to find ways to bring them on board, share the agenda
• Local GPs: role as representative of profession cf representative of community
• Round of visits to each practice completed by GM
• Data Validity exercise re local services & resources to produce solid, accurate 
database
• Some suspicion re "this new interfering body"
• Potential for conflict between different professions' views of needs
• Public: using rep as focal point for communication
• Politicians:
• Creating an association with local press,
• Agreement to get regular slot in local paper following each Board meeting, 
which LHG will produce
• National Assembly:
• Local AM invited to all meetings but has never attended;
• Limited organisational capacity: NA members have limited experience &
steep learning curve "more like Council members"
• Hope to get NA to see LHG as a source of information and change
LHG Priorities:
• To establish the Group
• Build credibility with field as a decision-making body
• Create more autonomy
• Concentrate on cross boundary issues, eg hospital discharges, and things which 
bring agencies together, linking processes
Opportunities:
• Involve NA members at a local level
• To get debate about rationing into public arena, involve people to allay suspicions
• To assess and prioritise needs
• To keep regional population focus
• To dis-invest & re-invest in priority areas: LHG as catalyst for this
• To merge budgets to tackle joint problems
Challenges:
• Involving the public
• Scale of task: one individual to link to the general public
• Balancing need for HIP to be inclusive with need for focus
• HA leading the HIP process, LHG to then tease out it's own "mini-HIP"
• -Clinical Governance developing along separate parallel track,
• CG: Having to learn from scratch, work "by the seat of the pants"
• Current structures don't facilitate joined up working, eg difficult to get Trust 
representatives on board
Supports/Tools:
• Good site: independent and accessible
• Being focus for the Contractor Services elements of the budget
• Chair's Group: getting together to share experiences, and re new requirements 
eg health needs assessm ent techniques
• Chairs Group: stepping stone and direct channel to National Assembly, skipping 
Welsh office layer
• Familiarity with the culture of the HA, and Welsh Office approach
• Project management skills within Trust, HA
• Having a good team
• Chairs group
• Climate of collaboration not competition unlike GPFH 
Constraints:
• IT: GPFH systems tapered off over last few years, all using different systems
• Most practices collecting practice not contracting-type data
• Lack of money for training & development:
• CESU encouragement to attend events cf lack of money (CG/MAAG 
money used up on putting staff in post)
• Need to find and pay for locum cover for practice-wide events, pay for 
loss of earnings for other contractors
• Costs of skilled facilitation
• Little protected time
• HA unwilling/unable to delegate power
• Funding not been clarified y e t : should've been by end 1998 to go live from 
1.4.99
• Conflict between needs of practice and demands of Chairman's role: "Could do 
this job fulltime"
• Making progress on priority areas is constrained by lack of available monies, and 
HA's deficit
Steffi Williams
APPENDIX C LHG Timeline 1999-2003
1997
1998
1999
Welsh Office Putting Patients First 
NHS (Primary Care) Act provision for 
t  flexibilities in service provision, salaried GPs, 
pilot schem es
Establishing Local Health Groups
Corporate G overnance Framework for NHS Wales
end  O ctober
D e c ’98->end March ’99
January 
Feb 1 & 2
1st April
Key Decisions & Events
LMC elections of LHG reps & Chairs
LHGs contrib.->interim HIP; consider proposed 
Agreements betw HAs/Ts re post ApnT99 services
shadow  Boards starting up 
All Wales LHG Chairs Dev prog starts 
HA/FHSA mergers effected/Trust reconfiguration 
underway
LHGs g o  live: set up premises/develop Boards/training 
for Chairs/select GMs & tms/ divide into Working Grps -> 
monitor service quality; implement HIP; bid partnerships by 
carrying out baseline assessments; sign up ->perf agreements; 
develop risk sharing policies; agree practice-level incentive 
schemes wi HAs; play key role in LHAs
HA CEXs: Bro Taf CEO removed 
XY acts up (DCS)
1st July S e c ’y of State for Wales devolved  powers to new
National Assembly; powers to d evelop  & 
implement policy health & h. servs, local g o v ’t, 
social servs e tc
August Jane Hutt calls for primary care d ev  priorities:
Consultation closes 16 Sept
O ctober JH spells out priorities for primary care: (H&SS Cte)
1. t  flexibility in service provision via p.c. pilots
2. enc LHGs->more responsibility & give more development
3. encourage joint planning & working
4. introduce poled budgets h & las
5. extend roles of nurses & nurse Rx
6. enc extension of °care servs ->reduce 2°care work
7. focus on inequals & needs of minority grps
8. reduce inequals of access & health status
9. enc indiv responsibility for health
10. increase responsiveness of services provided
Novem ber 2 Merger of UHW, Llandough & Cardiff Community
Nov 5 Health & Well-Being Policy Board set up
->promote joined up strategy & policy 
LHG Responsible Officers acting up til
July '99 GMs recruited (Cardiff-no one in post...)
-Dec '99 Focus on process & infrastructure/staffing
securing premises, developing remit/focus
Baseline assessments due; HIPs due
2000
January 
24 Jan
March 
June 2000
Cardiff & Vale NHS T b eco m es  
operational
A Better Wales consultation 
launched: 100 targets
HE CEOs: revolving doors
"seamless service admission-> discharge”
"most significant document since the White Paper on devolution" 
Western Mail 24 Jan Front Page-promised "new approach to 
primary care” & ‘tighter efficiency effectiveness & financial 
mngt of h & ss servs'
Gwent HA- Graham Coomber in post 
IMH: JW takes up post
Dyfed Powys CEO removed & Chair takes up executive role 
Director Performance & Director Finance leave DPHA 
NWHA: CEO leaves Interim CEO takes up post later in year
UK Gov't announces cash input to NHS: 
Wales: £99m 2000/01 financial yr:
£86m=HA & central priorities 
£40m=waiting list/times & 
demand mngt emergency care 
£6.7m (approx) recurring re vol sector & l_A 
partnership projects
July 2000 Access & Exellence published
Audit Commission Briefing re LHGs in Wales Yrl: "need for more powers & clearer sense of direction" HSJ 
6/7 /00  p8
NHS Plan (England) produced 27/7/00
Sept 2000 Modernization Board set up to lead reforms
NHS Chief Executive TBA
New Concordat TBA between NHS, vol sector & private sector 
1° care access targets: 24 hrs/48hrs for GP access; 
integration of OH & NHS Direct
VFM; tpatient experience; outcome focus; £stability via 3 yr allocates
2001
Jan
Feb
Joint GMs/Chairs paper re development of LHGs: 
Called for clear development pathway
PMS Pilot deadline 31.01.01
Improving Health in Wales produced 
NHS Plan (Wales) issued & HAs to go 1.04.03 
SoSHSC confirms full role for LHGs
BTHA- new CEO takes up post: 
Caerphilly GM sent to Cardiff 
Bridgend GM to Caerphilly
1st March workshop planned
District Audit Review underway re "Fitness for Purpose
Feb 21st
March 5
1st April
May
June
Jane Hutt & LHG Chairs Meeting
Consultation on Primary Care Development launched 
HA Allocations letter from WAG
Gwent HA-BH replaces GC as CEX
NAW makes £3 available for Inequalities in Health
(£3m=CHD)
NHSSCW becomes CHL with re-launch 
1st Health Plan Newsletter from AL re IHW
JH agrees commissioning role for LHGs -> be 
Developed asap
JH asks for proposals from HAs & Ts (in consult'n 
with LHGs) fpr devolving indicative budgets for 
community services ->LHGs ->enable them to 
Assume more direct commissioning responsib'ty 
For these services during 2001/2 (AL/CLR/03/003) 
Tighter mechanisms for investment/spending 
controls-AL personal approval needed 
Imminent new mngt arrangements for NHSSCW 
TBA, top slice for current yr only
Implementation Plan: set up Steering Group 
JH=Chair; set up Implementation Grp AL=
Chair; H&WBS&PTm Mike P leading management of 
Process; 9 Task & Finish Grps ALL chaired by HA 
Chairmen & NAW officers
Sept All Wales Chairs Grp sends response to NHS Plan
12/13 July
19 July
end July
15 August
LHG Chairs Leadership Dev prog session 1: 
Leadership skills & personal audit 
Beverley Alamo Metcalf (SW facil)
10 monthly sessions planned
Jane Hutt letter to Paul H CHL 
l°Care Strategy launched as consult'n
Shifting the Balance o f Power within the NHS: 
securing delivery published in England
Structural Change in the NHS in Wales 
Consultation doc published 
2 more T&F Grps (HR& Info)
Structural Chnge Newsletter #2
Suzanne Penny's letter re HR employment 
structure options-confidential discussion paper
LHG Chairs develop prg (signals step change in 
skills required; Bard members can stay til 31/03/03 
achieve full service integration (note changing 
structures not enuf-lesson fr England!) 
f  patient time with GP; develop l°Care Resurce 
Centres; invest in staff & OD; raise profile of ICare 
as career; 10 yr Strategy->Action Plan by April'02
reform & perf impr a la NHS Plan: empowering 
frontline staff; PCTs->become lead NHS 
organizations 1/04/02! 30 SHAs ->replace 95 HAs
LHGs->LHBs: Tresponsibilities ind 'commissioning, 
securing & delivery of h. care'; ?poss providing 
Community servs; proposes eval existing T-based 
Comm.servs; ?pathfinder pilots; sets up 3 health 
Economy areas=regions of WAG admin; LA reps 
Can incl county dlrs 'enhances NAW's direct relat'n 
Ship wi local pops'
Org chart of 10 T&F grps: 2 LHG reps in each;
# of members=17->32 (0 on PublHealth Review) 
possibility of single NHS Wales as employer mooted
Oct closing date for consultation l°Care Strat
NHS Confed event re NHS Plan Structures paper
Nov Structural Change Newsletter #3
Nov 7 H&SSCte Mtg: JH announces structural
Nov 15 Changes -> Plenary Session of NAW
5 Dec H&SSCte Mtg HSS-17-01 Health Legislation
AL letter: Local Health Board & Partnership Team
Primary Care Action Plan sub grp set up ->advise 
Re implementation of 1° Care Strategy 
T&F Grp members changing: fewer LHG reps IMT, 
Perf Mngt & H Challs
22 LHBs=LA areas='bldg blocks': statutory bodies 
stat duty of partnership via specific Welsh clauses 
in NHS Reform Bill: joint assessment of need & 
investment straegies; 18 mo all Wales Dev Prg; 
widen Board membership re Public Health; 
integrated commissioning H&CHS 
Pathfinder projs re Comm Servs provision 
3 reg'l WAG offices-> visible local presence of 
NHSSCDirectorate: 10-12 Local H Partnerships 
All Wales LHB & Partnership Dev Tm 
Specialist Health Service Commission for Wales: 
tertiary commissioning & advice re 2° comms 
Public Health organised all Wales acc-> CMO
confirms Welsh-specific clauses: not to go for 
l°Care Trust model ->give ptnts t  influence!
Welsh H&Well Being approach; est LHBs, decide 
funding at NAW level; joint planning Las re H&WB 
Strats & plans; strengthen Prof Advisory mechs
new structures for NHS D; arra->redistib HA 
functions; redesign Prof Adv mechs; OD of LHBs & 
NHS D; (review NHSSCW); OD to be commissioned
by new LHBPT chair AL + other snr mngrs (No LHG 
reps)
2 00 2
January
April
June
July
Aug-Oct
September
Nov
Dec
2003
New structures announced:
22 LHBs, coterminous LA 
+ Community Cll reps
WAG Programme Team set up to oversee 
Structural Change and Reform progress 
(Bryan Mitchell parachuted in)
Primary Care Action Plan Team set up 
5 LHB Chairs announced
Task & Finish Groups wound up
Action Plan for Future of Primary Care announced
LHBs to be set up in shadow form
12 LHB CEOs appointed
3 Regional Directors appointed (Acting up)
LHB Chairs Development 2 day Study Block
1st April: LHBs go live
